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Fiscal federalism is meant to benefit from both the advantages of centralization and decentralization in public revenues and expenditures, the optimal allocation of competencies between levels of governement depending on the nature of revenues, public goods or services. For historical, political or practical reasons, this optimal allocation is not always attainable. Therefore, fiscal federalism may raise new issues in efficiency or equity, in the form of spill-over effects, harmful fiscal competition or fiscal imbalance. To tend to the optimum, it is necessary to evaluate the extent of inefficiencies or inequities and to design corrective mechanisms in order to minimize them. This thesis adopts such an approach in four different situations. First, we measure empirically and dynamically the presence of fiscal competition between Belgian municipalities. The analysis reveals the existence of fiscal competition, but with a rather slow pace of adjustment of taxe rates over time. This pace depends on the mobility of tax bases and on the similarity of neighboring municipalities with respect to some socio-economic characteristics. Second, we evaluate the effects of the Belgian fiscal equalization mechanism on equity. This analysis shows the existence of a poverty trap at the level of regions and proposes a range of solutions, inspired by equalization mechanisms applied in other federal States. Third, we analyse the case of multiple States emitting multiple pollutants where a trade-off exists between producing goods and minimizing pollution. We propose a form of inter-State transfers such that all States adopt a behaviour leading to the collective optimum. To be sustainable, the collective optimum must be individually rational. We show that this condition is respected with the proposed transfer formula. Fourth, we examine the case of harmful fiscal competition between two countries differing in size, the small country being seen as a fiscal heaven. In order to reach the collective optimum, fiscal cooperation is needed. To convince the tax heaven to cooperate, a specific formula of transfers between the large and the small country is proposed, such that both countries are better off. / Le fédéralisme fiscal a pour objectif de bénéficier à la fois des avantages de la centralisation et des avantages de la décentralisation des revenus et dépenses publiques. La répartition optimale des compétences entre différents niveaux de pouvoir est déterminée par la nature des revenus, dépenses et biens et services publics. Pour des raisons historiques, politiques ou pratiques, cette répartition optimale n'est pas toujours accessible. En conséquence, les avantages du fédéralisme fiscal peuvent s'accompagner de problèmes d'efficacité ou d'équité sous la forme d'effets de débordement, de concurrence fiscale dommageable ou de déséquilibre fiscal. Pour tendre vers l'optimum, il convient dès lors d'évaluer l'ampleur des inefficacités et inéquités et de concevoir des mécanismes correctifs pour les atténuer. Cette thèse applique cette démarche à quatre situations particulières. Premièrement, nous mesurons la présence de concurrence fiscale entre les communes belges, de façon empirique et dynamique. L'analyse met en lumière l'existence d'une concurrence fiscale certaine, mais avec une vitesse d'ajustement des taux de taxation relativement faible dans le temps. Cette vitesse d'ajustement dépend de la mobilité des bases imposables et de la similitude des communes voisines en termes de caractéristiques socio-économiques. Deuxièmement, nous évaluons les effets redistributifs et incitatifs du mécanisme belge de péréquation financière. Cette analyse démontre la présence d'un effet de « piège à pauvreté » au niveau des Régions et propose une série de solutions pour y remédier, en s'inspirant de mécanismes étrangers. Troisièmement, nous analysons le cas de multiples Etats émettant de multiples polluants, dans un contexte où un arbitrage doit être effectué entre la production de biens et la minimisation de la pollution. Nous proposons une forme de transferts à appliquer entre Etats de sorte que tous les Etats sont amenés à adopter un comportement menant à l'optimum collectif. Pour être soutenable, l'optimum collectif doit être individuellement rationnel. Nous démontrons que la formule proposée respecte cette condition. Quatrièmement, nous examinons le cas d'une concurrence fiscale dommageable entre deux pays différents en taille, où le petit pays peut être considéré comme un paradis fiscal. Afin d'atteindre l'optimum collectif, une coopération fiscale est nécessaire. Afin de convaincre le paradis fiscal de coopérer, une forme spécifique de transferts entre le grand et le petit pays est proposée, de sorte que tous deux préfèrent coopérer.

