The aim of this thesis is to address the implications of Basel III regulation on counterparty credit risk. We analysed the development of OTC market, we addressed systemic risk and the way how central counterparties could mitigate or spread the contagion among banks. We used simulated data to develop a stress test model to find out the impact of counterparty credit risk on banks' capital requirements, in case the interest rate increased extensively. Six pos- sible scenarios of interest rate levels were developed with ascending order of the IR level. From these scenarios we computed the exposure levels and credit valuation adjustment (CVA) as the market value of counterparty credit risk. We came to the following conclusions: (1) Czech banks have enough capital to withstand any interest rate increase in any scenario. (2) Banks with high expo- sure to derivatives like Bank of America, Citibank and JP Morgan would face severe problems if the interest rate increased. (3) There is no direct correlation between credit valuation adjustment and interest rate, the CVA increases faster with the increase of the interest rate.

The thesis focuses on the impact of the banking regulation Basel III on bank-intermediated trade finance. The theoretical part of the thesis explains details of Basel III requirements, history of Basel Accords and their future in the form of Basel IV, characteristics of trade finance products and of the whole industry. Trade finance industry voiced worries about the negative effect that these new requirements might have on trade finance business. The thesis estimates determinants of bank-intermediated trade finance and includes a regulatory variable. We use trade finance data from the Czech Republic and Hong Kong in 2000−2014 and from India in 2007−2014. A negative effect of Basel III on trade finance growth is found using pooled OLS regression. Contrary to previous research, we also estimate a negative coefficient of banks' capital to assets ratios. To the best of our knowledge, the thesis provides the first empirical analysis of the impact of Basel III on trade finance. Trade finance research usually focuses more on the relationship of trade finance and trade flows and the thesis provides an extensive literature summary of this topic. The final part of the thesis contrasts different levels of risk of trade finance and shows that the imputed low-riskiness does not apply to the Czech data.

Counterparty credit risk is an important type of financial risk. The importance of proper counterparty risk management became most apparent in the wake of the 2008 series of failures of several large banks. Correlation of market factors is an important issue in the calculation of CVA. A notable case of correlation is wrong-way risk which occurs whenever the probability of default of the counterparty is positively correlated with exposure. The basic formulas for CVA and basic counterparty credit risk models do not account for wrong-way risk because its modeling is nontrivial. This thesis aims to answer how well can the impact of wrong-way risk on CVA be approximated with an add-on which only depends on correlation between the price of the underlying asset and the credit spread of the counterparty. The thesis is supplemented by a fully documented implementation of the model in the Mathematica software.

L'objectif de cette thèse est de fournir une évaluation de l'importance des caractéristiques du réseau bancaire pour expliquer la prise de décision des banques soumises à différents scénarios de politiques macroprudentielles et monétaires. Cette thèse examine donc les implications de la topologie des réseaux interbancaires pour la réglementation du capital et de la liquidité des banques et pour les politiques monétaires. Le premier chapitre examine comment les banques définissent leurs ratios de liquidité en fonction de la topologie de leur réseau sur le marché interbancaire. Nos résultats montrent que la prise en compte les connexions bancaires au sein d'un réseau améliore significativement les modèles de liquidité traditionnels. De plus, nous montrons que les banques fixent un ratio de liquidité plus bas lorsqu'elles ont un accès plus facile au marché interbancaire. Nos résultats soulignent également que le comportement en termes de liquidité des banques de tailles différentes ou des banques opérant dans différents systèmes bancaires pourrait varier en fonction de leurs positions interbancaires locales ou à l'échelle du système. Le deuxième chapitre analyse la réaction des prix des actions des banques aux annonces de politiques monétaires en fonction de leur position sur le marché interbancaire. Nos résultats montrent que la prise en compte de la manière dont les banques sont liées au sein d’un réseau contribue à l’explication de la réaction des prix de leurs actions à l’annonce des politiques monétaires. Nos résultats suggèrent qu'une position de réseau solide à l'échelle du système augmente les réactions positives à de telles annonces de politiques, alors qu'une position de réseau locale forte les réduit. Le troisième chapitre examine comment les effets de substitution de la liquidité sur le capital sont influencés par la position de la banque sur le marché interbancaire. Nous montrons que l’effet de substitution de la liquidité sur le capital est atténué si les banques sont fortement interconnectées dans le réseau interbancaire. Nos résultats suggèrent qu'en période de crise, les grandes banques non liquides détiennent un ratio de fonds propres élevé uniquement lorsqu'elles occupent une position faible sur le réseau interbancaire au niveau local ou à l'échelle du système, tandis que les petites banques non liquides renforcent leur solvabilité lorsqu'elles comptent un plus grand nombre d'emprunteurs directs . / The aim of this dissertation is to provide an evaluation of the importance of the bank network characteristics in explaining bank decision making under different macroprudential and monetary policy scenarios. This study examines, therefore, the implication of interbank network topology for bank capital and liquidity regulation and for monetary policies. The first chapter investigates how banks set their liquidity ratios depending on their network topology in the interbank market. Our results show that incorporating bank connections within a network adds value to traditional liquidity models. Moreover, we show that banks set lower liquidity ratios when they have easier access to the interbank market. Our findings also highlight that liquidity behavior of banks with different size, or banks that are operating in different banking sectors could vary depending on their local or system-wide interbank positions. The second chapter analyses the reaction of bank stock prices to the announcements of monetary policies depending on their position on the interbank market. Our results show that taking into account the way that banks are linked to each other within a network adds value to explain bank stock prices reaction to the announcement of monetary policies. Our findings suggest that strong system-wide network position increases the positive reactions to such policy announcements while strong local network position reduces them. The third chapter examines how the substitution effect of liquidity on capital are influenced by bank network position on the interbank market. We show that the substitution effect of liquidity on capital is dampened if banks are strongly interconnected in the interbank network. Our findings suggest that during crisis periods, illiquid large banks set higher capital ratio only when they have a weak local or system-wide position on the interbank network while illiquid small banks strengthen their solvency when they have a higher number of direct borrowers in that network.

