Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:46:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Maria Vera Cardoso Torrecillas.pdf: 1133217 bytes, checksum: 152334405d67d261e488edbb4f8d65f8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-02-14 / Fundo Mackenzie de Pesquisa / This dissertation aims at analyzing based on Textual Linguistics and Speech Analysis two theater plays: Oswald de Andrade s O Rei da Vela, and Jorge Andrade s A Moratória. Both plays focus on the economic crisis Brazil was going through in 1929; such crisis was provoked by the enormous fall in coffee prices; coffe was then the main product of national economy; both plays also portray the consequences of such crisis upon society, as well as the social changes families belonging to coffee elite had to undergo. A Moratória tells the story of a rural aristocratic family next to ankruptcy. Besides individual conflicts before a degrading social environment, the play portrays the hints of a slow and definitive changing process in the structure of São Paulo s families. The social and economic reality provoked by the 1929 crisis is presented through despair and hopes of Joaquim s family. Individual and family conflicts filter social analysis. O Rei da Vela focuses on the same Brazilian historical period. The author criticizes the industrialization process, and pokes fun of several aspects of Brazilian. The play presents a decadent rural aristocracy that tries, through marriage, regain the privileges it used to have; it also shows bourgeoisie in social ascension through jobbery, and conquering a place in society through economically motivated marriages. Demoralization and the reprehension of costumes are the play s guidelines. Though both works deal with the same subject, each author has his own way of representing the same historical moment, as well as different standpoints. Oswald de Andrade shows the crisis from the viewpoint of the social class making profit out of it: the industrial bourgeoisie. Jorge Andrade deals with the crisis from the aristocracy s viewpoint. The analysis of these theatre plays are based on texts by Robert-Alain Beaugrande and Wolfgang Ulrich Dressler, Eni Orlandi, Elisa Guimarães, Ingedore G. Villaça Koch, who deal with the marks of textuality and the relationship of language with exteriority. / A presente dissertação tem por objetivo analisar, à luz da Lingüística Textual e da Análise do Discurso, duas obras teatrais O Rei da Vela, de Oswald de Andrade, e A Moratória, de Jorge Andrade. As obras focalizam a crise econômica por que passa o país em 1929, provocada pela queda vertiginosa do preço do café, então principal produto da economia nacional; mostra as conseqüências dessa crise sobre a sociedade e as mudanças sociais a que as famílias da elite do café foram submetidas. A Moratória revela a história de uma família aristocrata rural à beira da falência. Além do conflito de indivíduos, ante um meio social em desagregação, a obra retrata os indícios de um processo lento e definitivo de mudanças na estrutura da sociedade paulista. A realidade socioeconômica resultante da crise de 1929 é mostrada por meio do desespero e das esperanças da família de Joaquim. São os conflitos individuais e familiares que filtram a análise social. O Rei da Vela focaliza o mesmo período da história brasileira. O autor faz uma crítica ao processo de industrialização e satiriza a sociedade brasileira em vários aspectos. A peça mostra a aristocracia rural decadente, que tenta, por meio do casamento, readquirir as vantagens de que dispunha; e mostra a burguesia ascendendo socialmente com uso da agiotagem e conquistando um lugar na sociedade por meio de um casamento por interesse. A desmoralização e a repreensão aos costumes são a nota propulsora da peça. Embora tratem do mesmo assunto, cada autor tem pontos de vista diferentes e uma maneira própria de representar o mesmo momento histórico. Oswald de Andrade mostra a crise a partir da classe que lucra com ela: a burguesia industrial. Jorge Andrade focaliza a crise do ponto de vista da aristocracia. A análise das obras teatrais está alicerçada nos textos de Robert Alain Beaugrande e Wolfgang Ulrich Dressler, Eni Orlandi, Elisa Guimarães, Ingedore G. Villaça Koch que tratam das marcas de textualidade e da relação da linguagem com a exterioridade.

Husserl&rsquo / s phenomenology can be analyzed simply by relying on the conception of intentionality. What I want to do is to put forward the logical grounds on which I can construct an acceptable account of Husserl&rsquo / s theory of intentionality. For this aim, firstly, I need to put some light on the nature of intentional acts or experiences.This suggests us that there is a close connection between the acts and what they are directed towards. Actually many have specified the relation between the act and the object, but what they have ignored was to give an exclusive explication of how such a relation can be connected with the content component. The penomenological content mediates between the intentional act and the intended object. There are some disagreements as regards whether the act is also directed towards the content or not. One of the significant aims of this research is to shed some light on the adequate arguments by which I will try to clarify that one can speak of such a directedness of intentional acts. In other words I believe that one can not only describe an intentional relation between the act and the intended object but also similar relations between the act and the content. There seem to be three parts to be examined interconnectedly: these, namely, are act, content and the object. For, the act is directed towards the object with the intermediation of the content. So his theory is not the same as the object theory of intentionality of which there are some defenders. Husserl&rsquo / s content theory is firstly examined in Logical investigations and Ideas respectively.

