Este trabalho busca uma melhor compreensão do princípio do devido processo legal, positivado pelo art. 5º, LIV, da CRFB. A maior parte da literatura jurídica nacional que o aborda concentra seus esforços em proclamar a importância do princípio ou em buscar explicá-lo com base no seu desenvolvimento no direito constitucional norte-americano. Parece-nos, entretanto, que uma compreensão constitucionalmente adequada do princípio exige uma abordagem diversa, coincidente com a usual apenas no primeiro passo, que é a apreensão de seu funcionamento no ambiente jurídico de origem. Em não se tratando de um trabalho de direito comparado, outros passos devem se seguir. Assim, sua continuação consiste na pesquisa dos antecedentes doutrinários que conduziram ao transplante do due process of law para o direito constitucional brasileiro. Depois, é necessário situá-lo no contexto da Constituição analítica de um Estado que se vincula à família do direito romano-germânico. E, por fim, verificar como o princípio tem sido aplicado na prática jurídica, particularmente pelo STF, tribunal que dá a última palavra em matéria de interpretação constitucional. / This thesis aims to reach a better understanding of the due process of law principle established in the Brazilian Federal Constitution, art. 5º, LIV. Most of brazilian juridical literature on the theme concentrates its efforts on proclaiming the importance of the principle or in trying to provide an explanation on the basis of north-american constitutional experience. But we don’t think any of these approaches are able to provide a constitutionally sound understanding of the principle. We propose a different approach, that also starts by investigating the north-american constitutional experience but goes further. It continues by researching the brazilian juridical literature that dealt with due process of law before the framing of Brazilian Federal Constitution. Next step is to set up the principle in the body of the analytical Constitution of a State which follows the roman-germanic law tradition. Last, but not least, the study examines the way due process of law has been used in juridical practice. We draw particular attention to brazilian Supreme Court’s decisions on that matter, because they state the last and highest constitutional interpretation.

O presente estudo procura examinar criticamente a forma como as competências legislativas são interpretadas no Brasil. Em especial, pretende-se demonstrar que o tema pode e deve se beneficiar das modernas técnicas e instrumentos desenvolvidos pela dogmática do Direito Constitucional contemporâneo. O trabalho se estrutura em três partes. Na Primeira Parte, serão expostas algumas premissas teóricas sobre a interpretação constitucional, o federalismo e a sindicabilidade judicial das competências, que nortearão o desenvolvimento do estudo. Na Segunda Parte, examinam-se os processos de qualificação das leis e de interpretação das competências legislativas. A partir do esboço de uma teoria das competências legislativas, será defendida a aplicação de parâmetros segundo os quais, em princípio, todos os dispositivos de competência devem ser interpretados da forma mais ampliativa possível, sendo as eventuais restrições, impostas por outras regras de competência, consideradas e justificadas argumentativamente. Em sua Terceira Parte, e última, o estudo identificará o fenômeno dos conflitos de competências legislativas em geral, esquecidos pela doutrina brasileira , examinando, na sequência, alguns critérios para sua solução. Afastada a possibilidade de recurso à supremacia do direito federal e ao princípio da subsidiariedade, bem como a preferências de mérito, serão desenvolvidos dois parâmetros formais e um material para a solução das inconsistências insolúveis entre competências. / This paper aims to analyze critically the way heads of legislative power are read and enforced in Brazil. In particular, it tries to demonstrate that this subject can and should benefit from the modern techniques and instruments developed by contemporary Constitutional Law. The paper is divided in three parts. In the First Part, some theoretical premises are established, regarding constitutional interpretation, federalism, and the justiciability of federative conflicts, which shall guide the rest of the study. The Second Part examines the processes of characterization of laws and interpretation of heads of legislative power. After sketching a theory of legislative powers, the paper develops standards according to which, in principle, all heads of power ought to be read in their widest possible range, and restrictions imposed by heads of powers relating to other governments must be considered and justified argumentatively. In the Third Part, its last, the paper identifies the phenomenon of legal inconsistencies between heads of power usually forgotten by Brazilian authors and analyses some of the criteria proposed for their solution. Once the supremacy of federal law and the principle of subsidiarity, as well as content-based preferences are ruled out, the paper develops two form-based and one matter-based standard for the solution of the so-called real legal inconsistencies between heads of legislative power.