A regulação e supervisão do sistema financeiro sempre foram motivos de apreensão por parte das principais autoridades econômicas mundiais. A globalização, o processo de liberalização financeira e a consequente interconexão econômica entre países maximizaram o risco sistêmico, aumentando a necessidade de marco regulatório e fiscalização mais eficientes. Assim, com a eclosão da crise norte-americana em 2008, o G-20 começou a atuar de forma mais ativa em prol da manutenção da higidez do sistema financeiro mundial. Para os bancos, o G-20 instruiu as principais instituições reguladoras como o Fundo Monetário Internacional, o Conselho de Estabilidade Financeira e o Comitê de Basileia (BCBS) a desenvolverem recomendações a fim de se solucionar o considerado principal problema da regulação dos mercados, o fato destes atualmente serem pró-cíclicos. Diante de tal cenário, em dezembro de 2009, o Comitê publicou um documento que considerou uma série de medidas a fim de solucionar tal problema, entre estas estava a inclusão do buffer de capital contracíclicodo novo marco regulatório proposto pelo Comitê, o Basileia III. O intuito do presente estudo é estudar esse buffer e analisar sua aplicabilidade no sistema bancário brasileiro e, porventura, sugerir metodologias alternativas de cálculo. / The regulation and supervision of the financial system have always been cause for concern on the part of major global economic authorities. Globalization, the process of financial liberalization and consequent economic interconnection between countries maximized systemic risk, increasing the need for a more efficient regulation. Thus, with the outbreak of the American crisis in 2008, the G-20 began to act more actively in favor of maintaining the health of the global financial system. For banks, the G-20 instructed the main regulatory institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to develop recommendations to be considered to solve the main problem of market regulation, the fact these currently being pro-cyclical. Faced with this scenario, in December 2009, the Committee published a document which considered a number of measures in order to solve this problem, among these was the inclusion of the counter-cyclical capital buffer of the new regulatory framework proposed by the Committee, the Basel III. The aim of this study is to study this buffer and analyze their applicability in the Brazilian banking system and perhaps suggest alternative methods of calculation.

