I Sverige klassificeras cirka 99,4 % av alla företag som mindre företag och under 2014 registrerades cirka 70 000 nya företag. Gemensamt är att nystartade och mindre företag som växer och utvecklas bidrar till nationell tillväxt i länderna de är verksamma inom. För att företagen ska kunna växa krävs finansiering och banker har traditionellt tillgodosett detta behov. Regelverket Basel III är därför väldiskuterat eftersom flera studier visar att det kan påverka bankers kreditgivning. Forskning visar bland annat att Basel III leder till minskad utlåning och ökade utlåningsräntor. Det visar också att nystartade företag kan missgynnas mer än andra bolag på grund av de interna riskklassificeringssystem som tillåts inom regelverket. Interna riskklassificeringssystem kan nämligen, på grund av olika variabler och parametrar, göra att nystartade företag betraktas som mer riskfyllda. Andra studier som gjorts i ämnet visar att Basel III inte påverkar varken banker, kreditgivning eller utlåningsräntor. Eftersom tidigare forskning och litteratur visar olika resultat syftar denna studie till att undersöka, beskriva och öka förståelsen för hur Basel III påverkat kreditgivningen till nystartade företag i Sverige. För att få empiriskt underlag till studien har tio intervjuer gjorts med elva respondenter från sju olika banker. Intervjuer har gjorts med anställda på större och mindre banker på central och lokal nivå. Resultatet i studien visar att alla banker höjt utlåningsräntorna till nystartade företag. Bankerna uppger att det framför allt beror på förändrad risksyn och riskbedömning till följd av Basel III. Basel III har lett till att företagskunder prissätts mer efter bedömd kreditrisk och detta har gjort att nystartade företag generellt fått en högre ränta. Resultatet visar också att interna system och modeller blivit viktigare inom bankerna och att alternativa finansieringslösningar börjat växa fram på marknaden. Samtidigt är kreditbedömningsprocessen och låneutbudet oförändrat sedan Basel III:s introduktion. Studiens resultat bidrar med praktiska implikationer till nystartade företag, banker, entreprenörer och samhället. Den bidrar också teoretiskt till forskningen i form av underlag till diskussionen om utlåningsräntor och låneutbud. / In Sweden approximately 99.4% of all companies are classified as small companies and in 2014 around 70,000 new companies were registered. The common denominator is that start-ups and small businesses that grow and evolve contribute to national growth in the countries they operate in. In order to enable businesses to grow they require finance and traditionally banks have met this need. Basel III is therefore a well-argued subject since several studies show that it can affect banks' lending. Research shows that Basel III will lead to reduced lending and increased lending rates. It also shows that start-ups may be more disadvantaged than other companies because of the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach allowed within the regulation. The IRB approach can namely, because of different variables and parameters, consider start-ups more risky than other companies. Other studies however, show that Basel III has no, or very little, impact on lending and interest rates. Since previous research and literature shows different results this study aims to examine, describe and increase the understanding of how Basel III impact lending to start-ups in Sweden. Ten interviews with eleven respondents from seven different banks have been conducted. The interviews were conducted with employees of large and small banks working on central and local level. The results of the study show that all banks have raised lending rates to start-ups. The banks say that it is mainly due to changed risk profile and risk assessment as a result of Basel III. Basel III has led to corporates, retails and start-ups being priced on estimated credit risk and this has led to start-ups being considered as riskier. Thus, banks have raised lending rates to start-ups. The result also shows that internal systems and models have become more important in banks and that alternative financing has begun to emerge on the market. Meanwhile, the credit assessment process and the loan supply are unaffected since Basel III's introduction. The study's results contribute with practical implications for start-ups, banks, entrepreneurs and the community. It also contributes to theoretical research regarding the lending rates and loan supply discussion.

Os Acordos da Basileia são os principais marcos da regulação financeira internacional. Basileia III, um conjunto de modificações do segundo acordo, tem como objetivo aumentar a exigência de capital dos bancos, introduzindo ao arcabouço prudencial a formação de "colchões" de conservação de capital e de capital contracíclico e estabelecendo índices mínimos de liquidez e uma taxa máxima de alavancagem. Para avaliar a efetividade desse acordo, serão revisitados os conceitos fundamentais de intermediação financeira e os riscos mais importantes envolvidos nesse processo. Além disso, serão recuperados os principais tópicos abordados pelos pactos predecessores a Basileia III, para efeitos de comparação e crítica. Integrará esta dissertação uma análise do impacto desse acordo em relação ao sistema financeiro internacional, ressaltando as principais diferenças entre as normas gerais e as particularidades nacionais. / The Basel Accords are the main marks of international financial regulation. Basel III, a set of reforms on the second accord, aims to increase the exigency of the banks' capital, introducing to the prudential outline the development of "buffers" of capital and countercyclical capital conservation, and establishing minimum rates of liquidity and a maximum leverage rate. To estimate the effectiveness of the accord, the fundamental concepts of financial intermediation and the more important risks this process involves will be revisited. Moreover, the main topics approached by the pacts previous to Basel III will be recalled, for the sake of comparison and review. This dissertation will be integrated by an analysis of this accord's impact, in regard to the international financial system, stressing the chief differences between general norms and national particularities.