Este trabalho busca uma melhor compreensão do princípio do devido processo legal, positivado pelo art. 5º, LIV, da CRFB. A maior parte da literatura jurídica nacional que o aborda concentra seus esforços em proclamar a importância do princípio ou em buscar explicá-lo com base no seu desenvolvimento no direito constitucional norte-americano. Parece-nos, entretanto, que uma compreensão constitucionalmente adequada do princípio exige uma abordagem diversa, coincidente com a usual apenas no primeiro passo, que é a apreensão de seu funcionamento no ambiente jurídico de origem. Em não se tratando de um trabalho de direito comparado, outros passos devem se seguir. Assim, sua continuação consiste na pesquisa dos antecedentes doutrinários que conduziram ao transplante do due process of law para o direito constitucional brasileiro. Depois, é necessário situá-lo no contexto da Constituição analítica de um Estado que se vincula à família do direito romano-germânico. E, por fim, verificar como o princípio tem sido aplicado na prática jurídica, particularmente pelo STF, tribunal que dá a última palavra em matéria de interpretação constitucional. / This thesis aims to reach a better understanding of the due process of law principle established in the Brazilian Federal Constitution, art. 5º, LIV. Most of brazilian juridical literature on the theme concentrates its efforts on proclaiming the importance of the principle or in trying to provide an explanation on the basis of north-american constitutional experience. But we don’t think any of these approaches are able to provide a constitutionally sound understanding of the principle. We propose a different approach, that also starts by investigating the north-american constitutional experience but goes further. It continues by researching the brazilian juridical literature that dealt with due process of law before the framing of Brazilian Federal Constitution. Next step is to set up the principle in the body of the analytical Constitution of a State which follows the roman-germanic law tradition. Last, but not least, the study examines the way due process of law has been used in juridical practice. We draw particular attention to brazilian Supreme Court’s decisions on that matter, because they state the last and highest constitutional interpretation.

Emergente a partir do final do século XX, o constitucionalismo popular enquanto campo acadêmico, tem buscado desconstruir a narrativa que legitima a afirmação da supremacia do judicial review estadunidense. Segundo seus expoentes, o melhor desenho envolveria a interpretação política, e não legal, da Constituição. Selecionados os exemplos de Larry Kramer, Mark Tushnet e Jeremy Waldron, o trabalho buscará abordar seus argumentos desde um ponto de vista individual, mas também os elementos que lhes são comuns. Nesse sentido, além da ofensiva à revisão judicial, busca-se identificar os debates que se fazem presentes, e atravessam o campo, tais como a utilidade de um tribunal que traga estabilidade ao sistema político, a ideia de melhor intérprete, a questão contramajoritária e o ideal de autogoverno democrático, em uma sociedade contemporânea atravessada pelo desacordo. Considerados os argumentos, busco chamar a atenção para a parcialidade do pensamento dominante, cuja recepção se ampara sobre bases problemáticas. / Since the late twentieth century, popular constitutionalism has risen as an academic field that seeks deconstructing the narrative that justifies the affirmation of the supremacy of the American judicial review. According to its supporters, the best design for it would not involve the legal, but the political interpretation of the constitution. Selecting the examples of Larry Kramer, Mark Tushnet and Jeremy Waldron, this work aims at addressing their statements not only as individual points of view, but also considering the elements they have in common. In this sense, besides being an assault on judicial review, this texts focuses on identifying the debates that arise and crisscross the field, such as the usefulness of a court which brings stability to the political system, the idea of best constitutional decision-making, the countermajoritarian difficulty, and the ideal of democratic self-government in a contemporary society pervaded by disagreement. Taking such issues into consideration, I propose drawing attention to the bias of mainstream constitutional thinking, whose reception lies on problematic bases.

