Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:20:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Priscilla Milena Simonato.pdf: 508067 bytes, checksum: b08fa76ded48c56a5e55f75845435744 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-05-28 / This dissertation talks about the concept of economic dependence for getting the pension benefit for death. It aims to analyze who the insured s economic dependents are, according to the Federal Constitution. The pension benefit for Death, constitutionally provided, as well as listed in an ordinary law n. º 8.213/91, is a social security benefit granted to the insured dependents. However, the common law has created an exhaustive list of dependents who have the real social security benefits in case of death risk. This list of dependents, besides having the reliant presumption, violates, in many cases, the constitutional principles about the social justice and exact application of the principle of human dignity, which is a fundamental right and lead us to search the real concept of economic dependence through a constitutional interpretation / A presente dissertação versa sobre o conceito de dependência econômica para fins de concessão do benefício de pensão por morte. Visa analisar quem são os dependentes econômicos do segurado à luz da Constituição Federal. O benefício da Pensão por Morte, previsto constitucionalmente, bem como previsto na legislação ordinária n.º 8.213/91, é um benefício previdenciário concedido aos dependentes do segurado. No entanto, a legislação ordinária criou um rol taxativo de dependentes que fazem jus ao benefício previdenciário na ocorrência do risco morte. Tal rol de dependentes, por ter uma presunção de dependência, em muitos casos fere os preceitos constitucionais da busca da justiça social e a aplicação exata do princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana, direito este fundamental, o que leva na busca do real conceito da dependência econômico através de uma interpretação constitucional

af / Suid-Afrika is sedert 27 April 1994 'n materiele regstaat, wat deur beide uitdruklike en 'ongeskrewe' fundamentele waardes onderskraag word. Dit is juis hierdie fundamentele waardes wat 'n blote formele konstitusie (as grondslag van 'n relative democracy) van 'n oppermagtige grondwet (as basis van 'n materiele standard-setting democracy) onderskei. Alhoewel daar 'n lewendige debat oor die toepaslikheid van die talle tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodes gevoer word, is daar nietemin tans geen oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma vir grondwetuitleg nie. Soms wil dit voorkom asof fundamentele grondwetlike waardes net as normatiewe retoriek, in stede van materiele riglyn, by grondwetuitleg gebruik word. Die owerheidsgesag is aan hoer normatiewe regsbeginsels gebonde wat grotendeels in die fundamentele regte-akte (as deel van 'n oppermagtige grondwet) vervat is. Die gewaarborgde fundamentele regte dien derhalwe as konkretisering van beide die regstaat en die demokrasie: die materiele regstaatbegrip is die basis van _die grondwetlike staat. Die materiele regstaat, as geregtigheidstaat, kan dus gesien word as die eindbestemming van die grondwet as lex fundamentalis in die regsorde. 'n Oppermagtige grondwet is egter onlosmaaklik verbind aan die materiele regstaat. Daarom behels grondwetuitleg noodwendig die aktivering van die grondwetlik-gepositiveerde waardes. Hierdie normatiewe regsbeginsels en fundamentele waardes wat in die grondwet as grundnorm van die geregtigheidstaat beliggaam is, moet dan deur 'n onafhanklike regbank gehandhaaf en afgedwing word. In beginsel is grondwetuitleg gemoeid met die identifisering, handhawing en aktivering van die fundamentele waardes wat 'n oppermagtige grondwet onderskraag. Waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg is nietemin nie 'n bloudruk waarmee aile praktiese uitlegprobleme opgelos kan word nie, maar 'n oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma: 'n dwingende, normatiewe verwysingsraamwerk waarvandaan, waarbinne en waarheen grondwetuitleg op pad is. Die tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodiek is bloat aanvullende tegnieke wat 'n waarde-aktiverende paradigma van grondwetuitleg ondersteun. Aangesien fundamentele waardes onlosmaaklik deel van die materiele regstaat is, moet grondwetuitleg nie net waardebaseer nie, maar ook waardegerig wees; nie net waardes handhaaf nie, maar ook bevorder en aktiveer; nie net waardes weerspieel nie, maar ook aktief vestig. 