This dissertation is composed of three essays, each examining a unique question relating to the role of intergovernmental transfers in fiscal federalism. Using a panel of the 48 contiguous U.S. states along with recent advances in nonstationary panel and spatial econometric methods this dissertation offers a number of important insights into the workings of intergovernmental transfers and therefore a clearer understanding of the interactions among the different layers of government. The third chapter examines the relationship between intergovernmental revenues from the federal government and intergovernmental expenditures to local governments. As observed by Wildasin (2010), there remains remarkable stability in the ratio of state-tolocal transfers to federal-to-state transfers despite the disparate programs being financed by each. Therefore, the purpose of this essay is to examine the extent to which states serve as a conduit for funds from the federal government to local governments. In particular, the research question asks to what degree do federal transfers stimulate transfers to local governments. The fourth chapter explores the direction of causality between tax revenues and expenditures in answering the four hypotheses set forth in the literature: tax-spend, spend-tax, fiscal synchronization, and institutional separation. Furthermore, along with exploring the role served by intergovernmental transfers within the revenue-expenditure nexus, this essay also examines differences relating to the revenue-expenditure nexus between states with relatively higher debt levels and states with low debt levels, in order to better understand the fiscal causal links favorable for debt accumulation. The purpose of the fifth chapter is to ascertain the effect interstate fiscal interactions on the stimulative effect of grants on state level expenditures. The vast literature on fiscal competition suggests that states do not make decisions in isolation, therefore, spatial econometrics are used to capture spillovers and mimicking behavior across states. Following Boarnet and Glazer (2002), the effect of informational externalities arising from grants awarded to neighboring states are examined as well as the effect of spending spillovers from neighboring states. The results show that the flypaper anomaly (i.e. the stimulative effect of grants greater than a pure income effect) can be explained by interstate fiscal interactions.

We address the questions on what determines local government proliferation, specifically on the impact of intergovernmental transfers on proliferation. On exploring the determinants of proliferation, we provide a more elaborate empirical technique than exists in the literature by employing panel binary outcome, survival regression, as well as count analysis to capture the time varying effect from intergovernmental transfers. We also examine the impact of proliferation on service delivery outcomes and construct channels by which the policy may affect the outcomes in the education and health sectors. We apply panel difference-in-difference estimation and we uniquely identify the different treatment group and thus control for the plausible differential impact on outcomes in regards to changes in intergovernmental transfers. On the determinants of local government formation, there are likely competing effects across transfers on the decision to proliferate as well as on the extent of fragmentation given that we find (1) the lump-sum conditional grants positively influence the probability of proliferation, (2) a province with higher median share of equalization grants associates with higher number of local governments, (3) higher equalization grants implies a longer duration to the proliferation event, and (4) higher tax sharing in the proliferated local governments reflects higher stability where stability refers to the longer duration to the sequential proliferation event. The findings suggest the tactical central-local behavior may be present, however, the support of rent-seeking hypothesis on proliferation should not be generalized to overall system of transfers. On the impact from the proliferation policy, the education and health outcomes estimations provide mixed results within the treatment group. The findings shed light on the current practice of administrative or political decentralization, specifically on the competing local-central preferences within each sector on measured service delivery outcomes. The results from difference-in-difference (DID) estimations show support on attainment of education outcome in new local governments represented by a reduction in the dropout rate but not on the quality of education in terms of higher students’ tests scores even though there is a relatively higher conditional grants allocated to the proliferated local governments. Meanwhile, in terms of infant mortality rate, we only find evidence of improvement in infant mortality on the originating local government but not on the new local governments. Controlling for selectivity and production function covariates have not changed the pattern of the impact.

No / This chapter reviews the substantive issue of the contemporary intertwining of both national and overall EU economy in relation to the spectre of monetary union through first evaluating a country’s readiness for euro entry through a comparison between the convergence criteria stipulated in the Treaty on European Union and the theory of optimal currency areas, which leads to discussion of the economic costs and benefits of euro membership. However, given the unprecedented strain eurozone has now come under the also chapter examines the background to the current eurozone crisis; specifically, how the Global Financial Crisis induced Great Recession triggered the problems within the eurozone. Subsequently, the chapter explores how the advent of EMU has significantly redefined the operation of fiscal and monetary policy with the former retained by member states, but proscribed by EMU-wide rules, whilst the latter has been assumed by a specifically created independent central bank. Hence, the chapter explores the theoretical underpinnings of the operation of monetary and fiscal policy within EMU, where it examines the conduct, coordination and philosophy of macroeconomic policymaking. This analysis is then extended by discussing a series of potential remedies, consisting of an evaluation of EU instigated solutions, together with a series of alternative propositions. However, whilst the economic remedies to the eurozone crisis may eventually succeed, the greater long-term damage may well emerge through the political sphere with the imposition of unelected technocrat governments, together with growing dissatisfaction of mainstream political parties with support for either the far-right, protest parties, anti-euro parties, anti-EU parties, or member states losing confidence in the direction of ‘ever closer union’.

