Depuis sa fondation en 1794 par Catherine II, Odessa, cité portuaire de la mer Noire, ne laisse personne indifférent. Conçue pour devenir une utopie urbaine au sein d’une Russie très contraignante, la ville nouvelle – libre de servage, tolérante et entreprenante – attire des populations venues des quatre coins de l’Europe. Les premiers migrants sont en majorité des déshérités, des infortunés et des Juifs persécutés de l’Empire en quête d’un refuge. La société juive naissante éprise de liberté saisit sa chance en s’impliquant activement dans la réalisation de ce chantier ambitieux. Dès les années 1860, premiers frémissements d’un « bonheur juif », des banquiers, des négociants, des intellectuels, des artistes, des bandits et des « Juifs ordinaires » écrivent pareillement le « modernisme » et les légendes colorées d’Odessa la Juive. Le XXe siècle pris entre guerres et révolutions, sonne le glas de l’âge d’or des Juifs d’Odessa avec le retour des pogromes et des massacres de masse. Bon nombre d’entre eux repartent sur les routes de l’exil à la recherche de ports d’attache : onze villes nord-américaines portent le nom d’Odessa. Les Odessites vouent à leur ancienne terre d’adoption un véritable culte, sous des formes plurielles, œuvres littéraires, musicales, picturales et cinématographiques. A la lumière de l’Histoire et de la micro-histoire, l’enjeu de cette recherche sur la communauté juive odessite est d’identifier l’« espace de vérité » de la ville d’Odessa entre mythe et réalité. / Since its creation by Catherine the IInd in 1794, Odessa, a harbour on the Black Sea, leaves no one indifferent. Designed to become an urban utopia within a very compelling Russia, the new town – tolerant, enterprising, and from its origins free from serfdom – has attracted populations from across Europe. The first migrants were mainly poor, hapless people and persecuted Jews from the Empire in search of a refuge. The emerging Jewish society, freedom-loving, seized the opportunity to build an ideal city, culminating in the birth of a “Jewish happiness”. From 1860 onwards, great bankers, merchants, intellectuals, artists, gangsters and labourers all contributed to the “modernism” and the colourful history of the Jewish Odessa. Caught between wars and revolutions, the 20th Century sounded the knell of the golden age for Odessa Jews, with the return of pogroms and mass slaughters. A number of Jews went back to the roads of exile, looking for a new home: eleven North American towns have taken the name of Odessa. “Odessity” worship Odessa-mama: music works, paintings and movies aim at celebrating the glory of the homeland. Considering both the historical and micro-historical legacy, the challenge of this research on the Jewish community from Odessa aims to identify and establish a “truth space” between the real and the imaginary city.

Depuis sa fondation en 1794 par Catherine II, Odessa, cité portuaire de la mer Noire, ne laisse personne indifférent. Conçue pour devenir une utopie urbaine au sein d’une Russie très contraignante, la ville nouvelle – libre de servage, tolérante et entreprenante – attire des populations venues des quatre coins de l’Europe. Les premiers migrants sont en majorité des déshérités, des infortunés et des Juifs persécutés de l’Empire en quête d’un refuge. La société juive naissante éprise de liberté saisit sa chance en s’impliquant activement dans la réalisation de ce chantier ambitieux. Dès les années 1860, premiers frémissements d’un « bonheur juif », des banquiers, des négociants, des intellectuels, des artistes, des bandits et des « Juifs ordinaires » écrivent pareillement le « modernisme » et les légendes colorées d’Odessa la Juive. Le XXe siècle pris entre guerres et révolutions, sonne le glas de l’âge d’or des Juifs d’Odessa avec le retour des pogromes et des massacres de masse. Bon nombre d’entre eux repartent sur les routes de l’exil à la recherche de ports d’attache : onze villes nord-américaines portent le nom d’Odessa. Les Odessites vouent à leur ancienne terre d’adoption un véritable culte, sous des formes plurielles, œuvres littéraires, musicales, picturales et cinématographiques. A la lumière de l’Histoire et de la micro-histoire, l’enjeu de cette recherche sur la communauté juive odessite est d’identifier l’« espace de vérité » de la ville d’Odessa entre mythe et réalité. / Since its creation by Catherine the IInd in 1794, Odessa, a harbour on the Black Sea, leaves no one indifferent. Designed to become an urban utopia within a very compelling Russia, the new town – tolerant, enterprising, and from its origins free from serfdom – has attracted populations from across Europe. The first migrants were mainly poor, hapless people and persecuted Jews from the Empire in search of a refuge. The emerging Jewish society, freedom-loving, seized the opportunity to build an ideal city, culminating in the birth of a “Jewish happiness”. From 1860 onwards, great bankers, merchants, intellectuals, artists, gangsters and labourers all contributed to the “modernism” and the colourful history of the Jewish Odessa. Caught between wars and revolutions, the 20th Century sounded the knell of the golden age for Odessa Jews, with the return of pogroms and mass slaughters. A number of Jews went back to the roads of exile, looking for a new home: eleven North American towns have taken the name of Odessa. “Odessity” worship Odessa-mama: music works, paintings and movies aim at celebrating the glory of the homeland. Considering both the historical and micro-historical legacy, the challenge of this research on the Jewish community from Odessa aims to identify and establish a “truth space” between the real and the imaginary city.

