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The Demons of Science What They Can and Cannot Tell Us About Our WorldWeinert, Friedel January 2016 (has links)
no / The title The Demons of Science may at first appear like a contradiction in terms.
Demons are associated with the forces of darkness; science represents the power of
light. One could assume, therefore, that science has no time for demons. This book
aims to destroy this assumption. Science opens its gates to demons as long as they
play a rational rather than an evil part. They are put to work. Demons are figures of
thought: they belong to the category of thought experiments, which are routinely
employed in science and philosophy. As they are cast as agents with superhuman
abilities, we may expect that demons provide us with valuable—albeit
non-empirical—clues about the constitution of the physical world. But I am
interested in exploring not only what the demons tell us but also what they do not
tell us about our world. They are cast as superhuman actors but even demons have
their limitations. The following chapters contain, I believe, the first systematic study
of the role of demons in scientific and philosophical reasoning about the external
world.
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Gedankenexperimente - Eine Familie philosophischer Verfahren / Thought Experiments - A Family of Philosophical ProceduresKlauk, Tobias 22 November 2007 (has links)
No description available.
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Stringed along or caught in a loop? : Philosophical reflections on modern quantum gravity researchMatsubara, Keizo January 2013 (has links)
A number of philosophical questions, all connected to modern research in quantum gravity, are discussed in this dissertation. The goal of research in quantum gravity is to find a quantum theory for gravitation; the other fundamental forces are already understood in terms of quantum physics. Quantum gravity is studied within a number of different research programmes. The most popular are string theory and loop quantum gravity; besides these a number of other approaches are pursued. Due to the lack of empirical support, it is relevant to assess the scientific status of this research. This is done from four different points of view, namely the ones held by: logical positivists, Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos. It is then argued that research in quantum gravity may be considered scientific, conditional on scientists being open with the tentative and speculative nature of their pursuits. Given the lack of empirical progress, in all approaches to quantum gravity, a pluralistic strategy is advised. In string theory there are different theoretical formulations, or dualities, which are physically equivalent. This is relevant for the problem of underdetermination of theories by data, and the debate on scientific realism. Different views on the dualities are possible. It is argued that a more empiricist view on the semantics of theories, than what has been popular lately, ought to be adopted. This is of importance for our understanding of what the theories tell us about space and time. In physics and philosophy, the idea that there are worlds or universes other than our own, has appeared in different contexts. It is discussed how we should understand these different suggestions; how they are similar and how they are different. A discussion on, how and when theoretical multiverse scenarios can be empirically testable, is also given. The reliability of thought experiments in physics in general and in quantum gravity in particular is evaluated. Thought experiments can be important for heuristic purposes, but in the case of quantum gravity, conclusions based on thoght experiments are not very reliable.
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Experimentos mentais no ensino de ciências: implementação de uma sequência didáticaKiouranis, Neide Maria Michellan [UNESP] 22 June 2009 (has links) (PDF)
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kiouranis_nmm_dr_bauru.pdf: 28976036 bytes, checksum: 3a8492dd7821465a9e1d894cc6bdd088 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Esta pesquisa é fruto do desenvolvimento de uma sequência didática sobre o comportamento das entidades físicas: partícula, onde e partícula-onda no Experimento da Supla Fenda, numa versão adaptada de Feynman e colaboradores e foi desenvolvida com estudantes de terceira série do ensino superior do curso de Química, disciplina Química Quântica, de uma universidade pública estadual. O objetivo geral do estudo foi discutir os fundamentos e práticas de experimentos mentais, tendo como parâmetro a utilização de diversas alternativas didáticas e seus desdobramentos para o ensino nas disciplinas científicas. A pesquisa de cunho qualitativo ancora-se nos fundamentos dos experimentos mentais e tem por base as teorias que visam promover a comunicação verbal e escrita dos conhecimentos científicos. O problema de pesquisa originou-se das dificuldades que os estudantes