The aim of the present study is to analyze the representation of the mythic timelessness and the religious subversion in the novel Pedro Páramo (1953) by the Mexican writer Juan Rulfo. The novel is analyzed from a narratological perspective based on the concept of focalization proposed by the French theoretician Gérard Genette. According to Genette it is possible to identify different levels of focalization depending on the position of the narrative voices.The key question in this investigation is if any salvation is possible in the universe of Pedro Páramo and how the mythic timelessness and the religious subversion are represented in the textual intentionality through the narrative voices. The main conclusion is that there is no possible salvation in the fictional universe of Pedro Páramo. The collective sin is so vast that the intermediation between God and the inhabitants of Comala does not work anymore. Thus, the only possible ”salvation” consists in the separation of the soul from the body the people of Comala experience after death. In Pedro Páramo the dead body is liberated from remorses, but - contrary to the Catholic concepts - becomes a conscious materia sentenced to remember eternally.Keywords: Juan Rulfo, Pedro Páramo, narratological analysis, Gérard Genette, textual intentionality, focalization, mythic timelessness, religious subversion, narrative voices.

What does it mean to be a Teaching Artist and how does the creation and facilitation of an applied theatre program with youth shape a Teaching Artist’s identity? This thesis follows the journey of one Teaching Artist and the applied theatre project she created and facilitated at The Ann Richards School for Young Women Leaders in Austin, Texas, surrounding the issues of self esteem and body acceptance. This applied theatre project combined drama-based strategies and creative writing strategies with public performance opportunities to encourage young girls to find their voices in order to promote positive self esteem. The semester long, after-school project was initially entered into by the Teaching Artist as a form of interactive dramaturgy and research, with the intention of developing a one woman play for young audiences about the same issues. But once submerged in the project, the Teaching Artist began to question the ethics of her process; she began to struggle with her identity, her intentionality and the reciprocity found within her work. All educators hope to transform their students; to observe growth and positive change among their pupils, to witness a successful performance event or to behold young people reveling in art making. But this thesis also considers the possibility that some of the greatest transformation in an arts education/applied theatre setting may be found within the educator themselves / text

En raison de sa force explicative et opérationnelle, la théorie du choix rationnel est utilisée au sein de plusieurs disciplines des sciences sociales. Alors que la majorité des économistes conçoivent la théorie du choix rationnel comme un processus de maximisation de l’utilité, la portée de ce modèle est le sujet de nombreuses critiques. Pour plusieurs, certaines préférences ne peuvent être modulées à l’intérieur de ce cadre. Dans ce mémoire, trois conceptions alternatives de la théorie du choix rationnel sont présentées : la rationalité comme présence virtuelle, la rationalité comme mécanisme intentionnel et la rationalité en tant que science du choix. Une analyse critique de celles-ci est effectuée. En design institutionnel, ces trois conceptions de la rationalité offrent des perspectives distinctes. La première met l’emphase sur les motivations non-égocentriques. La seconde mise sur l’aspect adaptatif du processus. La rationalité jouant un rôle privilégié, mais non exclusif, les mécanismes causaux doivent également être considérés. La troisième implique de formuler des règles institutionnels différentes dépendamment du modèle de l’agent rationnel qui est mis de l’avant. L’établissement de règles institutionnelles varie en fonction de la conception adoptée parmi ces théories du choix rationnel. / Because of its explanatory and operational strengths, rational choice theory is used in a variety of social sciences disciplines. Most economists understand rational choice theory as a utility maximization process. For this reason, the reach of the rational model has been subject of a great deal of criticism. For many commentators, there are preferences that cannot be represented by this model of explanation. In the following, three alternative rational choice theory accounts will be presented: the rationality as a virtual presence, rationality as an intentional mechanism and rationality as a science of choice. Each rationality account offers a different view of institutional design. The first focus on agents non-egoistic motivations. The second, on the adaptive aspect with an emphasis on causal mechanism. The third, on the multiplicity of rational actor models. Depending of which rational choice theory account is adopted, implications in institutional design will be different.

