Background: A majority of world trade takes place within rather than between organizations. When transactions take place within an organization and external market forces are absent, internal prices must be developed. The pricing of these internal transactions gives rise to the topic of transfer pricing. Purpose: Previous papers within the transfer pricing field have tended to have a narrow focus where one or a few aspects of transfer pricing have been examined. This paper instead investigates multiple aspects of transfer pricing with guidance from previous literature, stakeholder theory, and institutional theory. By doing so, the aim is to generate a holistic view of how transfer pricing is managed in an international organization. Method: This paper is based on a constructionist standpoint and uses an abductive qualitative approach. The study is a single-case study where data is mainly collected by interviewing employees involved in transfer pricing. To analyze the collected data, thematic analysis is used. Conclusion: Transfer pricing can be understood as a necessity stemming from the internal transactions that were beneficial to the case organization. The findings of this paper indicate that the management of transfer pricing is influenced by a variety of aspects that must be balanced.

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Transfer pricing Abstract The thesis focuses on transfer pricing which falls within a scope of international taxation. The aim of the theses is to define transfer pricing, describe transfer pricing rules and to assess these rules. The first part of the theses focuses on international taxation, especially BEPS. Double tax treaties and ATAD directive are further described. The second part of the diploma theses focuses on transfer pricing from international perspective. Transfer prices are prices agreed between associated enterprises. The fundamental concept of transfer pricing is arm's length principle. The prices agreed between associated enterprises should equal to prices which would have been agreed between independent parties. The arm's length principle is included within the double tax treaties. The theses further focuses on OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, especially comparability analysis and transfer pricing methods, which are used for setting up of transfer prices. The third part of the theses focuses on transfer pricing rules from the Czech perspective. The respective rules are included within the Income Taxes Act and legally non-binding guidance, which follow the international rules. The Czech Tax Authorities increase their attention on...

Base erosion and profit sharing (BEPS) explain the process when multinational enterprises take advantage of the gaps, mismatches or loopholes in the international tax regulations for artificially shifting profits to lower tax jurisdictions or no tax jurisdictions. Tax avoidance strategies were legal in most cases and overlooked until the OECD G20 BEPS project was done in 2013. Multinational companies were exploiting tax outdated taxation rules and uncoordinated with the other nations. BEPS is not exactly beneficial for all parties. Governments, citizens and businesses all bear the brunt of it. The government loses required tax revenue from the largest corporations in the world, approximately 4-10% of the global corporate tax revenues which could be allocated to infrastructure, health care facilities, education, pensions etc. The population loses out by paying higher taxes for services which could be funded through the corporates or going about without those services. Domestic or home-grown businesses find it challenging to compete with multinationals that could lower their tax by shifting profits offshore. Profit shifting behaviour of multinational enterprises is no new phenomenon.    Around 135 jurisdictions working together at present in the inclusive framework on BEPS. Additional to implementation of the minimum BEPS standards, they are tackling income tax challenges emanating from the digital economy to ensure that not just digitally operating businesses, but all pay a fair share of tax returns[1].    On the tax administrations’ perspective, the goal is to minimize the cost of goods sold for imported goods and thus the import prices, resulting in higher taxable profits, as direct tax income is directly related to taxable basis, which is naturally influenced by costs incurred with imported goods. Consequently, the taxation department’s interest would be to verify whether the value declared by a resident should be decreased in order to limit the tax-deductible amount. For the purposes of custom requirements, the transfer price has an explicit and outright impact on the determination of the value of the imported goods, which constitute as the base on which duties are charged. A lower transaction value means lower revenue collections. Therefore, an official working with the customs office would require himself to verify whether the value declared by an importer should be increased in order to collect more duties[2]. This discrepancy needs to be studied and eliminated for them to arrive at a consensus.  Research Question: What is the relationship between the transfer pricing guidelines and EU Custom laws and how can their discrepancies be reduced?   [1] OECD (2013) https://www.oecd.org/about/impact/ending-offshore-profit-shifting.html  [2] Duarte Nuno Tenreiro Freitas dos Reis: The tension between Transfer Pricing and Customs Valuation, Mestrado Em Contabilidade, Fiscalidade E Finanças Empresariais (2012).

