Throughout the western North Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico, invasive Indo-Pacific lionfish (Pterois volitans/miles) have established dense populations, greatly impacting their host environments. Lionfish tournaments have been an important tool for resource managers and other concerned stakeholders in suppressing local populations of lionfish. Tournaments can also bring economic benefits to the communities where they are held, despite this not being the primary purpose. Five derby events in Florida and the Bahamas were surveyed and 119 participants were interviewed on site, using a survey asking them to describe (1) the lionfish derby experience; (2) non-derby related lionfish removal effort; (3) derby expenditures; and (4) personal characteristics. Response rates of event participants were between 35% and 82%. Respondents spent an average of approximately $820 per person, potentially creating a net economic benefit to the communities where they were held. Total expenditures reported ranged from $5,000 to over $60,000 per tournament, with events drawing a high number of out of town participants reporting the highest amounts spent. Participants surveyed were largely males who resided in Florida and had a reported income of over $100,000 with 29% indicating an annual income of more than $200,000. In addition, lionfish tournaments have the effect of educating the public about the lionfish invasion, including greater targeting and consumption of lionfish, showing that tournaments are effective at their conservation mission as well as contributing to the economy of their host community.

The aim of this thesis is to verify the hypothesis on real data based on economic theory and these theories to confirm or reject. The first part deals with testing of hypotheses based on the game theory and tests whether tennis players play according to the minimax theory. The Hypotheses analyse the data for strong and weak players, considering their service, and verify which group of players converge in their strategies toward minimax theory assumptions. Specifically, theory components of the hypotheses are tested within this part: i) the probability of winning the game serving from the right side of a court is the same as the probability of winning the game serving from the left side, ii) this hypothesis will hold true rather in case of stronger players serving against weaker players than in case equally strong players playing against each other and iii) Based on the assumption that women do not excel distinctively in serving, the results in the women's matches will be worse in the minimax theory than results from men's matches. Hypotheses derived from the theory of elimination tournaments are tested in the second part of the diploma thesis. The hypotheses are analysed on the tennis data whether players make less effort in uneven tournaments, regardless of their position as favourite or outsider, than the theory presumes. The analysis of the above mentioned hypotheses was performed on the data from the Grand Slam tournaments in the years 2011 and 2012. Hypotheses are tested using both male and female data. The results obtained from analysis of the data confirm the hypotheses.

My dissertation consists of four chapters. In the first chapter, I use a laboratory experiment to analyze how individuals resolve an exploration versus exploitation trade-off. The experiment implements a single-agent exponential bandit model. I find that, as predicted, subjects respond to changes in the prior belief, safe action, and discount factor. However, I commonly find that subjects give up on exploration earlier than predicted. I estimate a structural model that allows for risk aversion, base rate neglect/conservatism, and probability mis-weighting. I find support for risk aversion, conservatism, and probability mis-weighting as potential factors that influence subject behavior. Risk aversion appears to contribute to the finding that subjects explore less than predicted. <div><br></div><div>In the second chapter, I use a laboratory experiment to analyze how a group of voters experiment with a new reform. The experiment implements the continuous time Strulovici (2010) collective experimentation model. I analyze a subset of data where groups and single decision makers should eventually prefer to stop experimentation and abandon the reform. I find three results that are consistent with the modeled experimentation incentives. In this subset of data, groups stop experimentation earlier than single decision makers, wait longer to stop experimentation as the number of revealed winners increases, and stop experimentation earlier than the utilitarian optimum predicts. However, I also find that both groups and single decision makers stop experimentation earlier than predicted. Additional treatments show that this result is unlikely to be explained by standard explanations such as incorrect belief updating or risk aversion. </div><div><br></div><div>In the third chapter, I use a laboratory experiment to investigate the role of group size in an innovation contest. Subjects compete in a discrete time innovation contest, based on Halac et al. (2017), where subjects, at the start of each period, are informed of the aggregate number of innovation attempts. I compare two innovation contests, a two-person and four-person contest, that only differ by contest size and have the same probability of obtaining an innovation in equilibrium. The four-person contest results in more innovations and induces more aggregate innovation attempts than the two-person contest. However, there is some evidence that the two-person contest induces more innovation attempts from an individual than the four-person contest. Subjects' behavior is consistent with subjects placing more weight on their own failed innovation attempts, when updating their beliefs, than their competitors' failed innovation attempts.</div><div><br></div><div>In the fourth chapter, I investigate the role of performance feedback, in the form of a public leaderboard, in innovation competition that features sequential search activity and a range of possible innovation qualities. I find that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of contests with a fixed ending date (i.e., finite horizon), providing public performance feedback results in lower equilibrium effort and lower innovation quality. I conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to test the theoretical predictions and find that the experimental results largely support the theory. In addition, I investigate how individual characteristics affect competitive innovation activity. I find that risk aversion is a significant predictor of behavior both with and without leaderboard feedback and that the direction of this effect is consistent with the theoretical predictions.</div>