demonstravam em sala de aula para explicar e debater suas idéias, de maneira significativa, inteligível e dinâmica, quando estas exigiam deles o domínio da verbalização de conhecimentos científicos sobre o experimento da dupla fenda. Para interpretação e análise dos dados, utilizou-se a vertente interpretativa por meio de instrumentos e técnicas que permitem, principalmente, a descrição e interpretação de fatos e fenômenos, a recuperação de sentidos, tendo como base a investigação interpretativa do conjunto de materiais empíricos que se transformaram em textos. Os resultados revelam que os procedimentos didáticos utilizados são relevantes por possibilitarem a problematização, a discussão, o uso da imaginação e da linguagem verbal e escrita, pouco usuais em contextos de aulas de Química Quântica. Com relação aos textos, tanto aqueles transcritos das discussões e das falas dos estudantes quanto os que foram produzidos durante o desenvolvimento da pesquisa, por solicitação do professor... / This research is the result of the development of a didactic sequence on the behavior of physical entities: particle, wave and wave-particle in the Double-Slit Experiment, in an adapted version from Feynman and assistants, which was developed with university students from the third grade of the Chemistry course, in the discipline of Quantum Chemistry, at a Brazilian public state university. The study aimed to discuss the fundaments and practices of thought experiments by using several didactic alternatives and its unfoldings to the teaching of scientific disciplines. The research, of qualitative basis, is anchored to the fundaments of thought experiments grounded on theories aiming to promote verbal and written communication of scientific knowledge. The research problem focuses on the difficulties that the students show in the classroom in order to explain and discuss their ideas when theses require that they master verbalization of scientific knowledge on the double-slit experiment in a meaningful, significant and dynamic manner. To the purpose of data interpretation and analysis, we used the interpretative perspective by means of the methodological and theoretical. Results revealed that the didactic procedures used are relevant since they allow problematization, discussion, the use of imagination and of verbal and written language, quite rare in classroom contexts of Quantum Chemistry. Regarding the texts, both the ones transcribed during the discussions and the students' speeches and those produced during the development of the research, required by the teacher, deserve attention. The text productions were found considerably reduced, fragmented, lacking progression and continuity of ideas, and also lacking the interconnected sequence of the parts that constitute an articulated whole. By means of discourse analysis, we detected loss of the line of unity that assures its interpretability... (Complete abstract click electronic access below)
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The Content of Thought Experiments and Philosophical ContextGilfether, Kevin G. 11 July 2013 (has links)
No description available.
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By indirections find directions out : thinkable worlds in Abbott and VonnegutFaucher, Benoît 09 1900 (has links)
This thesis is concerned with the interaction between literature and abstract thought. More specifically, it studies the epistemological charge of the literary, the type of knowledge that is carried by elements proper to fictional narratives into different disciplines. By concentrating on two different theoretical methods, the creation of thought experiments and the framing of possible worlds, methods which were elaborated and are still used today in spheres as varied as modal logics, analytic philosophy and physics, and by following their reinsertion within literary theory, the research develops the theory that both thought experiments and possible worlds are in fact short narrative stories that inform knowledge through literary means.
By using two novels, Abbott’s Flatland and Vonnegut’s The Sirens of Titan, that describe extra-dimensional existence in radically different ways, respectively as a phenomenologically unknowable space and as an outward perspective on time, it becomes clear that literature is constitutive of the way in which worlds, fictive, real or otherwise, are constructed and understood. Thus dimensions, established through extensional analogies as either experimental knowledge or modal possibility for a given world, generate new directions for thought, which can then take part in the inductive/deductive process of scientia. By contrasting the dimensions of narrative with the way that dimensions were historically constituted, the research also establishes that the literary opens up an infinite potential of abstract space-time domains, defined by their specific rules and limits, and that these different experimental folds are themselves partaking in a dimensional process responsible for new forms of understanding.