Transfer prices are the prices charged by one party for goods and/or services transferred to a related party. While transfer prices are essential to the goal of profit maximization within the enterprise, difficulties arise over how to establish the "correct" transfer price. For the global enterprise this problem is more acute because different segments of the enterprise operate under different political jurisdictions and are subject to taxation by different political entities. Concerns have been raised by Congress and the Internal Revenue Service regarding whether multinationals, especially foreign-owned multinationals, are using transfer-pricing and cost-allocation policies across international borders to avoid United States income taxes. Generally, testimony before the hearings, limited anecdotal studies, and court case findings have suggested that multinationals do not pay their "fair share". An examination of 336 companies in the chemical industry (STC codes 2800-2899) provided mixed support for the position that multinationals are paying less than their "fair share" of U.S. income taxes. While statistically significant differences were found among the three groups for the cost-ofgood-sold (COGS) ratio (after developmental stage enterprises were removed) and for the worldwide net-profit ratio, no Statistically significant differences were found for tax-rate measures (worldwide effective income tax rate, worldwide effective operating income tax rate, and U.S. effective operating income tax rate) or for the return measures (worldwide return on assets, worldwide operating return on assets, and U.S. operating return on assets). When multinationals (U.S.-controlled and foreign-controlled combined to form a single group) were compared to domestic companies, statistically significant differences were found only for the COGS ratio. When U.S. multinationals were restricted to those companies with 50% or more of both their net sales and average total assets abroad, statistically Significant differences were found for the operating income ratios (both U.S. and worldwide) and for the worldwide net profit ratio, but such differences were found neither for the COGS ratio, the effective-income-tax-rate measures, nor for the return measures. Complicating the issue were: (1) the presence of developing stage enterprises and foreign parent companies among the total group; (2) the use of a 10% cutoff in ownership and operations to determine whether a company is or is not a multinational; and (3) the absence of access to tax or accounting records, resulting in the need to use secondary sources for data. One suggestion for simplifying the transfer-pricing issue is the adoption of a method of formulary apportionment. Ina comparison of the amount of income allocated to U.S. operations under current methods (either specific allocation Or separate accounting) and the amount that would have been allocated under formulary apportionment methods no significant differences were found, suggesting that such a method is worthy of further study. / Ph. D.

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2006. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Governments do not want their tax collection to be affected by multinational companies that make use of distorted pricing models in order to maximize profits. For this reason Governments everywhere are implementing strict transfer pricing policies. These policies are mainly based on the OECD Guidelines with respect to transfer pricing. On the other hand, multinational companies do not want to be exposed to double taxation. The South African government also introduced regulations with respect to transfer prices set by multinational companies. Section 31 of the Income Tax Act 58, 1962, deals specifically with the issue of transfer pricing. This is fully explained in Practice Note 7 of SARS. RHI Refractories Africa, as part of the multinational company RHI-Ag, has to comply with SARS legislation. RHI Refractories Africa purchase many materials and products from the parent company for resale in the local market. The SEN is one such product and was selected for evaluation. This study found, after evaluation of the functions performed by RHI Refractories Africa and evaluating all the various preferred methods, the Resale Price Method (RPM) to be the most appropriate method to be used in the evaluation of the status of RHI Refractories Africa with respect to compliance with current SARS legislation. The gross margins eamed by RHI Refractories Africa on the sale of TYK and THOR SENs were compared. It was found that the gross margins earned on the sale of THOR SENs in the controlled transaction were actually higher than those earned in the uncontrolled transaction with TYK. The conclusion of this study is that RHI Refractories Africa does comply with current SARS legislation as measured against the guidelines of Practice Note 7 from SARS. This study further proposes that RHI Refractories Africa evaluate and document the process followed for all the inter-company transactions in order to ensure full compliance with SARS legislation. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Regerings wil verhoed dat die belasting basis verklein word deur multinasionale maatskappye wat gebruik maak van prys modelIe wat daarop gemik is om belasting te ontduik en sodoende die marges van die maaskappye te verhoog. Vir die rede implimenteer regerings strenger maatreels om te verseker dat oordrag pryse markverwant is en bly. Die riglyne soos voorgestel deur die OECD word meestal as basis gebruik vir die opstel van lokale wetgewing. Terselfdertyd wil multinasionale maatskapye ook nie dubbele belasting betaal nie. Die Suid Afrikaanse regering het wetgewing daar gestel as deeI van Seksie 31 van die Inkomste Belasting Wet 58, 1962, wat spesifiek handel met oordrag pryse. Die wetgewing word verder verduidelik in Praktiese Nota 7. RHI Refractories Africa, as deeI van die multinasionale maatskapy RHI-Ag, moet voldoen aan SARS wetgewing. RHI Refractories Africa koop 'n verskeidenheid van materiale en produkte van die moeder-maatskapy vir herverkoop in die lokale mark. Die SEN is een so 'n produk en is gekies vir evaluasie. Die funksies wat RHI Refractories Afrika uitvoer ten opsigte van die verkoop van SENs is ten volle ondersoek. Die verskillende metodes vir evaluering van die oordrag prys soos voorgestel deur SARS is ook ondersoek en daar is gevind dat die Herverkoop Prys Model (RPM) die mees geskikte model is vir RHI Refractories Africa om te gebruik in die evaluering van die verkoop van SENs. Die bruto marge wat RHI Refractories Africa behaal met die verkoop van TYK en THOR SENs is vergelyk. Daar is gevind dat die bruto marge wat behaal is met THOR SENs, as deel van die beheerde transaksie, in werklikheid groter is as die wat met TYK SENs in die onbeheerde transaksie behaal is. Die konklusie van die studie is dat RHI Refractories Africa wel voldoen aan die vereistes daar gestel deur SARS soos gemeet aan die riglyne van Praktiese Nota 7. Die studie stel voor dat RHI Refractories Africa al die intermaatskaplike transaksies evalueer aan die hand van die SARS riglyne om te verseker dat daar ten volle voldoen word aan die vereistes van SARS.

公司因應「企業全球化」趨勢，追求全球資源最佳配置下，交易大多在集團內部進行。透過移轉訂價政策，作為集團企業間關係人交易價格的制定依據。 此趨勢之下，我國集團企業間關係人交易採用移轉訂價政策的情況為何？本研究以我國上市櫃公司之集團企業為研究對象，探討分析移轉訂價查核準則實施對我國集團企業間移轉訂價制定因素之影響，並彙整我國集團企業對移轉訂價查核準則規範內容的意見。 一、我國集團企業移轉訂價政策之運用現況及考量因素： 1、目前僅有五成的集團企業有建立明確移轉訂價政策作為關係人交易訂價的依據：公司規模愈大、對外投資期間愈長、關係人交易總額愈多、而關係企業家數在5家以下的集團企業，採用比例也愈高。 2、以移轉訂價查核準則規範之「可比較未受控價格法」及「成本加價法」之傳統交易基礎法採用為多。整體租稅負擔並非主要考量因素，各國移轉訂價法令規定及我國財務會計準則公報第六號規定為最主要的因素。規模越大、關係企業家數越多、越重視法令規定的企業，採用交易基礎移轉訂價法的機率愈高。惟，綜合集團整體內外經濟因素加以考量時，則偏向利潤基礎法。 二、我國集團企業受移轉訂價查核準則影響及意見： 1、透過組織管理架構的調整，將關係人交易價格的重心轉為事前規劃，進而考量移轉訂價稽查之因應。 2、目前我國集團企業多數認為準則並無不合理且頗具可行性。 / With the trend of globalization, companies use global resources to pursue best interest of the group enterprises as a whole within related party transactions. Through the transfer pricing policy, conglomerates can determine the prices for transactions between related parties. This study uses the conglomerate enterprises of Listed and OTC companies in Taiwan as questionnaire samples. The study analyses the impact of implement action of Taiwan transfer pricing regulations on conglomerate enterprises and the factors of transfer pricing among the conglomerates in Taiwan. The results of the research are as follows: 1.Nowadays, only 50% of the conglomerates in Taiwan establish a stated transfer pricing policy in determining the prices for transactions between related parties. We also focus that the larger size, the longer time of investment and the great investment amount, the higher proportion to adopt the transfer pricing policy. 2.The conglomerates in Taiwan tend to “The Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method” and “The Cost Plus Method” . The groups do not regard world-wide tax burden as an important factor, rather they emphasize more on the other countries’ transfer pricing regulations and financial accounting standards No.6 as the main factors. 3.The larger size, the more related companies, and paying more attention to regulations, the higher probability of transaction-based transfer pricing method. When the comprehensive internal and external economic factors are considered, the conglomerate companies tend to adopt profit-based transfer pricing method. 4.Through the adjustment of the organizational structure, and planning the price for transactions between related parties in advance, the conglomerate enterprises take tax audit into account. 5.Most of conglomerates in Taiwan regard the criteria of Taiwan transfer pricing regulations as rational and feasible at present.