Alexander A. Razborov (2007) developed the theory of flag algebras to compute the minimum asymptotic density of triangles in a graph as a function of its edge density. The theory of flag algebras, however, can be used to study the asymptotic density of several combinatorial objects. In this dissertation, we present two original results obtained in the theory of tournaments through application of flag algebra proof techniques. The first result concerns minimization of the asymptotic density of transitive tournaments in a sequence of tournaments, which we prove to occur if and only if the sequence is quasi-random. As a byproduct, we also obtain new quasi-random characterizations and several other flag algebra elements whose density is minimized if and only if the sequence is quasi-random. The second result concerns a class of equivalent properties of a sequence of tournaments that we call quasi-carousel properties and that, in a similar fashion as quasi-random properties, force the sequence to converge to a specific limit homomorphism. Several quasi-carousel properties, when compared to quasi-random properties, suggest that quasi-random sequences and quasi-carousel sequences are the furthest possible from each other within the class of almost balanced sequences. / Alexander A. Razborov (2007) desenvolveu a teoria de álgebras de flags para calcular a densidade assintótica mínima de triângulos em um grafo em função de sua densidade de arestas. A teoria das álgebras de flags, contudo, pode ser usada para estudar densidades assintóticas de diversos objetos combinatórios. Nesta dissertação, apresentamos dois resultados originais obtidos na teoria de torneios através de técnicas de demonstração de álgebras de flags. O primeiro resultado compreende a minimização da densidade assintótica de torneios transitivos em uma sequência de torneios, a qual provamos ocorrer se e somente se a sequência é quase aleatória. Como subprodutos, obtemos também novas caracterizações de quase aleatoriedade e diversos outros elementos da álgebra de flags cuja densidade é minimizada se e somente se a sequência é quase aleatória. O segundo resultado compreende uma classe de propriedades equivalentes sobre uma sequência de torneios que chamamos de propriedades quase carrossel e que, de uma forma similar às propriedades quase aleatórias, forçam que a sequência convirja para um homomorfismo limite específico. Várias propriedades quase carrossel, quando comparadas às propriedades quase aleatórias, sugerem que sequências quase aleatórias e sequências quase carrossel estão o mais distantes possível umas das outras na classe de sequências quase balanceadas.

O objetivo dessa dissertação foi analisar a existência de processos que reflitam a teoria dos torneios de promoção (tournaments) em uma instituição financeira cooperativa. Foram examinados e analisados os efeitos da avaliação de desempenho nas promoções dos empregados, sua relação com os cargos da empresa, os incentivos gerados e como se relaciona à teoria dos torneios de promoção (tournaments). A análise empírica do caso da instituição financeira cooperativa em questão aponta clara necessidade da empresa em rever seus processos de promoções, a fim de gerar os incentivos adequados aos cumprimentos dos objetivos organizacionais. Os resultados indicaram haver pouca relação da avaliação de desempenho às promoções, deixando lacunas para os empregados visualizarem suas carreiras e se motivarem a cargas maiores de esforço através da estrutura organizacional. Cabe à empresa escolher se continuará com o modelo atual ou melhorará sua lógica de promoção. / The purpose of this dissertation was to observe the existence of processes that reflect the theory of promotion (tournaments) in a cooperative financial institution. They were examined and analyzed the performance evaluation of effects on promotion of employees, the company’s positions, the generated incentives and how it relates to the tournament’s theory. The empirical analysis of the case of cooperative financial institution in question points clear need for the company to review its promotion processes in order to generate the appropriate incentives to greetings of organizational objectives. The results indicated there is little performance evaluation in relation to promotions, leaving gaps for employees visualize their careers and motivate themselves to higher levels of effort by organizational structure. The company must choose whether to continue with the current model or improve your logical promotion sketch.

