<p>The swedish law of contract is fundamental within several civil law areas, among others labour law. The labour law contains more explicit legislation specificly adapted to the relation between employers and employees. Sometimes the labour law needs to rely on more general regulations, such as the law of contract. When the situation contains a specific contract relation dilemma it is logical to use the law of contract, when for example the law of employee protection does not reach an acceptabel solution.</p><p>Transfer of undertaking is a situation were the employee protection is disregarded. The Euro directive 2001/23/EG prescribes, by its implemented rules in the law of employee protection, that rights and duties, such as employement agreements, passes on to the earner of the business. The employee also has the right to oppose a new employement situation which follows by the 6 b § 4 piece law of employee protection.</p><p>Transfer of undertaking is becoming common i todays business life why it is important to analyse and clear the meaning of the transfer, from a labour law and contract law perspective. To make a contract law interpretation of what it means to leave an answer regarding a further employment is something that can involve more than as an employee oppose a continued employment. What includes the transfer of undertaking situation for an employee, in a contract law perspective? That is a question that summarizes the main purpose of this essay. My choise is to interpretate the law of contract restrictive to avoid a too general or wide meaning of the law.</p>

The swedish law of contract is fundamental within several civil law areas, among others labour law. The labour law contains more explicit legislation specificly adapted to the relation between employers and employees. Sometimes the labour law needs to rely on more general regulations, such as the law of contract. When the situation contains a specific contract relation dilemma it is logical to use the law of contract, when for example the law of employee protection does not reach an acceptabel solution. Transfer of undertaking is a situation were the employee protection is disregarded. The Euro directive 2001/23/EG prescribes, by its implemented rules in the law of employee protection, that rights and duties, such as employement agreements, passes on to the earner of the business. The employee also has the right to oppose a new employement situation which follows by the 6 b § 4 piece law of employee protection. Transfer of undertaking is becoming common i todays business life why it is important to analyse and clear the meaning of the transfer, from a labour law and contract law perspective. To make a contract law interpretation of what it means to leave an answer regarding a further employment is something that can involve more than as an employee oppose a continued employment. What includes the transfer of undertaking situation for an employee, in a contract law perspective? That is a question that summarizes the main purpose of this essay. My choise is to interpretate the law of contract restrictive to avoid a too general or wide meaning of the law.

Le premier chapitre montre l'interdépendance sur le marché locatif entre le formalisme procédural (FP) et les réseaux sociaux locaux. Tandis que le FP augmente le coût de résolution des conflits juridiques entre propriétaires et locataires, les réseaux sociaux présentent l'avantage de pouvoir régler un conflit sans la justice. Le FP permet de rendre plus intéressant aux yeux du propriétaire les individus appartenant à un réseau social. Le deuxième chapitre explique l'importance du soleil sur la demande de régulation du marché locatif. Les pays d'Europe du sud très ensoleillés sont attractifs de par leur douceur de vie. Cette immigration potentielle augmente la tension sur le marché locatif. Pour la réduire, les individus d'Europe du sud développent une complémentarité entre capital social local et régulation. Cette stratégie explique un équilibre méditerranéen où le capital social local et le FP sont élevés. A contrario, l'absence d'attractivité des pays faiblement ensoleillés explique un équilibre anglo-saxon et scandinave aux caractéristiques opposées. Le troisième chapitre explique le soutien pour la régulation du marché du travail par la présence de régulations sur le marché locatif. Lorsque ce dernier est très régulé, les propriétaires sélectionnent les locataires selon leur capacité à payer le loyer. Protéger les contrats à durée indéterminée oblige les entreprises à sélectionner les travailleurs et permet alors aux propriétaires de mieux estimer le risque individuel de licenciement. Nous construisons un modèle où les individus sans emploi demandent plus de régulations et de protections en dépit de l’augmentation du chômage et de la part des contrats temporaires. / The first contribution studies the complementarities between the strength of social networks and the stringency of procedural formalism. While procedural formalism increases the cost of legal dispute resolution between landlords and tenants, social networks allow conflicts to be solved without recourse to justice. Procedural formalism is thus a way to provide a market advantage to local individuals embedded in dense local social networks at the expense of nonlocal agents without access to such networks.The second contribution deals with the importance of the sun on the demand for regulation in the rental market. Southern European countries with good climate amenities are attractive by their mildness of life. This potential immigration increases the pressure on the rental market. To reduce it, individuals in Southern Europe develop complementarities between social capital and local regulations. This strategy explains a Mediterranean equilibrium characterized by high levels of local social capital and procedural formalism. Conversely, the lack of attractiveness of countries with low climate amenities leads to an Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian equilibrium with opposite features.The third contribution explains the support for labor market regulation by the presence of regulations on the rental market. When the rental market is very regulated, landlords screen applicants with regard to their ability to pay the rent. Protecting regular jobs offers a second-best technology to sort workers, thereby increasing the rental market size. We provide a model where non-employed workers demand protected jobs despite unemployment and the share of short-term jobs increase.