Over against science fiction literary theories of speculation that posit an equation between the fictive and the real, this thesis examines the complex structure of many overlapping possibilities that can organise themselves around larger compossible wholes, thus offering a theory of reading that is both non-mimetic and non-causal. It consequently examines the a dynamic process whereby literature is always reconceived through possibilities actualised by reading while never defining how the reader will ultimately understand the overarching structure. In this context, the thesis argues that a causal story can be construed out of any one interaction with a given narrative—underscoring, for example, the divinatory strength of a particular vision of the future—even as this narrative represents only a fraction of the potential knowledge of any particular literary text. Ultimately, the study concludes by tracing out how novel comprehensions of the literary, framed by the material conditions of their own space and time, endlessly renew themselves through multiple interactions, generating analogies and speculations that facilitate the creation of new knowledge. / Cette thèse se penche sur l’interaction entre la littérature et la pensée abstraite. Plus spécifiquement, elle étudie la charge épistémologique du littéraire, le type de savoir qui est transporté par des éléments propres aux narrations fictives vers d’autres champs disciplinaires. En ce concentrant sur deux méthodes théoriques, la création d’expériences de pensée et l’établissement de mondes possibles, des méthodes qui ont été élaborées et sont toujours d’usage aujourd’hui dans des disciplines aussi variées que la logique modale, la philosophie analytique et la physique, et en suivant leur réinsertion à même la théorie littéraire, la recherche développe la postulat que les expériences de pensée et les mondes possibles sont en fait de courtes histoires narratives qui informent le savoir par des moyens littéraire.
En utilisant Flatland de Abbott et The Sirens of Titan de Vonnegut, deux romans qui décrivent l’existence extra-dimensionnelle de façons radicalement différentes, un espace phénoménologiquement inconnaissable chez Abbott et une perspective extérieure au temps chez Vonnegut, il devient clair que la littérature est constitutive de la façon qu’un monde— qu’il soit fictif, réel ou autre—est construit et compris. Ainsi, les dimensions établies par des analogies extensionnelles génèrent de nouvelles directions pour la pensée, qui peut ensuite prendre part au processus inductif/déductif de la scientia. En contrastant les dimensions narratives avec la notion de dimension telle qu’elle s’est constituée historiquement, la recherche établit également que le littéraire ouvre un potentiel infini de domaines spatiotemporels abstraits, définis par leurs règles et leurs limites spécifiques, et que ces différents plis expérimentaux prennent eux-mêmes part dans un processus dimensionnel responsable pour de nouvelles formes de compréhensions.
Au-delà des théories spéculatives qu’on retrouve dans l’étude de la science-fiction, où est mise de l’avant une équation entre le fictif et le réel, cette thèse examine la structure complexe de plusieurs possibilités superposées qui peuvent s’organiser autour d’ensembles compossibles plus importants, ainsi offrant une théorie de la lecture qui est à la fois non- mimétique et non-causale. En conséquence, l’investigation examine un processus dynamique par lequel la littérature est toujours reconsidérée au travers des possibilités qui sont actualisées par la lecture, alors qu’elle ne définit jamais la compréhension ultime que le lecteur ou la lectrice se fera de la structure globale du texte. Dans ce contexte, la thèse argumente qu’une histoire causale peut être créée à partir de n’importe quelle interaction avec le texte— soulignant, par exemple, la force divinatoire d’une vision du futur particulière—même si cette narration ne représente qu’une fraction du savoir potentiel contenu à l’intérieur de n’importe quel texte littéraire particulier. Ultimement, l’étude conclut en décrivant comment de nouvelles compréhensions du texte, encadrées par les conditions matérielles de leur propre espace et temps, se renouvellent sans cesse grâce à des interactions multiples, ainsi générant des analogies et des spéculations qui facilitent la création de nouveaux savoirs.
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Animals on Lifeboats: a Defense of a Sliding Scale Model of Moral StatusBeck, Daniel Phillip 23 April 2009 (has links)
No description available.
