The main objective of this research is to look at the topic of everyday life from a dynamic perspective. The definition of everyday life that this thesis stands upon, i.e. the presence of a subject in the world with the other(s) outlines also two main sources of its dynamics: the world and the other. The essential aim of this thesis is to show that the different attitudes towards the world and the other in the works of Husserl and Lévinas consequently influence the understanding of the everyday life as such, as well as the requirements it imposes upon the subject. The chapter dedicated to Husserl presents his concept of the world as a horizon, the irreplaceable position of perception in our access to the world and the creation of the other within the subject itself. On the contrary, Lévinas stresses the separation of the subject and he understands the world and the other as inherently belonging to this never-ending process. The motive of dependence and responsibility of the subject for the other belongs to the most significant differences between the two philosophers. Whereas Husserl proposes us a subject in the world which he accesses via perception and in which he encounters the other, Lévinas shows us subject that is born to the pre-reflexive and intersubjective world from which he first has to...

Intentionality, in its various forms, connects the subject with objects as they appear within the subject's view of the world. Poets, like artists, create with their bodies and perceive the world with their senses and with their souls. Subjects allow objects to reveal themselves, to manifest themselves having identities according to the contexts in which they appear. This system is called intentionality—a phenomenological concept in which appearances have ontological meanings. Phenomenology, as explained by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, provides a theoretical framework within which Pedro Salinas's poetry may be understood and interpreted. Pedro Salinas forms part of Spain's Generation of 1927 and produces collections of poetry about the intentionality of the beloved during a love affair. La voz a ti debida, Razon de Amor, and Largo Lamento form a type of trilogy under the suggestion of his friend Jorge Guillén. Salinas resides in America during and after the Spanish Civil War and composes poems which later appear in Largo Lamento posthumously. "La memoria en las manos" exemplifies how the subject intends the stone and his hands while remembering an experience with the beloved. The poetic self in the poem probes the identities of objects in order to comprehend the essence of the beloved and of himself.Pedro Salinas practices intense observations in real life when he travels. While teaching in various schools across the country, he attends conferences showcasing his literary criticism, poetry, and playwriting. He corresponds prolifically with his wife Margarita Bonmatí­ . Through his correspondence with his wife, we see how despite distances and space, he thinks of her constantly. He relates a theory of tourism that coincides with Merleau-Ponty's "brute expression." On one occasion, he travels to Los Angeles, California to attend a literary conference. Along the way he travels through Missouri, Colorado, and Utah visiting various landscapes, national parks, and cities. He chronicles his impressions in letters to his wife. The letters Salinas writes and the appearances he contemplates show his focus and soul are not only his wife, but also Katherine Whitmore, his lover. Margarita and Katherine form a conflation that Salinas perceives in his surroundings.

Creating engaging, interactive, and immersive synthetic characters is a difficult task and evaluating the success of a synthetic character is often even more difficult. The later problem is solved by extending Turing's Imitation Game thusly: computational construct should be evaluated based on the criteria of how well the character can mimic a human. In order to accomplish a successful evaluation of the proposed metric, synthetic characters must be consistently believable and capable of role-appropriate emotional expression. The author believes traditional synthetic characters must be improved to meet this goal. For a synthetic character to be believable, human users must be able to perceive a link between the mental state of the character and its behaviors. That is to say, synthetic characters must possess intentionality. In addition to intentionality, the mental state of the character must be human-like in order to provide an adequate frame of reference for the human users' internal simulations, to wit, the character's mental state must be comprised of a synthetic model of personality, of personality dynamics, and of cognition, each of which must be psychologically valid and of sufficient fidelity for the type of character represented. The author proposes that synthetic characters possessing these three models are more accurately described as synthetic personalities. The author proposes and implements computational models of personality, personality dynamics, and cognition in order to evaluate the psychological veracity of these models and computational equivalence between the models and the implementation as a first step in the process of creating believable synthetic personalities.