[pt] Esta tese é composta de três capítulos que analisam aspectos do mercado de trabalho. O primeiro capítulo estima o efeito da mudança na Lei do Aviso Prévio em 2011 no Brasil. A nova lei tornou as demissões sem justa causa mais caras para as firmas, e o aumento do custo se deu de maneira crescente no tempo de serviço do empregado. O aviso prévio é parte do arcabouço da legislação de proteção ao emprego, e tem intenção preservar vínculos que, embora não desejados no curto prazo, seriam viáveis no longo prazo. No entanto, os resultados apontam para o aumento das demissões nas firmas mais afetadas e um ambiente de maior rotatividade. Tais resultados são especialmente desfavoráveis considerando o ambiente já de elevada rotatividade no Brasil. Argumentamos com um modelo teórico que o desenho da nova lei é consistente com os resultados, na medida em que se elevou não apenas o custo de demissão, mas também o custo esperado da continuidade do vínculo empregatício. O segundo capítulo avalia os efeitos da expansão das usinas de etanol no Mato Grosso do Sul (MS), pela perspectiva de realocação do trabalho. Seguindo os trabalhadores ao longo dos períodos, encontramos mecanismos que permitiram o ajuste da mão de obra às novas demandas por trabalho geradas por este grande investimento. Exploramos as realocações entre setores, ocupações e regiões. O terceiro capítulo estima impactos da modernização da agricultura (a partir de inovações da década de 1970) no Brasil Central, considerando os efeitos na força de trabalho e nas decisões de investimento em educação. Mostramos que este evento afetou a demanda por trabalho na região, gerando ganhos para a população adulta como um todo. Dessa forma, os incentivos para os mais jovens nas escolhas entre trabalhar (com ganhos imediatos do emprego) e investir em capital humano (e esperar ganhos potencialmente mais altos no futuro) também mudaram. / [en] This thesis consists of three essays on labor markets. The first chapter estimates the effect of the change in the Advance Notice Law in 2011 in Brazil. The new law made unjustified (without cause) dismissals more expensive for firms, and the cost gradually increased with tenure. Advance notice is part of the framework of employment protection legislation and is intended to preserve job contracts that, although undesirable in the short term, would be viable in the long term. However, results point to an increase in layoffs in the most affected firms and a higher turnover environment. These results are especially unfavorable considering the already high turnover rate in Brazil. I argue with a theoretical model that the design of the new law is consistent with the results because it increased not only the cost of dismissal but also the expected cost of continuity of employment. The second chapter evaluates the effects of the expansion of the ethanol mills in Mato Grosso do Sul (MS), from labor reallocation perspective. Tracking workers over the years, the analysis indicated mechanisms that enabled labor adjustment to the new labor demands generated by this large investment. I explore the reallocation across sectors, occupations, and regions. The third chapter estimates the impact of the modernization of agriculture (from the innovations of the 1970s) in Central Brazil, considering the effects on the labor force and investment decisions in education. The analysis shows that this event affected labor demand in the region, generating gains for the adult population. In this way, incentives have also changed for young people to make choices between working, with immediate job gains, and investing in human capital, and thus expect potentially higher gains in the future.