This thesis consists of five papers, presented as separate chapters within three parts: Industrial Organization, Evolutionary Game Theory and Game Theory. The common basis of these parts is research in the field of game theory and more specifically, equilibrium selection in different frameworks. The first part, Industrial Organization, consists of one paper co-authored with Prajit Dutta and Jörgen Weibull. Forward-looking consumers are analysed in a Bertrand framework. It is assumed that if firms can anticipate a price war and act accordingly, so can consumers. The second part, Evolutionary Game Theory, contains three chapters. All models in these papers are based on Young’s (1993, 1998) approach. In Chapter 2, the Saez Marti and Weibull’s (1999) model is generalized from the Nash Demand Game to generic two-player games. In Chapter 3, co-authored with Jens Josephson, a special set of stochastically stable states is introduced, minimal construction, which is the long-run prediction under imitation behavior in normal form games. In Chapter 4, best reply and imitation rules are considered on extensive form games with perfect information. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk., 2001

Thesis (M.Sc.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2010.

Esta tese tem dois objetivos: O primeiro é evidenciar, com base na literatura de Economia da Religião, a premissa de racionalidade humana relativa ao comportamento religioso. Com esse objetivo, realiza-se uma discussão dos fundamentos teóricos da Economia da Religião: a Escolha Racional, a Teoria do Consumidor aplicada à religião, o modelo de produção doméstica de Gary Becker e a Teoria do Mercado Religioso. Também se apresenta e se discute alguns dos principais modelos teóricos da Economia da Religião, citando, sempre que possível as evidências empíricas existentes na literatura. Como meio de contribuir para a discussão nessa área, são aplicados modelos econométricos de análise de survey com dados de duas pesquisas para dois dos modelos teóricos apresentados, o de Azzi-Ehremberg e o de Durkin Greeley (1991): Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domícilios (PNAD) de 1988, aplicada pelo IBGE, e Pesquisa Social Brasileira (PESB) de 2004, realizada pela FGV Opinião. Uma predição importante relacionada à Teoria do Mercado Religioso, um dos fundamentos da Teoria da Escolha Racional da Religião, é que quanto maior for, de um lado, o grau de regulação governamental neste mercado, por outro serão menores o grau de competição das organizações religiosas, o pluralismo religioso e, conseqüentemente, o nível de participação religiosa. Segundo a Teoria do Mercado Religioso, de modo semelhante a outros mercados, a intervenção estatal provoca, no mercado religioso, alocações subótimas de recursos escassos, ineficiência na produção e restrição na diversidade de bens e serviços religiosos ofertados aos consumidores pelas organizações religiosas. O segundo objetivo da tese, aliás, o principal, é buscar evidências que corroborem as premissas da Teoria dos Torneios de Promoção (Tournaments), elaborada por Edward Lazear e Sherwin Rosen (1981), em organizações religiosas. O problema se baseou na investigação do mercado interno de trabalho da Igreja Católica no que concerne à seleção e promoção de seus clérigos, recorrendo para isso ao seu Direito Canônico, na tentativa de identificar elementos que corroborassem ou evidenciassem os pressupostos da Teoria dos Torneios de Promoção nos documentos pesquisados, sendo o mais importante e fundamental o Código de Direito Canônico (CDC) de 1983. A legislação canônica suplementar também foi utilizada. Buscou-se investigar de que modo esses documentos normativos incorporam esquemas de incentivos para regular a hierarquia católica de ordem e de jurisdição, bem como a seleção e promoção de seus clérigos, sob a ótica de Torneios de Promoção. Estudando-se os Cânones do CDC e outros documentos de direito canônico, foram encontrados vários elementos que dão suporte à afirmação de que, de fato, existem evidências dos pressupostos de Tournaments naqueles esquemas, no que concerne à escolha e sistema promocional de clérigos católicos. / This thesis has two objectives: the first is the evidence, based on the literature of Religious Economics, the premise of human rationality related to religious behavior. With this objective, was carried out a discussion of the theoretical fundamentals of Religious Economics: the Rational Choice, Consumer Theory applied to the Religion, Gary Becker`s model of domestic production and the Theory of the Religious Market. Some of the main theoretical models of Religious Economics are discussed, mentioning, whenever possible, the empirical evidence that appears in the literature. As a way of contributing to the discussion in this area, econometric models of survey analysis with data of two items of theoretical research presented, such as Azzi-Ehremberg and that of Durkin Greeley (1991): the 1988 National Research per Address Sample, applied by the IBGE and, the Brazilian Social Research (PESB) done in 2004 by the FGV Opiniao. An important prediction, related to the Religious Market Theory, one of the bases of the Rational Religious Choice Theory, is that, the larger it is, on one side, the degree of government regulation in this market, on the other hand, is lower the degree of competition of religious organizations, religious pluralism and, consequently, the level of religious participation. According to the Theory of the Religious Market, similarly to other markets, the state intervention causes, in the religious market, sub-optimal allocations of scarce resources, production inefficiency and restriction in the diversity of goods and religious services offered to the consumers by the religious organizations. The second aim of this Thesis, albeit the main one, is to find evidence, which corroborates the premises of the Theory of the Promotion Tournaments, elaborated by Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981), in religious organizations. The problem was based on the investigation of the internal working market of the of the Roman Catholic Church, in what concerns the selection and promotion of its clergy, using the Canon Law, in the intent of identifying elements which corroborate or put into evidence the presumption of the Promotion Tournament Theory in the researched documents, being the most important and fundamental the 1983 Canon Law Code. The supplementary canon legislation was also used. It was investigated in what way those normative documents, incorporate incentive schemes in order to regulate the catholic hierarchy, of order and of jurisdiction as well as the selection and promotion of its clergy, under the optics of Promotion Tournaments. Studying the canons of the Canon Law Code and other canon law documents, several elements were found that give support to the affirmation that, in fact, there is evidence of the presupposition of the Tournaments in those schemes, as regards the choice and promotional system of Catholic clerics.

