This study examines the impact of governing parties in changing patterns of income inequality in three liberal democracies with 'Westminster' systems - Australia (1981-1990), the United Kingdom (1979-1986) and Canada (1971-1981). Extensive analysis of the Luxembourg Income Study datasets for these countries and periods suggests that structural factors, such as changes in the market sphere or alterations in the demographic profiles, can account for only a part of the overall inequality trends in these periods. By using income decomposition analyses, this study indicates that government redistributive policies played an important role in changing inequality trends. Governments in all three countries are single-party operations, and policy responds strongly to partisan processes and considerations. The main question involved in assessing policy changes is therefore why party actors may be willing to increase or decrease income inequality. Applying conventional 'unitary' models of party behaviour (such as the median voter convergence hypothesis) to try and explain decision-making on income inequality also cannot explain these examples. It seems that redistributive policies can only be understood by taking account of the bargaining processes which take place within the organization of the party in power. Explanations of how parties intervene on income inequality should explicitly incorporate the organizational dimension as a key to their behaviour.

This thesis is focused on questions of state redistribution and income inequality in the Czech republic. It explains the main ideas of state redistribution, income inequality and relation between them. It anlyzes the particular instruments of state redistribution such as tax systems and systems of social transfers which the government uses to achiave more equal distribution of incomes in society. The object of the thesis is to find out how the particular instruments contribute to filling the essentials goal - lower the income inequality in society. It is based on the data from years 2006 until 2008 from the statistics of household accounts published on the web site of the Czech statistical office. Finally, it is devoted to the trends of state redistribution and income inequality in OECD countries.

This thesis consists of five self-contained essays. Essay 1. (with Sören Blomquist and Luca Micheletto)  Using a calibrated overlapping-generations model we quantify the welfare gains of an age-dependent labor income tax. Agents face uncertainty regarding future abilities and can transfer consumption across periods through savings. The welfare gain of switching from an age-independent to an age-dependent nonlinear tax varies between 2.4% and 4% of GDP. Part of the welfare gain is due to capital accumulation effects and part descends from relaxing incentive-compatibility constraints. The welfare gain is of about the same magnitude as the welfare gain that can be achieved by moving from a linear- to a nonlinear labor income tax. Finally, the welfare loss from tax-exempting interest income is negligible under an optimal age-dependent labor income tax. Essay 2. (with Sören Blomquist and Luca Micheletto) Previous literature has shown that public provision of private goods can be a welfare-enhancing device in second-best settings where governments pursue redistributive goals. However, three issues have so far been neglected. First, the case for supplementing an optimal nonlinear income tax with public provision of private goods has been made in models where agents differ only in terms of market ability. Second, the magnitude of the welfare gains achievable through public provision schemes has not been assessed. Third, the similarities/differences between public provision schemes and tagging schemes have not been thoroughly analyzed. Our purpose in this paper is therefore threefold: first, to extend previous contributions by incorporating in the theoretical analysis both heterogeneity in market ability and in the need for the publicly provided good; second, to perform numerical simulations to quantify the size of the potential welfare gains achievable by introducing a public provision scheme, and to characterize the conditions under which these welfare gains are sizeable; finally, to compare the welfare gains from public provision with the welfare gains from tagging. Essay 3. (with Sören Blomquist and Luca Micheletto) Subsidized child care is a common phenomenon in both Europe and the United States. In this paper we study the efficiency of some of the most common types of child care subsidies. These are a (refundable) tax credit, tax deductibility and public provision. We evaluate the relative efficiency of these instruments using a quantitative simulation model calibrated to resemble the US economy. In our framework there is a special tax treatment for families with children of child care age, which is based on an assumption that agrees with facts pertaining to actual circumstances in the United States, as well as many other countries. We keep the net tax revenue for this group of tax payers constant, hence the subsidies to child care are paid for by the group itself. It is a commonly held view that in a 'good society' all children should have equal opportunities in life. Many proponents of subsidized childcare argue that one way to move in this direction is to allow all children access to good quality child care. We capture this ideological perspective by using a paternalistic social welfare function which places special emphasis on the quality of child care purchased by households. Using a standard social welfare function we find tax deductibility to be the most efficient instrument to subsidize child care and public provision the least efficient instrument. These results are completely reversed when using the paternalistic welfare function and when  society has the goal of providing all children with access to good quality child care.  