L'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant est un principe international proclamé à l'article 3-1 de la Convention internationale des droits de l'enfant. L'exercice de l'autorité parentale est dominé par la prise en compte de ce principe.La notion d'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant présente une unité à l'échelle européenne. Contribuent à la préciser des éléments de contenu éclairés par la mise en évidence d'une grille de lecture dégagée à partir de l'analyse de la jurisprudence interne et européenne. En outre, les arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme fondent l'émergence d'éléments de caractérisation permanents mais non cumulatifs et parfois s'excluant : le maintien de relations personnelles entre l'enfant et ses père et mère d'une part ; un environnement sain autour de l'enfant, d'autre part. La notion d'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant révèle son autonomie par l'existence de moyens d'appréciation, modalités et modes propres. Cette autonomie se trouve étroitement liée à l'impact qu'offre à la notion sa réception dans les différentes législations européennes. Cette large consécration se trouve confortée par le développement d'un contrôle de conventionnalité révélateur de la véritable nature de l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant. L'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant constitue désormais une notion clef dans le domaine de l'exercice de l'autorité parentale. Il fonde un nouvel ordre public protecteur de l'enfant à l'échelle européenne. Sa primauté s'impose corrélativement de plus en plus nettement. Surgissent toutefois des conflits entre cet intérêt supérieur et d'autres intérêts ou principes concurrents. In fine, l'unité et l'autonomie de l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant, désormais notion de droit, devraient asseoir une effective protection de l'enfant en Europe. / The child's highest interest is an international principle that has been announced in the 3-1 article of the International Bureau for Children's' Rights. This principle dominates the exercise of the parental authority.The notion of the child's highest interest is seen as a unit at the European scale. It can be clarified thanks to a key to read that has been highlighted from the French and European jurisprudence and which contains some content elements. Besides the appearance of characterization's elements is based on the Human Rights European Court's judgements. Those elements are permanent, non-cumulative and sometimes they can become mutually exclusive such as the maintenance of individual relations between the child and his parents or a healthy environment around the child. The notion of the child's highest interest is autonomous by judgment resources, modes and own methods. This autonomy is slightly linked to the notion's impact in the different European legislations. This large recognition is strengthened by the increase of a conventionality review that reveals the real nature of the child's highest interest. The child's highest interest is from now on part of a key notion in the area of the parental authority's exercise. It creates a new public order that protects the child at the European scale. Its primacy establishes itself more and more clearly. However, some conflicts between the highest interest and other concerted interests and principles suddenly appear. Ultimately, the unit and autonomy of the child's highest interest, which is from now on a law notion, should base an effective protection of the child in Europe.

Les préambules constitutionnels sont répandus à travers le monde, depuis le constitutionnalisme de la fin du XVIIIème. A ce jour, plus de deux constitutions sur trois dans le monde en sont précédées. Pourtant, leur nature suscite un faible intérêt pour la doctrine, voire même un rejet. Pourtant, l'intérêt que leur porte constituants contemporains et l'utilisation qui en est faite par les juges constitutionnels invalide cette position de principe. Il convient de s'attacher à la variété des préambules constitutionnels à travers le monde, en dégager des fonctions et comprendre leurs utilisations contentieuses (ce qui n'exclut nullement la possibilité que certaines juridictions constitutionnelles ne s'y réfèrent pas). A ces fins, une approche marco-comparative puis micro-comparative semblent nécessaires pour embrasser cet objet juridique rarement étudié de manière systématique. / Constitutional Preambles are worldwide spread from the late 18st Century constitutionalism. And today, more than two to three constitutions are opened with such a Preamble. Yet, regarding to their particuliar nature, law studies dealing with them are quite rare, if not deny them. However, the certain onstituents'interest to them and their use by constitutional judges just disprove it. A broad and methodic study dealing with the wide range of Preambles shall be established in ordre to understand their functions and their judicial uses - though a jurisdiction can not use them. To that end, a broad - macro-comparativ - and then a micro-comparativ study must be done, since a systematic study on Preambles has not been done.