[pt] A interpretação constitucional é objeto freqüente de reflexão da doutrina jurídica contemporânea, a ocorrência de conflito entre normas vigentes e uma ampliação do caráter principiológico dos textos constitucionais exigem uma nova proposta metodológica na interpretação da Carta Magna. A proposta de permissão legal para antecipação terapêutica de parto em caso de anencefalia fetal foi formulada como estudo de caso devido a sua repercussão nos diversos setores da sociedade brasileira. A racionalidade laica utilizada pelos ensinos da Bioética é essencial para a construção de argumentos legítimos no processo deliberativo. Os dados empíricos do Instituto Fernandes Figueira comprovam a especialidade deste tipo de gestação, impondo uma análise interdisciplinar na qual os conhecimentos jurídicos recebem o complemento teórico da área médica. Esta interligação dos campos científicos acarreta uma dinâmica no estudo do Direito, não podendo mais ser este entendido como um sistema fechado de normas. O conflito de valores fundamentais envolvidos no estudo de caso e a provocação de uma solução judicial a respeito remetem a um questionamento sobre a função constitucional do Supremo Tribunal Federal e seu papel dentro do Estado Democrático de Direito. / [en] The constitutional interpretation is frequent object of reflection of the legal doctrine contemporary, the occurrence of conflict between effective norms and a magnifying of the importance of principles in the texts constitutional demands a new proposal of methodic in the interpretation of the Constitution. The study of case formulated, the proposal of legal permission for therapeutical anticipation of childbirth in case of fetal anencephaly, its repercussion in the diverse sectors of the Brazilian society. The laical rationality used by educations of Bioethics is essential for the construction of legitimate arguments in the deliberative process. The empirical data of the Instituto Fernandes Figueira prove the specialty of this type of gestation, imposing a new analysis in which the legal knowledge receive the complement theoretical from the medical area. This interconnection of the scientific fields causes one dynamic study of the Law, not being able the understood of the Law as a closed system of norms. The conflict of basic values in the study of case and the provocation of a judicial solution sends to a questioning on the constitutional function of the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court and its paper on the Democratic State of Right.

This thesis examines the topic of conflict of norms in European Union (EU) law and the legal reasoning of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), arguing that the framework of conflict of norms provides conceptual insight into justification and the role of value choices in legal reasoning. After examining the theory of conflict of norms, which seems to have been relatively under-studied generally and especially in EU law, it examines three particular aspects of norm conflict resolution in the legal reasoning of the ECJ and EU law: conflict of interpretative norms, especially the opposition between conserving and innovative interpretation; conflicts of human rights norms, looking in particular at the idea of a hierarchy of rights and of specificationism in the articulation of rights; and conflicts of competence norms. It concludes that the scope exists for a fuller justification of the choice of norms in the legal reasoning of the ECJ and generally in EU law and offers a perspective on how the values articulated by the EU suggest particular approaches to norm conflict resolution by the ECJ in its decision-making in these fields, in particular, a greater resort to lex specialis and originalist or historical interpretation, in contrast to its current method.