Public provision then becomes the best way to subsidize child care.  An important aspect of public provision is that it is an efficient instrument in raising the quality of child care. Essay 4.  In a recent paper Alesina et al. (2011) construct a model in which different labor supply elasticities for men and women emerge endogenously from intra-household bargaining. In this paper I explore the optimal tax implications of their model in an economy with both singles and couples and inequality across as well as within households. In the model, the welfare of married women can be improved by lowering taxes for single women. However, this benefit must be weighed against the welfare cost of taxing single men and women at different rates. Moreover, if single men earn more than single women, the welfare of married women can alternatively be improved by a gender-neutral tax scheme which taxes singles at a higher rate. Because the government is concerned not only with equalizing utilities within families, but also with the redistribution between high income and low income households, gender-based adjustments in the income tax must be weighed against the welfare consequences of changing the progressivity of the tax system. I find that larger lump-sum transfers to women is always optimal. Interestingly, marginal tax rates, on the other hand, should be lower for women only if the exogenous bargaining power of men is moderate. The welfare gains of gender based taxation are sizable and the welfare gains of having tax instruments which depend on household composition are even larger. Essay 5. (with Håkan Selin) Recent microeconometric studies of taxpayers' responsiveness to taxation have shown that intensive margin labor supply and earnings elasticities typically are modest and sometimes equal to zero. However,a common view is that long-run responses might still be large since micro-estimates are downward biased owing to optimization frictions. In this paper we estimate the taxable income elasticity at a very large kink point of the Swedish tax schedule using the bunching method. During the period of study the change in the log net-of-tax rate reached a maximum value of 45.6%. Interestingly, we obtain a precise elasticity estimate of zero for wage earners at this large kink. The size of the kink allows us to derive tighter bounds on the long-run elasticity than previous studies. If wage earners on average tolerate 1% of their disposable income in optimization costs, the upper bound on the long-run taxable income elasticity is 0.39. We also evaluate the performance of the bunching estimator by performing Monte Carlo simulations.

The purpose of this dissertation is to identify the impact of moral emotions (sympathy and empathy) and religious education on individual behavior. This dissertation is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter examines the effect of sympathy and empathy on tax compliance. We run a series of experiments in which we employ methods such as priming, the Davis Empathic Concern scale, and questions about frequency of prosocial behaviors in the past year in order to promote and to identify empathy and sympathy in subjects. We observe the subjects’ decisions in a series of one-shot tax compliance game presented at once and with no immediate feedback. Our results suggest that the presence and/or the promotion of sympathy in most cases encourage tax compliance. The second chapter takes into consideration religious schooling as a way of helping the development of religiosity or morality on individuals. Our intent is to investigate the effect of religious education on charitable donations in adulthood. Our empirical analysis is based on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics dataset. Our estimation results indicate that there is a positive effect of religious education on donations to secular and religious organizations. The third chapter explores the hypothesis that sympathetic individuals are more likely to support income redistribution because they believe that the poor may benefit from this policy. We use data from the General Social Survey to estimate support for income distribution. Our results suggest that some measures of sympathy have a positive effect on support for redistribution. Across all three main chapters, we find that sympathy has mostly small and positive effects on the types of behavior examined in this dissertation, although we are not able to determine the impact of religious education on charitable donations. Despite the sometimes weak results of this research caused by the limitations of the available data and the complexity of the issues studied, we believe that the development of these moral emotions is likely to generate benefits to society.

