O objetivo central deste artigo é verificar em que medida as estratégias de autonomia regional e de compartilhamento do desenvolvimento, empreendidas pelos governos Lula da Silva e Dilma Rousseff (2003 a 2014), expressaram a intenção de constituir uma hegemonia política brasileira sobre a América do Sul. O esforço de construção de um espaço de liderança hegemônica do Brasil no continente se assentou na ideia da legitimação pelo consentimento dos demais Estados sobre esta liderança regional. Esta política estava amparada em um bloco de forças, reunindo a burguesia interna e setores da classe trabalhadora, interessada na ampliação do mercado consumidor e produtor, como um mecanismo da ampliação da economia brasileira. O contexto internacional de crítica à liderança unipolar dos Estados Unidos da América, os índices de crescimento econômico do Brasil e o forte ativismo político internacional do governo brasileiro contribuíram para criar as condições para essa pretensão de liderança hegemônica do país. A análise tem por método a aplicação do conceito de hegemonia política construído por Antonio Gramsci, tendo sido realizado uma revisão da literatura e dos documentos oficiais brasileiros. / The objective of this study is to verify to what extent the strategies for regional autonomy and shared development employed by Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff’s administration periods (2003-2014) expressed the intent of creating a Brazilian political hegemony over South America. The effort to build a space for Brazil’s hegemonic leadership in the continent was based on the idea of a legitimacy afforded by the consent of the other countries in what regards this regional leadership. This policy was supported by a bloc of forces that brought together Brazil’s internal bourgeoisie and sectors of the working class, both interested in the expansion of the consumer and producer markets as a means to expand the Brazilian economy. The international context, which criticized the unipolar leadership enforced by the United Stated, the indexes of Brazil’s economic growth and the strong international political activism put forth by the Brazilian government contributed to create the conditions necessary for Brazil’s pretension of hegemonic leadership. The analysis has by method the application of the concept of political hegemony constructed by Antonio Gramsci, having been realized a review of de literature and the official brazilian documents.

<p>It is rather undisputed that the United States has maintained its position of global primacy since the end of the Cold War. According to the current Bush- administration and the US National Security Strategy, this power will be used to fight terrorists as well as to encourage free and open societies on every continent. With this position held by the government, it becomes essential to know more about the US power to better understand world politics. What opinions an American foreign policy elite has on international politics in general and on the US power in particular, can be consideredto have a certain influence on the US governmental policy making and is hence an interesting object of analysis for an improved knowledge of the US power position. This thesis aims to analyse different foreign policy elite interpretations, both of the present US situation and of what can be expected in the near future. In addition to opinions on the power position itself, the question addressed is whether there seem to be any impact of modern theories of international politics among the elite and if these theories are relevant at all for policy- orientated estimations. The result of the analysis indicates at least some impact of neorealism, neoliberalism and social constructivism, while there tend to be no influence of feminist IR-theory. However, as a base assumption in this thesis, most modern theories of international politics are conceived as partly related to a realist tradition in the field of academics, and this might diminish the influence of the separate theories among the elite. Accordingly, nor can extreme theoretical differences be confirmed, neither can the differences be disregarded. A majority of the foreign policy elite representatives describe the present US position as unrivalled in all critical dimensions, with an unsurpassed military, economic, technological and cultural power. The opinions on the expected power position in the near future are more diverging and suggest different courses of development. However, as long as the US keeps the precedence of interpretation and attracts others to American values and ideas, in addition to a solid base of economic and military strength, the US power position will most probably last for a foreseeable future.</p>