"The Ethiopian Constitution, in a 'creative stroke', provides the power to "interpret" the Constitution to the House of Federation (the House), which is referred to by some writers as the "Upper House" or "Second Chamber" of the bicameral parliament. The Constitution also establishes the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (the Council), a body composed of members of the judiciary, legal experts appointed by the House of Peoples' Representatives and three persons designated by the House from among its members, to examine constitutional issues and submit its recommendations to the House for a final decision. This is, of course, very different from a number of other more well-known legal systems which vest the power of constitutional review either in general courts or in constitutional courts set up exclusively for constitutional matters. The formal way through which issues of constitutional interpretation take place is via the Council. Issues of constitutional interpretation are referred to the Council by a court or "the interested party" to a dispute. The Council, after examining the constituitonal issue, can either remand the case to the competent court after it has found no need for constitutional interpretation, or submit its findings on constitutional interpretation to the House. The House, after deliberating on the suggestions of the Council, can either accept or reject the recommendations of the Council. It should be noted that a party not satisfied with the order of the Council to remand the case to the competent cout for lack of grounds of constitutional interpretation, may appeal against the order to the House. As indicated above, the House has the final and ultimate power to interpret the Constitution. However, the role of the courts in the interpretation of the Constitution is still far from settled. The function, relation and co-existence of the courts and other organs of state need to be spelled out clearly. The extent to which, and the circumstances under which, the judiciary should defer to other institutions, and especially to the House, need to be ascertained. The difficulty lies in determining where the role of the court ends and that of the other institutions (especially the Council and House) begins. The problem has a normative component as well. The Ethiopian approach to constitutional review, one may argue, is a response to the ocunter-majoritarian dilemma. By excluding the involvement of ordinary or special courts from the business of constiutional review ,the government has made it impossible for the court to "usurp legislative power". A question, however, remains whether this really represents an adequate response to the counter-majoritarian dilemma. This research paper investigates both the descriptive and normative component of the problem. As the title of the study and the discussion in the preceding paragraphs suggest, it asks who interprets the Constitution and who should do so. While the first part sets out to investigate the structure and institutions of constitutional review in Ethiopia, the second part evaluates the legitimacy of the system." -- Introduction. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2004. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

As a result of frequent and flagrant human rights violations by most post-independence African regimes (particularly before the 1990s), the new or substantially revised post-1990 African constitutions entrenched fundamental rights and freedoms. The constitutions of Benin, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Africa established constitutional courts with mandates, inter alia, to deal with any disputes involving the violation of these fundamental human rights. Over the last three decades, the constitutional courts of these three countries have produced a considerable body of human rights jurisprudence that has begun to show that legislation and conduct hostile to human rights cannot be tolerated. This study undertakes a comparative appraisal of the extent to which differences between the common law and civil law legal traditions – on which the design of constitutional courts and the recognition of human rights in Benin, the DRC, and South Africa are based – influence the constitutional interpretation of fundamental rights and the possible implications these have for the promotion of a human rights culture. Three decades after the revival of constitutionalism and concerted attempts to protect fundamental human rights in Africa, it is important to assess whether constitutional jurisdictions established to promote and protect the constitutional order against the attacks that were commonplace before 1990s have used their human rights mandate in a progressive and transformative way such that state and non-state actors respect human rights and constitutionalism. Constitutional courts are increasingly imposing limitations on the exercise of political powers and are being used by some individuals to challenge the despotic tendencies of those who undermine the transformative human rights ideals contained in the constitutions of Benin, the DRC and South Africa. This study is primarily comparative in its methodology. It begins by examining possible influences on the nature, scope, and constitutional interpretation of African bills of rights; it then examines the background and approaches to bills of rights in the three countries. In three subsequent chapters, the study critically investigates the quality of the interpretation of equality and non-discrimination, fair trial, and political rights provisions of the constitutions of these three countries in cases brought before their Constitutional Courts. This is followed by a chapter that provides a comparative overview of trends, developments and lessons from the three constitutional courts. In conclusion, the study argues that although differences between the common law and civil law legal traditions significantly influence approaches to bills of rights and the interpretation of human rights by the three constitutional courts, these courts have the potential to improve the quality of their interpretations and learn from each other. More specifically, it is contended that many African countries, especially those operating under the civil law tradition, can learn much from the experience of the South African Constitutional Court. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2021. / Centre for Human Rights / LLD / Restricted