No / The pace of economic integration amongst European Union (EU) member states has accelerated considerably during the past decade, highlighted by the process of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Many aspects of the EU's apparatus, however, have failed to evolve in order to meets these new challenges. This book explores the issue of fiscal federalism within the context of EU integration from theoretical, historical, policy and global perspectives. It contrasts the pace of integration amongst EU member states with the failure of financial and administrative apparatus to evolve to encompass fiscal federalism, i.e. the development of a centralised budgetary system. This impressive collection, with contributions from a range of internationally respected authors, shall interest students and researchers involved with European economics and economic integration. Its accessible style will also make it extremely useful to policy-makers and professionals for whom European economic integration is a daily topic of conversation.

Au regard des dégâts environnementaux au cours des dernières années, il est important de mettre en œuvre des politiques environnementales efficaces afin de lutter contre le changement climatique, de préserver la biodiversité, et de réduire les pollutions de l'eau et de l'air. Le secteur énergétique est l'un des principaux contributeurs à la détérioration de l'environnement. Ainsi, afin d'atteindre les objectifs environnementaux, l'établissement de politiques énergétiques efficaces est primordial. A cet effet, il semble indispensable de mener une démarche inclusive et transversale en impliquant l'ensemble des acteurs des différents échelons (locaux, régionaux, nationaux, internationaux,...). Dès lors, l'identification de l’échelon optimal est cruciale dans une optique d'élaboration des politiques énergétiques efficaces. La thèse s'attache précisément à éclairer les enjeux liés à la fiscalité énergétique. Ainsi, l'objectif principal de cette thèse est d'analyser la nature des interactions environnementales, qu'elles soient entre régions ou Etats, en termes de fiscalité ou de dépenses environnementales. Les contributions de cette thèse sont à la fois théorique et empirique. D'un point de vue empirique, cette thèse s'est d'abord focalisée sur l’étude de la fiscalité énergétique sous l'angle des interactions spatiales. En particulier, le chapitre 1 teste la présence des interactions spatiales des départements français via la vignette automobile. Ce chapitre fournit une analyse empirique de la réaction de la politique fiscale d'un département français suite à un changement de la politique fiscale de ces voisins. Tout d'abord, en utilisant une approche économétrique spatiale en panel, les résultats montrent l'existence d'une dépendance spatiale positive, suggérant l'existence d'un comportement mimétique des départements français lors de la détermination des taux de la vignette automobile. Ensuite, ce chapitre met également en évidence une relation entre les impôts directs locaux et ceux indirects locaux. En particulier, les résultats des estimations montrent que le taux de la taxe professionnelle (resp. la taxe sur le foncier non bâti) et la vignette fiscale sont des substituts alors que le taux de la taxe d'habitation (resp. la taxe sur le foncier non bâti) sont des compléments à la vignette automobile. Enfin, les résultats montrent que les départements avec des populations plus grandes, plus jeunes et plus âgées fixent des montants plus élevés de la vignette automobile. D'un point de vue théorique, le but du chapitre 2 est d'analyser les interactions fiscales entre plusieurs niveaux de gouvernements (en particulier deux niveaux de décisions), dans lesquels il existe plusieurs juridictions de niveaux inférieurs identiques, telles que les États ou encore les collectivités locales, et une juridiction unique de premier plan, telle que l'Etat fédéral, un pays ou une union communautaire, toutes ces juridictions pouvant taxer deux bases fiscales à savoir, le capital et la ressource énergétique. Nous déterminons grâce à la formalisation théorique les implications en termes de distorsions fiscales de l'architecture fiscale dans le cadre d'une politique énergétique. En