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In this dissertation, I examine the role that intentional descriptions play in our scientific study of the mind. Behavioural scientists often use intentional language in their characterization of cognitive systems, making reference to “beliefs”, “representations”, or “states of information”. What is the scientific value gained from employing such intentional terminology? I begin the dissertation by contrasting intentional descriptions with mechanistic descriptions, as these are the descriptions most commonly used to provide explanations in the behavioural sciences. I then examine the way that intentional descriptions are employed in various scientific contexts. I conclude that while mechanistic descriptions characterize the underlying structure of systems, intentional descriptions allow us to generate predictions of systems while remaining agnostic as to their mechanistic underpinnings. Having established this, I then argue that intentional descriptions share much in common with statistical models in the way they characterize systems. Given these similarities, I theorize that intentional descriptions are employed within scientific practice as a particular type of phenomenological model. Phenomenological models are used to study, characterize, and predict the phenomena produced by mechanistic systems without describing their underlying structure. I demonstrate why such models are integral to our scientific discovery, and understanding, of the mechanisms that make up the brain. With my account on the table, I then look back at previous accounts of intentional language that philosophers have offered in the past. I highlight insights that each brought to our understanding of intentional language, and point out where each ultimately goes astray. I conclude the dissertation by examining the ontological implications of my theory. I demonstrate that my account is compatible with versions of both realism, and anti-realism, regarding the existence of intentional states.

The main thesis of this dissertation is that final causes are beings of reason (‘entia rationis’) in the philosophy of Francisco Suárez (1547-1617). The rejection of final causes is often seen as one of the hallmarks of Early Modern philosophy, marking the transition from an earlier Aristotelian tradition. However, in this dissertation it is shown that final causes had a problematic position already within the Aristotelian tradition. Although other examples of this can be found, this dissertation centers around the thinking of the philosopher and theologian Francisco Suárez and his treatment of final causes in his Disputationes Metaphysicae from 1597. Suárez counts final causes as one of the four kinds of causes, in line with the Aristotelian tradition. However, what these are and how they cause is, at closer inspection, not at all clear, as Suárez shapes his notion of final causation against the background of a definition of causation where efficient causation is the principal kind of causation. Due to this basic view on causes, he is faced with a host of problems when it comes to “salvaging” final causes. Though at first sight seemingly real, in a final analysis final causes are shown to belong to the class of “beings of reason,” ‘entia rationis,’ which are not real beings at all. However, it is also argued that this does not in itself preclude counting final causes as causes; something can really be a cause without being real. Chapter one presents Suárez’ general view on causes and causation. Chapter two presents his view on final causation. Chapter three examines the close link between final causation and moral psychology. Chapter four relates the question of final causation to God’s concurrence with the world. Finally, chapter five argues for the thesis that final causes are beings of reason.

Doctor of Philosophy / People gather. Everywhere. They gather to witness. To tell and to listen to stories. To show what was done, and how what is to be done might best be done. To perform the necessary procedures to make sure the gods are glorified and the world continues to be made as it should. To dance, to heal, to marry, to send away the dead, to entertain, to praise, to order the darkness, to affirm the self. People are gathering. As they always have—everywhere. Doctors, lawyers, bankers and politicians don evening wear to attend performances in which people sing in unearthly voices in languages they do not understand, to sit in rows, silent, and to measure the appropriate length of time they should join with each other in continuing to make light slapping noises by striking the palms of their hands together to show their appreciation at the end of the performance. One hundred thousand people gather on the last Saturday of September every year in a giant stadium in the city of Melbourne, Australia at the “hallowed turf” of the Melbourne Cricket Ground, to watch 36 men kick, punch and catch an oval shaped ball with each other, scoring points by kicking it between long sticks planted in the ground. The gathered multitude wears the same ritual colours as the men playing the game. They cry out, stand and sing anthems. This game is played and understood nowhere else in the world, but in the Melbourne cultural calendar it is the most important day of the year. It is what makes Melbourne Melbourne. Before the whitefella came, aborigines from the clans of the Yiatmathang, Waradjuri Dora Dora, Duduroa, Minjambutta, Pangerang, Kwatt Kwatta—the wombat, kangaroo, possum, Tasmanian tiger, echidna, koala and emu, would gather on the banks of the Murray River, near what is now the twin cities of Albury/Wodonga to organize marriages, perform initiations, to lay down weapons, to dance, to settle debts and disputes, to tell stories, to paint their bodies, and to request permission from the Yiatmathang to cross the river and make the climb to the top of Bogong High Plains in late spring, to feast on the Bogong moths arriving fully grown after their flight from Queensland, ready to be sung, danced and eaten. On the island of Sulawesi, a son of a family bears the responsibility of providing the largest possible number of buffalo to be sacrificed at the funeral of his father. A sacrifice which will condemn the son to a life of debt to pay for the animals which must be slaughtered in sufficient number to affirm the status of his family, provide enough meat to assure the correct distributions are made, and assure that his father has a sufficiently large herd in Puya, the afterworld. Temporary ritual buildings for song and dance must be constructed, effigies made, invitations issued. Months are spent in the preparations. And then the people will arrive, family, friends, colleagues and tourists, in great numbers, from surrounding villages, from Ujung Pandang, from Jakarta, from Australia, from Europe, from the USA, to sing, dance, talk, look and listen. And if the funeral is a success, the son will gain respect, status and honour for himself, and secure a wellprovided journey to the afterlife for his father. In a primary school playground, in an outer suburb of any Australian city, thirty parents sit in a couple of rows of metal and plastic chairs on a spring afternoon to watch their own and each other’s children sing together in hesitant or strident voices, in or out of time and tune versions of well-known popular songs praising simple virtues are applauded; the younger the children, the greater the effort, the longer and louder the applause. Some of these people are the same doctors, bankers and lawyers who had donned evening wear the night before at opera houses, now giving freely of the appreciative palm slapping sound held so precious in that other environment. And they will gather and disperse and regather, at times deemed appropriate, at the times when these gatherings have always occurred, these lawyers, doctors, sons, mothers, sports fans, when and where they can and should and must, to sing, to dance, to tell stories, to watch and listen, to be there with and among each other bearing witness to their faith, their belief, their belonging, their values. But what, in these superficially disparate, culturally diverse and dispersed groups of people, what draws them, what gathers an audience, what gathers in an audience, and what in an audience is salient for the audience members? What gathers, what gathers in an audience?