This dissertation analyses changes in income redistribution through the lens of market-state (private-public) nexus. The main goal of the dissertation is to explore the impact of taxes and benefits on income redistribution among different population groups while aiming for social welfare in emerging welfare capitalism Lithuania. This dissertation analyses the changes in market income and primary income inequality among households and individuals. Changes in public opinion towards desirable income redistribution level and state’s role in distribution process during the last two decades are evaluated as well, stressing the demand for redistribution. Dissertation analyses the impact of taxes and benefits on disposable income inequality and consequences for different socio-economic groups. Relative importance, size and progressivity of redistributive instruments are evaluated. Changes in income redistribution are associated with the changes in tax-benefit legislation. Finally, considering the relative importance of taxes and benefits for income inequality, dissertation contributes to the on-going discussion on the kind of welfare regime forming in Lithuania. / Disertaciniame darbe, analizuojant gyventojų pajamų perskirstymo kaitą, akcentuojama analitinė valstybės – rinkos (viešo – privataus) skirtis. Pagrindinis disertacijos tikslas - ištirti mokesčiais ir socialinėmis išmokomis vykdomą pajamų perskirstymą besiformuojančiame gerovės kapitalizme Lietuvoje tarp skirtingų gyventojų grupių siekiant socialinės gerovės tikslų. Disertacijoje analizuojama, kaip keitėsi gyventojų rinkos pajamos ir jų nelygybė. Kartu parodoma ir gyventojų nuomonių dėl norimo pajamų pasiskirstymo ir didesnio ar mažesnio valstybės vaidmens kaita per du dešimtmečius, taip išryškinant poreikį pajamų perskirstymui. Darbe analizuojama, kaip valstybė socialinėmis išmokomis ir mokesčiais sumažina pirminę pajamų nelygybę ir koks yra poveikis skirtingoms gyventojų pajamų ir socialinėms ekonominėms gyventojų grupėms. Įvertinamas atskirų instrumentų dydis, progresyvumas ir kaita besiformuojančiame gerovės kapitalizme. Pajamų perskirstymo kaita siejama su mokesčių ir išmokų politikų pokyčiais. Galiausiai prisidedama prie mokslinės diskusijos, kokiam gerovės režimo tipui, pagal santykinį mokesčių ir išmokų vaidmenį perskirstant pajamas ir mažinant pirminių pajamų nelygybę, Lietuva galėtų būti priskirta.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-08T14:44:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 2093357 bytes, checksum: 3fb158ddc9ba4dcac9dcf3dfdb5ab56b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-03-29 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This study aims to analyse the income redistribution in Latin American Countries from two essays. The first modeling redistributive preferences with special focus on the impact of mobility expectations on the demand for redistribution. The results suggest demand for self-interest and for considerations of justice based on inequality of opportunity. Furthermore, the results indicate the importance of past mobility and rejection the prospect of upward mobility (POUM) hypothesis of Benabou & Ok (2001). The second study evaluates the effects of income redistribution policies on esponsibility-sensitive" fairness levels in major Latin American countries. In doing so, the following items are analyzed: i) the fairness rule described in Bossert (1995), Konow (1996), and Cappelen & Tungodden (2007) and; ii) the redistribution mechanism (taxation policy) proposed by Ooghe & Peich (2010). The results indicate that taxation does not have a significant efect on Latin American fairness indicators. This behavior can be explained, among other factors, by the fiscal design used, which utilizes high rates associated with the effort variables and fails to equalize unequal opportunities. Additionally, as the redistribution does not equalize differential of opportunities and this is an important component of the redistributive preferences, there is a growing demand for redistribution that starts a specific vicious cycle in Latin American countries. / Este estudo analisa a redistribuição de renda na América Latina a partir de dois ensaios. O primeiro modela as preferências redistributivas com foco especial no impacto das expectativas de mobilidade sobre a demanda por redistribuição. Os resultados sugerem demanda por autointeresse e por considera ações de justiça baseadas na desigualdade de oportunidades. Revela-se ainda a importância da mobilidade passada e a rejeição da hipótese de mobilidade ascendente (POUM) de Benabou & Ok (2001). O segundo ensaio avalia o efeito das políticas de redistribuição sobre o nível de justiça responsibilitysensitive dos principais países latino-americanos. Para tanto, adota-se: i) o critério de justiça contido em Bossert (1995), Konow (1996) e Cappelen & Tungodden (2007) e; ii) a avaliação do mecanismo de redistribuição (política tributária) fornecido por Ooghe & Peich (2010). Os resultados indicam que o sistema de tributação não possui impacto significativo sobre os indicadores de injustiça latino-americanos. Isso pode ser explicado, entre outros fatores, pelo desenho fiscal implementado, que utiliza altas taxas associadas ás variáveis de esforço e não diminui a desigualdade de oportunidades. Adicionalmente, como a redistribuição não equaliza diferenciais de oportunidades e eles constituem importante componente das preferências redistributivas, há uma crescente demanda por redistribuição que inicia um ciclo vicioso específico da região.