Les relations entre l’Etat et la religion sont déterminantes dans l’histoire de chaque pays. Au Kazakhstan, le statut de l’islam a varié au gré du régime sur place. Implanté en plusieurs vagues, commençant par la conquête arabe du sud du pays, puis officialisé par les Qarakhanides, la Horde d’Or sous le khan Özbek et les khans kazakhs, l’islam a trouvé une certaine régulation à partir du XVIIIème siècle avec la colonisation russe. L’Empire russe, intéressé par le fait de gagner les musulmans à sa cause, favorise leur religion en créant l’Assemblée spirituelle à Orenbourg. L’impératrice Catherine II envoie des mollahs tatars dans la steppe kazakhe et construit de nombreuses mosquées pour mieux contrôler les Kazakhs. Mais le renforcement de l’islam donne des résultats inverses à ceux escomptés et l’empire durcit sa position envers le dernier, il limite le nombre de mollahs et de mosquées par région. Avec l’arrivée des soviétiques au pouvoir, tout semble changer. Mais provisoirement seulement ; les premières « déclarations démocratiques » n’aboutissent qu’à se retourner contre toutes les religions par une série de répressions à la fin des années 1920, et l’idéologie communiste espère mettre fin à l’islam. Pourtant les Directions spirituelles musulmanes avaient été rétablies durant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale par Staline qui avait voulu utiliser le potentiel religieux pour servir ses buts. Elles ont fonctionné jusqu’à l’effondrement de l’URSS en reflétant les décisions du parti. L’indépendance du Kazakhstan a donné une chance aux croyants de rétablir la religion, mais en même temps elle a contribué à l’apparition de mouvances radicales. Depuis les années 2000 le gouvernement revoit sa politique en matière religieuse, en effectuant de nouveau des restrictions. L’histoire recommence-t-elle ? / Relations between the state and religion are determining in the history of every country. At Kazakhstan the status of Islam has largely depended on the ruling regime. Islam was brought to Kazakhstan in several waves, starting from the conquest of the country’s south by Arabs. It was legalized by Qarakhanides, the Golden Horde under Khan Özbek and Kazakh clans and was further regularized with Russian colonization starting from XVIII century. Russian Empire, interested in attracting Muslims, has favored their religion by creating a Spiritual assembly at Orenburg. Empress Catherine II (The Great) had sent Tatar mullahs to the Kazakh steppes to establish Moslem institutions (mosques, religious schools, etc). This was aimed at gaining control over the Kazakh population. But reinforcement of Islam has led to rather opposite result and, as a consequence, Empire hardened towards Islam - the numbers of mosques and mullahs were reduced. It seemed to change upon arrival of the Soviets to the region, but only for a limited time, followed by anti-religious declarations of the Soviet Government and repressions at the end of 1920s, aiming to exterminate the influence of Islam once and forever. However during Second World War, under Stalin, Muslin spiritual institutions were once more re-established. They continued to function during the post-war era and collapse of USSR, being in the total support for the latter. Independence of Kazakhstan has provided an opportunity for the citizens to freely express their beliefs, and at the same time it led to the emerging of certain radical movements. From the years of 2000 the Kazakh government revises once again its policy on religion towards restriction. The history repeats itself?