Cette thèse analyse l'effet de la législation de protection de l'emploi sur le taux de chômage, les salaires et la productivité des entreprises. En particulier, je m'intéresse dans cette thèse à l’effet de la réglementation des licenciements et des contrats de travail temporaires. Cette question de recherche est motivée par le fait que dans de nombreux pays de l’OCDE, la législation combine des coûts de licenciements élevés et des restrictions faibles sur les contrats temporaires, ce qui entraîne, d’après un certain nombre d’économistes, une segmentation du marché du travail. Le premier chapitre défend l’idée qu’il est important de comprendre les mécanismes qui expliquent le choix des entreprises de signer des contrats temporaires ou permanents afin d'évaluer l’effet de la protection de l’emploi. Ce chapitre analyse un problème de contrat dynamique entre un travailleur averse au risque et un employeur neutre vis-à-vis du risque. Dans ce chapitre, je soutiens notamment que le choix du type d'emploi est déterminé par un arbitrage entre les gains associés au partage du risque qu’offre un emploi permanent et les gains associés à la flexibilité qu’offre un emploi temporaire. Le deuxième chapitre construit un modèle du marché du travail caractérisé par des frictions de recherche et d’appariement, dans lequel le contrat dynamique du chapitre 1 est intégré. Je propose ainsi un modèle dans lequel l’allocation des agents au sein des différents types d’emplois est déterminée de façon endogène par des considérations reliées au partage du risque. Le modèle, calibré pour reproduire les caractéristiques du marché du travail en France durant les années 2000, suggère que les contrats temporaires ont tendance à augmenter la productivité des entreprises mais également le taux de chômage. Le dernier chapitre propose un modèle de cycle de vie visant à évaluer les effets des coûts de licenciement sur l’emploi et les salaires en fonction du niveau d’éducation et d’expérience. Le modèle est calibré sur les données d’enquête sur la main d’œuvre en France durant les années 2000. Une série d'expériences contrefactuelles indiquent que les coûts de licenciement ont un effet négatif sur l’emploi, concentré principalement sur les jeunes travailleurs avec un niveau d’éducation faible. En revanche, cet effet semble être négligeable pour les travailleurs avec un niveau d'expérience et d'éducation élevé. / This thesis analyzes the effect of employment protection on labor market outcomes. The thesis focuses on the impact of firing restrictions and the regulation of temporary contracts. In many OECD countries, the employment protection legislation combines high firing restrictions and relatively lax regulation of temporary jobs which is, according to several economists, a source of labor market segmentation. The first chapter argues that analyzing the effect of employment protection requires to understand how economic agents choose between permanent and temporary contracts. This chapter examines a dynamic employment contract between a risk-averse worker and a risk-neutral firm. I argue in this chapter that the choice between a permanent and a temporary contract is driven by a trade-off between efficient risk-sharing and flexibility. The second chapter builds a model of the labor market with search frictions, in which the contracting problem of chapter 1 is embedded. Thus, this chapter proposes a model in which the allocation of agents into permanent and temporary jobs is endogenous to risk-sharing considerations. The model is calibrated to the features of the French labor market during the 2000s and indicates that temporary contracts tend to increase productivity but unemployment as well. The third chapter proposes a life-cycle model to evaluate the effect of firing costs across different experience and education groups. The model is calibrated using a French labor force survey dataset. Policy experiments suggest that firing costs have a negative effect on employment, which is concentrated on low experience and education workers.

Several interesting findings emerged from this study. First, strong labour movements still failed to successfully bargain for employment protections due to resistance from employers to encroachments on their institutionalized managerial prerogatives. Second, governments favoured a policy of abstentionism and acquiescence to the collective-laissez-faire tradition until the critical juncture of the 1960s and 1970s. Third, the increasing power resources of trade unions and a deteriorating socio-economic climate created a window of opportunity for bold government action to improve industrial relations, albeit without the consent of employers, and at first, unions. Fourth, contrary to the liberalizing pressures one would expect to find in an archetypical free market economy, the UK has implemented far more statutory protections than deregulatory reforms. Fifth, in contrast to its traditional non-intervention in industrial relations and reputation for worker-protective regulations, Swedish governments have enacted numerous statutes, both restricting and freeing managerial prerogatives in the hiring and firing process. Sixth, statutory employment protections became an independent set of institutional power resources for unions in the long run, serving their organizational and representational interests in important ways. Seventh, unions and left parties consistently defended and advanced the policy preferences of their core constituencies in secure employment by privileging the job security of regular contracts. Eighth, employers and parties on the right of the political spectrum consistently opposed restrictions on the managerial capacity to hire and fire at will, especially for small businesses. Nineth, to increase flexibility without threatening the stability of regular contracts, reforms over the years had to foster atypical forms of work, creating a regulatory gap between permanent and temporary employment, particularly in Sweden. Tenth, differences exist between job security in the statute books and job security in action, particularly in the UK where this gap pervades all aspects of the unfair dismissal system. These findings suggest employment protection legislation has developed in ways far more complex, dynamic and contradictory than is commonly assumed by prominent theories of comparative political economy. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This thesis examines how and why employment protection legislation developed in the United Kingdom and Sweden in the ways that it did from its early beginnings to the present period. It hopes to offer answers to questions about the initial impetus for statutory regulation, the number, content and impact of significant legislative changes and the preferences of key stakeholders with material interests in the policymaking process. It does this by drawing on a variety of both primary and secondary source materials, including employment protection databases, parliamentary records and research publications. At the same time, it assesses the explanatory merit of dominant theories in the political economy literature by testing them against voluminous empirical evidence and provides a multi-factorial account to fill the gaps in the existing body of knowledge.