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La ricerca, condotta secondo il metodo interdisciplinare e in comparazione tra Unione europea e Stati Uniti d’America, mira a indagare i profili di risk management relativi allo sviluppo e alla immissione sul mercato/messa in servizio dei dispositivi medici di intelligenza artificiale (IA). Speciale attenzione viene rivolta al ruolo del diritto penale nella gestione del “rischio da IA” (con particolare riferimento alla responsabilità colposa per “danno da dispositivo medico AI-based”) nell’ordinamento italiano, espressione della tradizione giuridica di civil law e parte dello “spazio di libertà, sicurezza e giustizia” (v. art. 3, paragrafo 2 TUE) determinato dall’adesione della Repubblica italiana all’Unione europea, e nell’ordinamento federale statunitense, titolare (in virtù dell’art. I § 8 U.S. Constitution) della potestà normativa nella materia de qua e rappresentativo della tradizione giuridica di common law. Segnatamente, la Parte I è dedicata alla disamina delle caratteristiche tecniche dell’IA e delle sue principali applicazioni in medicina, nonché all’illustrazione dell’avanzato livello del dibattito angloamericano in ordine alle decisioni in stato di incertezza scientifica. Nella Parte II vengono illustrate le discipline applicabili alle diverse fasi del “ciclo di vita” di un AI-based medical device, con riguardo prima all’ordinamento dell’Unione europea, poi all’ordinamento federale statunitense. Discipline, queste, aventi natura essenzialmente amministrativistica (o para-amministrativistica), sia che si tratti di hard law (come nel caso dei principali strumenti normativi UE), sia che si tratti soft law (come, invece, prevalentemente si riscontra negli USA), e dalle quali promanano norme di condotta a contenuto cautelare. La Parte III affronta il tema della tutela penale di dette regole cautelari. L’indagine si conclude con una riflessione circa i principali punti “di forza” e “di debolezza” dei sistemi comparati, e, dal punto di vista dell’ordinamento italiano, con una proposta in chiave de lege ferenda: i.e., onde evitare (poco coerenti) effetti disincentivanti dell’attività (consentita) in questione, si auspica una riforma di sistema finalizzata a riequilibrare la portata del diritto penale, in armonia con gli strumenti offerti dal diritto amministrativo e dal diritto civile.

Even in the days of an ever closer European union, Europe contains no less than four different legal cultures with respect to real estate conveyances: the Latin-German notary system, the deregulated Dutch notary system, the lawyer/solicitor system, and the Scandinavian licensed real estate broker system. The latter is of particular interest in that Scandinavian brokers play a far larger role in real estate transactions than their European counterparts.This paper examines and compares the Swedish real estate broker and the Latin notary. The Swedish broker is required by law to act as an impartial intermediary, to provide counseling to both parties, and to assist in drawing up all contracts and other documents necessary for the transaction at hand. To that end, the broker must be active and observant of the particular needs of the parties to the present transaction, always striving to enable them to reach equitable and practical agreements so as to prevent future disputes. In other words, the broker is required to tailor the transaction to fit the needs of the buyer and seller.The Latin notary profession prevails in large parts of the world, particularly the Latin-German parts of continental Europe, and Latin America. While there are divergences in the notarial laws of all countries, the similarities are greater still, and it is correct to speak of a single profession throughout all these countries. The notary carries out several important functions, the nexus of which is the authentication of legal documents. In the preparation of these documents, the notary is required to provide impartial counseling in order to tailor the transaction at hand to fit the will and needs of the parties. To uphold the integra fama of the profession, and to safeguard the proper performance of the notarial functions, lawgivers in all countries emphasize the importance of impartiality and integrity. There are national divergences as to the specific rules of conduct related to impartiality, particularly those concerning what activities are considered incompatible with the notariat, but they rest on common principles. Most importantly, not only must the publica fides be honored, it must be seen in the eyes of the public to be honored. The organization and regulation of the notary profession raises important economic issues, particularly with regard to competition/monopoly and market failures. The discussion of the regulation or deregulation of the notariat is by no means settled. Comparing the two professions, it is striking to see the enormous similarities in the legal frameworks and their respective rationales. Two common features are of particular interest. Firstly, both the Swedish broker and the Latin notary are required to assist the contracting parties in the contract phase, drawing up any necessary documents and counseling the parties as to the implications of the