Les États-Unis ont traditionnellement été accusés de ne pas avoir de réelle politique africaine. Une période semble échapper à cette affirmation car elle a été particulièrement riche dans ce domaine. Il s’agit des années 1975 à 1995 et particulièrement de la zone de l’Afrique australe. Cette politique étrangère a néanmoins été fluctuante au gré des présidences et influencée tant par la guerre froide et par des impératifs de politique nationale.Après l’effondrement de l’empire portugais, les États-Unis sont pris au dépourvu dans cette région stratégique à divers titres. Avec la fin de la guerre du Viêt Nam, Cuba et l’URSS lancent une politique expansionniste en Afrique. Ces deux paramètres vont créer les conditions d’un regain d’intérêt pour cette région et donner à l’Afrique du sud une rôle central au moment où les opinions publiques s’invitent dans la lutte contre l’apartheid.Les caractéristiques et composantes de cette politique, le processus de décision, ses acteurs multiples et variés constituent un sujet d’étude particulièrement riche. Quelle est la réelle part d’approche régionale de celle plus globaliste ? Quelles spécificités entre administrations démocrates et républicaines ?Au niveau militaire, il y a eu une certaine indulgence vis-à-vis du programme nucléaire et biologique sud-africain ainsi que le maintien de liens très forts entre les militaires des deux pays. L’utilisation des covert-actions de la CIA, l’appui du Zaïre, l’implication de l’OTAN et la résistance des états de la ligne de front constituent autant d’aspects de cette histoire très riche. / The United States has been traditionally accused of having no real African policy. A period seems to avoid this statement because it was particularly rich in this domain. It is the period covering the years 1975 to 1995 and particularly the Southern Africa area. This foreign policy has however been fluctuating according to presidencies and influenced so much by the cold war and by the imperatives of national politics.After the collapse of the Portuguese empire, the United States have been taken by surprise in this strategic region in various areas. With the end of the Vietnam war, Cuba and the USSR launched an expansionist policy in Africa. These two parameters will create the conditions for a resurgence of interest of this region and give South Africa a key role when public opinions started to be more engaged against apartheid.The features and components of this policy, the decision-making process with multiple and varied actors are a particularly rich subject of study. What is the real part of the regional approach to a more holistic one? What are the specificities of Democratic and Republican administrations?At the military level, there has been some leniency towards the South African nuclear and biological program and the maintenance of the strong linkage between the military of both countries. The use of the CIA's covert operations, Mobutu’s Zaire support, NATO's involvement and the resistance of the frontline states are all aspects of this rich history.

Après la Seconde guerre mondiale, plus de 6,5 millions de sujets japonais, dont la moitié était des civils résidant dans les territoires japonais d’outre-mer, ont été rapatriés au Japon. Le Japon n’avait pas prévu l’éventualité d’un rapatriement en cas de défaite, et les Alliés, s’ils avaient planifié le retour des soldats japonais, n’avaient pas préparé le retour des civils. Pourtant, le rapatriement des civils japonais fut, dans sa majeure partie, rapide et efficace. Entre octobre 1945 et décembre 1946, 5,1 millions de Japonais purent rejoindre le Japon. Pour d’autres, le processus put durer jusque la fin des années 1950. Une fois au Japon, les rapatriés, confrontés à un Japon en ruines, se virent imposer une nouvelle identité, celle de hikiagesha, personne rapatriée. La mémoire et l’identité des rapatriés, confrontés à l’hostilité et la méfiance de la population de métropole, connurent plusieurs mutations pour finalement se réintégrer au sein du mémoriel discours dominant sur la guerre. Après une analyse des processus de rapatriement, cette thèse se penchera donc sur la formation de l’identité des rapatriés en tant que groupe, leur mémoire, et comment ce groupe au départ marginalisé est parvenu à intégrer son récit mémoriel au sein du discourra officiel. / After the Second World War, Japan saw the return of more than 6.5 million Japanese nationals, of which about half were civilian overseas residents of Japan’s colonial empire. Japan had no plan for the evacuation of foreign territories in the event of defeat, and but although provisions had been made by the Allies for the repatriation of the military personnel, the return of civilians was initially outside their scope, and left to the Japanese. The Allies would later assign military transports to help with the task of ferrying millions of men, women and children back to the mainland. However, despite this lack of previous planning, the repatriation of Japanese nationals was fast and efficient: between October 1945 and December 1946; over 5.1 million Japanese were brought back to the mainland. Some, however, had to wait until the second half of the 1950s. Once in Japan, the returnees found that a new identity had been imposed on them, one that stemmed from their shared experience as returnees: that of hikiagesha, or repatriates. Joined by their war experiences, they found themselves part of a heterogeneous group with an identity that still awaited definition. The meaning of the memory of their experience was shaped by the very way in which they defined and re-defined themselves and their experience, as they encountered marginalisation, hostility and distrust as they reintegrated to mainland Japanese society. After analysing the process of repatriation, this thesis will attempt to map out the process by which this initially marginalised group became acceptable, by integrating its narrative within an official discourse.