Le modèle ELIE (pour Equal Labour Income Equalization) est un modèle inédit de redistribution globale des revenus – qui a été proposé par Serge-Christophe Kolm dans Macrojustice (2005). Les enjeux de ce modèle, qui repose notamment sur une réflexion profonde concernant les implications économiques des systèmes de valeurs acceptés dans les sociétés occidentales contemporaines, méritent d’être discutés. Notre thèse est qu’en prenant ses distances avec le paradigme dominant en économie normative, à savoir le welfarisme, Kolm est conduit à modifier la définition de l’économie normative. Pour être plus précis, alors que l’économie normative ne traitait jusque-là que de la question des modalités de la redistribution, laissant celle de la nature de l’assiette de redistribution à la philosophie morale et politique (comme en atteste la controverse « égalité de quoi ? » initiée par Sen), Kolm entend réintroduire cette seconde question dans le champ de l’économie normative. La thèse se compose de trois parties portant sur les implications de ce changement de paradigme et de la redéfinition du champ de l’économie normative. La première partie s’attache aux fondements du modèle ELIE et plus précisément à la justification de la redistribution des revenus et à la détermination de son intensité à travers la question d’un choix social libéral. La deuxième partie aborde les implications théoriques de ce changement de paradigme et traite plus spécifiquement de la relation du modèle avec la théorie mirrleesienne de la fiscalité optimale et avec le welfarisme en général. La troisième partie se tourne vers les conséquences de ce modèle en termes de règles de redistribution. / The ELIE model (for « Equal Labor Income Equalization ») is a new model of global income redistribution – proposed by Serge-Christophe Kolm in Macrojustice (2005). What is at stake in this model, which is based on a Deep Thought concerning economic implications of values systems accepted in contemporary occidental societies, deserves to be discussed. I defend the idea that by distancing himself from the dominant paradigm in normative economics, namely the welfarism, Kolm is led to modify the definition of normative economics. To be more precise, while until then normative economics dealt only with the question of redistribution modality, leaving the question of nature of redistribution to moral and political philosophy (as shown in the « equality of what? » controversy initiated by Sen), Kolm reintroduces this second question in the field of normative economics. The dissertation is composed of three parts relating to implications of this paradigm shift and to Kolm’s redefinition of normative economics field. The first part focuses on fundaments of the ELIE model and, more precisely, on income redistribution justification and on the determination of the intensity of redistribution, through the question of a liberal social choice. The second part is about implications of this paradigm shift and is devoted more specifically to the relation of the ELIE model with the mirrleesian theory of optimal taxation and with welfarism in general. The third part turns toward this model’s consequences in terms of redistribution rules.

[pt] Esta tese é formada por três artigos, o primeiro em economia organizacional e cultura; os dois últimos em economia política. No primeiro capítulo, nós modelamos a relação entre a disseminação de normas sociais de ética do trabalho e incentivos propostos pelas firmas, que motivamos utilizando evidência de três bases de dados diferentes. No segundo capítulo, examinamos se a renda dos vizinhos afeta o voto de eleitores, utilizando dados de resultados de eleições presidenciais (2004 até 2012) nos Estados Unidos, por zona eleitoral e grupo de bairros. Com isso, buscamos contribuir para o entendimento das razões que levam a diferentes níveis de demanda por redistribuição de renda. Como estratégia de identificação, utilizamos efeitos fixos de ano e dummies de trato e ano; trato sendo a menor unidade geográfica maior que o grupo de blocos (em média, um trato contém 4 grupos de blocos). No terceiro capítulo, estudamos patronagem, investigando o efeito da vitória de um candidato a prefeito de um partido na probabilidade de membros deste partido (ou de partidos da mesma coalizão) ocuparem cargos públicos no governo; ou de sua renda advinda do governo aumentar, caso já sejam empregados públicos. Analisamos também o efeito da vitória de um partido sobre o número de registrados a este partido nos anos futuros, o que indicaria um desejo de sinalizar apoio ao candidato eleito. Estimamos o efeito causal de um partido ocupar a prefeitura, comparando municipalidades em que este partido quase ganhou com cidades em que quase perdeu. / [en] This thesis is composed of three papers, the first in organizational economics and culture; the last two in political economics. In the first chapter, we model the relation between dissemination of social norms of work ethic and incentives proposed by firms, which we motivate using evidence from three different datasets. In the second chapter, we examine whether neighbors income affects voting, using data from election results for the 2004-2012 Presidential Elections in Unites States, by precinct and block group. That way, we try to contribute to understanding the reason why there are different demands for income redistribution. As an identification strategy, we use year fixed-effects and tract year dummies; tract is the smallest geographic unit larger than block group (on average, each tract contains 4 block groups). In the third chapter, we study patronage, investigating the effect of a mayoral candidate s victory on the probability that members of his party (or parties in the same presidential coalition) occupy public jobs in the government, or on their income accrued from government, in case they are already public employees. We also analyze the effect of a party s victory over the number of registered members of that party in future years, which would indicate that voters affiliate to political parties as a way to signal support to the office holder. We estimate plausibly causal effects of a party holding mayoral position by comparing municipalities where that party nearly won with places where it nearly lost.