transaction. In that respect, both professions function as tailors to the transaction. Secondly, both the broker and the notary are required to act impartially and independently – impartially visavi the contracting parties, and independently in order to preserve the public faith in the independence and integrity of the professions.The similarities can be summarized as a function on the real estate market: impartial counseling and contract-engineering. This function exists alongside other functions, such as the brokers’ traditional matchmaking, or the registration of property rights. This functional approach may prove very useful in all kinds of analyses of the real estate market, whether of political, legal, or economic nature. For instance, with respect to the merits and/or necessity of the Swedish impartiality rule, those wishing to amend the law and introduce a system of overtly partial brokers acting solely on behalf of their principal have to face the question of what is to become of counseling for the principal’s counterpart. Should the counterpart be forced to choose between hiring their own legal counsel or make do without? Further, those wishing to contest the mandatory notarial intervention in real estate transactions have to face the same question: what is to happen to impartial counseling, given not only to the client but also to the client’s counterpart? Both instances illustrate the common feature shared by the two examined professions: impartial contract-engineering and counseling. To complete the picture and cover the whole arena of real estate transactions, the next logical step is therefore to compare and analyze different systems for registration of property rights. Doing so will hopefully achieve a tool for examining the real estate market that will prove useful indeed, particularly in future discussions concerning European harmonization.

This thesis explores the notion of the employer in English employment law. It seeks to develop a functional reconceptualisation of that notion in the hope of overcoming the theoretical and practical problems resulting from the tensions inherent in the current approach. The first part of the thesis analyses the notion of the employer as counterparty to the contract of employment. Two conflicting strands emerge: the employer is simultaneously identified as a single party to a bilateral contract (the unitary strand) and defined through the exercise of a range of employer functions (the multi-functional strand). As a result of this tension, full employment law coverage is restricted to a narrow paradigm scenario where a single legal entity exercises all employer functions. Modern economic developments, from the rise of employment agencies and service companies to corporate groups and Private Equity investors, have however increasingly led to the joint exercise of such functions across multiple entities. The second part illustrates the practical implications of these developments: regulatory obligations are placed on inappropriate entities, and workers may even find themselves without recourse to any employment law protection. An additional chapter compares this situation with the notion of the employer in German law, where a sophisticated apparatus has been developed in order to address the particular challenges of employment in multi-entity scenarios, in particular in corporate groups. On the basis of these observations the final part of the thesis then proposes a reconceptualised notion. The employer is defined as the entity, or combination of entities, exercising functions regulated in a particular domain of employment law. Each of the two strands of the current notion is addressed in turn to demonstrate how this more openly multi-functional approach addresses the rigidities of the current notion without abandoning an underlying unitary conceptualisation. It is hoped that the resulting notion of the employer will be able to place employment law obligations on the entity, or combination of entities, exercising the relevant employer functions, regardless of the formal legal organisation of the enterprise in question.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The various constructions of rights of pre-emption encountered in South African case law all have some merit. This is confirmed by the multiplicity of types of preference contracts encountered in German law especially. The tendency of South African courts and writers to portray one approach as the only correct one to the exclusion of all other views, results in tension and confusion, all the more because of the failure to investigate the relevant policy considerations comprehensively. The confusion is compounded by what amounts to a breakdown of the system of precedents with judgments being based on incorrect interpretations of previous decisions and with scant regard for contrary decisions. No certainty exists regarding the construction of the contractual right of pre-emption in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, nor is it clear what figure or figures were received into South African law. The Germanic concept of tiered ownership that forms the historical basis for the Oryx remedy, does not form part of our law. This accounts for the difficulty that