O custo elevado da crise financeira do subprime, que assolou a economia norte-americana nos últimos anos e provocou a intervenção estatal no salvamento de diversas Instituições Financeiras consideradas Grandes Demais para Falir, abriu espaço para o crescimento dos títulos Condicionalmente Conversíveis (CoCos). Trata-se de títulos que injetam capital automaticamente no balanço do banco sempre que o nível de capital fique abaixo de determinado parâmetro pré-estabelecido – chamado de gatilho – pela conversão da dívida em capital e com termos de conversão já estabelecidos em contrato. Essa é uma inovação do mercado que entrou no arcabouço de Basileia III e poderá exercer um importante papel na prevenção ao risco moral, uma vez que tais instrumentos permitem a divisão dos riscos entre o banco emissor do título e o investidor, retirando eventuais encargos dos recursos públicos de ter que salvar grandes empresas insolventes. Espera-se, assim, reduzir ou até mesmo eliminar o problema da existência de companhias Grandes Demais para Falir. Mas o mercado de CoCos, que são títulos híbridos, terá de se tornar mais líquido – de forma a atrair mais investidores – e buscar um caminho em torno da padronização nas emissões ao eliminar, principalmente, incertezas relacionadas ao nível do gatilho e aos termos de conversão. / The high cost of the 2007-08 subprime financial crisis that led to state intervention with the rescue of several financial institutions considered too big to fail made room for the growth of the contingent convertible bonds (CoCos). These securities automatically inject capital in the bank’s balance sheet when its capital level is below certain pre-set ratio (trigger), by converting debt into equity. Both trigger and conversion terms are established by contracts. This is a market innovation that has entered the Basel III framework and can play an important role in preventing moral hazard, since such instruments allow risk sharing between the issuing bank and CoCos investors, preventing government bailouts. CoCos are expected to reduce or even eliminate the existence of too big to fail companies. But these hybrids must provide more liquid markets – in order to attract more investors – and seek contracts standardization by eliminating mainly uncertainties related to the trigger level and conversion terms.

Cette thèse de doctorat est une première tentative d'examiner si les réglementations bancaires ont le même impact sur la stabilité et l'efficience des banques islamiques que sur celles des banques conventionnelles. Suite aux nouvelles recommandations de Bâle III, nous étudions l'impact des exigences minimales en matière de fonds propres, de liquidité et de levier financier sur la stabilité et l'efficience des banques islamiques comparativement aux banques conventionnelles. Une première étude exploratoire utilise l'analyse en composantes principales (ACP), les méthodes Logit et Probit et les régressions MCO pour montrer que les banques islamiques disposent d'un capital plus élevé, qu'elles sont plus liquides, plus profitables, mais moins stables que leurs homologues conventionnelles. Une deuxième étude empirique examine la stabilité des banques islamiques et utilise la régression quantile pour montrer que les banques islamiques sont moins stables que les banques classiques. L'étude prouve également que des exigences de fonds propres renforcées améliorent la stabilité des banques islamiques les plus petites et les plus liquides, tandis que le levier financier est négativement associé à la stabilité de ce type de banques. Des contraintes de liquidité plus fortes renforcent la stabilité des grandes banques islamiques alors que l'effet est inverse pour les petites banques. Enfin, nous examinons l'efficience des banques islamiques en utilisant la méthode d'enveloppement des données (DEA). Nous constatons que les banques islamiques sont plus efficientes que les banques conventionnelles. Nous trouvons aussi que des exigences de capital et de liquidité accrues pénalisent l'efficience des petites banques islamiques très liquides, alors que l'inverse est vrai pour le levier financier. Ces résultats montrent notamment qu'en matière de réglementation du capital pour les petites banques islamiques très liquides, un choix est à opérer entre une efficience accrue ou une stabilité renforcée. / This PhD dissertation is the first attempt to examine whether banking regulations have the same impact on the stability and the efficiency of Islamic than for conventional banks. We benefit of Basel III recommendations to investigate the impact of bank capital, liquidity and leverage requirements on the stability and the efficiency of Islamic banks compared to conventional banks. A first exploratory study uses Principal Component Analysis, Logit and Probit methods, and OLS regressions and shows that Islamic banks have higher capital, liquidity, and profitability, but that they are less stable than their conventional counterparts. A second empirical study examines the stability of Islamic banks using conditional quantile regressions and proves that Islamic banks are less stable than conventional banks. It also shows that higher capital and lower leverage improve the adjusted profits of small and highly liquid Islamic banks. Liquidity is positively associated with the stability of large Islamic banks while an opposite effect is detected when small Islamic banks are examined. Finally, we study the efficiency of Islamic banks using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and find that Islamic banks are more efficient than conventional banks. We also find that higher capital and liquidity requirements penalize the efficiency of small and highly liquid Islamic banks, while the opposite is true for financial leverage. These results show that concerning capital requirements for small and highly liquid Islamic banks, a possible trade-off could be found between stability and efficiency.