Depuis la ratification, à l’UNESCO en 2007, de la Convention sur la protection et la promotion de la diversité des expressions culturelles, ces dernières sont désormais des espèces protégées par les hautes sphères de la politique internationale. Émergeant de diverses négociations ponctuelles concernant les biens et services culturels au sein de nombreuses instances internationales, une importante mobilisation politique se concrétisa au tournant du millénaire fort d’un concept, la « diversité culturelle », qui servit de catalyseur pour l’élaboration d’un instrument juridique contraignant au sein de l’UNESCO. Rien ne résume mieux cette montée de boucliers que le mantra récité à maintes reprises à l’intérieur comme à l’extérieur de l’UNESCO : la culture n’est pas une marchandise comme les autres. Pourquoi ? Principalement, argumente-t-on depuis, parce que les biens culturels expriment – identité, valeurs et sens – et que la diversité des expressions est justement à même de mieux représenter la diversité des cultures sur une scène de plus en plus mondialisée. Cette matérialisation de la problématique de la diversité culturelle s’élabora donc face à la forte charge libre-échangiste des années 80-90. En positionnant la diversité culturelle comme contrepoids à une mondialisation perçue comme étant trop étroitement économique, on souhaitait insister sur une dimension négligée dans l’engrenage commercial bien entamé. La « diversité culturelle » en avait apparemment déjà dessiné les traits et il importait désormais de mettre celle-ci à l’avant-plan. Cette recherche s’attarde donc sur l’apparition de ce concept et son déploiement à l’international. Une approche ethnographique permet d’examiner son usage, l’institution hôte (UNESCO), les débats suscités, la multiplication des protagonistes au fil de son institutionnalisation et, évidemment, le consensus établi. J’aborde donc une disposition singulière afin d’en cerner certaines assises conceptuelles clef question d’éclairer le domaine d’intervention international qui s’est constitué au nom d’une diversité culturelle que l’on s’attardait justement à inventer. / Since the ratification of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions – UNESCO (2007) –, cultural expressions are now protected species under the umbrella of international law. Emerging from various negotiations and debates about cultural goods and services in various international fora, a major political mobilization took place at the turn of the millennium. It mostly materialized through the concept of "cultural diversity", which served as a catalyst for the elaboration of a legally binding instrument within UNESCO. Nothing sums up better the argument brought forth than the recurring mantra which could be heard inside and outside UNESCO: “culture is a commodity like no other”. Why? Mainly, it is argued, because of what it expresses – identity, values and meaning. The diversity of cultural expressions is therefore able to better represent the diversity of cultures on an increasingly globalized scene. The materialization of the issue of cultural diversity was mainly a reaction to the multiplication of multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements in the 80s and 90s. By placing cultural diversity as a counterpoint to a globalization seen as too narrowly economic in its scope, the promoters of the project wanted to emphasize its neglected cultural dimension. "Cultural diversity" had apparently already drawn the necessary traits of a globalization with a human face and it was now important to put them to the forefront. This research therefore focuses on the emergence of this concept and its international dissemination. An ethnographic approach examines its use, the host institution (UNESCO), the debates surrounding the multiplication of actors in the course of its institutionalization, and of course the established consensus. I attempt to identify some key conceptual issues underpinning the field of an international intervention made on behalf of a cultural diversity that was about to be invented. / Recherche réalisée en cotutelle - Université de Montréal/EHHESS (Paris)

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

No description available.

O objetivo geral deste trabalho é analisar a recente fase de integração da América do Sul a partir da estratégia da política externa brasileira no governo do presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, com ênfase nas instituições desta integração, utilizando a análise dos discursos e ações, a comparação histórica a processos e períodos relacionados à integração na região e em outras regiões, bem como os condicionantes nacionais, regionais e internacionais. Partimos da premissa de que o sistema internacional está fragmentado em sua ordem, num movimento cíclico da economia capitalista com reestruturação científico-tecnológica de alta intensidade, forjando-se um cenário multipolar em blocos onde se destacam processos de integração regional. A estratégia de integração do governo Lula se dá a partir da conjunção de três principais vertentes: infraestrutura com a IIRSA, econômico-comercial com a ampliação do Mercosul, e política com a Unasul, que se desdobra em áreas sensíveis como a segurança e defesa. A OTCA recebe um tratamento especial por parte da diplomacia brasileira, objetivando não abrir espaços para o aparecimento de iniciativas de influência externa na região Amazônica, seja de Estados ou ONG. A estratégia de integração do governo Lula é solidária com objetivos de médio e longo prazo, não intervencionista sem ser indiferente, objetivando o fortalecimento de sua posição regional e daí internacionalmente, possui características institucionais de neofuncionalismo com intergovernamentalismo, enfatizando a diminuição das assimetrias, com o Brasil assumindo o papel de país pagador. Em comparação com o mais avançado processo de integração, a União Europeia, a integração sulamericana não permite vislumbrar o mesmo alcance de complementaridade econômica que tornou a experiência no velho continente um ator importante no cenário internacional. Comparada às experiências na região latina e sulamericana, existem semelhanças na trajetória institucional e nas dificuldades político, econômica e institucionais de concretização de uma União Aduaneira, como no Mercosul, bem como na flexibilidade e gradualismo deste. Por outro lado as diferenças em termos de integração física, de um país pagador, do foco nas assimetrias, na diminuição das desigualdades sociais, dos condicionantes internacionais, regionais e nacionais remetem a um processo em formação, como nunca na história do Brasil. / The general objective of this study is to analyze the recent phase of South America integration concerning to the international politics strategy of the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva administration, focusing on the institutions, using the analysis of the speeches and actions, the historical comparisons between periods and processes related to integration in the region and other regions, as well as national, regional and international constraints. Our premise is that the international system is fragmented in its order, in a cyclical movement of capitalist economy with high intensity scientific-technological restructuring that forges a multipolar scenario in blocks which highlight regional integration processes. The integration strategy of the Lula’s administration happens from the conjunction of three main areas: infrastructure to IIRSA, economic-trade with expansion of Mercosul, and politics with Unasul, which unfolds in sensitive areas such as security and defense. OTCA receives a special treatment by the Brazilian diplomacy, aiming to open spaces for the emergence of initiatives from outside influence in the Amazon region, whether by States or NGOs. The integration strategy of the Lula administration is sympathetic with medium and long term targets, non-interventionist but not being indifferent, aiming to strengthen its regional and international position, has institutional characteristics of neofunctionalism with intergovernmental relations, emphasizing the reduction of asymmetries, with Brazil assuming the role of paymaster. Compared with the more advanced integration process – the European Union – the South American integration do not reveal the same range of economic complementarity that has became the Old World experience a key player in the international arena. Compared to the experiences in Latin and South American region, there are similarities in the institutional history and also in the political, economic and institutional difficulties for implementation of a Customs Union, as in Mercosul, as well as this flexibility and gradualism. Otherwise the differences in terms of physical integration, for a payer country, the focus on asymmetries, in the reduction of social inequalities, as well as international, regional and national determinants resolve to a formation process, as ever in the history of Brazil.

