Although the self is central to human beings and has been pondered on for thousands and thousands of years, its nature remains unknown to us. Many want to solve the question of self but where does one even begin? Philosophers have investigated the self for hundreds if not thousands of years, and many theories and concepts exist. In more recent years it has become possible for science to investigate the self through the use of psychoactive substances. Most notably is the use of drug-induced ego-dissolution, where individuals report a state of self devoid of many of the characteristics that would normally be considered crucial for our everyday lives. This has created new circumstances, it is no longer solely philosophy that can investigate the self, but also science. By measuring the brain activity of participants who are experiencing this ego-dissolution, information about a disrupted self can be gathered. And by using this data more can be known about the normal state of self than ever before. Even though current research is young, it has still revealed certain elements of the self, such as the importance of connectivity between multiple brain regions. These findings strongly support the materialist network approach to the self, which philosophers are taking note of. Although many of the findings are of interest, they can still be underwhelming due to the vagueness of the exact nature of ego disruption being investigated and the lack of sophistication regarding the conceptualization of self.

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Jan Wallentin. Vägar till samadhi : en granskning av Robert K. C. Formans begrepp ”Pure Consciousness Event” (Roads to Samadhi : An Examination of Robert K. C. Forman’s Concept of ”Pure Consciousness Event”). Umeå University: Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious studies. Bachelor thesis. June 2021.Is Robert K. C. Forman’s concept of ”pure consciousness event” an example of a universal,mystical core experience? Is it possible to establish the neural correlates of this proposedexperience, and to induce it experimentally? These are the main questions of this study,which is a literature review drawing on recent scientific research from three fields: religious studies, philosophy of consciousness and neuroscience.The major findings are:The concept of ”pure consciousness event” (PCE) does seem like a tenable way ofgetting around the constructivist critique regarding universal, mystical core experiences.However, Forman’s original definition of PCE seems too strict. Forman defines PCE as ”a wakeful though contentless (non-intentional) consciousness”, but in the conventional wisdom of contemporary philosophy it is deemed impossible to be conscious without beingconscious about something. A conceivable solution would be to replace the term ”PCE” withThomas Metzinger’s less strict term ”Minimal Phenomenal Experience” (MPE), whichallows for some, though minimal, mental content during these kind of experiences.Regarding neural correlates, several recent studies suggest that a high level of activityin the brain’s default mode network (DMN) is correlated with a heightened sense of self-awareness. A low level of activity in the DMN is, vice versa, correlated with a sense of self-forgetting, as in the flow-experience. However, the activity-level of the DMN does not seem to fully explain the proposed existence of pure consciousness events, even in a less strict definition of this term.Methods used to induce experiences reminiscent of PCE include the white dreams ofTibetan dream yoga (yoga nidrā), states of deep meditation, and the intake of psychoactive substances, like psilocybin, DMT and LSD.Keyterms: Robert K. C. Forman, pure consciousness event, mysticism, samadhi, philosophy of consciousness,Thomas Metzinger, minimal phenomenal experience, drug induced ego dissolution.

[pt] As substâncias psicodélicas clássicas são agonistas serotoninérgicos que atuam essencialmente no sistema de neurotransmissão 5HT2A. Essas substâncias podem promover estados alterados de consciência, bem como alterações visuais, afetivas, de humor e alterações cognitivas. Historicamente, eles têm sido usados para fins ritualísticos, recreativos e medicinais. Estudos indicam que essas substâncias apresentam baixa toxicidade, baixo risco de dependência e overdose. Existe um interesse científico atual no uso dessas substâncias como tratamento para uma variedade de condições e, embora muitos estudos busquem investigar objetivamente os resultados vinculados ao seu uso, os conteúdos subjetivos da experiência dos usuários ainda são pouco explorados. Considerando que a perspectiva de primeira pessoa é central para a experiência psicodélica, esta tese buscou investigar experiências subjetivas ligadas a psicodélicos por meio de uma variedade de abordagens. Primeiramente, buscou-se adaptar e validar o Ego Dissolution Inventory (EDI), instrumento amplamente utilizado por pesquisadores para avaliar um fenômeno essencial da experiência psicodélica, para o contexto brasileiro (Artigo 1). Em seguida, buscou-se explorar relatos públicos negativos (Artigo 2) e positivos (Artigo 3) de usuários de psilocibina (princípio ativo dos cogumelos mágicos), por meio do método Reinert, que analisa quantitativamente as falas transcritas. Por fim, discutiu-se a possível influência dos estados alterados de consciência (ASC), incluindo aqueles relacionados ao uso de substâncias psicoativas, na evolução humana (Artigo 4), sugerindo futuras pesquisas para explorar essa hipótese. / [en] Classical psychedelic substances are serotonergic agonists that act essentially on the 5HT2A neurotransmission system. These substances can promote altered states of consciousness, as well as visual, affective, mood, and cognitive changes. Historically, they have been used for ritualistic, recreational, and medicinal purposes. Studies indicate that these substances have low toxicity, low risk of dependence and overdose. There is current scientific interest in the use of these substances as a treatment for a variety of conditions, and while many studies seek to objectively investigate outcomes linked to their use, the subjective contents of the experience of users is seldom explored. Since a first-person perspective is central to the psychedelic experience, this thesis sought to investigate subjective experiences linked to psychedelics through a variety of approaches. First, we sought to adapt and validate the Ego Dissolution Inventory (EDI), an instrument widely used by researchers to assess a central feature of the psychedelic experience, to the Brazilian context (Article 1). Then, we sought to explore public negative (Article 2) and positive (Article 3) reports of psilocybin (the active principle of magic mushrooms) users, through the Reinert method, which quantitatively analyses transcribed speeches. Finally, the possible influence of altered states of consciousness (ASC), including those linked to use of psychoactive substances, in human evolution was discussed (Article 4), suggesting future research to explore this hypothesis.