This dissertation contains three essays on the impact of other-regarding behavior on human decision-making. Chapter II uses experimental methods to analyze the relative performance of a variety of compensation contracts. This study creates an environment in which individuals are paid via common payment mechanisms employed in the dual-principal agent relationships (Piece Rate, Flat Rate, Salary, Bonus and Socialization) and examines the effect that different incentive structures have on agent behavior. In Chapter III I explore the potential outcomes of blended payment structures in a dual-principal agent environment. I draw from the previously conducted experimental study in Chapter II and simulate agent behavior induced by blended payment mechanisms. In Chapter IV, I move away from studying payment mechanisms to investigate the impact of intentionality and responsibility on an individual's decision-making process. I explore the effects of direct and indirect responsibility as well as selfish and kind intentions using experimental methodology. Each of these essays provides further evidence that other-regarding behavior has a significant impact on the outcome of an economic situation; therefore, emphasizing the need to address such behavior in theoretical designs. / Ph. D.

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Yes / In light of the emerging African Union (AU) legal order, this chapter examines AU’s institutions and courts to situate AU law in the wider context of AU’s enforcement mechanisms. In the nearly two decades of the operational phase of the AU, several institutions and courts have arguably ensured enforcements of its laws, policies, and decisions. Added to its judicial, human rights, and legal organs, the African Court of Human Rights has been at the disposal of the AU in the fight against human rights abuses and implementation of regional and international instruments in environmental and criminal law matters. What could potentially be the impact of these institutions on AU law? Also, will the evolving AU law require a separate enforcement mechanism, or could it rely on pre-existing institutions and courts? These issues become necessary in view of the AU’s commitment to implement Aspiration 3 of Agenda 2063, which amongst other things, envisions respect for human rights, justice, and the rule of law within the region. The chapter argues that the challenges of weak institutions, corruption, and internal conflicts are endemic within the continent. Therefore, it takes the view that a system of normative, cultural, and cognitive institutional reforms and transformation will be valuable.

In this thesis I present and defend an interpretation of Kant’s theory of experience as it stands from the viewpoint of his empirical realism. My central contention is that Kant’s is a conception of everyday experience, a kind of immediate phenomenological awareness as of empirical objects, and although he takes this to be representational, it cannot itself amount to empirical knowledge because it can be non-veridical, because in such experience it is possible to misrepresent the world. I outline my view in an extended introduction. In Part I I offer a novel interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of sensibility and sensation. Utilizing a data-processor schematic as an explanatory framework, I give an account of how outer sense, as a collection of sensory capacities, is causally affected by empirical objects to produce bodily state sensations that naturally encode information about those objects. This information is then processed through inner sense to present to the understanding a manifold of mental state sensations that similarly encode information. I also give accounts of how the reproductive imagination operates in hallucination to produce sensible manifolds in lieu of current causal affection, and of the restricted role that consciousness plays at this low level of cognitive function. In Part II I turn to the role of the understanding in experience. I offer a two-stage model of conceptual synthesis and explain how Kant’s theory of experience is a unique blend of conceptualist and non-conceptualist elements. I show that it explains how our experience can provide us with reasons for belief while at the same time accounting for the fact that experience is what anchors us to the world. Finally, I return to non-veridical experience. I confront recent naïve realist readings of Kant and argue that, for Kant, the possibility of non-veridicality is built into the very nature of the human mind and the way it relates to the world.

While most human language is expressed verbally, the gestures produced concurrent to speech provide additional information, help listeners interpret meaning, and provide insight into the cognitive processes of the speaker. Several theories have suggested that gesture played an important, possibly central, role in the evolution of language. Great apes have been shown to use gestures flexibly in different situations and to modify their gestures in response to changing contexts. However, it has not previously been determined whether ape gestures are defined by structural variables, carry meaning, are used to intentionally communicate specific information to others, or can be used strategically to overcome miscommunication. To investigate these questions, I studied three captive populations of orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus and P. abelii) in European zoos for 10 months. Sixty-four different gestures, defined through similarities in structure and use, were included in the study after meeting strict criteria for intentional usage. More than half of the gesture types were found to coincide frequently with specific goals of signallers, and were accordingly identified as having meanings. Both structural and social variables were found to determine gesture meaning. The recipient’s gaze in both the present and the past, and the recipient’s apparent understanding of the signaller’s gestures, affected the strategies orangutans employed in their attempts to communicate when confronted with different types of communicative failure (e.g. not seeing, ignoring, misunderstanding, or rejecting a gesture). Maternal influence affected the object-directed behaviour and gestures of infants, who shared more gestures with their mothers than with other females. These findings demonstrate that gesture can be used as a medium to investigate not only the communication but also the cognition of great apes, and indicate that orangutans are more sensitive to the perceptions and knowledge states of others than previously thought.