courts and writers have in explaining this remedy in terms of Romanist terminology, and the resort to the language of fiction. German law and English law, relied upon in South African case law, do not support a uniform construction of all rights of pre-emption as creating an enforceable duty to make an offer upon manifestation of a desire to sell. The almost unanimous support of US courts for a remedy by which the holder can ultimately obtain performance of the main contract upon conclusion of a contract with a third party, challenges the hypothesis suggested by German law that the default construction of preference contracts should be the bare preference contract which only creates a negative obligation. The very cryptic way in which rights of pre-emption are normally drafted, makes it difficult to even identify the main purpose of the parties. It is therefore not easy to classify preference contracts into the different types identified in this study as notional possibilities. A default regime is therefore highly desirable in the interest of legal certainty. The choice of a default regime should be made on the basis of recognised policy considerations, particularly on the basis of an equitable balancing of typical parties' interests and in view of communal interests balanced against the demand for legal certainty. The choice of default regime cannot be based merely on historical authority or precedent (which is in any event unclear in the present context) or unsubstantiated claims that one model is more logical or commercially useful than another. When rules are chosen as the default regime, these rules must, as far as possible, be reconciled with the existing conceptual structure of our law to prevent contradictions and inconsistencies. A policy analysis reveals that three default types of preference contract should be recognised, each with a clearly delineated field of application. Firstly, where the agreement allows the grantor to contract with a third party, the holder has the right to contract with the grantor at the terms agreed with the third party. Such a preference contract can therefore be regarded as an option conditional upon conclusion of a contract with a third party. Such contracts are rare in South Africa. In other cases, the default rule should be that the grantor must first give the holder an opportunity to contract before he contracts with a third party. The default construction of this latter type of preference contracts depends on whether the preference contract itself predetermines the main contract price. If so, the holder has a right or option to contract at that price upon any manifestation of a desire to conclude the relevant type of contract. However, where the preference contract does not predetermine the price, or refers to a price that the grantor would accept from third parties, any manifestation of a desire to sell should not be sufficient to trigger the holder's right. The grantor and society have an interest in having her freedom to negotiate with third parties to obtain the best possible price curtailed as little as possible. In such cases, the default rule should be that the holder is only entitled to conclusion of the main contract upon breach in the form of a contract with or offer to a third party. The default rule should also be that such preference contracts - which will be treated as ordinary preference contracts - only terminate upon the grantor actually contracting with and performing to a third party within a reasonable time after the holder declined the opportunity to match those terms, and provided the identity of the third party was disclosed to the holder on request. The holder therefore cannot lose his preferential right by a rejection of an outrageously high offer by the grantor. Options and preference contracts are closely related and overlapping concepts. The type of preference contract that grants a conditional right to contract can often be understood as a conditional option (or at least as a conditional option subject to a resolutive condition that the grantor does not want to contract anymore). The traditional distinction between options and rights of first refusal can only be maintained in respect of some types of preference contracts. These are negative or bare preference contracts which only give rise to remedies aimed at restoring the status quo ante the breach, as well as those preference contracts creating conditional rights to contract which courts refuse to treat as conditional options because their wording implies a duty to make or accept an offer, or because the requirement of certainty precludes them from being options. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die verskillende konstruksies van voorkoopsregte aanvaar III Suid-Afrikaanse beslissings het almal meriete. Dit word bevestig deur die verskillende tipes voorkoopskontrakte wat veral in die Duitse reg erken word. Die neiging van Suid- Afrikaanse howe en skrywers om een benadering as die enigste korrekte een te tipeer veroorsaak spanning en onsekerheid, des te meer weens die versuim om die relevante beleidsoorwegings deeglik te ondersoek. Boonop is die presedentestelsel telkens verontagsaam deur verkeerde interpretasies van vorige uitsprake en deurdat teenstrydige uitsprake bloot geïgnoreer is. Geen sekerheid bestaan oor die konstruksie van die kontraktuele voorkoopsreg in die Romeinse of Romeins-Hollandse Reg nie. Dit is ook nie duidelik watter figuur of figure in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg geresipieer is nie. Die Germaanse konsep van gesplitste eiendomsreg wat die historiese basis van die Oryx-meganisme daarstel, vorm nie deel van ons reg nie. Dit verduidelik hoekom howe en skrywers sukkel om dié remedie te verduidelik aan die hand van Romanistiese verbintenisreg-terminologie, en die gevolglike gebruikmaking van fiksie-taal. Die Duitse en Engelse reg waarop gesteun is in Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak, steun nie 'n uniforme konstruksie van alle voorkoopsregte as behelsende 'n afdwingbare plig om 'n aanbod te maak by enige manifestasie van 'n begeerte om te verkoop nie. Die byna eenparige steun van Noord-Amerikaanse howe vir 'n remedie waarmee die voorkoopsreghouer uiteindelik prestasie van die substantiewe kontrak kan kry by sluiting van 'n kontrak met 'n derde, is 'n teenvoeter vir die hipotese gesuggereer deur die Duitse reg dat die verstekkonstruksie van voorkeurkontrakte behoort te wees dat slegs 'n negatiewe verpligting geskep word. Die kriptiese wyse waarop voorkeurkontrakte normaalweg opgestel word, maak dit moeilik om selfs die hoofdoelstelling van die partye te identifiseer. Dit is daarom nie maklik om voorkeurkontrakte te klassifisieer in die verskillende tipes wat in hierdie studie geïdentifiseer is nie. 'n Verstekregime is daarom wenslik in die belang van regsekerheid. Die keuse van verstekregime behoort gemaak te word op die basis van erkende beleidsoorwegings, spesifiek op die basis van 'n billike balansering van tipiese partybelange en in die lig van gemeenskapsbelange gebalanseer teen die vereiste van regsekerheid. Die keuse van verstekregime kan nie gebaseer word bloot op historiese gesag en vorige beslissings nie (wat in elk geval in die huidige konteks onduidelik is). Dit kan ook nie gebaseer word op ongemotiveerde aansprake dat een model meer logies of kommersieël bruikbaar as 'n ander is nie. Wanneer verstekreëls gekies word moet dit, sover moontlik, versoen word met die bestaande begrippe-struktuur van ons reg om teenstrydighede in die sisteem te vermy. 'n Beleidsanalise laat blyk dat drie verstektipes voorkeurkontrakte erken behoort te word, elk met 'n duidelik afgebakende toepassingsveld. Eerstens, waar die ooreenkoms toelaat dat die voorkeurreggewer eers met 'n derde party kontrakteer, het die voorkeurreghouer 'n opsie om te kontrakteer op die terme ooreengekom met die derde. Die voorkeurkontrak kan daarom beskou word as 'n opsie onderhewig aan die voorwaarde van sluiting van 'n kontrak met 'n derde. Sulke kontrakte is raar in Suid- Afrika. In ander gevalle behoort die verstekreël te wees dat die voorkeurreggewer eers die houer 'n geleentheid moet gee om te kontrakteer voordat sy met 'n derde 'n kontrak aangaan. Die verstekkonstruksie van hierdie laasgenoemde tipe voorkeurkontrak hang daarvan af of die voorkeurkontrak self die substantiewe kontraksprys vasstel. Indien wel het die houer die reg of opsie om te kontrakteer teen daardie prys by enige manifestasie van 'n begeerte om die spesifieke soort kontrak te sluit. Maar waar die voorkeurkontrak nie die prys vasstel nie, of verwys na 'n prys wat die gewer sou aanvaar van 'n derde, behoort enige manifestasie van 'n begeerte om te kontrakteer nie genoeg te wees om die houer se reg afdwingbaar te maak nie. Die voorkeurreggewer en die gemeenskap het 'n belang daarby dat die gewer se vryheid om met derdes te onderhandel so min as moontlik beperk word sodat sy die beste moontlike prys kan kry. In sulke gevalle behoort die verstekreël te wees dat die houer slegs geregtig is op die voordeel van die substantiewe kontrak by kontrakbreuk in die vorm van 'n kontrak met of aanbod aan 'n derde. Die verstekreël behoort ook te wees dat sulke voorkeurkontrakte in beginsel slegs beëindig word wanneer die voorkeurreggewer inderdaad kontrakteer met en presteer aan 'n derde binne 'n redelike tyd nadat die voorkeurreghouer die geleentheid gegee is om daardie terme te ewenaar. Dit behoort ook vereis te word dat die identiteit van die derde aan die houer geopenbaar word op sy versoek. Die houer kan dus nie sy voorkeurreg verloor deur nie-aanvaarding van 'n belaglik hoë aanbod deur die voorkeurreggewer nie. Opsies en voorkeurkontrakte is oorvleulende konsepte. Die tipe voorkeurkontrak wat 'n voorwaardelike reg om te kontrakteer verleen kan dikwels verstaan word as 'n voorwaardelike opsie (of minstens as 'n voorwaardelike opsie onderhewig aan 'n ontbindende voorwaarde dat die gewer glad nie meer wil kontrakteer nie). Die tradisionele onderskeid tussen opsies en voorkeurregte kan slegs behou word tov sommige voorkeurkontrakte. Hulle is die "negatiewe" voorkeurkontrakte, wat slegs aanleiding gee tot remedies gemik op herstel van die status quo ante kontrakbreuk sowel as daarde voorkeurkontrakte wat voorwaardelike regte om te kontrakteer skep wat howe weier om as voorwaardelike opsies te behandelomdat hulle bewoording wys op 'n plig om 'n aanbod te maak of te aanvaar, of omdat die vereiste van sekerheid hulle verhoed om opsies te wees.