Författare: Narina Bengtsson och Victor Friis-Liby Handledare: Eva BerggrenTitel: Fastighetsbolagens finansiering – En studie om fastighetsbolagens nyafinansieringsalternativ Bakgrund och problem: Kapitaltunga bolag som fastighetsbolag är ständigt i behov avkapital. Bankkredit som alltid varit det vanligaste och mest använda finanseringsalternativethar i större utsträckning ersatts med företagsobligationer och preferensaktier. Marknaden försvenska företagsobligationer har växt de senaste åren och fastighetsbolagen står idag för tvåtredjedelar av de totala preferensaktierna på Stockholmsbörsen. Efter den senaste finanskrisensvarade myndigheterna med att ta fram Basel III – regelverket, som ställer striktarekapitaltäckningskrav för bankerna. Med anledning av hur marknaden har utvecklats med nyafinansieringsalternativ och införandet av Basel III - regelverket vill vi undersöka hurfastighetsbolagen resonerar kring finansiering i nuläget. Syfte: Syftet med studien är att undersöka om de svenska börsnoterade fastighetsbolagens valav finansiering har förändrats efter finanskrisen 2008.Avgränsning: Studien bortser från fastighetsbolag som inte är börsnoterade och verksamheterutanför Sverige. Studien bortser också från de delar av kapitalmarknaden som inte berörfastighetsbolag och därför inte är aktuella för studien. Studien går igenom Basel III -regelverket som en följd av finanskrisen men vi kommer inte gå in djupare på orsaken tillfinanskrisen. Metod: Vi har gjort en kvalitativ studie på tre svenska börsnoterade fastighetsbolag. Slutsats: Basel III har enligt vår studie inte påverkat fastighetsbolagens tillgång till kapital pådet sättet som tidigare studier pekat på. Förändringen på marknaden beror på flera faktorer isamverkan som alla påverkat fastighetsbolagens val av finansiering. Vi kommer fram till attPecking order teorin inte är aktuell längre eftersom olika finansieringsalternativ idagkombineras för att diversifiera finansieringsrisken. Marknaden har förändrats sedan Peckingorder teorin utvecklades och det är därför inte längre möjligt att göra analyser på samma sättsom tidigare. Idag påverkas marknaden av flera faktorer samtidigt, vilket innebär attfastighetsbolagens finansieringsbeteende bara är en del av informationen att ta hänsyn till. Anledningen tros bland annat vara att vi idag är mer globalt integrerade än tidigare vilketinnebär att tillgången till information är större. Dessutom påverkas marknaden av flerstörningar nu än tidigare. Räntederivat, certifikatprogram och preferensaktier är alla nyafinansieringsalternativ som används av fastighetsbolagen och som inte tas upp i Pecking order teorin.