Internprissättning anses vara ett av de mest kritiska problemen när det kommer till nationell och internationell beskattning. Den växande globaliseringen har resulterat i uppkomsten av många nya multinationella verksamheter, vilket även har till följd att transaktioner mellan företag med verksamhet i olika länder ökat. För att uppnå maximal global vinst flyttar multinationella företag vinster från högskatteländer till lågskatteländer och utnyttjar därmed länders olika skattesystem. Till följd av detta har fokus ökat från skattemyndigheter världen över, med incitament om att skydda sitt lands skattebas. Regler i syfte att begränsa internationell skatteflykt har blivit alltmer betydelsefulla, därmed har ett behov av en global accepterad standard avseende internprissättning uppkommit. Organisationen Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) har tagit fram ett antal riktlinjer som behandlar internprissättning. Syftet med studien är att redogöra om det finns skillnader eller likheter mellan implementeringen av OECDs riktlinjer avseende internprissättning mellan Sverige, som är medlem i OECD, samt Kina och Singapore som inte är medlemmar. Vidare syftar studien till att verifiera eller falsifiera följande hypotes; att skillnader i implementeringen och utformning av internprissättning i respektive länders lagar och riktlinjer kan förklaras av kulturella dimensioner i landet. Därav genomfördes en komparativ studie mellan Sverige, Kina och Singapore lagtexter och riktlinjer samt OECDs riktlinjer. Studien omfattar en undersökning av OECDs riktlinjer för internprissättning, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2017, avseende kapitel I. Armlängdsprincipen, kapitel II. Prismetoder och kapitel IV. Dokumentation. Slutsatsen av studien är att såväl medlemsländer samt icke-medlemsländer följer OECDs riktlinjer för internprissättning men att det förekommer variationer i omfattning. Vi finner likheter i såväl ländernas lagstiftning som riktlinjer avseende syfte och innehåll inom de undersökta områdena. Studien identifierar även skillnader i ländernas internprissättningsreglering vilka till största del utgörs av vilken omfattning länderna har anpassat sina riktlinjer efter OECDs riktlinjer. Vår slutsats är att harmonisering råder, men i olika utsträckning, även utanför OECD som institution och att ett medlemskap i organisationen inte är en nödvändighet för att likhet i internprissättning ska existera. Vår studie visar samtidigt att utformningen av internprissättningsregler beror på kulturella dimensioner i högre utsträckning än institutionella influenser. Vår hypotes har genom studien kunnat verifieras och ger därför stöd åt att skillnader i internprissättning i respektive länders lagar och riktlinjer kan förklaras av kulturella dimensioner i landet. Studien bidrar till ökad förståelse av respektive länders lagstiftningar och riktlinjer för internprissättning samt dess likhet med OECDs riktlinjer. Vidare bidrar studien med kunskap i hur kulturella dimensioner, i samspel med OECD, påverkat både medlemsländer samt icke-medlemsländers implementering och utformning av sina lagar och riktlinjer inom internprissättning. / Transfer pricing is considered one of the most critical issues regarding national and international taxation. The growing globalization has resulted in the creation of a multiplicity of new multinational corporations, which in turn has led to an increase in financial transactions between companies with business in different countries. To maximize global profit, multinational corporations move profit from high tax countries to low tax countries by using other countries tax systems. As a consequence, focus on this issue has increased from tax departments all over the world, with the intent to protect their nations’ tax base. Regulation with the purpose of minimizing international tax avoidance have become increasingly important and thus a need for a globally accepted standard considering transfer pricing, has ascended. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has developed a number of guidelines regarding transfer pricing. The purpose of the study is to present differences and similarities in the implementation of OECDs guidelines regarding transfer pricing between Sweden, a member in OECD, as well as China and Singapore who are not members in the OECD. Further the study aims to verify or falsify the hypothesis: that differences in the implementation and design of transfer pricing in the respective countries’ national regulation and guidelines can be explained by cultural dimensions within the countries. Hence a comparative study was executed between Sweden, China and Singapore’s legal texts and guidelines, along with the OECD guidelines. The study contains an examination of transfer pricing in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administration 2017 of Chapter I. Arm's Length Principle, Chapter II. Price Methods and Chapter IV. Documentation. The study concludes that both member states as well as non-member states follow the OECD guidelines for transfer pricing but that variations between the nations exist. We find similarities in the nations’ regulation and guidelines regarding purpose and content within the examined areas. The study also identifies differences in the transfer pricing regulation between the nations, largely regarding the extent to which the nations has adapted the legal texts and guidelines to the OECD guidelines. Our conclusion is that visible harmonization exist, but in a varying extent, even outside the OECD as an institution, and that membership in the organisation is not a necessity for similarities in transfer pricing guidelines to occur. The study also indicates that the structure of transfer pricing regulation is influenced by cultural dimensions to a larger extent than institutional influences, hence our hypothesis verify that differences in transfer pricing in the respective countries’ national regulation and guidelines can be explained by cultural dimensions within the countries, is supported. The contribution of the study is increased understanding of the examined nations’ regulation and guidelines regarding transfer pricing and their similarities with OECD guidelines for transfer pricing. Further the study contribute to knowledge of how the cultural dimensions within the nations, in combination with OECD, influence the implementation and structuring of regulation and guidelines regarding transfer pricing in both member states and non-member states of the OECD.