86 'n raamwerk vir grondwetuitleg behels die 'animering' en konkretisering van fundamentele waardes, ideale en standaarde wat die materiele regstaat onderle, kortom, waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg as vergestalting van die materiele regstaat. / On 27 April1994 South Africa became a constitutional state (Rechtsstaat), underpinned by both express, and 'unwritten' fundamental constitutional values. These values represent the distinction between a formal constitution (ie the basis of a relative democracy), and a supreme constitution (the foundation of a material standard-setting democracy). Although the merits of various methods of constitutional interpretation are hotly debated, no general value-based paradigm for constitutional interpretation has yet been established. At times it seems as if fundamental constitutional values are merely invoked as normative rhetoric during constitutional interpretation, rather than as substantive guidelines. Government institutions are bound by these higher normative legal principles, which in a supreme constitution are articulated primarily in the bill of fundamental rights. The guaranteed fundamental rights are a concretisation of both the constitutional state and democracy: the material law state principle (Rechtsstaatprinzip) as the foundation of the constitutional state. The Rechtsstaat as 'just state' is the ultimate goal of a supreme constitution as lex fundamentalis in the legal order. A supreme constitution is inextricably linked to the Rechtsstaat. As a result, constitutional interpretation inevitably involves animating and activating values positivised within the constitution.These normative legal principles and fundamental values must be maintained and enforced by an independent judiciary. In principle, constitutional interpretation deals with the identification, maintenance and animation of the fundamental values underlying a supreme constitution. Value-activating constitutional interpretation is not a blueprint for resolving all practical interpretive problems, but it is a general value-based paradigm: a peremptory, normative frame of reference from which, within which and towards which all constitutional interpretation should be directed. The traditional methodologies of constitutional interpretation are merely ancillary techniques supporting a value-activating paradigm of constitutional interpretation. Since fundamental values undeniably form part of the Rechtsstaat, constitutional interpretation should not only be value-based, but also values-directed; should not merely uphold the values, but also promote and activate them; should not only reflect the values, but also actively establish them. Such a framework for constitutional interpretation involves the animation and concretisation of the fundamental values, standards and ideals underlying the constitutional state: valueactivating constitutional interpretation as embodiment of the Rechtsstaat. / Law / LL.D. (Law)

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

The issue of the vertical /or horizontal operation of the Bill of Rights (chapter 3) is a controversial one. The interim constitution deals with this controversy in a subtle way by avoiding direct horizontal operation of Chapter 3. Instead, it provides for the so-called 'seepage to horizontal relationships' in terms of section35{3). This apparently was a political compromise between the pro-vertical only and the pro-horizontal groups. The human rights history of this country justifies a Bill of Rights that would have both vertical and horizontal operation. However, in section 35 (3) there is potential for the values enshrined in the constitution and Chapter 3, and the spirit hereof, to permeate and filter through the entire legal system in all it's applications. It would seem, however, as demonstrated by the decision in De Klerk v Du Plessis, that the extent to which this filtering process will benefit individuals in their private relations, will depend on the interpretation given to section 35 (3) by the courts. If courts, as it happend in De Klerk's case fail to realise the full import of section 35 ( 3) aspects of the existing law which are unjust could remain and the process of creating a just, open and democratic society will be hampered. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.M.