Tre tydliga svagheter kunde identifieras i den globala banksektorn under den stora finanskrisen år 2007. Dessa tre svagheter var brist på kapital av tillräcklig kvalitet för att kunna hantera förluster, en för tätt sammankopplad finansmarknad samt otillräcklig likviditetshantering och för små likviditetsbuffertar. I syfte att främja en banksektor med starkare motståndskraft togs regelverket Basel III fram för att reglera bland annat bankernas likviditet, kapitaltäckning och riskhantering. De nya kapitaltäckningskraven från Basel III innebär bland annat att kärnprimärkapitalrelationen ska uppgå till minst sju procent senast år 2019, Sverige och Storbritannien har dock valt att ställa högre krav på sina storbanker. Kärnprimärkapitalet är den del av primärkapitalet som håller högst kvalitet och har bäst förmåga att absorbera förluster. Europeiska bankmyndigheten (EBA) genomför årligen stresstester på bankerna inom Europeiska unionen (EU) med syfte att se hur bankerna kan hantera ogynnsamma scenarier. På liknande sätt genomför även Finansinspektionen stresstester på de svenska storbankerna.Syftet med denna studie är att ur ett internationellt perspektiv undersöka vilka resultat storbankerna i Sverige, Storbritannien och Tyskland uppnår i EBA:s stresstester för två olika år. Studien syftar även till att ur ett nationellt perspektiv studera hur de fyra svenska storbankerna Handelsbanken, SEB, Nordea och Swedbank klarar sig i Finansinspektionens egna stresstester över en fyraårsperiod. Slutligen syftar studien till att studera hur väl de fyra svenska storbankerna lever upp till de nya kraven som Basel III medför med avseende på kärnprimärkapitalrelation för åren 2006, 2011 och 2014 samt hur bankernas riskrapportering har förändrats sedan år 2011. För att besvara våra frågeställningar studerades tryckt material i form av bland annat årsredovisningar och vi genomförde även två intervjuer med en respondent från Finansinspektionen respektive två respondenter från Sveriges Riksbank.Studiens resultat för den internationella frågeställningen visar att det är de svenska storbankerna som har den lägsta genomsnittliga procentuella differensen mellan ett normalscenario och ett stressat scenario. Det är även de svenska storbankerna som har de högsta genomsnittliga kärnprimärkapitalrelationerna i EBA:s stresstester för åren 2011 respektive 2014. De brittiska och de tyska storbankerna uppnår lägre resultat än de svenska storbankerna. Det finns banker i dessa länder som det krävs ytterligare arbete ifrån för att de vid ett normalscenario ska uppnå Basel III:s grundkrav där kärnprimärkapitalrelationen ska uppgå till minst sju procent. Utifrån vår analys kan vi dra slutsatsen att de svenska storbankerna är de banker som klarar sig bäst med avseende på EBA:s stresstester och bankernas kärnprimärkapitalrelationer.Studiens resultat för den nationella frågeställningen visar att Handelsbanken och Swedbank är de svenska storbanker som klarar sig bäst i Finansinspektionens stresstester. SEB och Nordea däremot uppvisar något sämre resultat och vid något tillfälle når de inte upp till de formella eller de individuella kraven under ett mycket stressat scenario. Vid analys av bankernas årsredovisningar kan vi se en positiv utveckling av deras kärnprimärkapitalrelationer då samtliga svenska storbanker når upp till de strängare formella kraven på 10 respektive 12 procent och även når upp till Finansinspektionens strängare individuella krav för respektive storbank. Vi kan även se en positiv utveckling av de svenska storbankernas riskrapportering och vi kan se att många av bankerna offentliggör mer riskinformation än vad som krävs. Vi kan konstatera att de svenska storbankerna över lag är välkapitaliserade och har inga problem med att nå upp till de nya kraven i Basel III. / Three weaknesses were identified in the global banking sector during the great financial crisis in 2007. These three weaknesses were a lack of capital of sufficient quality to cope with losses, a too closely linked financial market and finally an insufficient liquidity management and too small liquidity buffers. In order to promote a banking sector with stronger resistance Basel III regulations was established to regulate the banks' liquidity, capital adequacy and risk management. The new capital requirements of Basel III means that the core Tier I capital ratio must at least reach seven percent by the year 2019, Sweden and the UK have, however, chosen to set higher standards for their largest banks. Core Tier I capital is the part of Tier I capital that keeps the highest quality and has the best ability to absorb losses. The European Banking Authority (EBA) conducts annual stress tests on banks in the European Union (EU) in order to study how banks can handle adverse scenarios. In a similar way, Finansinspektionen also conducts stress tests on the major Swedish banks.The purpose of this study is from an international perspective to examine what results the major banks in Sweden, the UK and Germany achieve in the EBA's stress test for two years. The study also aims to study from a national perspective how the four major Swedish banks, Handelsbanken, SEB, Nordea and Swedbank achieve in Finansinspektionens own stress tests over a four year period. Finally, the study aims to examine how well the four major Swedish banks live up to the new requirements under the Basel III, with regard to core Tier I capital ratio for the years 2006, 2011 and 2014, as well as how banks' risk reporting has changed since the year 2011. In order to answer our questions, printed material in the form of e.g. annual reports were studied and we also conducted two interviews with respondents from Finansinspektionen and Sveriges Riksbank (the Swedish national bank).The study's results of the international perspective shows that it is the major Swedish banks that have the lowest average percentage difference between a normal scenario and a stressed scenario. It is also the Swedish banks that have the highest average core tier 1 ratios in the EBAs' stress tests for the years 2011 and 2014. The British and German banks achieved lower results than the Swedish banks. There are banks in these countries where further work is needed in order for them at a normal scenario to reach a core Tier 1 capital ratio of at least seven percent. Based on our analysis, we can conclude that the major Swedish banks have the best results both regarding EBAs' stress tests and the banks' core Tier 1 capital ratio.The study's results of the national perspective shows that Handelsbanken and Swedbank are the major Swedish banks with the best results in Finansinspektionens stress tests. SEB and Nordea present slightly lower results and at some time during the test they do not reach the formal or individual requirements in a highly stressed scenario. In the analysis of banks' annual reports, we observe a positive development of their core tier 1 ratios and all major Swedish banks reach the stricter formal requirements of 10 and 12 percent. All the banks also reach Finansinspektionens stricter individual requirements for each major bank. We also observe a positive development of the Swedish banks' risk reporting and we can also see that many of the banks disclose more risk information than is required. We can conclude that the major Swedish banks are well capitalized and have no problems reaching up to the new requirements of Basel III.This essay is written in Swedish

