This study examined the determinants of commercial bank liquidity in South Africa. The panel regression approach was used, applying panel data from twelve commercial banks over the period 2006 to 2016. A quantitative research method was used to investigate the relationship between bank liquidity and some microeconomic and bank-specific factors and between bank liquidity and selected macro-economic factors. The regression analysis for four liquidity ratios was conducted using the pooled ordinary least squares regression, fixed effects, random effects and the generalised methods of moments. However, the system generalised methods of moments approach was preferred over the other methods because it eliminated the problem of endogeneity. Results show that capital adequacy, size and gross domestic product have a positive and significant effect on liquidity. Loan growth and non-performing loans had a negative and significant effect on liquidity. Inflation had both a positive and a negative but an insignificant effect on liquidity. The study concluded that South African banks could enhance their liquidity positions by tightening their loan-underwriting criteria and credit policies. Banks should improve their credit risk management frameworks to be more prudent in their lending practices to improve the quality of the loan book to enhance liquidity. They also need to grow their capital levels by embarking on efficient revenue enhancements activities. Banks may also to look at their clients on an overall basis and not on transaction bases, and they need to improve non-interest revenue by introducing innovated products. The South African Reserve Bank could push for policies that might enhance capitalisation by ensuring that the sector is consolidated and thus merging smaller banks to create banks with stronger balance sheets and stronger capital base. This study contributes to the empirical research repository on the determinants of liquidity and more specifically, it identified the significant factors that affect South African commercial bank liquidity. Identifying the determinants of South African commercial bank liquidity will provide the South African Reserve Bank with insight into ways of enhancing liquidity management reforms, to improve the sector’s liquidity management practices and help to maintain a sound and liquid banking sector. / Business Management / M. Com. (Business Management)

Main goal of this dissertation is to analyze and evaluate corporate governance of DEK Company. Dissertation is composed of two parts -- theoretical part and practical part. The theoretical part will summarize the issue of corporate governance, which will result primarily from literature and relevant legislations. The practical part is the theoretical part applied to the selected company. To meet the targets will be used primarily analysis of ratios and cooperation with the member of the Board. At the conclusion will be compared to theoretical solutions with real results and propose recommendations for the company.

The full text will be available at the end of the embargo period: 31st December 2026.