Thesis (MComm)--University of Stellenbosch, 2004. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Despite the fact that transfer pricing legislation (i.e. section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 (“the Act”) has been in force in South Africa since 1995, it has only been in the last three years that the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) has embarked on a number of assessments of taxpayers’ cross border transactions with foreign group companies. In particular, the SARS targets taxpayers that have rendered cross border services (including financial assistance) to a foreign group company for no consideration and has assessed these taxpayers on the adjusted interest/ fee amounts. Since the burden of proof lies with the taxpayer to demonstrate that its cross border transactions with foreign group companies do not infringe the provisions of section 31(2) of the Act, this study provides taxpayers with guidance as to when its transactions would fall within the scope of application of section 31(2) of the Act and when the SARS would be excluded from applying the provision of section 31(2) of the Act. Following upon a critical analysis of the essential components of section 31(2) of the Act the following conclusions are drawn by the author: • If the taxpayer proves that it did not transact with a connected party (as defined in section 1 of the Act), or it did not supply goods or services in terms of an international agreement (as defined in section 31(1) of the Act), or its transfer price would be regarded as arm’s length, the Commissioner would be excluded from applying the provision of section 31(2) of the Act since all of the components to apply section 31(2) of the Act are not present. • The current view held by the South African Revenue Service and tax practitioners that transactions between a South African company and an offshore company, which are both directly or indirectly held more than fifty percent by an offshore parent company, are transactions between connected persons (as defined in 5 section 1 of the Act) is incorrect in law. Section 31 of the Act is not applicable to such transactions. • The Commissioner will be excluded from making a transfer pricing adjustment to a service provider’s taxable income where the following circumstances are present: o Where the cross border transaction with a connected party does not give rise to gross income, which is the starting point in the determination of taxable income, since the service provider agreed to render services for no consideration and was therefore not entitled to receive income (i.e. no receipt or accrual) and o Where the service provider can provide evidence that demonstrates that there was no practice of price manipulation as regards the transaction under review. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Alhoewel oordragprysbeleid wetgewing (artikel 31 van die Inkomstebelastingwet 58 van 1962 (“die Wet”)) al sedert 1995 in Suid Afrika van krag is, het die Suid Afrikaanse Inkomstediens (“SAID”) eers werklik gedurende die laaste drie jaar begin om aanslae ten opsigte van belastingpligtiges se internasionale transaksies met buitelandse groepmaatskappye uit te reik. In die besonder teiken die SAID belastingpligtes wat dienste (insluitend lenings) aan buitelandse groepmaatskappye vir geen vergoeding lewer. Aangesien die bewyslas op die belastingpligtige rus om te bewys dat sy internasionale transaksies met buitelandse groepmaatskappye nie die bepalings van artikel 31(2) van die Wet oortree nie, word belastingpligtiges in hierdie studie van riglyne, wat aandui wanneer transaksies met buitelandse groepmaatskappye binne die omvang van artikel 31(2) van die Wet val asook onder welke omstandighede die SAID verhoed sal word om artikel 31(2) van die Wet toe te pas, voorsien. Na aanleiding van ‘n kritiese analise van die deurslaggewende komponente van artikel 31(2) van die Wet kom die skrywer tot die volgende gevolgtrekkings: • As die belastingpligte kan bewys dat hy nie met ‘n verbonde persoon (soos omskryf in artikel 1 van die Wet) handelgedryf het nie, of dat hy nie goedere of dienste in terme van ‘n internasionale ooreenkoms (soos omskryf in artikel 31(1) van die Wet) gelewer het nie, of dat sy