particulier, en recourant au jeu de Nash, nos résultats montrent d'une part une substitution entre les taxes fédérales et locales sur l'énergie impliquant que les gouvernements locaux augmentent leurs taux de taxation de l'énergie en réponse à une baisse du taux de la taxe fédérale sur l'énergie, toutes choses égales par ailleurs. D'autre part, nous constatons que les taxes locales sur l’énergie ont une incidence positive sur la qualité de l’environnement, ce qui suggère que la décentralisation de la politique énergétique peut jouer un rôle crucial pour atténuer les dommages environnementaux. Enfin, à travers le chapitre 3, nous testons d'un point de vue empirique l'existence d'une interdépendance spatiale entre les pays de l'OCDE via les dépenses environnementales. / In the light of environmental damage in recent years, it is important to implement effective environmental policies to combat climate change, preserve biodiversity, and reduce water and air pollution. The energy sector is one of the main contributors to the deterioration of the environment. Thus, in order to achieve environmental objectives, establishing effective energy policies is paramount. To this end, it seems essential to carry out an inclusive and transversal approach by involving all actors at different levels (local, regional, national, international, etc.). Therefore, identifying the optimal step is crucial for effective energy policy development. The thesis focuses on clarifying the issues related to energy taxation. Thus, the main objective of this thesis is to analyze the nature of environmental interactions, be they between regions or states, in terms of taxation or environmental expenses. The contributions of this are both theoretical and empirical.From an empirical point of view, this thesis first focuses on the study of energy taxation from the perspective of spatial interactions. In particular, Chapter 1 tests the presence of spatial interactions of French departments via the car sticker. This chapter provides an empirical analysis of the reaction of the tax policy of a French department following a change in the tax policy of these neighbors. First, by using a spatial econometric panel approach, the results show evidence of spatial dependence, suggesting the existence of a mimetic behavior of French departments when determining the rates of the car sticker. Next, this chapter also highlights a relationship between local direct taxes and indirect local taxes. In particular, the results of the estimates show that the rate of the business tax (or the tax on undeveloped land) and the road tax sticker are substitutes, whereas the residential tax rate (or the tax rate on developed land) are complements to the road tax sticker. Finally, the results show that departments with larger, younger and older populations are setting higher amounts of the car sticker.From a theoretical point of view, the purpose of Chapter 2 is to analyze the tax interactions between several levels of government (in particular two levels of decision-making), in which there are several jurisdictions of similar lower levels, such as local authorities, and a single leading jurisdiction, such as the federal state, a country or a community union, all of which can tax two tax bases, namely, capital and energy resources. Through theoretical formalization, we determine the implications in terms of tax distortions of tax architecture in the context of an energy policy. In particular, using the Nash game, our results show, on the one hand, a substitution between federal and local taxes on energy, implying that local governments increase their energy tax rates in response to a fall in the rate of energy. of the federal energy tax, all other things being equal. On the other hand, we find that local taxes on energy have a positive impact on the quality of the environment, suggesting that decentralization of energy policy can play a crucial role in mitigating environmental damage.Finally, in Chapter 3, we empirically test the existence of spatial interdependence among OECD countries through environmental spending. To this end, we use data from 30 OECD countries for the period 1994-2014 and a wide range of economic and political control variables.