The Zuma case - important as the first decision of the Constitutional Court - is primarily concerned with the constitutionality of section 217(l)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In trying to fmd an answer to this question, the Constitutional Court also addressed other important issues. In this dissertation the Constitutional Court's decision on the constitutionality of section 217(1)(b)(ii) is examined, as well as important general principles laid down by the Court regarding incompetent referrals by the Supreme Court; constitutional interpretation; reverse onus provisions and the right to a fair trial; as well as the application of the general limitation clause. A closer look is taken at adherence to these principles in subsequent Constitutional Court decisions, and finally a conclusion is reached on the value of the Zuma case. / Law / LL.M. (Law)

L’histoire a toujours occupé une place singulière au sein des sciences sociales mais qu’en est il de sa place dans le contentieux constitutionnel comparé des démocraties occidentales ? Le présent travail de recherche tendra ainsi à démontrer que la référence à l’histoire est bel et bien présente et qu’elle revêt un impact décisif sur les solutions constitutionnelles effectivement retenues pas le juge comme sur la substance même des droits et libertés fondamentaux. Il apparaîtra, en effet, que l’histoire, jaillissant dans le contentieux constitutionnel sous la forme d’un référent juridique type pouvant faire l’objet d’une systématisation au sein du droit comparé, contribue, par le truchement du juge constitutionnel à l’établissement comme au fonctionnement de l’État de droit contemporain. De la même manière, la symbolique particulière des évènements historiques qui seront mobilisés, c’est à dire leur charge positive ou négative pour l’État de droit, va nourrir la volonté juridictionnelle du juge d’assurer la rupture avec un fait historique tragique ou à l’inverse de conforter un héritage historique glorieux. Juge qui, en dernier analyse, pourra être conduit, conformément au rôle social nouveau que lui confère les démocraties constitutionnelles contemporaines, selon une utilisation soutenue du référent historique, à réparer directement ou plus indirectement les préjudices nés de l’histoire comme à renforcer ou à limiter le sens des droits et libertés fondamentaux devenus historiquement circonstanciés / History has always occupied a singular place within the realm of Social Sciences and the question of its functions in comparative judicial review deserves to be raised. This research intends to demonstrate that the historical argument has a decisive impact on constitutional decisions as well as on the substance of fundamental rights and freedoms. History, being systematized in comparative law, through the form of a standard legal argument, contributes, via constitutional review, to the establishment as well to the operation of the rule oflaw, today. The immediate legal logic of such historical impregnation will be analysed through the work of the judge in the motivation of its decisions. In the same perspective, the singular meaning of historical events and their positive or negative impact, feeds judicial interpretation, either breaking away from a tragic historical event or consolidating a glorious historicalheritage. The judge, in accordance with his new social function recognized in western democracies, is lead to repare directly or indirectly, the damages resulting from historical events as well as to strenghten or limitate the scope of fundamental rights, which appear today, historically situated

A sociedade brasileira aguarda pacientemente e há anos uma real reforma que introduza a ética e a moral no meio político e faça valer a soberania de seu povo. De um lado, observa-se um Poder Legislativo com sérias dificuldades de quebrar sua inércia e cumprir o seu papel de concretizar a lei como expressão da vontade geral. De outro, um Poder Judiciário que busca suprir os anseios sociais dando efetividade aos direitos fundamentais colocados na Constituição Federal da República Brasileira de 1988. O presente estudo almeja analisar como o Estado brasileiro tem convivido com um intenso ativismo judicial ou judicialização da política e suas consequências para a democracia pátria. Para a eficácia de suas conclusões, limitou-se o campo de estudo à matéria eleitoral, dada sua cristalina correlação com o Estado Democrático de Direito. Foram selecionadas, deste modo, as recentes decisões dos Tribunais nacionais em temas eleitorais para averiguar os reflexos desta jurisprudência sobre as bases democráticas de nosso país. E, em assim procedendo, foram trazidos elementos para uma crítica fundamentada à tentativa do Poder Judiciário de moralizar as instituições políticas, buscando fornecer as bases para concluir se esse altivo movimento dos Tribunais logrou, de fato, o aprimoramento do regime democrático vigente, preservando a harmonia entre os Poderes, a unidade do ordenamento jurídico e a legitimidade das instituições da nação ou se, ao contrário, apenas soluções pontuais foram conquistadas, combatendo-se uma doença grave com remédios paliativos ao invés de atacar a real causa das mazelas que assolam o Estado Democrático de Direito brasileiro. / The Brazilian society waits patiently and for many years for a deep change that introduces ethics and moral to politics to renew the sovereignty of its people. On one hand, the Parliament presents serious difficulties in moving forward to fulfill its role of materializing the law as an expression of the general will. On the other hand, the judiciary tries to meet social expectations, providing effectiveness to basic rights constitutionally established. This study aims to analyze how the Brazilian State has been living with an intense judicial activism and a judicialization of its politics and its consequences to democracy. For the effectiveness of its conclusions, the object of the analysis was limited to electoral issue, due to its crystal clear relation with the Rule of Law. In this manner, some recent judicial decisions of the national Courts as regards electoral subjects were chosen to verify the consequences of this jurisprudence on the democratic foundations of our country. And, in so proceeding, many aspects were brought to enable a justified criticism to the judiciary attempt to moralize political institutions, trying to provide the basis for the following questions: have, in fact, this noble movement of the Courts succeeded in improving the current democratic Brazilian system, preserving the harmony between the Powers, the unity of the legal system and the legitimacy of the nation institutions?; or, on the opposite, only few hoc solutions have been conquered, fighting with a serious illness by ministering palliative drugs, instead of solving the real cause of the illness that plagues the State?