This dissertation is a descriptive study in which the changed meaning of nonalignment in international politics between the years 1961 - 1992, is analysed. The concept non-alignment as manifested in four chronological phases of the Non-Aligned Movement {1960's, 1970's, 1980's, 1990/92] is analysed, compared and evaluated. The comparison shows that the meaning of non- alignment underwent a change in each of these four phases. It's meaning changed from a literal meaning in phases 1-3 [in which the focus shifted from being political to economic], to a symboric or figurative meaning in phase 4. The changes to the meaning of non-alignment came about mainly as a result of interaction with the international context and, to a lesser extent, due to the role of influential states in NAM. These changes were of critical importance for non-alignment to remain relevant and for NAM to be able to make a potential impact on an ever-changing world. / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

O objetivo central deste artigo é verificar em que medida as estratégias de autonomia regional e de compartilhamento do desenvolvimento, empreendidas pelos governos Lula da Silva e Dilma Rousseff (2003 a 2014), expressaram a intenção de constituir uma hegemonia política brasileira sobre a América do Sul. O esforço de construção de um espaço de liderança hegemônica do Brasil no continente se assentou na ideia da legitimação pelo consentimento dos demais Estados sobre esta liderança regional. Esta política estava amparada em um bloco de forças, reunindo a burguesia interna e setores da classe trabalhadora, interessada na ampliação do mercado consumidor e produtor, como um mecanismo da ampliação da economia brasileira. O contexto internacional de crítica à liderança unipolar dos Estados Unidos da América, os índices de crescimento econômico do Brasil e o forte ativismo político internacional do governo brasileiro contribuíram para criar as condições para essa pretensão de liderança hegemônica do país. A análise tem por método a aplicação do conceito de hegemonia política construído por Antonio Gramsci, tendo sido realizado uma revisão da literatura e dos documentos oficiais brasileiros. / The objective of this study is to verify to what extent the strategies for regional autonomy and shared development employed by Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff’s administration periods (2003-2014) expressed the intent of creating a Brazilian political hegemony over South America. The effort to build a space for Brazil’s hegemonic leadership in the continent was based on the idea of a legitimacy afforded by the consent of the other countries in what regards this regional leadership. This policy was supported by a bloc of forces that brought together Brazil’s internal bourgeoisie and sectors of the working class, both interested in the expansion of the consumer and producer markets as a means to expand the Brazilian economy. The international context, which criticized the unipolar leadership enforced by the United Stated, the indexes of Brazil’s economic growth and the strong international political activism put forth by the Brazilian government contributed to create the conditions necessary for Brazil’s pretension of hegemonic leadership. The analysis has by method the application of the concept of political hegemony constructed by Antonio Gramsci, having been realized a review of de literature and the official brazilian documents.