O objetivo dessa dissertação foi analisar a existência de processos que reflitam a teoria dos torneios de promoção (tournaments) em uma instituição financeira cooperativa. Foram examinados e analisados os efeitos da avaliação de desempenho nas promoções dos empregados, sua relação com os cargos da empresa, os incentivos gerados e como se relaciona à teoria dos torneios de promoção (tournaments). A análise empírica do caso da instituição financeira cooperativa em questão aponta clara necessidade da empresa em rever seus processos de promoções, a fim de gerar os incentivos adequados aos cumprimentos dos objetivos organizacionais. Os resultados indicaram haver pouca relação da avaliação de desempenho às promoções, deixando lacunas para os empregados visualizarem suas carreiras e se motivarem a cargas maiores de esforço através da estrutura organizacional. Cabe à empresa escolher se continuará com o modelo atual ou melhorará sua lógica de promoção. / The purpose of this dissertation was to observe the existence of processes that reflect the theory of promotion (tournaments) in a cooperative financial institution. They were examined and analyzed the performance evaluation of effects on promotion of employees, the company’s positions, the generated incentives and how it relates to the tournament’s theory. The empirical analysis of the case of cooperative financial institution in question points clear need for the company to review its promotion processes in order to generate the appropriate incentives to greetings of organizational objectives. The results indicated there is little performance evaluation in relation to promotions, leaving gaps for employees visualize their careers and motivate themselves to higher levels of effort by organizational structure. The company must choose whether to continue with the current model or improve your logical promotion sketch.