綠色稅制改革始於1990年代，在此前歐美主要稅收所得來源為所得稅，隨著歐美國家面臨經濟與財政困境，課稅項目漸漸地轉向環境稅，最先實施的國家為北歐國家，目前我國正面臨經濟衰退，且新政府上任後，增稅政策屢屢遭到民眾的反彈，有些學者認為，環境稅有辦法達成「雙重紅利」，既能增進環境品質且改善所得分配，不失為一向好的課稅工具。 本研究以民國100年行政院主計處的「產業關聯表」與「家庭收支調查報告」估計綠色稅制改革的所得重分配效果，利用投入產出分析法，估計環境稅對於消費支出項目價格影響，再將環境稅稅收金額作為所得稅減免與移轉收入減免用途，最後估計吉尼係數，觀察實施綠色稅制改革後的所得重分配效果。 實證結果顯示，環境稅是一具有累退性質之租稅，故單純課徵環境稅會造成所得分配惡化，且課徵越高之金額，所得分配惡化越嚴重；實施綠色稅制改革後，所得分配都較原始值平均，且綠色稅制改革金額越大之方案，改善所得分配效果則越好。

社會保險制度(social insurance)是社會安全制度(social security)的重心，也是現今政府為了增進民生福祉、促進社會安全的重要環節。我國的社會保險制度自民國三十九年開辦勞工保險，至今已歷經五十六年。社會保險制度具有諸多的功能，其中一項重要的功能便是所得重分配(income redistribution)，亦即政府可以利用租稅以外的社會保險制度，來改善國民所得分配不平均之問題，以達公平的目標。 在測度所得不均等程度方面，最普遍用來衡量的指標便是吉尼係數 (Gini coefficient)，亦即我們可以從吉尼係數的變動來看出所得重分配變動的情形。另外，多數的學者以往只從垂直與水平兩效果著手來衡量所得重分配，但本文採用Aronson、Johnson與Lambert於1994年提出的AJL計算模型，將所得重分配效果拆解更細，除了拆解出垂直效果與水平效果外，還多了重排序效果。 由於現今國人受教育的機會愈來愈普遍，有不少學者利用人力資本論(human capital theory)與篩選理論(screening theory)來說明教育與所得之間的關係。這二種理論均認為薪資與教育程度呈現正向關係，因此，教育程度愈高者，所得水準通常會愈高，教育程度愈低者，所得水準通常會愈低，使得教育程度成為所得差異的來源之一。故透過社會保險的施行，能使高所得者與低所得者之間進行所得重分配。此外，隨著經濟發展層次之提昇，使得薪資所得佔總所得的比重日益增加，因此，透過受教育機會的擴大及國民教育品質的提昇，也會造成所得更均等地分配。 而本文正是以教育程度別與社會保險為出發點，來探討我國社會保險的所得重分配效果是否在不同教育程度下會有所影響。本文的資料來源為行政院主計處之「家庭收支調查報告」，實證年度為民國85年至91年。綜合本文中第二章到第五章的分析，對於民國85年至91年社會保險實施情形的所得重分配效果所得到的結論如下： 一、從民國85至91年之各年「全年」的所得重分配效果分解中發現，每年的所得重分配效果皆為正數，代表社會保險具有所得重分配的功能。若將重分配效果拆解成垂直、水平、重排序三種效果，則發現垂直效果占了重分配總效果大部分的比例，且重排序效果大於水平效果，但由於水平與重排序兩效果的比重不高，故我國的社會保險仍然是具有改善所得分配的功能。 二、若進一步把各年的所得重分配以教育程度分成「國小及以下」、「國中」、「高中職」、「大專及以上」四類來重新檢視社會保險的重分配效果，則發現教育程度愈低者愈能因為社會保險制度的施行而使所得分配改善。 三、在上述四種教育程度分類下，所得重分配效果中除了垂直效果與重排序效果有大幅變動外，水平效果所占的比例甚低，且其變動幅度不大，因此我們可以說，社會保險的實施所帶來的水平不公平甚低。 / Social insurance is the core of social security, and is also the important link for the government to improve the welfare of people. Social insurance has many function, the most important is that it can redistribute people’s income. Therefore, the government can use social insurance to achieve the goal of equity. In the aspect of measuring the inequity, the most popular index is Gini coefficient. Lots of scholars decompose the income redistribution effect into two parts-vertical effect and horizontal effect. Unlike previous, I use AJL model to analyze the income redistribution of social insurance. In other words, AJL model decompose the income redistribution into there parts-vertical effect, horizontal effect and reranking effect. Because of the popular of education, people can accept education easily. Lots of scholars use “Human capital theory” and “Screening theory” to explain the relations between education and income. They point out that when a person have a high education then he will get a high payment. Therefore, this thesis is based on education and is arguing the distribution function of social insurance. The results are as follow： First, the social insurance system of Taiwan stills has the function of redistributing people’s income. Second, the people in the lower layer of education usually can redistribute their income by means of social insurance. Finally, the horizon inequity is few in reality.