Ce mémoire analysera une des thèses majeures de l’œuvre d’Emmanuel Levinas, à savoir le primat de l’éthique sur l’ontologie. L’argumentation se penchera surtout sur la description phénoménologique de l’approche de l’altérité, incarnée dans la concrétude du visage du prochain et dans laquelle se retrouve l’idée de l’infini, inspirée dans sa formulation de Descartes. Cette idée, n’étant pas qu’un simple concept mais plutôt une réalité phénoménale transcendante, amène Levinas à questionner le rôle de la conscience thématisante dans l’expérience morale, caractérisée par son immédiateté et par la présence d’un Autre. Est-ce que l’essentiel de la conscience se comprend comme liberté et savoir ? Y aurait-il un autre aspect, oublié par la rationalité que Levinas qualifie de grecque, qui serait plus propre à décrire la conscience ? L’ontologie ne repose-t-elle pas sur une conception de l’homme comme un sujet autonome et en contrôle ? Par ses fines analyses plutôt ontologiques dans Totalité et infini, et par sa prose plus déconstructrice d’Autrement qu’être, ou au-delà de l’essence, Levinas ébranle les fondations du sujet moderne tout en ramenant au centre des préoccupations philosophiques une idée que la tradition occidentale a eu tendance à évacuer, c’est-à-dire l’altérité. Et cette altérité, irréductible aux concepts immanents de la conscience d’un sujet, est ce qui justifie le primat de l’éthique, posant devant le je un tu qui appelle et demande une responsabilité absolue. Plusieurs auteurs et commentateurs seront mis à contribution, dont surtout Husserl et Heidegger, ainsi que S. Critchley, B. Bergo, J.-M. Salanskis et Jacques Roland. / This paper will analyze one of the major theses of the work of Emmanuel Levinas, his affirmation of the primacy of ethics over ontology. The argument will concentrate on the phenomenological description of the approach of Otherness, incarnated in the concreteness of the neighbour’s face, in which we could encounter the idea of infinity. This idea would not be a concept, but a transcendent phenomenal reality, leading Levinas to question the role of thematizing consciousness in the moral experience, characterised by the immediacy of the presence of an Other. Does the essential part of consciousness consist of liberty and knowledge ? Is there not another aspect, forgotten by a rationality qualified as Greek, which would be better suited to the nature of consciousness? Does ontology rely on a subject conceived as autonomous and in control of its destiny? Through his analysis in an ontological language in Totality and infinity, and through his deconstructive prose in Otherwise than Being, Levinas compromises the very core of the modern subject, bringing back to the forefront of philosophical inquiries an idea that the western tradition tended to evacuate from its discourse : Otherness. And this Otherness, irreducible to the immanent concepts of a subject’s consciousness, is what justifies the primacy of an ethic, positioning the I in front of a you that demands absolute responsibility. The contribution of several authors and commentators will be taken into account in this paper, mainly Husserl and Heidegger, but also S.Critchley, B. Bergo, J.-M. Salanskis and Jacques Roland.

For centuries referential theories of language and meaning have dominated Western philosophy. The idea that noises and scratches become meaningful words and writing by virtue of a mental grasp one has on the referents they are talking about has become deeply entrenched. Starting with Plato, and reinvented by Locke, contemporary theorists continue to reproduce this mental fix requirement (MFR) in their philosophies of language and intentionality-Physicalists, such as Paul and Patricia Churchland are typical. Plato, Locke and the Churchlands all share the view that bits of language reach out to extra-linguistic entities by some act of mind (for Plato the mind grasped referents via the Forms, for Locke Ideas bridged the relation, and the Churchland's, brain states). In each case a self-referential mental act gets language up and running, i.e. mental connections (or representations) to referents do the trick. My question also concerns what makes squiggles and noises meaningful. The question is a nested one-ancillary to it are questions of what makes language work? How do words mean or relate to the world? How do speakers mean certain things and not others? I will approach the question from a contextualist perspective where roles in rule-governed activities are the bottom line, not representations in the mind/brain.

