My goal in this dissertation is to show that Searles theory of Intentionality is worth far more than it is generally given credit for. I defend Searles theory of Intentionality by addressing the main criticisms of his theory rather than by contrasting his view with other popular accounts of Intentionality. I argue that a major benefit of Searles theory is that it provides a solution to both Putnams underdetermination problem and the particularity problem that face internalism, arguing against Dretskes claim that the problem of particularity can be solved without an appeal to Intentionality, and against Bachs claim that Searles solution to the particularity problem is ultimately unsuccessful. I also defend Searles theory of Intentionality against Jacob and van Gulick, who claim that function and consciousness should precede Intentionality in an order of explanation, and I argue that Thompson and Dretskes arguments about mistaken cases of perception are based on a misunderstanding of Searles theory. In the conclusion of my thesis I address the motivation for my defense of Searles theory of Intentionality, which is that it provides the only possible groundwork for a theory of mind that is both naturalistic and non-reductionist.

La plupart des lectures contemporaines des Essais ignore la pensée morale de Montaigne. Ici, je maintiens que Montaigne épouse ‘une éthique de la modestie’ en même temps qu’il rejette toute éthique normative. En particulier, je cherche à aborder comment Montaigne suggère que nous connaissons la vertu et agissons si deux individus ne partagent pas le même perspective et on ne peut pas être le même sujet éthique deux fois. Je vais commencer par discuter la position épistémique de Montaigne par rapport aux universels pour illustrer comment Montaigne met en question l’universalité des lois éthiques et un bien connu a priori comme certains nominalistes et comment la notion de la contingence qui accompagne cette attitude a des implications pour le sujet. Ensuite, je vais explorer comment Montaigne partage et part des penseurs anciens, surtout les sceptiques, afin de façonner une méthode empirique qui a son point de départ dans l’individu. En fouillant sa méthode, qui a son modèle dans le chapitre « De l’expérience », je vais démontrer comment cet aspect de la pensée de Montaigne empêche sa morale de succomber au nihilisme, parce qu’il affirme qu’il reste des phénomènes qu’on peut connaître à posteriori. Je voudrais montrer comment la méthode des Essais aide les individus à exercer leur jugement pratique et former leur intention face aux circonstances changeantes indépendamment des croyances. English Translation : [Most contemporary readings of the Essays ignore Montaigne’s moral thought. In this paper, I assert that Montaigne espouses ‘a modest ethics’ at the same time that he rejects all normative ethical systems. Specifically, I seek to address how Montaigne suggests that we can know virtue and act if no two individuals share the same epistemological position and an individual can never be the same ethical subject twice. I will argue that Montaigne denies human knowledge of metaphysical universals and in this regard resembles medieval nominalists, who held that humans only know individuals and particular instances a posteriori. I will demonstrate that Montaigne’s epistemological modesty influences his ethical position, as he repudiates our capacity to identify an a priori good or a télos to which we should all strive. Because I think that this negative aspect of the Essays does not lead to moral nihilism, I will explore how Montaigne draws and departs from classical thinkers, specifically the Skeptics, in order to fashion an empirical method with the individual ethical subject at its center. I will show how the study of experience outlined in the Essays helps the moral subject to make practical judgments and form intentions with regard to particular circumstances, independently of belief.]

Teleological reasoning reflects the general tendency to view objects, behaviors and events in terms of their “purpose.” Although healthy educated adults tend to refrain from committing errors in teleological reasoning about objects, our knowledge regarding how adults reason about events is limited. It has been suggested that teleological reasoning biases our interpretations of emotionally significant and unexpected life events of which a physical or social cause is absent or unsatisfactory. The current investigation seeks to better understand the types of events that evoke a teleological perspective and the conditions and individual difference factors that facilitate it. The results revealed that participants high in religiosity and low in ACT science reasoning are more likely to commit teleological errors (i.e., imbuing purpose upon events with non-intentional causal forces). Additionally, participants of low religiosity were more likely to commit teleological errors when placed under cognitive load. It appears that two routes to teleological reasoning exist: one that represents an explicit belief system such as religion, and one that reflects implicit intuitions about how the world works. These findings shed light on how, when confronted with certain life events, both our belief systems and situational pressures lead us to rely on intuitive assumptions rather than engage in careful consideration of more scientifically sound alternatives.

Det inledande resonemanget leder fram till att meningsskapande förankringsarbete är viktigt men att detta ofta saknas i kliniskt arbete med ångest och depression. Från detta följer syftet att göra meningsskapande processer tillgängliga i det kliniska arbetet med ångest- och depressionsliknande lidanden genom att svara på frågeställningen: Hur söker vi efter och skapar övergripande och meningsfulla värden? Skriftliga beskrivningar från tre deltagare samlades in och analyserades utifrån en deskriptiv fenomenologisk metod vilket möjliggjorde identifierandet av den psykologiskt relevanta processtrukturen. Bland åtta identifierade delprocesser fanns till exempel ifrågasättandet och övergivandet av tidigare värden och följandet och definierandet av nya värden. Förslag ges till hur ett meningsskapande förankringsarbete skulle kunna se ut i en klinisk tillämpning. Sist ges även förslag till vidare forskning. / The introduction highlights the importance of working with meaning-making processes and argues that this work is lacking in clinical work with anxiety and depression. The aim in this study is to render meaning-making processes available to clinical work with anxiety and depressionlike afflictions by answering the research question: How do we search for and create meaningful values? Written descriptions from three participants were gathered and analyzed with a descriptive phenomenological method which made possible the identification of a psychological process structure. Among eight identified partial processes, questioning and abandonment of earlier values and following and defining of new values were found. How to work with meaning-making processes in a clinical setting is suggested. Last, suggestions for future research are presented.