O custo elevado da crise financeira do subprime, que assolou a economia norte-americana nos últimos anos e provocou a intervenção estatal no salvamento de diversas Instituições Financeiras consideradas Grandes Demais para Falir, abriu espaço para o crescimento dos títulos Condicionalmente Conversíveis (CoCos). Trata-se de títulos que injetam capital automaticamente no balanço do banco sempre que o nível de capital fique abaixo de determinado parâmetro pré-estabelecido – chamado de gatilho – pela conversão da dívida em capital e com termos de conversão já estabelecidos em contrato. Essa é uma inovação do mercado que entrou no arcabouço de Basileia III e poderá exercer um importante papel na prevenção ao risco moral, uma vez que tais instrumentos permitem a divisão dos riscos entre o banco emissor do título e o investidor, retirando eventuais encargos dos recursos públicos de ter que salvar grandes empresas insolventes. Espera-se, assim, reduzir ou até mesmo eliminar o problema da existência de companhias Grandes Demais para Falir. Mas o mercado de CoCos, que são títulos híbridos, terá de se tornar mais líquido – de forma a atrair mais investidores – e buscar um caminho em torno da padronização nas emissões ao eliminar, principalmente, incertezas relacionadas ao nível do gatilho e aos termos de conversão. / The high cost of the 2007-08 subprime financial crisis that led to state intervention with the rescue of several financial institutions considered too big to fail made room for the growth of the contingent convertible bonds (CoCos). These securities automatically inject capital in the bank’s balance sheet when its capital level is below certain pre-set ratio (trigger), by converting debt into equity. Both trigger and conversion terms are established by contracts. This is a market innovation that has entered the Basel III framework and can play an important role in preventing moral hazard, since such instruments allow risk sharing between the issuing bank and CoCos investors, preventing government bailouts. CoCos are expected to reduce or even eliminate the existence of too big to fail companies. But these hybrids must provide more liquid markets – in order to attract more investors – and seek contracts standardization by eliminating mainly uncertainties related to the trigger level and conversion terms.

Os Acordos da Basileia são os principais marcos da regulação financeira internacional. Basileia III, um conjunto de modificações do segundo acordo, tem como objetivo aumentar a exigência de capital dos bancos, introduzindo ao arcabouço prudencial a formação de "colchões" de conservação de capital e de capital contracíclico e estabelecendo índices mínimos de liquidez e uma taxa máxima de alavancagem. Para avaliar a efetividade desse acordo, serão revisitados os conceitos fundamentais de intermediação financeira e os riscos mais importantes envolvidos nesse processo. Além disso, serão recuperados os principais tópicos abordados pelos pactos predecessores a Basileia III, para efeitos de comparação e crítica. Integrará esta dissertação uma análise do impacto desse acordo em relação ao sistema financeiro internacional, ressaltando as principais diferenças entre as normas gerais e as particularidades nacionais. / The Basel Accords are the main marks of international financial regulation. Basel III, a set of reforms on the second accord, aims to increase the exigency of the banks' capital, introducing to the prudential outline the development of "buffers" of capital and countercyclical capital conservation, and establishing minimum rates of liquidity and a maximum leverage rate. To estimate the effectiveness of the accord, the fundamental concepts of financial intermediation and the more important risks this process involves will be revisited. Moreover, the main topics approached by the pacts previous to Basel III will be recalled, for the sake of comparison and review. This dissertation will be integrated by an analysis of this accord's impact, in regard to the international financial system, stressing the chief differences between general norms and national particularities.