Do all conscious states structurally necessitate self-consciousness? For many, the answer is affirmative: self-consciousness is an inherent property of phenomenal consciousness. I refer to this family of theses under the denomination of Strong Subjectivity Claim (SSC). However, reports of DIED (Drug-Induced Ego Dissolution) and MIED (Meditation-InducedEgo Dissolution) seem to suggest otherwise: there are at least some extraordinary circumstances under which no sense of self contributes to the resulting phenomenology. Similarly, subjectivity is altered in depersonalisation, a condition whereby the subject feels detached from oneself. I argue that different varieties of self-consciousness are altered or missing in concomitance with ego dissolution and depersonalisation. Nonetheless, I speculate that depersonalisation per se does not involve a lack of basic self-consciousness — while some reports of ego dissolution indicate that even the most minimal formulation of phenomenal self-consciousness is not adequately present. I identify two modalities —boundlessness and centrelessness — whose implication seems to be crucial in experiences of total lack of self-consciousness. All things considered, I conclude that, while self-consciousness could be a frequent feature of our ordinary experience, SSC is not plausible. In the absence of phenomenal self-consciousness, what remains is the epistemic observation that experiences are self-bounded: no one can have access to each other’s experiences in a first-personal manner. This ontological fact, however, need not be accompanied by a corresponding “sense of self”. Finally, I propose an account explaining the conceivableness of selfless self-reports resting on the premise of the subject being conscious and on her dispositional ability for self-consciousness. / Kräver alla medvetna tillstånd strukturellt självmedvetenhet? För många är svaret jakande: självmedvetenhet är en inneboende egenskap hos fenomenalt medvetande. Jag hänvisar till denna familj av avhandlingar under benämningen Strong Subjectivity Claim (SSC). Rapporter om DIED (Drug-Induced Ego Dissolution) och MIED (Meditation-Induced Ego Dissolution) verkar dock antyda något annat: det finns åtminstone några extraordinära omständigheter när en brist av känsla av jaget bidrar till den resulterande fenomenologin. På liknande sätt förändrar depersonalisation subjektiviteten, ett tillstånd där subjektet känner sig fristående från sig själv. Jag hävdar att olika varianter av självmedvetande förändras ellersaknas i samband med ego upplösning och depersonalisering. Icke desto mindre spekulerar jag att depersonalisation i sig inte innebär brist på grundläggande självmedvetenhet – medan vissa rapporter om egoupplösning indikerar att även den mest minimala formuleringen av fenomenal självmedvetenhet inte är tillräckligt närvarande. Jag identifierar två modaliteter -gränslöshet och centerlöshet - vars implikation verkar vara avgörande i upplevelser av total avsaknad av självmedvetenhet. Sammantaget drar jag slutsatsen att även om självmedvetenhet kan vara ett vanligt inslag i vår vanliga upplevelse, är SSC inte rimligt. I frånvaro av fenomenal självmedvetenhet, kvarstår den epistemiska observationen att upplevelser är självbundna: ingen kan ha tillgång till varandras upplevelser på ett förstapersonligt sätt. Detta ontologiska faktum behöver dock inte åtföljas av en motsvarande "känsla av jaget". Slutligen föreslår jag en redogörelse som förklarar tänkbarheten av osjälviska självrapporter som vilar på premissen att subjektet är medvetet och på hennes dispositionsförmåga till självmedvetenhet.