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Les contre-exemples de Frankfurt ratent leur cible : un nouveau heaume pour le principe des possibilités alternativesChevarie-Cossette, Simon-Pierre 06 1900 (has links)
Les contre-exemples de Frankfurt sont inoffensifs contre l’argument de la conséquence (consequence argument), l’argument qui, à partir du principe des possibilités alternatives et du déterminisme, montre que nous ne pouvons être tenus moralement responsables de nos actions. En effet, ils sont formulés soit dans un cadre déterministe, soit dans un cadre indéterministe. S’ils sont formulés dans un cadre indéterministe, ils sont inoffensifs parce qu’ils contreviennent à un principe méthodologique que nous défendons : le principe de non-négation des prémisses (PNNP). En fait, nous montrons que pour tout argument donné, il est proscrit de supposer la négation d’une prémisse afin de réfuter une autre prémisse à moins que l’attaque réussisse à réfuter les deux prémisses en question. Or, d’une part, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt indéterministes supposent explicitement qu’une prémisse de l’argument de la conséquence – le déterminisme est vrai – est fausse; et d’autre part, ils ne peuvent pas nous donner de raisons de croire en l’indéterminisme, ce que nous montrons grâce à des considérations sur la transmission de la justification. Construire des contre-exemples de Frankfurt indéterministes est donc incorrect pour des raisons méthodologiques et logiques. S’ils sont formulés dans un cadre déterministe, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt font face à une autre accusation d’entorse argumentative, présentée dans la défense du dilemme (Dilemma Defence) de Kane-Ginet-Widerker : celle de la pétition de principe. Nous inspectons et nuançons cette accusation, mais concluons qu’elle tient puisque les contre-exemples de Frankfurt déterministes supposent au final une analyse des agents contrefactuels dans les mondes déterministes et de la relation « rendre inévitable » que ne peuvent endosser ni les incompatibilistes de la marge de manœuvre (leeway incompatibilists), ni les incompatibilistes de la source (source incompatibilists) ni non plus les semicompatibilistes. Conséquemment, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt ne peuvent plus soutenir la forme de compatibilisme à laquelle ils ont donné naissance. L’incompatibilisme de la source ne peut plus être préféré à l’incompatibilisme de la marge de manœuvre ni non plus rejeter toute participation des possibilités alternatives dans l’explication de la responsabilité morale sur cette seule base. / Frankfurt-type examples are inoffensive against the Consequence argument, which purports to show that from both the principle of alternative possibilities and determinism, we can deduce that we are not morally responsible for our actions. Indeed, they require either a deterministic context or an indeterministic one. If they require indeterminism, they are harmless because they violate a methodological principle that we defend: the no-premise-negation principle (PNNP). In fact, we show that for each given argument, we cannot legitimately suppose the negation of a premise in order to refute another, unless the attack succeeds to refute both premises. Yet, on the one hand, indeterministic Frankfurt-type examples explicitly suppose that a premise of the Consequence argument – determinism holds – is false; and on the other hand, Frankfurt-type examples do not give us reasons to reject determinism, which we show with considerations on the transmission of justification. To build indeterministic Frankfurt scenarios is therefore incorrect for methodological and logical reasons. If they require determinism, Frankfurt-type examples are facing a different, yet very serious, argumentative accusation (presented in the Kane-Ginet-Widerker famous Dilemma defence): begging the question. We inspect and qualify this accusation. However, we ultimately claim that it still holds because a deterministic Frankfurt-type example supposes an analysis of the role of counterfactual agents and of the relation “render inevitable” in deterministic worlds that is acceptable neither for a leeway incompatibilist, a source incompatibilist or a semicompatibilist. Thus, Frankfurt-type examples no longer successfully support the form of compatibilism they contributed to give birth to. Also, source incompatibilism may not be preferred to leeway incompatibilism, nor reject all use of alternative possibilities in the explanation of moral responsibility on the sole basis of Frankfurt scenarios.
