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Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Políticas Públicas / Autor no envía autorizacion, para ser publicada en el Portal de Tesis Electrónicas de la U. de Chile. / La crisis macroeconómica de 2008 y 2009 puso en evidencia la débil situación fiscal de los gobiernos sub-nacionales en México, baja generación de ingresos propios, alta participación del gasto corriente en el gasto total, dependencia de las transferencias federales, constantes déficits, niveles de liquidez inferiores a la unidad y crecimiento acelerado de deuda pública. Ante tal deterioro de las finanzas públicas se ha hecho constante el uso de esquemas de financiamiento de corto y largo plazo hasta llegar a significar cerca del 2.9% del PIB1 nacional. Los estudios más recientes2 advierten que la viabilidad fiscal en el mediano plazo es posible siempre y cuando se haga un esfuerzo recaudatorio y se disminuyan los gastos corrientes. Otros estudios3 recomiendan modificar la ley de coordinación fiscal4 respecto a la fiscalización de deuda y promover una mayor transparencia. Por su parte Carpizo (2012) plantea fortalecer el rol fiscalizador de los Órganos de Fiscalización Superior (ORFIS), y dotar a la Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (SHCP) de mayores facultades para supervisar el perfil de endeudamiento de las entidades. No obstante, al sólo fiscalizar no se corrigen los problemas estructurales. De hecho se corre el riesgo de generar rivalidad entre el gobierno estatal y la federación. Ante dicho contexto, esta investigación planteó como pregunta guía si ¿Debería México establecer reglas fiscales sub-nacionales como un mecanismo de monitoreo y control en lugar de, sólo controlar la deuda sub-nacional?. La respuesta pasa por analizar cada uno de los mecanismos de control de deuda que se han establecido y sincerar su respectivo alcance. Por ejemplo, se detectó que la heterogeneidad en las definiciones estatales de inversión pública ha impedido que prime la regla de oro, que consiste en autorizar deuda sólo para fines de inversión pública. Posteriormente, la incorporación de la calificación de riesgo como señal de finanzas públicas estatales sanas no generó escenarios de sostenibilidad fiscal de largo plazo, ya que falencias en su diseño debilitaron su rol de enviar señales de mercado respecto a la capacidad de pago para anticipar escenarios de default crediticio y respecto a las entidades que han impuesto limitantes a la contratación de crédito y déficit fiscal. El presente documento hace una propuesta de monitoreo y control fiscal estatal, mediante una regla de balance estructural, siendo ésta una solución metodológicamente homogénea para todos los estados. La aplicación del balance estructural permite no sólo diagnosticar la situación fiscal sino también diferenciar los casos críticos de los no críticos, estableciendo así metas de balance estructural diferenciadas5. Esta política toma en consideración el carácter cíclico que tienen las transferencias federales por tanto, resuelve la vulnerabilidad de las políticas públicas estatales a causa de la alta dependencia fiscal. Esta idea descansa sobre la participación directa del gobierno federal en su diseño, implementación y fiscalización pero en colaboración con los gobiernos estatales. Lo anterior, al amparo de la Ley de Coordinación y Fiscalización y la participación de la Auditoría Superior de Fiscalización. El gobierno federal debe impulsar esta política ya que que las entidades federativas no tienen por sí mismas el incentivo a hacerlo, pues la experiencia muestra que ante manejos fiscales poco prudentes existe una alta posibilidad de rescate de parte del gobierno federal. No obstante, ésta propuesta establece que sean los estados quienes al final realicen la política de balance como eje de su planeación fiscal. El impacto de la política de balance estructural sub-nacional se ejemplifica con el caso del Estado de Veracruz (1 de los 5 estados más endeudados en el país para 2012), haciendo uso de las estadísticas de finanzas públicas, difundidas por el Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) y la Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público. (SHCP).