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2005. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 256-273). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

The work presents the thesis of Sartre about the Ego, namely, it is a transcendent object to consciousness and, hence, is situated in the existential dominion. It was looked for demonstrating that this thesis was engendered from the defense of intentional consciousness and the distinction between the irreflective and the reflexive consciousness. The purpose that comes after this is to make clear the distance taken by Sartre from proposals found to the Ego in the philosophical tradition, more specifically, from proposals of Descartes, Kant and Husserl. After that, it is made explicit how the Ego constitution is done, while a transcendent pole of other transcendent units, namely: the states, the actions and the qualities. Finally, the consequences to the transcendental and existential spheres of affirmation that impose the transcendent character to the Ego are investigated. It is presented as results: I. the evidence of the distance from the Sartre s comprehension of epoché in relation to the one by Husserl; II. the understanding of Ego as an object that urgently, is characterized by dubiety and irrationality; III. the conclusion that there is a change in the treatment about the personhood of consciousness between the works The Transcendence of the Ego and Being and Nothingness; and IV. the connection between the emptying of consciousness and the possibility of moral action. The first result is due to the fact that the epoché will not be considered a procedure, just as in Husserl, but as a torment that is imposed by the spontaneity which marks the Sartre s definition of consciousness, in that there is no transcendental Ego. The second, records that any intuition of the Ego can be contradicted by a new intuition and also, its irrational character is what allows to say that, despite of being an object, it is given as a producer of states and actions. The third, illustrates that the changes between the listed works is attributed to an approximation between the irreflected and reflexive consciousness done in Being and Nothingness, which equalize the consciousness of the Ego to a transcendental field without subject. The last result inscribes the necessity of abandonment of any sedimented sense, as well as of any previous human essential to its existence, to allow affirm the freedom as the insignia of men. / O trabalho apresenta a tese de Sartre acerca do Ego, a saber, que ele é um objeto transcendente à consciência e que, portanto, situa-se no domínio existencial. Procurou-se demonstrar que tal tese foi engendrada a partir da defesa da consciência intencional e da distinção entre consciência irrefletida e reflexiva. A finalidade, que se segue disso, é deixar clara a distância tomada por Sartre das propostas encontradas para o Ego na tradição filosófica, mais especificamente, das propostas de Descartes, Kant e Husserl. Na seqüência, explicita-se como se dá a constituição do Ego enquanto pólo transcendente de outras unidades transcendentes, quais sejam: os estados, as ações e as qualidades. Por fim, investigam-se quais as conseqüências para a esfera transcendental e existencial da afirmação que impõe ao Ego o caráter transcendente. Apresentam-se como resultados: I. a evidência da distância da compreensão sartriana de epoché com relação à cunhada por Husserl; II. o entendimento de que o Ego é um objeto que, prementemente, caracteriza-se pela dubitabilidade e irracionalidade; III. a conclusão de que há uma mudança no tratamento sobre a pessoalidade da consciência entre as obras A transcendência do Ego e O Ser e o Nada; e IV. o vínculo entre o esvaziamento da consciência e a possibilidade da ação moral. O primeiro resultado deve-se ao fato de que a epoché não será considerada um procedimento, tal como em Husserl, mas como angústia que se impõe pela espontaneidade, a qual marca a definição sartriana da consciência, na medida em que não há um Ego transcendental. O segundo, registra que qualquer intuição do Ego pode ser contradita por uma nova intuição e, também, que o seu caráter irracional é o que permite dizer que, apesar de ser um objeto, ele dá-se como produtor dos estados e das ações. O terceiro, ilustra que a mudança entre as obras citadas atribui-se a uma aproximação entre as consciências irrefletida e reflexiva realizada em O Ser e o Nada, a qual faz equivaler a consciência do Ego a um campo transcendental sem sujeito. O último resultado inscreve a necessidade do abandono de qualquer sentido sedimentado, bem como de qualquer essência humana prévia a sua existência, para permitir afirmar a liberdade como insígnia do homem.