This thesis examines the interaction of Georgian painting and national politics in the first two decades of Soviet power in Georgia, 1921-1939, focussing in particular on the period following the consolidation of Stalin's power at the helm of the Communist Party in 1926-7. In the Stalin era, Georgians enjoyed special status among Soviet nations thanks to Georgia's prestige as the place of Stalin's birth. However, Georgians' advanced sense of their national sovereignty and initial hostility towards Bolshevik control following Georgia's Sovietisation in 1921 also resulted in Georgia's uniquely fraught relationship with Soviet power in Moscow in the decades that followed. In light of these circumstances, this thesis explores how and why the experience and activities of Georgian painters between 1926 and 1939 differed from those of other Soviet artists. One of its central arguments is that the experiences of Georgian artists and critics in this period not only differed significantly from those of artists and critics of other republics, but that the uniqueness of their experience was precipitated by a complex network of factors resulting from the interaction of various political imperatives and practical circumstances, including those relating to Soviet national politics. Chapter one of this thesis introduces the key institutions and individuals involved in producing, evaluating and setting the direction of Georgian painting in the 1920s and early 1930s. Chapters two and three show that artists and critics in Georgia as well as commentators in Moscow in the 1920s and 30s were actively engaged in efforts to interpret the Party's demand for 'national form' in Soviet culture and to suggest what that form might entail as regards Georgian painting. However, contradictions inherent in Soviet nationalities policy, which both demanded the active cultivation of cultural difference between Soviet nationalities and eagerly anticipated a time when national distinctions in all spheres would naturally disappear, made it impossible for an appropriate interpretation of 'national form' to be identified. Chapter three, moreover, demonstrates how frequent shifts in Soviet cultural and nationalities policies presented Moscow institutions with a range of practical challenges which ultimately prevented them from reflecting in their exhibitions and publications the contemporary artistic activity taking place in the republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia. A key finding of chapters four and five concerns the uniquely significant role that Lavrenty Beria, Stalin's ruthless deputy and the head of the Georgian and Transcaucasian Party organisations, played in differentiating Georgian painters' experiences from those of Soviet artists of other nationalities. Beginning in 1934, Beria employed Georgian painters to produce an exhibition of monumental paintings, opening at the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow in 1937, depicting episodes from his own falsified history of Stalin's role in the revolutionary movement in Transcaucasia. As this thesis shows, the production of the exhibition introduced an unprecedented degree of direct Party supervision over Georgian painting as Beria personally critiqued works by Georgian painters produced on prescribed narrative subjects in a centralised collective studio. As well as representing a major contribution to Stalin's personality cult, the exhibition, which conferred on Georgian painters special responsibility for representing Stalin and his activities, was also a public statement of the special status that the Georgians were now to enjoy, second only to that of the Russians. However, this special status involved both special privileges and special responsibilities. Georgians would enjoy special access to opportunities in Moscow and a special degree of autonomy in local governance, but in return they were required to lead the way in declaring allegiance to the Stalin regime. Chapter six returns to the debate about 'national form' in Georgian painting by examining how the pre-Revolutionary self-taught Georgian painter, Niko Pirosmani, was discussed by cultural commentators in Georgia and Moscow in the 1920s and 30s as a source informing a Soviet or Soviet Georgian canon of painting. It shows that, in addition to presenting views on the suitability of Pirosmani's painting either in terms of its formal or class content, commentators perpetuated and developed a cult of Pirosmani steeped in stereotypes of a Georgian 'national character.' Further, the establishment of this cult during the late 1920s and early 1930s seems to have been a primary reason for the painter's subsequent canonisation in the second half of the 1930s as a 'Great Tradition' of Soviet Georgian culture. It helped to articulate a version of Georgian national identity that was at once familiar and gratifying for Georgians and useful for the Soviet regime. The combined impression of cultural sovereignty embodied in this and other 'Great Traditions' of Soviet Georgian culture and the special status articulated through the 1937 exhibition allowed Georgian nationalism to be aligned, for a time, with support for Stalin and the Soviet regime.