Thesis advisor: Jonathan Laurence / The purpose of this thesis is to identify the political, institutional and economic obstacles to achieving economic integration and stability in the euro area while finding a solution to those obstacles by examining the economics and political dynamics of the currency union. The benchmarks of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact encouraged cosmetic reforms that did little to alter the structural problems of the Eurozone's economic periphery. Therefore, the best political and economic solution to the problem of integration is to allow for fiscal federalism within the union whereby Member States take full ownership of their economic policies. Although decentralizing fiscal policy is an essential part of fostering integration, harmonizing banking regulation throughout the Eurozone is also necessary course of action. The guarantee of emergency funds for Eurozone states at the precipice of default will only breed a moral hazard for more rule-breaking. The conditionality of tough austerity measures of the emergency programs also breeds popular animosity against the euro and outsources the moral and political responsibility of unpopular structural reform to forces outside of the country. Member States should allow heavily indebted states to default and allow banks that made investments in those countries' debts to incur losses. Through enforcement of the no-bailout clauses of Eurozone agreements, domestic political actors will be unable to issue more debt and thus have the political cover to impose the necessary structural reforms to improve the economic sustainability of their respective countries. Since an exit from the currency union would aggravate the debt problems of a peripheral Member State, the rest of the euro area is unlikely to suffer the loss of membership by refusing to transfer funds to its insolvent members. / Thesis (MA) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Esta pesquisa busca analisar as dinâmicas espaciais a partir de conceitos e concepções oriundos da Geografia e das Ciências Jurídicas. Discutir a parcela de autonomia que é atribuída aos Municípios dentro do federalismo fiscal à luz do período atual. A forma como se organiza a federação brasileira constitui um arranjo político e fiscal que confere a cada ente autonomia, característica essa que produz no território consequências positivas e negativas. O federalismo brasileiro possui uma trajetória de avanços e retrocessos em um movimento pendular, ora um modelo de Estado mais centralizador, ora um modelo mais descentralizado. Com o advento da Constituição Federal de 1988 houve um novo ciclo de descentralização em que os municípios são reconhecidos como entes federados autônomos recebendo parcela constitucional de competência para instituir e cobrar tributos. Essa possibilidade assume características específicas causando distorções como as trazidas pela guerra fiscal municipal. Os conflitos e as tensões no âmbito fiscal têm suas repercussões e efeitos nas mais diversas dimensões, entre elas no território. O federalismo fiscal surge na guerra fiscal como um componente eminentemente territorial, a compreensão dessa dinâmica e as suas nuances no território constitui o nosso objetivo. / This research seeks to analyze the spatial dynamics using concepts and ideas resulting from the Geography and Legal Sciences and discuss the amount of autonomy that is allocated to the municipalities within the fiscal federalism in the light of the current period. The way it organizes the Brazilian federation is a political and fiscal arrangement that gives each entity autonomy, a characteristic that produces negative and positive consequences in the territory. Brazilian federalism has a path of progress and setbacks in a pendulum motion, or in a more centralized state model, or in a more decentralized model. With the advent of the Federal Constitution of 1988 there was a new decentralization cycle in which municipalities are recognized as autonomous entities receiving federal constitutional portion of the power to impose and collect taxes. This possibility takes on specific characteristics causing distortions as brought by the municipal tax war. Conflicts and tensions in the tax field have its repercussions and effects on several dimensions, including in the territory. Fiscal Federalism arises in the fiscal war as an eminently territorial component, understanding this dynamic and its nuances in the territory is our goal.

A Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF) foi criada em 2000, tendo como um de seus objetivos o de controlar e limitar o processo de endividamento dos estados brasileiros. No entanto, em 2016, a União acertou o refinanciamento das dívidas de alguns destes estados. Este trabalho busca analisar esta aparente contradição; a crise dos estados teria como origem fatores exógenos à LRF ou os mecanismos da LRF não foram suficientes para conter o comportamento de endividamento excessivo dos estados? Utilizando a metodologia de Bohn (1998), estimou-se cinco modelos: painel completo, separação regional, separação por critério endógeno, separação por gasto com pessoal em relação a receita corrente líquida e separação pelo critério da Resolução de número 40 do Senado Federal. As estimações contemplam quatro períodos: 2001 a 2015; 2008 a 2015; 2001 a 2020 e 2008 a 2020, e consideram tanto a dívida consolidada líquida quanto a bruta. Os resultados apontam que os instrumentos que foram criados são ineficientes, pois estados que não estão constrangidos por nenhuma punição da LRF não possuem uma trajetória sustentável da dívida. Por consequência, é reforçada a ideia de que há um comportamento de risco moral por parte dos estados, que procuram endividar-se excessivamente por considerarem que a dívida será renegociada pela União, comportamento este que só pode ser combatido a partir de aprimoramentos institucionais. / The \"Fiscal Responsibility Law\" (LRF) was created in 2000, having as one of its pillars the control of the regional states\' indebtedness process. However, in 2016, the federal government approved the refinance of such debts for some states. This paper seeks to analyze this seeming contradiction: the states\' crysis is due to factors that are exogenous to the LRF, or are the LRF mechanisms not sufficient to restrain the excessive indebtness by the states? Using Bohn\'s methodology (1998), five models are estimated: complete pannel, regional separation, separation by an endogenous criteria, separation by LRF\'s resolution to stafe workers expending (wages, pensions, etc) and separation by a Senate resolution\'s criteria. The estimations are made in four time frames: 2001-2015; 2008-2015; 2001-2020; 2008-2020, and both the net debt and the gross debt are considered. Results indicate that the instruments that were created by the LRF are inefficient, in the sense that states that are not punished or affected by said instruments do not follow a sustainable fiscal policy. Consequently, the idea of a moral hazard behaviour is reemforced: the states expect that the federal government will refinance its debt, so they do not follow a sustainable fiscal policy. This behaviour can only be stopped through institucional reforms.