This thesis analyses the long-distance control of the environmentally-situated imagination, in both spatial and temporal dimensions. Central to the project is what I call the extended social brain hypothesis. Grounded in the Peircean conception of 'pragmaticism‘, this re-introduces technical intelligence to Dunbar‘s social brain—conceptually, through Clark‘s 'extended mind‘ philosophy, and materially, through Callon‘s 'actor–network theory‘. I claim that: There is no subjectivity without intersubjectivity. That is to say: as an evolutionary matter, it was necessary for the empathic capacities to evolve before the sense of self we identify as human could emerge. Intersubjectivity is critical to human communication, because of its role in interpreting intention. While the idea that human communication requires three levels of intentionality carries analytical weight, I argue that the inflationary trajectory is wrong as an evolutionary matter. The trend is instead towards increasing powers of individuation. The capacity for tool-use is emphasized less under the social brain hypothesis, but the importance of digital manipulation needs to be reasserted as part of a mature ontology. These claims are modulated to substantiate the work-maker, a socially situated (and embodied) creative agent who draws together Peircean notions of epistemology, phenomenology and oral performance.

Ce mémoire analysera une des thèses majeures de l’œuvre d’Emmanuel Levinas, à savoir le primat de l’éthique sur l’ontologie. L’argumentation se penchera surtout sur la description phénoménologique de l’approche de l’altérité, incarnée dans la concrétude du visage du prochain et dans laquelle se retrouve l’idée de l’infini, inspirée dans sa formulation de Descartes. Cette idée, n’étant pas qu’un simple concept mais plutôt une réalité phénoménale transcendante, amène Levinas à questionner le rôle de la conscience thématisante dans l’expérience morale, caractérisée par son immédiateté et par la présence d’un Autre. Est-ce que l’essentiel de la conscience se comprend comme liberté et savoir ? Y aurait-il un autre aspect, oublié par la rationalité que Levinas qualifie de grecque, qui serait plus propre à décrire la conscience ? L’ontologie ne repose-t-elle pas sur une conception de l’homme comme un sujet autonome et en contrôle ? Par ses fines analyses plutôt ontologiques dans Totalité et infini, et par sa prose plus déconstructrice d’Autrement qu’être, ou au-delà de l’essence, Levinas ébranle les fondations du sujet moderne tout en ramenant au centre des préoccupations philosophiques une idée que la tradition occidentale a eu tendance à évacuer, c’est-à-dire l’altérité. Et cette altérité, irréductible aux concepts immanents de la conscience d’un sujet, est ce qui justifie le primat de l’éthique, posant devant le je un tu qui appelle et demande une responsabilité absolue. Plusieurs auteurs et commentateurs seront mis à contribution, dont surtout Husserl et Heidegger, ainsi que S. Critchley, B. Bergo, J.-M. Salanskis et Jacques Roland. / This paper will analyze one of the major theses of the work of Emmanuel Levinas, his affirmation of the primacy of ethics over ontology. The argument will concentrate on the phenomenological description of the approach of Otherness, incarnated in the concreteness of the neighbour’s face, in which we could encounter the idea of infinity. This idea would not be a concept, but a transcendent phenomenal reality, leading Levinas to question the role of thematizing consciousness in the moral experience, characterised by the immediacy of the presence of an Other. Does the essential part of consciousness consist of liberty and knowledge ? Is there not another aspect, forgotten by a rationality qualified as Greek, which would be better suited to the nature of consciousness? Does ontology rely on a subject conceived as autonomous and in control of its destiny? Through his analysis in an ontological language in Totality and infinity, and through his deconstructive prose in Otherwise than Being, Levinas compromises the very core of the modern subject, bringing back to the forefront of philosophical inquiries an idea that the western tradition tended to evacuate from its discourse : Otherness. And this Otherness, irreducible to the immanent concepts of a subject’s consciousness, is what justifies the primacy of an ethic, positioning the I in front of a you that demands absolute responsibility. The contribution of several authors and commentators will be taken into account in this paper, mainly Husserl and Heidegger, but also S.Critchley, B. Bergo, J.-M. Salanskis and Jacques Roland.