In this dissertation, I examine the role that intentional descriptions play in our scientific study of the mind. Behavioural scientists often use intentional language in their characterization of cognitive systems, making reference to “beliefs”, “representations”, or “states of information”. What is the scientific value gained from employing such intentional terminology? I begin the dissertation by contrasting intentional descriptions with mechanistic descriptions, as these are the descriptions most commonly used to provide explanations in the behavioural sciences. I then examine the way that intentional descriptions are employed in various scientific contexts. I conclude that while mechanistic descriptions characterize the underlying structure of systems, intentional descriptions allow us to generate predictions of systems while remaining agnostic as to their mechanistic underpinnings. Having established this, I then argue that intentional descriptions share much in common with statistical models in the way they characterize systems. Given these similarities, I theorize that intentional descriptions are employed within scientific practice as a particular type of phenomenological model. Phenomenological models are used to study, characterize, and predict the phenomena produced by mechanistic systems without describing their underlying structure. I demonstrate why such models are integral to our scientific discovery, and understanding, of the mechanisms that make up the brain. With my account on the table, I then look back at previous accounts of intentional language that philosophers have offered in the past. I highlight insights that each brought to our understanding of intentional language, and point out where each ultimately goes astray. I conclude the dissertation by examining the ontological implications of my theory. I demonstrate that my account is compatible with versions of both realism, and anti-realism, regarding the existence of intentional states.

My goal in this dissertation is to show that Searles theory of Intentionality is worth far more than it is generally given credit for. I defend Searles theory of Intentionality by addressing the main criticisms of his theory rather than by contrasting his view with other popular accounts of Intentionality. I argue that a major benefit of Searles theory is that it provides a solution to both Putnams underdetermination problem and the particularity problem that face internalism, arguing against Dretskes claim that the problem of particularity can be solved without an appeal to Intentionality, and against Bachs claim that Searles solution to the particularity problem is ultimately unsuccessful. I also defend Searles theory of Intentionality against Jacob and van Gulick, who claim that function and consciousness should precede Intentionality in an order of explanation, and I argue that Thompson and Dretskes arguments about mistaken cases of perception are based on a misunderstanding of Searles theory. In the conclusion of my thesis I address the motivation for my defense of Searles theory of Intentionality, which is that it provides the only possible groundwork for a theory of mind that is both naturalistic and non-reductionist.

Human interaction with technical artifacts is often mediated by treating them as if they are alive. We exclaim "my car doesn't want to start," or "my computer loves to crash." Of increasing cultural importance are software systems designed explicitly to perform tasks and/or exhibit complex behaviors usually deemed as intentional human phenomena, including creating, improvising, and learning. Compared to the instrumental programs (e.g., Adobe Photoshop), these intentional systems (e.g., George Lewis' musical system Voyager) seem to produce output that is "about" certain things in the world rather than the mere execution of algorithmic rules. This dissertation investigates such phenomena with two central research questions: (1) How is system intentionality formed? and (2) What are the design implications for building systems that utilize such intentionality as an expressive resource. In the discourse of artificial intelligence (AI) practice, system intentionality is typically seen as a technical and ontological property of a computer program, emerging from its underlying algorithms and knowledge engineering. Distilling from the areas of hermeneutics, actor-network theory, cognitive semantics theory, and philosophy of mind, this dissertation proposes a humanistic and interpretive framework called the AI hermeneutic network. It accentuates that system intentionality is narrated and interpreted by its human creators and users in their socio-cultural settings. Special attention is paid to system authors' discursive strategies, a constitutive component of AI, embedded in their source code and technical literature. The utility of the framework is demonstrated by a close analytical reading of a full-scale AI system, Copycat. The theoretical discovery leads to new design strategies, namely scale of intentionality and agency play. They provide insights for using system intentionality and agency as expressive resources that can be used to convey meanings and express ideas. The fruits of these insights are illustrated by a stream of consciousness literature inspired interactive narrative project Memory, Reverie Machine, co-developed using Harrell's GRIOT system. It portrays a protagonist whose intentionality and agency vary dynamically in service of narrative needs.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 252-266).

published_or_final_version / Educational Psychology / Master / Master of Social Sciences

In this dissertation I direct critique at a conception of self-deception prevalent in analytical philosophy, where self-deception is seen as a rational form of irrationality in which the self-deceiver strategically deceives himself on the basis of having judged that this is the best thing to do or, in order to achieve something advantageous. In Chapter One, I criticize the conception of self-deception as analogous to deceiving someone else, the so-called “standard approach to self-deception”. The account under investigation is Donald Davidson’s. I criticize Davidson’s outline of self-deception as involving contradictory beliefs, and his portrayal of self-deception as a rational and strategic action. I trace the assumptions involved in Davidson’s account back to his account of radical interpretation and argue that the problems and paradoxes that Davidson discusses are not inherent in self-deception as such but are problems arising in and out of his account. In Chapter Two, I present Sebastian Gardner’s account of self-deception. Gardner is concerned with distinguishing self-deception as a form of “ordinary” irrationality that shares the structure of normal, rational thinking and action in being manipulation of beliefs from forms of irrationality treated by psychoanalysis. I object to the way in which Gardner makes this distinction and further argue that Gardner is mistaken in finding support in Freud for his claim that self-deception involves preference. In Chapter Three, I present a different understanding of self-deception. I discuss self-deception in the context of Sigmund Freud’s writings on illusion, delusion, different kinds of knowledge, etc., and propose a view of self-deception where it is not seen as a lie to oneself but rather as motivated lack of self-knowledge and as a flight from anxiety. In Chapter Four, I discuss some problems inherent in the three accounts under investigation, for example, problems arising because first-person awareness is conflated with knowledge of objects.