Basel III和Solvency II 對法國銀行系統的影響 / Following the 2008 financial crisis and the 2010 European Sovereign crisis, regulators and supervisors were urged to improve and reinforce the regulation of the banking system in order to prevent and assist banks from failing and provoking a system-wide crisis. Similarly some measures have been taken to regulate and reinforce the insurance industry in the EU. Basel III accords have been set up as an emergency measure and response to the financial crisis that hit the world in 2008 following a liquidity crisis that has started in 2007. Basel II framework had never been made to resist a system wide crisis and was not anymore effective in regulating the banking industry following the important deregulations that happened in the 2000s. Similarly to Basel, the primary goal of Solvency II is to prevent (with a 99.5% probability or 1 chance over 200) a company from ceasing payments and/or going bankruptcy. It has therefore introduced a complete framework relying as well on three pillars which have been adapted to the constraints and specificities of the insurance industry. Bank-insurances which are companies offering both insurance and banking services are therefore subject to both regulations. Moreover despite increasing their offerings, bank-insurer have to adapt to a complex maturing environment. The future of their business strongly depends upon their strategic choices regarding growth, profitability and mandatory compliance to regulation. They need to start and/or accelerate their transformation strategy in order to take into account this changing environment. The regulations are becoming more binding and therefore questioning the model of a global bank (as the banks have to increase their level of required capital). Despite these challenges, they still have an important role to play on the French Market.

[pt] Este trabalho analisa o impacto dos requerimentos de liquidez da Basiléia III na gestão de liquidez dos bancos. A partir de uma base de dados que engloba bancos de todos os países signatários do Comitê de Basiléia III, foram definidos indicadores de liquidez bancária com base nas práticas utilizadas na literatura econômica e que busquem servir de proxies aos indicadores propostos pelo Comitê. Foram então verificados os cronogramas de implementação dos novos requerimentos de liquidez estabelecido por cada país. Acompanhou-se, então, a evolução dos indicadores de liquidez antes e depois do novo requerimento de liquidez instituído pelo Comitê. Foi observado alta estatisticamente relevante nas proxies de liquidez de curto prazo. Por outro lado, o resultado das regressões que buscam acompanhar a evolução de liquidez de longo prazo demonstraram quedas estatisticamente significativas. / [en] This paper analyzes the impact of Basel III liquidity requirements on banks liquidity management. Indicators of bank liquidity were defined based on the practices used in the economic literature and that seek to serve as proxies to the indicators proposed by the Committee. Database was built including banks from all countries that are signatories to the Basel III Committee. The timelines for implementation of the new liquidity requirements established by each country were then verified. The evolution of the liquidity indicators before and after the new liquidity requirement established by the Committee was followed. A statistically significant elevation was observed in short-term liquidity proxies. On the other hand, the result of the regressions that seek to follow the evolution of long-term liquidity showed statistically significant declines.

A regulação e supervisão do sistema financeiro sempre foram motivos de apreensão por parte das principais autoridades econômicas mundiais. A globalização, o processo de liberalização financeira e a consequente interconexão econômica entre países maximizaram o risco sistêmico, aumentando a necessidade de marco regulatório e fiscalização mais eficientes. Assim, com a eclosão da crise norte-americana em 2008, o G-20 começou a atuar de forma mais ativa em prol da manutenção da higidez do sistema financeiro mundial. Para os bancos, o G-20 instruiu as principais instituições reguladoras como o Fundo Monetário Internacional, o Conselho de Estabilidade Financeira e o Comitê de Basileia (BCBS) a desenvolverem recomendações a fim de se solucionar o considerado principal problema da regulação dos mercados, o fato destes atualmente serem pró-cíclicos. Diante de tal cenário, em dezembro de 2009, o Comitê publicou um documento que considerou uma série de medidas a fim de solucionar tal problema, entre estas estava a inclusão do buffer de capital contracíclicodo novo marco regulatório proposto pelo Comitê, o Basileia III. O intuito do presente estudo é estudar esse buffer e analisar sua aplicabilidade no sistema bancário brasileiro e, porventura, sugerir metodologias alternativas de cálculo. / The regulation and supervision of the financial system have always been cause for concern on the part of major global economic authorities. Globalization, the process of financial liberalization and consequent economic interconnection between countries maximized systemic risk, increasing the need for a more efficient regulation. Thus, with the outbreak of the American crisis in 2008, the G-20 began to act more actively in favor of maintaining the health of the global financial system. For banks, the G-20 instructed the main regulatory institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to develop recommendations to be considered to solve the main problem of market regulation, the fact these currently being pro-cyclical. Faced with this scenario, in December 2009, the Committee published a document which considered a number of measures in order to solve this problem, among these was the inclusion of the counter-cyclical capital buffer of the new regulatory framework proposed by the Committee, the Basel III. The aim of this study is to study this buffer and analyze their applicability in the Brazilian banking system and perhaps suggest alternative methods of calculation.