Os Acordos da Basileia são os principais marcos da regulação financeira internacional. Basileia III, um conjunto de modificações do segundo acordo, tem como objetivo aumentar a exigência de capital dos bancos, introduzindo ao arcabouço prudencial a formação de "colchões" de conservação de capital e de capital contracíclico e estabelecendo índices mínimos de liquidez e uma taxa máxima de alavancagem. Para avaliar a efetividade desse acordo, serão revisitados os conceitos fundamentais de intermediação financeira e os riscos mais importantes envolvidos nesse processo. Além disso, serão recuperados os principais tópicos abordados pelos pactos predecessores a Basileia III, para efeitos de comparação e crítica. Integrará esta dissertação uma análise do impacto desse acordo em relação ao sistema financeiro internacional, ressaltando as principais diferenças entre as normas gerais e as particularidades nacionais. / The Basel Accords are the main marks of international financial regulation. Basel III, a set of reforms on the second accord, aims to increase the exigency of the banks' capital, introducing to the prudential outline the development of "buffers" of capital and countercyclical capital conservation, and establishing minimum rates of liquidity and a maximum leverage rate. To estimate the effectiveness of the accord, the fundamental concepts of financial intermediation and the more important risks this process involves will be revisited. Moreover, the main topics approached by the pacts previous to Basel III will be recalled, for the sake of comparison and review. This dissertation will be integrated by an analysis of this accord's impact, in regard to the international financial system, stressing the chief differences between general norms and national particularities.

This thesis presents changes proposed in the European Union as a reaction to financial crisis. The aim of this thesis is to provide a summary and comment of changes both in organisation of supervision and banking regulation, especially concentrating on Basel III and taxation. The first part contains a description of the structure of supervision both in the Czech Republic and in the European Union. The description includes development in the Czech Republic in last five years. The second part contains a description of causes and development of the global financial crisis, defines systemic risk and financial stability and the ways to measure it. The third part describes new structure of supervision in the EU and impact of the change. It also includes a description of Basel III and CRD IV and its impact, discussion of options of taxation in the financial market. The end of this part is a brief summary of changes applied in the USA and its comparison to changes in the EU. The last chapter contains the CNB's position to these changes.

This work focuses on new regulatory proposals, primarily Basel III accords and analyzes its ability to create a buffer for recurrent credit bubbles. This paper follows a research made by Lis, Pagés and Saurina [2000]. Their paper has illustrated the cyclicality of loan growth and GDP growth for Spain. This cyclicality is supported by cyclical Basel II regulation. In this paper is examined the ability of new regulatory proposals such as Basel III, statistical provisions and change in the approach to the probability of default, to cope with recurrent credit bubbles. According to my critical assessment, Basel III may not be able to create sufficient capital buffer for exceptional credit bubbles such as the current one. This buffer suggested by Basel III has several drawbacks which may decrease its functionality. Statistical provision is not an appropriate measure either, because it could weaken the fair and true view of financial statements principle. Change in approach to probability of default seems to be rational and effective. The only issue may relate to its recovery mechanisms. It doesn't support economic growth in time of economic recession. The author's proposal of new countercyclical buffer, which would be based on credit-to-GDP ratio and GDP growth to loan growth gap is introduced at the end of this work. Although this measure may have negative impact on GDP growth, it may create an appropriate buffer to systematic credit risk.

The main aim of this work is to describe and explain the capital requirements of the banking sector. Both economically and legally. The thesis is divided into five main parts. First, I deal with the theoretical description and reasoning behind the banking sector regulation. This part of the work emphasized the relation between financial and business cycle, I illustrate their close relation and mutual interaction. Furthermore, the thesis defines capital adequacy in general, its importance and its most important elements and features. Subsequently, the development of the Basel regulation is described in detail, which despite its legal non-binding nature represents the basic rules for capital adequacy. The main emphasis is put on Basel II and Basel III and its implementation in European and Czech law, where the most important concepts are elaborated in detail to analyze and evaluate them. The main topics I deal with are the structure of capital and measurement of market, credit and operational risk. Particular emphasis is placed on the pro-cyclicality of capital requirements, the implications of this pro-cyclicality, and the tools in Basel III to mitigate this feature. Therefore, I describe in detail the additional capital buffers and liquidity requirements introduced in response to tackle this...