This thesis examines various aspects of English and Canadian charity law in terms of their relationship with the contested categories of ‘public law’ and ‘private law’. It argues that the law of charities can be regarded as a hybrid legal discipline in both a general or categorical sense, and in the context-specific or functional sense that both the conditions for obtaining charitable status, and the regulation of the conduct of charities and their trustees, are continually being adjusted in such a way as to maintain in a broad sense a functional equilibrium between individual project pursuit and collective project pursuit; that is to say, an equilibrium between the protection of the autonomy of property-owning individuals to control and direct their own wealth, and the furtherance of competing public interests or visions of the good. After sketching out the history and nature of the common law charities tradition and the contemporary English and Canadian regulatory regimes, the thesis pursues its analytical and comparative hypotheses by examining two important features of English and Canadian charity law, the public benefit doctrine and the rules of locus standi that determine who may seek relief for misapplications of charity property. It then addresses the comparatively modern issue of the governmental co-optation of charitable resources, considering to what extent modern pressures associated with the retrenchment of welfare states threaten to destabilize charity law’s hybrid equilibrium in EW and Canada. The thesis then turns to the emerging phenomenon of social enterprise, arguing that shifts to charity law’s functional equilibrium may explain the emergence of this ‘post-charitable’ legal form. The thesis concludes with some observations on the hybrid nature of the law of charities, and on the different functional equilibriums between individual project pursuit and collective project pursuit that have been reached by English and Canadian charity law.

This study analyses the treatment of Islamic law (Fiqh) under the English legal system by looking into the developments in waqf law in British India. It has the dual objective of analysing the impact of the English legal system upon Islamic law, and determining the role of various actors in this process. It argues that waqf law was transformed in order to fit into the state structure. The colonial state used the techniques of translation, adjudication, legislation and teaching in order to transform Islamic law. Adjudication was preferred over legislative codification as a mode of governance and rule making because of its flexibility. The translation of classical Islamic legal texts, the Hidāya and certain parts of the Fatāwā al-‘Ālamgīriyya, relieved English judges of the need for a reliance on local legal advisors. However, Muslim lawyers, judges, legal commentators, and some religious scholars (‘ulamā’) simultaneously collaborated and negotiated with, and resisted colonial administrators in the process of legal transformation. As adjudication was a preferred mode of transformation, legal commentaries played a crucial role in legal developments. A majority of legal commentators were Muslims, such as Ameer Ali, Abdur Rahim and Faiz Tyabji. They used their legal treatises to resist any colonial intervention in Islamic law. Although English educated Muslims replaced ‘ulamā’ as cultural intermediaries between the state and society, this did not eliminate the role of ‘ulamā’ as the custodians of Islamic law. They established closer links with society and issued fatāwā (legal opinions) on legal issues. Fatāwā were sought regarding every important aspect of waqf law, from the validity of family awqāf to the management of awqāf and the permissibility of awqāf of movables such as shares of companies. ‘Ulamā’ also lobbied for the enforcement of Islamic law in order to promote women’s rights of inheritance and to get a divorce. This study finds that Anglo-Muhammadan law was a product of interaction between various sections of Muslim society and colonial administrators. It reflected the socio-political context of colonial India and the process of negotiations between divergent interest holders. Despite replacing the traditional institutional structure, the overall legal system became more inclusive. It could interact with various stakeholders and represent them in the process of law making in order to respond to social change.