金融海嘯提供我們一個深刻的教訓，因為危機前信貸過度增長伴隨著大量的系統風險，最後導致景氣反轉時銀行業龐大損失。而這些損失將動搖整個金融體系，並引發了一連串的惡性循環(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision , BCBS ,2010a, 2010b)；若依循過往個別審慎監理((Microprudential regulation)原則，將無法察覺背後隱藏的系統風險。因此目前趨勢是將以個別(Micro)與總體審慎監理原則(macro)並重，針對能夠影響整體市場金融穩定風險來源而詳加監管，同時透過規範與監理措施適度的降低系統風險，最終達到金融穩定的目的。IMF、BIS以及FSB(2009)針對G20制定的金融機構、市場與工具的指導文件(Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments)中，認為有效控制系統風險是現階段政策監理最重要的主軸之一。所謂系統風險是指能影響金融機構所持有的部位以及對於實體經濟存在嚴重負面影響的風險來源；此總體風險將存在負外部性而非個別審慎監理的風險因子。 因此本文由兩篇宏觀審慎監管框架文章所構成的研究，分別針對市場流動性風險和信用風險的因子。透過非流動性賣權與逆景氣資本緩衝（CCB）買權來分析和評價兩種新的監管框架。第一篇論文的主要概念是討論市場流動性風險因子，雖然當前銀行監管的重點是資金流動性風險，如新巴塞爾協議三 (Basel III)的流動性風險覆蓋率（LCR）和淨穩定資金比率（NSFR），但金融機構實際上也同時面臨資金和市場流動性之間的高度順週期效應，導致流動性螺旋，並威脅到金融穩定。因此，本文提出一個市場流動性，系統性風險和宏觀審慎監理分析框架來填補這一空白。 與Drehmann和Juselius（2013B）的實證研究結果比較，我們發現利用6個月歷史波動度建構的非流動性選擇權是最有效的提前預警指標（EWIS），且符合穩定政策結構和最小監管成本。此外在三個子樣本和嚴重危機時期亦能同樣保持預警的穩健性。因此如果金融機構能透過預警減少金融機構投資種類、行業、交易對手與大額暴險的集中度時，將可以由危機發生後被動式轉變成危機發生前主動式的風險管理，將符合總體審慎監理定義：能影響所有而非單一的金融機構，以及有效控制破壞總體市場產生的系統風險。 在第二篇文章中，我們專注於信用風險監管框架的避險，即Basel III的逆景氣資本緩衝(CCB)。這個新穎的監理視角將鼓勵銀行在危機前的信貸繁榮時期增加資本緩衝，而非在危機後接受援助或者增加昂貴的資本。據美國聯邦存款保險公司（FDIC）統計，2014年第1季全美的存款機構風險加權資產為10.27兆美金；如果最高的逆景氣資本緩衝被應用到這些銀行，將有2570億美金的資本不得不額外注資。因此本文設計了一個新的買權來符合CCB的監管框架，建立提前資本防禦措施來減輕系統性風險和整體銀行業不穩定。首先發現這款買權將能在順境時注入資本，即更低的潛在違約風險與信貸寬鬆時期，進而抵禦未來發生的金融危機。我們的建議也符合Basel III的目標，在危機前2至5年協助銀行取得資本保護。最重要的是，CCB買權可以透過提前取得資本形成一個“減震器”，舒緩隨後而來經濟衰退的壓力達到降低銀行資本順週期性目標；此外還提供了一個對於銀行過度冒險行為的抗衡力量，成為一個“自動穩定器”來達到宏觀審慎監理目標。 / Financial tsunami offered a profound lesson as the pre-crisis excessive credit growth was accompanied by huge systemic risks that ultimately led to the reversal of economy and huge losses of the banking sector. Such losses will shake the entire financial system and trigger a series of vicious cycles (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, BCBS, 2010a , 2010b ); the hidden systemic risk may not be observed if we follow the previous principles of micro prudential regulation. The guidance formulated by G20 to assess the systemic importance of financial institutions, markets and instruments (IMF, BIS, and FSB, 2009) analyzes that the main issue of prior micro prudential regulation is that every financial institution’s incentive is to manage its own return-risk tradeoff but not necessarily manage the stability for the financial system as a whole. Consequently, the macroprudential regulation focusing on shocks originating outside the financial system can control the negative externalities of systemic risk rather than micro prudential regulation. This dissertation consists of two essays on the macro prudential framework of market liquidity risk and credit risk factor. We introduce, analyze, and value two new regulation frameworks via an illiquidity put option and a CCB call option respectively. The main concept of first essay is to discuss the macro prudential framework of market liquidity risk factor. Although the current banking regulation focuses on systemic funding liquidity risk such as Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) of Basel III, financial institutions would actually have highly procyclical effects between funding and market liquidity at the same time, leading to liquidity spirals and threatening to financial stability. We therefore propose a market liquidity, systemic risk and macroregulation analysis framework in Taiwan's capital market to fill this gap. Comparison with the Drehmann and Juselius' empirical study (2013b), we find that illiquidity options by using 6-month historical volatility and forecasting short-term stock declines are effective early warning indicators (EWIs) having most stable policy structures and minimal regulation costs. Applying AUC macroregulation criteria, we show this illiquidity measure is also maintained fairly robustness in different intervals, e.g. during three sub-samples and serious crisis periods. If financial institutions can diversify the concentration of portfolios varieties, industries, and counterparty before crises by using EWIs, the passive risk taking can be converted into the active risk management. It is necessary to prepare the market liquidity and macroregulation framework in advance. In the second essay, we focus the hedging product for credit risk factors, i.e. countercyclical capital buffer (CCB). This purpose of countercyclical capital buffer standards is to encourage banks to increase capital buffers in credit good times that can be used in the future stress. According to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the risk-weighted assets of U.S. depository institutions were $10.27trillion dollars in 2014:Q1. If the maximum CCB is applied to these banks, an additional US$257 billion of equity capital will have to be raised. Hence, we design a new option to establish the capital defenses meeting CCB framework and then mitigating systemic risk and banking instability in advance. We show this product injects capital in good times i.e., lower credit risk and more credit expansion, to weather the future financial crisis. Our proposal also complies with the goal of Basel III to obtain capital in 2 to 5 years prior to crises. Most importantly, the CCB option can provide protection with additional capital to act as a "shock absorber" reducing a procyclicality problem in the subsequent downturn. Besides, this type of option also offers a countervailing force to excessive risk-taking behaviors to act as an "automatic stabilizer" for reaching macroprudential goals.

本研究主要係在探討經過會計師查核的內部控制報告書是否會影響到分析師的公私有資訊精確度以及市場流動性。實證結果發現，當公司被視為具有重大內控缺失者，會造成分析師公有及私有資訊精確度下降，進而使得整體資訊環境的不確定性增加。本研究亦發現，當公司揭露內部控制缺失時，該公司在宣告期間會有較差的市場流動性以及較嚴重的資訊不對稱性。本研究更進一步將內控缺失區分成公司及會計層級內控缺失，結果發現有公司層級內控缺失的公司，相較於會計層級缺失者，會有較差的公有資訊精確度及市場流動性。最後，本研究發現，若公司下一年度有進行內部控制缺失修正時，會產生較高的公私有資訊精確度及較高的市場流動性。 / This dissertation extends prior research on internal control weaknesses (hereafter ICW) by examining the impact of internal control weakness and their remediation on information precision and market liquidity for firms filed Section 404 reports with the SEC. First, I find that the presence of ICW is associated with lower precisions of public and private information contained in analysts’ earnings forecasts, which in turn increase overall information uncertainty. Second, I find that market liquidity is significantly lower for ICW firms. Moreover, this dissertation provides evidence that firm-level control weaknesses have stronger impact on public information precision and market liquidity than account-specific control weaknesses. Finally, this dissertation suggests that ICW remediation firms have higher information precision and market liquidity, compared to non-remediation firms. My results are robust after controlling for the endogeneity problem and other sensitivity tests.