Filmmediet idag är den mest populära formen av masskultur. Med sin världstäckande genomslagskraft och sitt stereotypa porträtterande av verklighet, påverkar filmen världsåskådningen för människor runtom i världen. Ett brinnande ämne i amerikansk film har alltid varit Ryssland, på grund av de politiska motsättningarna och den historiska rivaliteten med USA. Studiens syfte är att undersöka hur Ryssland porträtteras i amerikanska filmer från perioden för presidenterna Dmitrij Medvedevs respektive Barack Obamas första mandatperiod. Frågeställningen för uppsatsen är: hur ser stereotypa föreställningar om Ryssland ut i amerikansk film 2008-2011? Trettiotal filmer med ryska motiv valdes ut för undersökningen och analyserades utifrån de visuella och sociala aspekterna. Resultatet visar på att det förekommer tre skikt av stereotyper om Ryssland: de eviga, som har existerat i hundratals år och spridits av resenärer; stereotyper från epoken för det kalla kriget; och stereotyper om det moderna Ryssland inspirerade av medias nyhetsrapporteringar.

Šio magistrinio darbo pavadinimas „Kolektyvinės tapatybės formavimas SSRS ir ES: ekonominio veiksnio įtaka“. Istorinės ribos apima laikotarpį nuo SSRS susikūrimo iki šių dienų aktualijų, žodis "formavimas" nurodo analizuojamo proceso t��stinumą. Pagrindinė darbo analizės ašis – kolektyvinė tapatybė. Darbo pagrindinis tikslas yra įvertinti ES kolektyvinio tapatumo formavimo perspektyvumą, remiantis Sovietų Sąjungos patirtimi ir nustatyti ekonominio veiksnio ryšį su kolektyvinio tapatumo formavimo procesu. Siekiant užsibrėžtų tikslų, reikia atlikti šiuos išsikeltus uždavinius: visų pirma, reikia išsiaiškinti kaip yra konstruojamas kolektyvinis tapatumas, kokie veiksniai tai lemia ir kokia yra ekonominio veiksnio reikšmė kolektyvinio tapatumo formavimui; antra, reikia išanalizuoti SSRS kolektyvinio tapatumo formavimo trūkumus; trečia, reikia išanalizuoti ES kolektyvinio tapatumo formavimo ypatumus bei į perspektyvą nukreiptą formavimo politiką, įvertinant ekonominio veiksnio svarbą; ketvirtą, reikia palyginti ES ir Sovietų Sąjungos kolektyvinio tapatumo formavimo specifiką, remiantis gautais duomenimis, padaryti išvadas. Darbe yra keliamos šios hipotezės: 1. ekonominis veiksnys yra svarbus kolektyvinio tapatumo formavimo procese; 2. kolektyvinio tapatumo formavimo specifika SSRS ir ES turi sąryšio taškų, tai yra - juos įtakoja tie patys veiksniai; 3. ES turi daugiau perspektyvų suformuoti kolektyvinį tapatumą nei SSRS. Darbe taikomi tyrimo metodai: analitinis – aprašomasis... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / The title of this master thesis is “Formation of Collective Identity in USSR and EU: Impact of Economic Factor“. It defines historical period from USSR foundation till nowadays. The main aspect according to which these multinational blocks are analyzed is collective identity. Special efforts are given to analyze factors which have impact to collective identity formation, but the biggest attention is paid to analyze importance of economic factor. Identity – the sense of dependence. This concept at one time contains as the connective as also separative elements. This is a result of identification process which helps to define human or group exceptional indications. As individual or collective identity formation problems are widely discussed in today’s society discourses. Its importance is comprehensible as to the individual as also to the communities behavior motivation. The perception of identity allows to know better your historical or cultural roots, and also to know yourself and others better. But the concept of identity is so wide and variant, that it leaves a lot of place to the following discussions. This work appoints a lot of attention to collective identity forming and it’s specific. Actuality of the topic remains also in today’s political discourses undisputed – if we clear, how to construct common identity it would emerge a possibility to evaluate, what main mistakes in it forming maid USSR and what perspectives in common identity constructing has EU. This... [to full text]

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This study seeks to analyze the process of transition and democratization in Kyrgyzstan from 1990 to 2000. The collapse of the Soviet Union opened new political perspectives for Kyrgyzstan and a chance to develop sovereign state based on democratic principles and values. Initially Kyrgyzstan attained some progress in building up a democratic state. However, in the second half of 1990s Kyrgyzstan shifted toward authoritarianism. Therefore, the full-scale transition to democracy has not been realized, and a well-functioning democracy has not been established. This study aims to focus on the impediments that led to the failure of establishing democracy in Kyrgyzstan. It analyzes the role of economy, political elites and political culture in the form of tribalism in Kyrgyzstan within the framework of the economic and political changes that have been undergoing since independence. The political and economic developments in Kyrgyzstan are discussed with specific reference to the hardships in economic transition, elite continuity and role of tribal and clan structures in present politics.