Cette étude s’intéresse à la mise en discours et au procès de signification de l’objet sensible dans l’interaction sujet/objet dans la littérature. En comparant les techniques de description d’un corpus hétérogène, composé d’Histoire, La bataille de Pharsale de Claude Simon et du Feu des origines d’Emmanuel Dongala, cette recherche a pu établir deux types de rapports observateur –objet observé : subjectif et objectif, corrélés au niveau de l’énonciation à deux types de points de vue. Cette typologie a permis, dans le processus de signification, de définir deux modes d’articulation des structures expressives de l’objet sensible dans le « plan noématique », comme plan probable de l’expression. Ces différents processus ont ainsi conduit à mettre en lumière deux systèmes épistémologiques fondés sur la projection des points de vue et la variation des deixis de l’observation dans la prise en charge des hyper-savoirs dans le discours. Ainsi la variation contradictoire des deixis de l’observation et la résolution de leurs hétérogénéités ont abouti à un point de vue relativiste chez Dongala, alors que la variation non-contradictoire donne lieu à un point de vue constructiviste chez Simon. / This study focuses on the speech development and significance of the trial of the sensible object in the interaction subject / object in the literature. By comparing the technical description of a heterogeneous corpus, consisting of Histoire, La bataille de Pharsale of Claude Simon and Le feu des origines of Emmanuel Dongala, this research could establish two types of reports observer / item observed: the subjective one and the objective one, correlated at the utterance to two types of points of view. This typology allowed in the process of signification, define two modes of articulation of expressive structures of the sensible object in the "noematic plan", as the probable level of expression. These processes thus led to highlight two epistemological systems based on the projection of the views and the change in deixis of observation in support of hyper-knowledge in the speech. Thus the contradictory variation deixis observation and solving their heterogeneity resulted in a relativistic perspective in Dongala, while the non-contradictory variation results in a constructivist point of view at Simon.

Within the construction industry, proximity of actual to scheduled completion time is a primary performance measure, and deviations from planned schedules remain a popular concern in the field of construction management. Prevailing research assumes that delays arise either from flawed execution of the plan or from failure to plan effectively. Thus, solutions suggested include improving execution and developing ever more sophisticated planning techniques. In spite of these efforts, accuracy in scheduling construction projects has shown little or no improvement, and clients continue to incur the significant costs associated with the failure to more accurately plan. Eschewing this traditional techno-rational view, the current research turned to critical management studies for solutions and investigated planning intentionality, the intentional and unintentional roles planners play in project delays. Thus, it sought to explore the following with respect to the project planner role: optimism bias, where a planner unintentionally mitigates negative information in decision-making; strategic misrepresentation, where a planner intentionally mitigates negative information; and group dynamics in time estimation. The latter is relevant because a team rather than an individual typically embodies the planner function within a construction project. To perform this research, two mixed-methods studies, preceded by a pilot study, and seven interviews with project planners were conducted. The first mixed-methods study investigated how intended and unintended actions of participants affected underestimation of time during task performance; and the second investigated the creation of collective intentionality, the transmutation of individual preferences into a group consensus in time estimation. Results of the first mixed-methods study identified the key situational variables differentiating intended and unintended actions of planners and indicated how these can influence the quality of time estimation. Results of the second study showed that group performance in time estimation was inferior to that of individuals and that group member interaction appeared detrimental to good decision-making. Reasons found were sense of power, commitment, confidence level, cultural diversity, conflicts, and groupthink. The findings were compared and contrasted with those obtained from interviews with project planners to enhance the scope of the study.