Esta tese tem dois objetivos: O primeiro é evidenciar, com base na literatura de Economia da Religião, a premissa de racionalidade humana relativa ao comportamento religioso. Com esse objetivo, realiza-se uma discussão dos fundamentos teóricos da Economia da Religião: a Escolha Racional, a Teoria do Consumidor aplicada à religião, o modelo de produção doméstica de Gary Becker e a Teoria do Mercado Religioso. Também se apresenta e se discute alguns dos principais modelos teóricos da Economia da Religião, citando, sempre que possível as evidências empíricas existentes na literatura. Como meio de contribuir para a discussão nessa área, são aplicados modelos econométricos de análise de survey com dados de duas pesquisas para dois dos modelos teóricos apresentados, o de Azzi-Ehremberg e o de Durkin Greeley (1991): Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domícilios (PNAD) de 1988, aplicada pelo IBGE, e Pesquisa Social Brasileira (PESB) de 2004, realizada pela FGV Opinião. Uma predição importante relacionada à Teoria do Mercado Religioso, um dos fundamentos da Teoria da Escolha Racional da Religião, é que quanto maior for, de um lado, o grau de regulação governamental neste mercado, por outro serão menores o grau de competição das organizações religiosas, o pluralismo religioso e, conseqüentemente, o nível de participação religiosa. Segundo a Teoria do Mercado Religioso, de modo semelhante a outros mercados, a intervenção estatal provoca, no mercado religioso, alocações subótimas de recursos escassos, ineficiência na produção e restrição na diversidade de bens e serviços religiosos ofertados aos consumidores pelas organizações religiosas. O segundo objetivo da tese, aliás, o principal, é buscar evidências que corroborem as premissas da Teoria dos Torneios de Promoção (Tournaments), elaborada por Edward Lazear e Sherwin Rosen (1981), em organizações religiosas. O problema se baseou na investigação do mercado interno de trabalho da Igreja Católica no que concerne à seleção e promoção de seus clérigos, recorrendo para isso ao seu Direito Canônico, na tentativa de identificar elementos que corroborassem ou evidenciassem os pressupostos da Teoria dos Torneios de Promoção nos documentos pesquisados, sendo o mais importante e fundamental o Código de Direito Canônico (CDC) de 1983. A legislação canônica suplementar também foi utilizada. Buscou-se investigar de que modo esses documentos normativos incorporam esquemas de incentivos para regular a hierarquia católica de ordem e de jurisdição, bem como a seleção e promoção de seus clérigos, sob a ótica de Torneios de Promoção. Estudando-se os Cânones do CDC e outros documentos de direito canônico, foram encontrados vários elementos que dão suporte à afirmação de que, de fato, existem evidências dos pressupostos de Tournaments naqueles esquemas, no que concerne à escolha e sistema promocional de clérigos católicos. / This thesis has two objectives: the first is the evidence, based on the literature of Religious Economics, the premise of human rationality related to religious behavior. With this objective, was carried out a discussion of the theoretical fundamentals of Religious Economics: the Rational Choice, Consumer Theory applied to the Religion, Gary Becker`s model of domestic production and the Theory of the Religious Market. Some of the main theoretical models of Religious Economics are discussed, mentioning, whenever possible, the empirical evidence that appears in the literature. As a way of contributing to the discussion in this area, econometric models of survey analysis with data of two items of theoretical research presented, such as Azzi-Ehremberg and that of Durkin Greeley (1991): the 1988 National Research per Address Sample, applied by the IBGE and, the Brazilian Social Research (PESB) done in 2004 by the FGV Opiniao. An important prediction, related to the Religious Market Theory, one of the bases of the Rational Religious Choice Theory, is that, the larger it is, on one side, the degree of government regulation in this market, on the other hand, is lower the degree of competition of religious organizations, religious pluralism and, consequently, the level of religious participation. According to the Theory of the Religious Market, similarly to other markets, the state intervention causes, in the religious market, sub-optimal allocations of scarce resources, production inefficiency and restriction in the diversity of goods and religious services offered to the consumers by the religious organizations. The second aim of this Thesis, albeit the main one, is to find evidence, which corroborates the premises of the Theory of the Promotion Tournaments, elaborated by Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981), in religious organizations. The problem was based on the investigation of the internal working market of the of the Roman Catholic Church, in what concerns the selection and promotion of its clergy, using the Canon Law, in the intent of identifying elements which corroborate or put into evidence the presumption of the Promotion Tournament Theory in the researched documents, being the most important and fundamental the 1983 Canon Law Code. The supplementary canon legislation was also used. It was investigated in what way those normative documents, incorporate incentive schemes in order to regulate the catholic hierarchy, of order and of jurisdiction as well as the selection and promotion of its clergy, under the optics of Promotion Tournaments. Studying the canons of the Canon Law Code and other canon law documents, several elements were found that give support to the affirmation that, in fact, there is evidence of the presupposition of the Tournaments in those schemes, as regards the choice and promotional system of Catholic clerics.