oordragprys as arm lengte beskou kan word, sal die Kommissaris verhoed word om die bepaling van artikel 31(2) van die Wet toe te pas, aangesien al die komponente van artikel 31(2) van die Wet nie teenwoordig is nie. • Die huidige sienswyse van die SAID en belastingpraktisyns dat transaksies wat tussen ‘n Suid Afrikaanse maatskappy en ‘n buitelandse maatskappy plaasvind, waar ‘n buitelandse moedermaatskappy meer as vyftig persent van albei maatskappye se aandeelhouding (direk of indirek) hou, beskou kan word as 7 transaksies tussen verbonde persone (soos omskryf in artikel 1 van die Wet) is regstegnies nie korrek nie. Artikel 31(2) van die Wet is nie van toepassing op sulke transaksies nie. • Die Kommisaris sal onder die volgende omstandighede verhoed word om enige oordragprysaanpassing aan ‘n diensleweraar se belasbare inkomste te maak: o Waar die internasionale transaksie met ‘n verbonde persoon nie bruto inkomste (die beginpunt van ‘n belasbare inkomste berekening) voortbring nie, aangesien die diensleweraar ingestem het om dienste teen geen vergoeding te lewer, wat tot die gevolg het dat die diensleweraar nie geregtig is om inkomste te ontvang nie (dus geen ontvangste of toevalling) en o Waar die diensleweraar kan bewys dat die transaksie nie onderhewig aan prys manipulasie was nie.

Disertacijoje nagrinėjami sandorių kainodaros teisinio reguliavimo ypatumai Lietuvoje ypatingą dėmesį kreipiant į tarptautinių organizacijų (Ekonominio bendradarbiavimo ir plėtros organizacijos (EBPO) ir Europos Sąjungos) rekomendacijų įtaką jam. Pirmoje disertacijos dalyje pateikiama sandorių kainodaros samprata, sandorių kainodaros reguliavimo raida Lietuvoje ir EBPO bei Europos Sąjungos lygmeniu, tiriama tarptautinių organizacijų rekomendacijų reikšmė sandorių kainodaros reguliavimui, nagrinėjamas EBPO pavyzdinės mokesčių konvencijos dėl pajamų ir kapitalo 9 straipsnis ir jo pagrindu priimtos Lietuvos teisės normos. Ši dalis baigiama „ištiestosios rankos“ principu pagrįstos sandorių kainodaros kritika ir perspektyvomis. Antroje dalyje, skirtoje bendrosioms sandorių kainodaros praktinio taikymo nuostatoms Lietuvoje ir EBPO bei Europos Sąjungos rekomendacijų įtakai joms, tiriama palyginamumo analizė, sandorių kainodaros metodai ir jų parinkimas ir sandorių kainodaros dokumentavimo reikalavimai. Trečioje dalyje analizuojamos tarptautinės ginčų sandorių kainodaros srityje nagrinėjimo galimybės ir jų prevencija tiriant abipusio susitarimo procedūrą pagal minėtą pavyzdinę konvenciją ir sutartis dėl dvigubo apmokestinimo išvengimo, ginčų šioje srityje nagrinėjimą pagal 1990 m. liepos 23 d. Konvenciją 90/436/EEB dėl dvigubo apmokestinimo išvengimo koreguojant asocijuotų įmonių pelną ir šių ginčų prevenciją išankstiniais kainodaros susitarimais. / In the dissertation there are analyzed peculiarities of transfer pricing legal regulation in Lithuania paying a special attention to the influence of international organizations‘ (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and European Union) on it. In the first part there are submitted the concept of transfer pricing, the history of transfer pricing regulation in Lithuania and at the level of OECD and the European Union, there are analyzed impact of recommendations of international organizations to the transfer pricing regulation and Article 9 of OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital and Lithuanian legal provisions adopted basing on this Article. This part is ended by presenting the critics of transfer pricing, based on arm’s length principle, and the perspectives of it. In the second part, which is dedicated to the general provisions of Lithuanian transfer pricing implementation practical issues with regard to the OECD and European Union recommendations, there are examined comparability analysis, transfer pricing methods and the selection of them, as well as transfer pricing documentation requirements. In the third part there are analyzed the legal regulation of the possibilities of international disputes on transfer pricing resolution and their prevention by examining the mutual agreement procedure under the mentioned Model Convention and conventions of double taxation, resolution of disputes according to Convention 90/436/EEC on the... [to full text]