A opção pela forma federativa de governo importa em compromisso com a existência de mais de um ente responsável, em territórios sobrepostos, pela realização das tarefas de arrecadação e gasto público, além de suas inerentes atividades políticas. O exercício dessas tarefas pode ser definido com rigor, em um regime dual, ou com possibilidade de auxílios mútuos, em um regime de cooperação. O Brasil adotou, como cláusula pétrea em sua Constituição, a forma de federação cooperativa, estruturada em três níveis de governo, tendo como consequência a divisão de competências materiais entre os componentes dessa federação. Apesar disso, os Tribunais brasileiros têm insistido em sustentar a tese de solidariedade obrigacional entre todos os entes federados em processo que tenham por objeto o controle de políticas públicas sociais. A imposição dessa obrigação solidária, além de desrespeitar a estrutura federativa e afrontar os princípios da efetividade e economicidade da administração com sobreposições e sobrecargas que facilitam o desperdício de verbas e a corrupção ainda não atenta para a regra de ouro da imposição de solidariedade obrigacional, que é a menção expressa em dispositivo legal ou constitucional. Conforme será demonstrado, as decisões proferidas pelos Tribunais nacionais em sede de controle jurisdicional de políticas públicas vem ignorando todo o arcabouço jurídico acerca do tema, além de impor aos entes federados desnecessária dificuldade de gestão de suas competências e de seus recursos financeiros. A defesa de responsabilidades divididas, porém, poderia gerar efeitos nefastos. É que, em sede processual, a demanda ajuizada em face do ente não diretamente responsável pela execução da política pública questionada poderia ser extinta sem resolução do mérito, impondo atrasos à efetivação de direitos sociais decorrentes de óbices processuais. Como os direitos fundamentais categoria na qual estão inseridos os direitos sociais exigem efetivação imediata e são sindicáveis judicialmente a partir dos comandos genéricos dados pela Constituição, foi preciso recorrer a uma técnica antiga já prevista no Brasil, porém mal compreendida de integração subjetiva da demanda por ordem do juiz, a intervenção iussu iudicis. Para evitar a repetição de erros, será refeito o caminho histórico de surgimento e desenvolvimento dessa técnica para melhor compreensão de seus escopos. / The option for the federal form of government matter commitment to the existence of more than one entity responsible, in overlapping territories, for performing the tasks of public collection and spending beyond their inherent political activities. The exercise of these tasks can be defined rigorously, in a dual system, or with the possibility of mutual aid, in a regime of cooperation. Brazil has adopted as entrenchment clause in its Constitution, a cooperative federation, structured in three levels of government, resulting in the division of powers between the material components of this federation. Nevertheless, the Brazilian Courts insisted on supporting the thesis of a mandatory solidarity among all federal entities in the suits whose purpose is the control of public policies. The imposition of such solidarity, besides disregarding the federal structure and defy the principles of effectiveness and economy of administration - with overlays and overloads that facilitate waste of money and corruption - not attentive to the golden rule imposing mandatory solidarity, which is the expressly stated in law or constitutional provision. As will be shown, the decisions handed down by national courts in the seat of judicial control of public policies has ignored the whole legal structure of the topic, and impose to federal entities an unnecessary difficulty in managing their skills and their financial resources. The defense of divided responsibilities, however, could generate adverse effects. Is that in procedural field, a suit filed in the face of an entity not being directly responsible for the execution of the questioned public policy demand could be terminated without resolution, imposing delays to the realization of social rights under procedural obstacles. As fundamental rights - the category in which they belong social rights - require effective immediately be investigated and are chargeable from generic commands given by the Constitution, it was necessary to resort to an old technique - already foreseen in Brazil, but poorly understood - a subjective integration demand by the judge\'s order, the intervention iussu iudicis. To avoid repeating mistakes, will be redone historical path emergence and development of this technique to better understand their scopes.

A proposta da tese é explorar como a interação entre abertura política, redemocratização e mudança no contrato social contribuíram para o aumento do tamanho do governo e do gasto no Brasil. Dessa forma, a tese sugere a persistência de um padrão de política fiscal que prevaleceu após a Constituição Federal de 1988, encontrado no governo central e nos governos subnacionais, cujo padrão é formado por: i) pressão pelo aumento do tamanho do governo; ii) crescimento da despesa corrente em relação ao investimento; iii) comportamento pró-cíclico do gasto e presença do efeito voracidade. A hipótese explorada na tese é que o padrão de política fiscal possui como origem o equilíbrio que emergiu com a abertura política e a redemocratização na década de 1980, onde foram incorporadas as demandas por bens públicos (educação, saúde, proteção social, por exemplo) e a maior ênfase pelas políticas redistributivas, oriundas do aprofundamento da democracia e da presença do sufrágio universal. Ao mesmo tempo, o equilíbrio sugere a necessidade de acomodar os grupos de interesse (elites empresariais