La thèse traite l'éthique organisationnelle à partir de différentes perspectives afin de fournir des analyses complémentaires sur l'organisation de la prise de décision éthique de managers et les évaluations morales de ces dernières. À travers trois articles, cette thèse vise à explorer les facteurs sous-jacents qui façonnent l'éthique managériale et organisationnelle ainsi que les évaluations morales de cette dernière en mettant l'accent sur le rôle des conséquences des actions éthiques comme facteur majeur de comportement moral et d'évaluation. / Recent research demonstrates that, in ethically relevant tasks, individuals base intentionality judgments on action outcomes, rather than mental states only. In a first place, the current thesis extends those findings to responsibility judgments and examines affective and attitudinal characteristics moderating the relationship between outcomes and moral judgment. At a second place, the current thesis discusses ethical organizational activity with a focus on intensified ethical behavior enacted following involvement in heavy unethical activity. In so doing, the current thesis intends to problematize the extent to which motivation behind such organizational attitudes is genuinely trying to compensate for the negative effects of organizational wrong-doing. At the same time, the current thesis examines human perception of the above mentioned organizational efforts to compensate for corporate malfeasance. We discuss the implications of our findings for understanding ethical decision making and ethical judgments, offering theoretical directions for future research and managerial implications.

Submitted by Noeme Timbo (noeme.timbo@metodista.br) on 2018-03-19T17:38:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 THIAGO.pdf: 1252867 bytes, checksum: c952095fa39bc0ee8147631a37ce8014 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-03-19T17:38:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 THIAGO.pdf: 1252867 bytes, checksum: c952095fa39bc0ee8147631a37ce8014 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-08-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This research aims to analyze the way that the theologian and philosopher Paul Tillich (1986-1965) applied the phenomenology in the elaboration of his own theology and which are the implications of this for the theological method. In his Systematic Theology, Tillich developed the method called critical phenomenology and stated this is the most appropriate method for the analysis of the theological concepts. However, the presence of phenomenology in the tillichian thoughts is previous of his ST. During the period since the ending of the First World War until the last years of the 1920, Tillich took over a revisionist stance in relation to his previous period and established important dialogs with the phenomenological school, mainly the school of Edmund Husserl. These dialogs became evident in the appropriation of the intentionality of conscious and the intuition of essences did by the theologian. Nevertheless, Tillich appropriated of the husserlian phenomenology in the critical way and he rejected, as the theologian has claimed, the ahistorical realism adopted by Edmund Husserl. For Tillich, the form and substance aren’t dissociable and therefore becomes necessary a method which values both poles. In this context, the theologian proposed the union of a critical element to the pure phenomenology, and later, in his ST, the idea of a critical phenomenology. The union of the critical and intuitive elements in the Tillich thought constitutes as the basis and the innovator aspect of his phenomenology. Comprehend this appropriation of the phenomenology by the theologian is fundamental for a rigorous understanding about the totality of his work as well as the possibilities to application of his phenomenological method for the current days. / A presente pesquisa tem por objetivo analisar de que maneira o teólogo e filósofo Paul Tillich (1986-1965) aplicou a fenomenologia na elaboração de sua própria teologia e quais as implicações disso para o método teológico. Em sua Teologia Sistemática, Tillich desenvolve o método chamado de fenomenologia crítica e afirma ser este o mais adequado para a análise dos conceitos teológicos. Entretanto, a presença da fenomenologia no pensamento tillichiano é anterior à sua TS. Durante o período que vai do fim da Primeira Guerra Mundial até os últimos anos de 1920, Tillich assume uma postura revisionista em relação ao seu período inicial e estabelece importantes diálogos com a escola fenomenológica, principalmente a de Edmund Husserl. Esses diálogos se tornam evidentes na apropriação que o teólogo faz da teoria da intencionalidade da consciência e da intuição das essências. Entretanto, Tillich se apropria da fenomenologia husserliana de maneira crítica e rejeita, como o próprio teólogo afirma, o realismo a-histórico adotado por Husserl. Para Tillich, forma e substância são indissociáveis e nesse sentido torna-se necessário um método que valorize ambos os polos. É neste contexto que o teólogo propõe a união de um elemento crítico à fenomenologia pura, e mais tarde em sua TS, a ideia de uma fenomenologia crítica. A união entre os elementos crítico e intuitivo no pensamento de Tillich se constitui como o fundamento e também o aspecto inovador de sua fenomenologia. Compreender esta apropriação que o teólogo faz da fenomenologia é fundamental para um entendimento rigoroso da totalidade de seu trabalho assim como para apreender as possibilidades de aplicação que seu método fenomenológico possui para a atualidade.