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:27:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silvio Luiz Maciel.pdf: 1023048 bytes, checksum: 6f6f1e168654ca0acc3baed6763755a5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-08-08 / The purpose of the present study is the analysis of the interpretation in accordance with the Constitution, which is both a hermeneutic tool and a technique for the control of constitutionality. First, the nature of such interpretation is reviewed according to the various senses adopted by the doctrine and jurisprudence: as a constitutional principle; as a method or rule for legal interpretation; as a modern form of constitutional interpretation; as a method or technique for the control of constitutionality. Then, such interpretation is approached as a form to close the gaps and optimize the Constitution. After such review, the origin and the historic evolution of the interpretation in accordance with the Constitution are studied. Next, the instrument is discussed as a method to control constitutionality, taking into account the different issues related to this approach: the pertinence of such interpretation for the diffuse and concentrated methods of constitutionality; the difference between such method and partial unconstitutionality without textual reduction; the applicability or not of plenary reservation in the decisions awarded by the Court; the extent of the binding effect of such interpretation as issued by the Supreme Federal Court. There is further the study of the various fundamentals indicated by the Brazilian and foreign doctrine and jurisprudence to justify the use of interpretation in accordance with the Constitution. Finally, the limits of such interpretation and the issue of the so-called interpretation of the Constitution in accordance with the law are examined / O presente estudo dedica-se à análise da interpretação conforme a Constituição, que ao mesmo tempo é instrumento hermenêutico e técnica de controle de constitucionalidade. Em primeiro é analisada a natureza da interpretação conforme, nas diversas acepções pelas quais é encarada pela doutrina e jurisprudência: como princípio constitucional; como método ou regra de interpretação jurídica; como moderna forma de interpretação constitucional; como método ou técnica de controle de constitucionalidade. Em seguida faz-se a abordagem da interpretação conforme como forma de colmatação de lacunas e de otimização constitucional. Após tais análises, são estudadas a origem e evolução histórica da interpretação em conformidade com a Constituição. Na seqüência o instituto é abordado em sua vertente de método de controle de constitucionalidade, com o enfrentamento das questões correspondentes a esse enquadramento: o cabimento da interpretação conforme nos métodos difuso e concentrado de constitucionalidade; sua distinção com a inconstitucionalidade parcial sem redução de texto; a aplicabilidade ou não da reserva de plenário nas decisões de proferidas pelos Tribunais; a extensão do efeito vinculante da interpretação conforme proferida pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal. São estudados ainda os diversos fundamentos indicados pela doutrina e jurisprudência nacionais e estrangeiras para justificar o emprego da interpretação conforme. Ao final, são analisados os limites da interpretação conforme e a questão da chamada interpretação da Constituição conforme a lei

本論文主要在探討大法官審理案件法修正後，大法官解釋制度的演變，且為求對原先制度有所了解，亦論及修正前的運作情形。主要目的在試圖從制度發展的觀點，對大法官解釋制度的運作做時間縱斷面的分析，期能有助於吾人了解制度的演進歷程。 　　本論文共分成七章，約十二萬餘字，大致內容如下： 　　第一章　緒論。 　　本章旨在說明研究的動機、目的、範圍、架構、途徑以及方法等，並檢閱相關的研究論文。 　　第二章　大法官解釋制度之目的。 　　大法官解釋制度，可分為解釋憲法和統一解釋法律及命令兩種。就解釋憲法言，欲論其制度之目的，宜先就憲法的特性予以分析，以期對制度不僅能知其然，且能知其所以然、所應然。故本章先分析憲法的特性，然後分述解釋憲法和統一解釋法令之目的。 　　第三章　大法官解釋制度之建制與發展。 　　本章係在論述「大法官會議規則」與「大法官會議法」適用期間，解釋制度的運作情形。一方面分析法令的規定，一方面亦探討實際運作的發展，以期能了解「大法官審理案件法」實施時的起點制度。 　　第四章　大法官審理案件法的修正過程。 　　本章乃是從法案的修正背景、研擬與審議三方面，來探討其修正過程。 　　第五章　現行大法官解釋制度的轉變與檢討（一）－－有關解釋案件之審理。 　　第六章　現行大法官解釋制度的轉變與檢討（二）－－有關憲法法庭之建制。 　　上述兩章係在分析大法官審理案件法修正後，解釋制度的轉變，並檢討其得失。第五章是著重在解釋程序上的改變，第六章則在探討憲法法庭與違憲解散審理的有關問題。 　　第七章　結論 　　縱論大法官解釋制度所發揮的功能，並展望未來可能的發展。