e do funcionalismo público, por exemplo) que aparelham o estado e buscam defender e ampliar seus privilégios, especialmente em relação aos benefícios tributários, acesso aos recursos orçamentários e prioridade no direcionamento do gasto do governo. Assim, a viabilidade do equilíbrio depende do crescimento do tamanho do governo que serve para minimizar os conflitos entre grupos de interesse, também preservar a paz social e a estabilidade política. No entanto, o equilíbrio contribui para fortalecer a percepção de ilusão fiscal sobre as limitações e as restrições de curto e longo prazo que a política fiscal está submetida, eclipsando como são distribuídos os custos e os benefícios das ações do governo. A contribuição da tese é aprofundar a discussão sobre como o funcionamento de uma democracia iliberal (nova democracia ou democracia não consolidada) e a alteração no contrato social em um ambiente de instituições frágeis são capazes de influir sobre o tamanho do governo e o comportamento do gasto no curto e longo prazo. Além disso, a tese busca explorar quais seriam os problemas fiscais, as potenciais fragilidades, os canais e mecanismos de transmissão que relacionam uma democracia não consolidada e os problemas fiscais, tomando como estudo de caso a experiência brasileira. / The main objective of this thesis is to explore the interaction between the democratization process and change of social contract on government size and public spending in Brazil. The hypothesis of the thesis is the persistence of a fiscal policy pattern, present in both central government and subnational governments, composed of the following characteristics: i) increased pressure for increasing government size; ii) growth of current expenditure in relation to investment; and iii) procyclical and voracity effect. This fiscal policy pattern has its origin in the democratization process in the 1980s, with demands of society for public goods (education, health, social security, for example) and redistribution policies, stemming from the deepening of democracy and the presence of universal suffrage. Alongside, the emerging equilibrium suggests the need to accommodate interest groups (business elites and civil servant, for example) that equip the state and seek to defend and expand their privileges, especially in relation to tax benefits, access to budgetary resources and defense of priority in spending. So, the viability of this balance depends on the growth of government size that serves to minimize conflicts between interest groups, also preserving social and politics stability. However, the equilibrium contributes to strengthening the fiscal illusion about the short and long-term limitation of the budget and fiscal policy. The contribution of the thesis is to deepen the discussion about how the functioning of an illiberal democracy (or new democracy) and the change in the social contract in an environment of weak institutions can influence government size and the behavior of spending in the short and long term. In addition, the thesis seeks to explore what the fiscal problems, potential weaknesses and channels of transmission that relate to illiberal democracy and fiscal problems are, taking Brazil as a case study.

Esta pesquisa busca analisar as dinâmicas espaciais a partir de conceitos e concepções oriundos da Geografia e das Ciências Jurídicas. Discutir a parcela de autonomia que é atribuída aos Municípios dentro do federalismo fiscal à luz do período atual. A forma como se organiza a federação brasileira constitui um arranjo político e fiscal que confere a cada ente autonomia, característica essa que produz no território consequências positivas e negativas. O federalismo brasileiro possui uma trajetória de avanços e retrocessos em um movimento pendular, ora um modelo de Estado mais centralizador, ora um modelo mais descentralizado. Com o advento da Constituição Federal de 1988 houve um novo ciclo de descentralização em que os municípios são reconhecidos como entes federados autônomos recebendo parcela constitucional de competência para instituir e cobrar tributos. Essa possibilidade assume características específicas causando distorções como as trazidas pela guerra fiscal municipal. Os conflitos e as tensões no âmbito fiscal têm suas repercussões e efeitos nas mais diversas dimensões, entre elas no território. O federalismo fiscal surge na guerra fiscal como um componente eminentemente territorial, a compreensão dessa dinâmica e as suas nuances no território constitui o nosso objetivo. / This research seeks to analyze the spatial dynamics using concepts and ideas resulting from the Geography and Legal Sciences and discuss the amount of autonomy that is allocated to the municipalities within the fiscal federalism in the light of the current period. The way it organizes the Brazilian federation is a political and fiscal arrangement that gives each entity autonomy, a characteristic that produces negative and positive consequences in the territory. Brazilian federalism has a path of progress and setbacks in a pendulum motion, or in a more centralized state model, or in a more decentralized model. With the advent of the Federal Constitution of 1988 there was a new decentralization cycle in which municipalities are recognized as autonomous entities receiving federal constitutional portion of the power to impose and collect taxes. This possibility takes on specific characteristics causing distortions as brought by the municipal tax war. Conflicts and tensions in the tax field have its repercussions and effects on several dimensions, including in the territory. Fiscal Federalism arises in the fiscal war as an eminently territorial component, understanding this dynamic and its nuances in the territory is our goal.