Cette thèse est consacrée à l'étude des conséquences de la libéralisation des marchés financiers sur la politique monétaire et la régulation du système bancaire dans les pays émergents. La première partie présente des estimations des taux de recouvrement et des probabilités de non payement des titres du gouvernement argentin. Par la suite, cette étude présente un modèle macroéconomique qui permet d'analyser les limites et conséquences potentielles de la politique monétaire dans un contexte caractérisé par le risque de défaut de l'état. Ceci est une approche qui semble négligée par la littérature. La deuxième partie résume la littérature concernant la relation entre la présence des banques étrangères et la stabilité macroéconomique. Ensuite, l'impact des banques étrangères sur le niveau et la volatilité du crédit réel est estimé dans un panel des pays d'Amérique Latine pour la période 1995:1-2001:4. Ceci est le primer travail qui applique des techniques ARCH pour l'analyse de ce sujet. / This thesis is focused on the implications of financial liberalization in monetary and banking policymaking. The first half of the work simultaneously estimates recovery values and probabilities of default implicit on market prices of the Argentine sovereign bonds. It conducts an empirical research contributing with evidence to the existing limited literature. It also presents a macroeconomic model that allows the analysis of limits and potential consequences of monetary policy in an environment characterized by sovereign default risk. An approach almost disregarded by literature. The second half surveys the literature that relates foreign bank presence with macroeconomic stability and estimates the impact of foreign bank presence on both the level and the volatility of real credit in a panel of eight Latin American countries over the period 1995:1 -2001:4. This is the first time that ARCH techniques are used to analyse this topic.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2006. / 1 electronic text (193 p. : ill.) : digital, PDF file. Title from title screen. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez, committee chair; Andre G. Komenan, Jameson L. Boex, Neven T. Valev, Shiferaw Gurmu, Roy W. Bahl, committee members. Description based on contents viewed Mar. 23, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 179-192).

This dissertation consists of three essays examining issues related to fiscal competition. The first essay investigates the Stackelberg equilibrium for public input competition and compares it with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Given two asymmetric regions, I show that under the Nash equilibrium, the more productive region tends to spend more on public input, which results in this region attracting more capital than the less productive region. The comparison of the two equilibria reveals that the leader region obtains a first mover advantage under the Stackelberg setting. This suggests that if regions interact with each other sequentially as in the Stackelberg equilibrium, then the regional disparity that is due to the heterogeneity of productivity is likely to be mitigated or enlarged, depending on which region performs the leadership role in the competition process. This second essay examines how a fiscal equalization system affects the disciplining effect of competition for capital among heterogeneous regions in a decentralized economy. I build a model in which regions that are heterogeneous in initial endowments try to attract capital by competing public input that enhances the productivity of capital; meanwhile, a fiscal equalization system is imposed by the central government to reduce regional disparities in fiscal capacity. The key prediction, borne out in data from the German equalization system, is that while competition for capital strengthens discipline in the well-endowed regions, it weakens discipline in the poorly endowed regions. However, a conventional equalization transfer scheme, common to many countries, can be effective in correcting the distortion driven by the heterogeneity of initial endowments across competing regions. This third essay aims to provide empirical evidence on the extent and possible channels of tax competition among provincial governments in China. Using a panel of provincial level data for 1993-2007, I find strong evidence of strategic tax interaction among provincial governments. Tax policy is approximated by average effective tax rates on foreign investment, taking into account the tax incentives available to foreign investors. In line with the predictions of the theoretical tax competition literature, I also highlight the impact of each province's characteristics (including its size and level of industrialization) on the strategic interaction with its neighbors. Finally, I explicitly identify the establishment of development zones as an important conduit for tax competition among provinces.

Texte remanié de: Th. doct.--Droit--Aix-en-Provence, 2003. / Bibliogr. p. 487-512. Index.