O objetivo central deste artigo é verificar em que medida as estratégias de autonomia regional e de compartilhamento do desenvolvimento, empreendidas pelos governos Lula da Silva e Dilma Rousseff (2003 a 2014), expressaram a intenção de constituir uma hegemonia política brasileira sobre a América do Sul. O esforço de construção de um espaço de liderança hegemônica do Brasil no continente se assentou na ideia da legitimação pelo consentimento dos demais Estados sobre esta liderança regional. Esta política estava amparada em um bloco de forças, reunindo a burguesia interna e setores da classe trabalhadora, interessada na ampliação do mercado consumidor e produtor, como um mecanismo da ampliação da economia brasileira. O contexto internacional de crítica à liderança unipolar dos Estados Unidos da América, os índices de crescimento econômico do Brasil e o forte ativismo político internacional do governo brasileiro contribuíram para criar as condições para essa pretensão de liderança hegemônica do país. A análise tem por método a aplicação do conceito de hegemonia política construído por Antonio Gramsci, tendo sido realizado uma revisão da literatura e dos documentos oficiais brasileiros. / The objective of this study is to verify to what extent the strategies for regional autonomy and shared development employed by Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff’s administration periods (2003-2014) expressed the intent of creating a Brazilian political hegemony over South America. The effort to build a space for Brazil’s hegemonic leadership in the continent was based on the idea of a legitimacy afforded by the consent of the other countries in what regards this regional leadership. This policy was supported by a bloc of forces that brought together Brazil’s internal bourgeoisie and sectors of the working class, both interested in the expansion of the consumer and producer markets as a means to expand the Brazilian economy. The international context, which criticized the unipolar leadership enforced by the United Stated, the indexes of Brazil’s economic growth and the strong international political activism put forth by the Brazilian government contributed to create the conditions necessary for Brazil’s pretension of hegemonic leadership. The analysis has by method the application of the concept of political hegemony constructed by Antonio Gramsci, having been realized a review of de literature and the official brazilian documents.

O objetivo geral deste trabalho é analisar a recente fase de integração da América do Sul a partir da estratégia da política externa brasileira no governo do presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, com ênfase nas instituições desta integração, utilizando a análise dos discursos e ações, a comparação histórica a processos e períodos relacionados à integração na região e em outras regiões, bem como os condicionantes nacionais, regionais e internacionais. Partimos da premissa de que o sistema internacional está fragmentado em sua ordem, num movimento cíclico da economia capitalista com reestruturação científico-tecnológica de alta intensidade, forjando-se um cenário multipolar em blocos onde se destacam processos de integração regional. A estratégia de integração do governo Lula se dá a partir da conjunção de três principais vertentes: infraestrutura com a IIRSA, econômico-comercial com a ampliação do Mercosul, e política com a Unasul, que se desdobra em áreas sensíveis como a segurança e defesa. A OTCA recebe um tratamento especial por parte da diplomacia brasileira, objetivando não abrir espaços para o aparecimento de iniciativas de influência externa na região Amazônica, seja de Estados ou ONG. A estratégia de integração do governo Lula é solidária com objetivos de médio e longo prazo, não intervencionista sem ser indiferente, objetivando o fortalecimento de sua posição regional e daí internacionalmente, possui características institucionais de neofuncionalismo com intergovernamentalismo, enfatizando a diminuição das assimetrias, com o Brasil assumindo o papel de país pagador. Em comparação com o mais avançado processo de integração, a União Europeia, a integração sulamericana não permite vislumbrar o mesmo alcance de complementaridade econômica que tornou a experiência no velho continente um ator importante no cenário internacional. Comparada às experiências na região latina e sulamericana, existem semelhanças na trajetória institucional e nas dificuldades político, econômica e institucionais de concretização de uma União Aduaneira, como no Mercosul, bem como na flexibilidade e gradualismo deste. Por outro lado as diferenças em termos de integração física, de um país pagador, do foco nas assimetrias, na diminuição das desigualdades sociais, dos condicionantes internacionais, regionais e nacionais remetem a um processo em formação, como nunca na história do Brasil. / The general objective of this study is to analyze the recent phase of South America integration concerning to the international politics strategy of the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva administration, focusing on the institutions, using the analysis of the speeches and actions, the historical comparisons between periods and processes related to integration in the region and other regions, as well as national, regional and international constraints. Our premise is that the international system is fragmented in its order, in a cyclical movement of capitalist economy with high intensity scientific-technological restructuring that forges a multipolar scenario in blocks which highlight regional integration processes. The integration strategy of the Lula’s administration happens from the conjunction of three main areas: infrastructure to IIRSA, economic-trade with expansion of Mercosul, and politics with Unasul, which unfolds in sensitive areas such as security and defense. OTCA receives a special treatment by the Brazilian diplomacy, aiming to open spaces for the emergence of initiatives from outside influence in the Amazon region, whether by States or NGOs. The integration strategy of the Lula administration is sympathetic with medium and long term targets, non-interventionist but not being indifferent, aiming to strengthen its regional and international position, has institutional characteristics of neofunctionalism with intergovernmental relations, emphasizing the reduction of asymmetries, with Brazil assuming the role of paymaster. Compared with the more advanced integration process – the European Union – the South American integration do not reveal the same range of economic complementarity that has became the Old World experience a key player in the international arena. Compared to the experiences in Latin and South American region, there are similarities in the institutional history and also in the political, economic and institutional difficulties for implementation of a Customs Union, as in Mercosul, as well as this flexibility and gradualism. Otherwise the differences in terms of physical integration, for a payer country, the focus on asymmetries, in the reduction of social inequalities, as well as international, regional and national determinants resolve to a formation process, as ever in the history of Brazil.