The present dissertation concerns cognitive psychology--theories about the nature and mechanism of perception and thought--during the High Middle Ages (1250-1350). Many of the issues at the heart of philosophy of mind today--intentionality, mental representation, the active/passive nature of perception--were also the subject of intense investigation during this period. I provide an analysis of these debates with a special focus on Durand of St.-Pourçain, a contemporary of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Durand was widely recognized as a leading philosopher until the advent of the early modern period, yet his views have been largely neglected in the last century. The aim of my dissertation, then, is to provide a new understanding of Durand's cognitive psychology and to establish a better picture of developments in cognitive psychology during the period. Most philosophers in the High Middle Ages held, in one form or another, the thesis that most forms of cognition (thought, perception) involve the reception of the form of the object into the mind. Such forms in the mind explain what a given episode of cognition is about, its content. According to what has been called the conformality theory of content, the content of our mental states is fixed by this form in the mind. Durand rejects this thesis, and one of the primary theses that I pursue is that Durand replaces the conformality theory of content with a causal theory of content, according to which the content of our mental states is fixed by its cause. When I think about Felix and not Graycat, this is to be explained not by the fact that I have in my mind the form of Felix and not Graycat, but rather by the fact that Felix and not Graycat caused my thought. This is both a controversial interpretation and, indeed, a controversial theory. It is a controversial interpretation because Durand seems to reject the thesis that objects are the causes of our mental states. In the first half of the present dissertation, I argue that Durand does not reject this thesis but he rejects another nearby thesis: that objects as causes give to us 'forms'. On Durand's view, an object causes a mental state even though it does not give to us a new 'form'. In the second half of the dissertation I defend Durand's causal theory of content against salient objections to it.

The present dissertation concerns cognitive psychology--theories about the nature and mechanism of perception and thought--during the High Middle Ages (1250-1350). Many of the issues at the heart of philosophy of mind today--intentionality, mental representation, the active/passive nature of perception--were also the subject of intense investigation during this period. I provide an analysis of these debates with a special focus on Durand of St.-Pourçain, a contemporary of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Durand was widely recognized as a leading philosopher until the advent of the early modern period, yet his views have been largely neglected in the last century. The aim of my dissertation, then, is to provide a new understanding of Durand's cognitive psychology and to establish a better picture of developments in cognitive psychology during the period. Most philosophers in the High Middle Ages held, in one form or another, the thesis that most forms of cognition (thought, perception) involve the reception of the form of the object into the mind. Such forms in the mind explain what a given episode of cognition is about, its content. According to what has been called the conformality theory of content, the content of our mental states is fixed by this form in the mind. Durand rejects this thesis, and one of the primary theses that I pursue is that Durand replaces the conformality theory of content with a causal theory of content, according to which the content of our mental states is fixed by its cause. When I think about Felix and not Graycat, this is to be explained not by the fact that I have in my mind the form of Felix and not Graycat, but rather by the fact that Felix and not Graycat caused my thought. This is both a controversial interpretation and, indeed, a controversial theory. It is a controversial interpretation because Durand seems to reject the thesis that objects are the causes of our mental states. In the first half of the present dissertation, I argue that Durand does not reject this thesis but he rejects another nearby thesis: that objects as causes give to us 'forms'. On Durand's view, an object causes a mental state even though it does not give to us a new 'form'. In the second half of the dissertation I defend Durand's causal theory of content against salient objections to it.

Comment former un élève ingénieur à un « principe » comme celui du progrès permanent ou du développement durable ? Notamment pour qu’il/elle devienne un futur acteur de progrès (permanent) pour l’organisation qui va l’employer ? Il n’y a pas de réponses satisfaisantes à cette question dans le sens classique d’apports de savoirs. Le rôle de l’école ne serait-il alors pas d’isoler « ce qui doit prioritairement rester de ce principe quand tous les autres savoirs auront été oubliés » : son « principe d’action » ? Enfin, de stimuler chez l’élève l’intérêt d’en savoir plus ? L’apprenant ne cherchera-t-il alors pas par lui-même les savoirs qui lui seront nécessaires le moment voulu ? Cette thèse montre l’efficience des jeux pédagogiques d’entreprise pour « allumer le feu » chez l’élève qui lui donnera l’intention de devenir un acteur de progrès. Toutefois, le résultat final dépendra également de l’enseignant et de sa manière de se mettre en scène et d’utiliser l’outil pour faire jouer, communiquer, prendre de la hauteur aux participants, et … penser. / How to train a student in engineering in applying a "principle" such as continuous improvement or sustainable development? In particular when the aim is to allow him/her to become a future actor of (continuous) improvement? There is no satisfactory answer to such a question in terms of knowledge transmission. We assume that the role of school should be, first, to isolate "what must, in priority, remains of this principle when all other knowledge has been forgotten", i.e., the “action principle”; secondly, to stimulate the student' interest in learning more about it ? Then, when time is come, the learner will search, by him/herself, for the pieces of knowledge which appear to be necessary to play his/her role. This thesis demonstrates the efficiency of educational business games to “set fire” to a student and boost his/her intention of becoming an actor of progress. However, the end result will also depend on the teacher and on his/her way of staging him/herself and use the game to make the participants play, communicate and… think.