Les juridictions constitutionnelles ont sans doute de larges compétences interprétatives. Toutefois, l’ampleur de ces compétences varie dans les différents ordres juridiques selon l’aptitude que les autres organes et autorités de l’Etat peuvent adopter devant ces interprétations. Une juridiction constitutionnelle a une suprématie interprétative dans un Etat en particulier si ses interprétations doivent être obligatoirement respectées et appliquées par tous les autres organes et autorités de l’Etat. Si ses interprétations sont seulement obligatoires pour quelques autorités, cette juridiction constitutionnelle a simplement une compétence interprétative supérieure vis-à-vis de ces autorités. Afin d’identifier les plus larges compétences interprétatives des juridictions constitutionnelles, la démarche comparative est hautement recommandée parce qu’elle permet de distinguer plus facilement les limitations que ces juridictions peuvent rencontrer dans leurs ordres juridiques respectifs. Ainsi, en suivant cette démarche, seront identifiées l’ampleur des compétences interprétatives des juridictions constitutionnelles française et colombienne et leurs répercussions dans chacun de leurs Etats. / Constitutional jurisdictions should have wide interpretative powers. However, the scope of these competences varies in different legal systems depending on the ability of other authorities to adopt such interpretations. A constitutional court has interpretative supremacy in a particular State, if its interpretations are binding for all other departments of the State. If its interpretations are just binding for some authorities, this constitutional court would simply have a superior interpretative competence toward those authorities. In order to determine the broader interpretative powers of the constitutional courts, the comparative approach is highly recommended because it makes easier to distinguish the limitations that these jurisdictions may encounter in their respective legal systems. In this way, the scope of the interpretative powers of the French and Colombian constitutional courts will be identified as well as their repercussions in each of its states.

An important change wrought by the post-1994 South African Constitutions is the attempt to have South Africa recognised as a democratic and sovereign state in the "family of nations." The new Constitutions make extensive reference to the state's international obligations and represent an endeavour to [re]define the status of international law vis-a-vis national law. Some provisions utilise international law in the interpretation and formulation of national jurisprudence and represent an [albeit not totally successful] endeavour to attain greater harmonisation between international and national law. This is an attempt to systematize the various criticisms levelled against these provisions to date, and to highlight certain interpretational difficulties and problems that present themselves in the process. The distinction between the various terminologies and branches of international law is also taken to task. Lastly, this paper attempts to determine the extent to which international law is applied at national level under the post-1994 constitutions. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:29:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Adriano Santana Pedra.pdf: 2337462 bytes, checksum: 0ccc70b392e1af4a53f92e6a06f59606 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-06-29 / The objective of this study is to analyze the informal constitutional changes and to further examine the limitations to which they are submitted. In opposition to what occurs with formal changes (constitutional amendments), informal changes are not foreseen by the Constitution. Nevertheless, constitutional changes occur and are necessary as means of preservation and conservation of the Constitution, purposing its perfection, and seeking, through a dialectical process, to attain harmony with society. This is due to the fact that constitutional norms are not to be considered perfect and complete, but are yet in a constant state of mutual interaction with reality. There is no systematic treatment related to the limitations to which constitutional mutations submit existing in fact a shortage of works that deal specifically with the theme. The proposed hypothesis is that constitutional mutation must occur within the limits set by the