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Nature, fiabilité et rôle des intuitions utilisées en philosophie morale contemporaineGiroux, Jessy 07 1900 (has links)
Ce mémoire porte sur les intuitions utilisées en philosophie morale contemporaine. Les intuitions sont interrogées sur trois aspects : leur nature, leur fiabilité et leur rôle. Concernant la nature des intuitions, celles-ci sont présentées comme des jugements spontanés ayant une valeur épistémique « à première vue ». Concernant la fiabilité des intuitions, trois grands types de raisons de douter de leur fiabilité sont considérés, à savoir les résultats de certaines études scientifiques montrant de diverses manières leur instabilité, les études réalisées par le mouvement de philosophie expérimentale afin d'illustrer le phénomène du désaccord intuitif, et enfin, le problème de l'origine douteuse des intuitions. Aucune de ces raisons n'est jugée efficace afin de discréditer l'usage des intuitions en philosophie. Concernant le rôle des intuitions, une distinction est proposée entre deux grands types d'usage philosophique contemporain. D'une part, ce qu'on peut appeler la méthodologie standard en philosophie morale contemporaine consiste en une combinaison d’expériences de pensée et de la méthode de l’équilibre réfléchi. Différentes manières d'aborder la méthode de l'équilibre réfléchi sont présentées, et le modèle de l'équilibre réfléchi large développé par Norman Daniels est jugé le plus efficace. D'autre part, les intuitions sont parfois utilisées en philosophie morale contemporaine dans le cadre de la théorie de l'intuitionnisme éthique. La théorie est défendue contre diverses objections, et elle est montrée compatible avec la méthode de l’équilibre réfléchi. / The object of this Master’s thesis is the intuitions used in contemporary moral philosophy. Intuitions are investigated on three aspects: their nature, their reliability, and their role. Regarding the nature of intuitions, they are presented as spontaneous judgments with “prima facie” epistemic value. Regarding the reliability of intuitions, three general types of reasons to question their reliability are considered, namely, the results of certain scientific studies showing in various ways Fiabilité des intuitionstheir unreliability, studies conducted in the field of experimental philosophy which emphasize the phenomenon of intuitive disagreement, and finally, the problem of the origin of intuitions. None of these reasons is judged good enough to discredit the use of intuitions in philosophy. Regarding the role of intuitions, a distinction is drawn between two main types of usage in contemporary philosophy. On the one hand, what can be called the “standard methodology” in contemporary moral philosophy consists in the combination of thought experiments and the method of reflective equilibrium. Different ways of construing the method of reflective equilibrium are considered, and the “Wide Reflective Equilibrium” model developed by Norman Daniels is judged the most successful. On the other hand, intuitions are sometimes used in contemporary moral philosophy in the context of the theory of ethical intuitionism. The theory is defended against various objections, and it is shown to be compatible with the method of reflective equilibrium.
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SCIENCE FICTION THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN BIOETHICSSmart, Jasmine 12 December 2012 (has links)
Science fiction is particularly apt as bioethical thought experiment. In considering the theories of James R. Brown, John D. Norton and Marco Buzzoni, I suggest that mental-modeling theories afford the best explanation for what thought experiments can do. I propose a version of mental modeling that has the flexible modalities of experience found in Nancy J. Nersessian's account, combined with Nenad Miš?evi?'s compelling vision of how existing knowledge is used to create mental models, and Tamar Gendler's use of schemas to understand ethical thought experiments.
Bioethics makes use of thought experiments' capacity to move from abstraction to discrete instances. Sometimes thought experiments will be better, and sometimes real cases will be unavailable. Given the cognitive advantages that access to mental models provides, thought experiments will be of use in the field of bioethics.
To identify literature that is thought-experimental I look to Geordie McComb's family resemblance theory, and consider accounts of literary thought experiments by Noel Carroll and Edward Davenport. Extended narratives will in some cases be more useful for ethical understanding than philosophical thought experiments. Science fiction has this same advantage: as ethical narrative it is detailed and humanized. In addition the specula-tive nature of science fiction lends itself to the exploration of new and emerging sciences and technologies including those in the field of bioethics.
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