normative force and by the supremacy of the Constitution itself. For the development of this work, it is necessary to consider that the constitutional norm does not confound with the Constitution text, but it is the result of a concretion process, methodologically structured. According to the concretion theory, constitutional norms result from the connection between the normative program (Normprogram), that is, its literal expression, and the normative ambit (Normbereich), understood by the surrounding reality, which results in a decision norm. Constitutional mutations occur from the existing alterations in the normative ambit and contained by the concretion process. The followed methodological approach proposes the analysis of legitimate ways for constitutional mutations to occur. Through deductive process, the informal constitutional changes that may be contained by the normative program, by the normative ambit and by the decision norm are analyzed. The applied research technique is the bibliographic research, jurisprudential and legislative. The obtained results with the research enables us to evaluate the limitations that are imposed to constitutional mutations, as well as associating them to the elements that integrate the norm. The identified and analyzed limits in this work are the elasticity of the text, the binding orders of the Constitutional Court, the prohibition of abolition of perpetual clauses, the prohibition retreating to fundamental rights and writs (normative program), the transcending restrictions, the legitimate acceptance by the community (normative ambit), the rationality of the decisions, the authority conferred to another institution and the non-retroactivity of the effects of the new interpretation (decision norm) / Este estudo objetiva analisar as mudanças informais da Constituição e examinar os limites a que elas estão submetidas. Ao contrário do que ocorre com as mudanças formais (reforma e revisão constitucional), as mudanças informais não estão previstas na Constituição. Mas as mudanças constitucionais ocorrem e são necessárias como meio de preservação e conservação da própria Constituição, visando ao seu aperfeiçoamento, e buscando, em um processo dialético, alcançar a harmonia com a sociedade. Isto acontece porque as normas constitucionais não podem ser consideradas perfeitas e acabadas, mas estão em uma constante situação de interação com a realidade. Não existe tratamento sistemático relativo às limitações a que se submetem as mutações constitucionais, pois há carência de trabalhos que enfrentem especificamente o tema. A hipótese proposta é que a mutação constitucional deve ocorrer dentro dos limites traçados pela força normativa e pela supremacia da própria Constituição. Para o desenvolvimento deste trabalho, é necessário considerar que a norma constitucional não se confunde com o texto da Constituição, mas é o resultado de um processo de concretização, metodologicamente estruturado. De acordo com a teoria da concretização, as normas constitucionais resultam da conexão entre o programa normativo (Normprogram), ou seja, a sua expressão literal, e o âmbito normativo (Normbereich), entendido como a realidade circundante, o que resulta na norma de decisão. As mutações constitucionais ocorrem a partir das alterações havidas no âmbito normativo e comportadas pelo processo de concretização. A abordagem metodológica seguida propõe a análise dos meios legítimos para ocorrerem as mutações constitucionais. Através de processo dedutivo, analisam-se quais mudanças informais da Constituição são comportadas pelo programa normativo, pelo âmbito normativo e pela norma de decisão. A técnica de pesquisa utilizada é a documentação indireta, através de pesquisa bibliográfica, jurisprudencial e legislativa. Os resultados obtidos com a pesquisa permitem avaliar as limitações que se impõem às mutações constitucionais, assim como associá-las aos elementos integrantes da norma. Os limites identificados e analisados neste trabalho são a elasticidade do texto, as decisões vinculantes do Tribunal Constitucional, a vedação de abolição de cláusulas pétreas, a vedação de retrocesso para direitos e garantias fundamentais (programa normativo), as restrições transcendentes, a aceitação legítima pela comunidade (âmbito normativo), a racionalidade das decisões, a competência conferida a outro órgão e a irretroatividade dos efeitos da nova interpretação (norma de decisão)