[pt] Esta tese é uma coleção de três ensaios empíricos em economia bancária no Brasil. O capítulo 1 mostra evidências que cidades governadas por prefeitos da base aliada do governo federal recebem mais crédito de bancos públicos federais. Utilizando uma base de dados longitudinal única que cruza informações de crédito em nível municipal com resultados eleitorais no período 1997-2008, eu exploro variações no alinhamento político de cada município ao longo do tempo para estimar seu impacto no montante de crédito. Como resultado, observo que os bancos públicos federais aumentam seus empréstimos em 10 por cento a mais em cidades alinhadas. Em resposta, os bancos privados restringem sua expansão de crédito nessas localidades, embora o efeito líquido seja de um aumento no crédito agregado para cidades alinhadas, deixando a questão de uma provável má alocação de capital entre cidades. Eu também utilizo outra base de dados de crédito única e ainda mais abrangente, disponível somente a partir de 2004, e emprego a metodologia de regressão com descontinuidade em disputas eleitorais apertadas para avaliar possíveis problemas de identificação. Em contraste com a literatura, eu observo que os resultados não são conduzidos por empréstimos direcionados, mas por operações de crédito livre. O capítulo 2 analisa firmas que contribuem para campanhas eleitorais de modo a testar a hipótese de favorecimento de crédito como retribuição a contribuição de campanha. Combinando dados de contribuição de campanha e informações de crédito ao nível da firma, eu exploro variações em uma mesma firma ao longo do tempo para testar se aquelas que contribuem para partidos da base aliada do governo federal recebem mais crédito de bancos públicos federais. Os resultados indicam que contribuintes de campanha de partidos da base aliada têm maior proporção de seu crédito oriundo de bancos públicos federais e tomam de uma maneira geral 20 por cento a mais de crédito que firmas que contribuem para outros partidos. No capítulo 3, eu aproveito da introdução de uma nova forma de seguro depósito voluntário, conhecido por DPGE (Depósito a Prazo com Garantias Especiais), para avaliar questões relevantes relativas a corrida bancária, liquidez de mercado (market liquidity) e liquidez na captação (funding liquidity). Primeiramente, documento uma corrida de depositantes a bancos pequenos e médios no Brasil após o agravamento da crise financeira global de 2008. A seguir, observo que esta corrida bancária foi impulsionada primordialmente por investidores institucionais. Em seguida, demonstro que, em resposta ao enfraquecimento da posição no seu passivo, os bancos reduziram seu ativo liquidando suas posições de crédito. Em quarto lugar, encontro evidências de que a introdução do DPGE ajudou a estabilizar as captações bancárias. Com este novo instrumento, os certificados de depósito (CD) passaram a ser segurados em até 20 milhões de reais, enquanto os demais eram segurados em até 60 mil reais. Por fim, demonstro que bancos com menor liquidez nos ativos foram aqueles que escolheram emitir DPGE, apesar de seu elevado custo (emissores devem pagar prêmio mensal de mais de seis vezes o valor cobrado em depósitos segurados convencionais). Portanto, restaurar a liquidez pelo lado do passivo (funding liquidity) foi mais importante a bancos mais afetados pela liquidez de mercado (market liquidity), ou seja, para aqueles com menos ativos líquidos. Uma investigação dos determinantes da emissão de DPGE mostra que: 1) bancos mais dependentes de cessão de carteira de crédito antes da crise estão mais propensos a emitir no novo esquema de depósito segurado; e 2) bancos com proporção mais elevada de crédito em relação ao ativo estão mais propensos a emitir sob o novo esquema, embora os resultados sejam menos precisos. Tais resultados são importantes por diversas razões. Primeiramente, estão entre os primeiros resultados empíricos a documentar a relação entre liquidez de mercado (ma / [en] This thesis is a collection of three empirical essays on banking using Brazilian data. Chapter 1 provides evidence that cities ruled by a mayor from the presidential coalition s party receive significantly more credit from public federally owned banks. Using a unique longitudinal database that matches branch-level credit information with election outcomes over the period 1997-2008, I explore the within-municipality variation in political alignment to estimate the impact of alignment on the amount of credit. I find that public federal banks increase their lending 10 per cent more in aligned cities. In response, private banks contract credit, but the net effect is an increase in aggregate credit to aligned cities, raising the issue of a misallocation of capital across cities. I also use another unique and more comprehensive credit database, available only since 2004, and apply a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races to address possible identification concerns. In contrast with the received literature, I find that the results are not driven by earmarked lending, but by non-earmarked operations. Chapter 2 focuses the analysis on firms that donate to electoral campaigns in order to test for the hypothesis of favored lending as a reward mechanism for campaign giving. I combine data from firm level campaign contributions with credit information and explore within-firm variation in order to test whether donating to aligned parties results in a better access to credit from public federal banks. Results indicate that campaign contributors to aligned parties have a higher lending share from public federal banks and borrow 20 per cent more than firms that donate to nonaligned parties. In Chapter 3 I take advantage of the introduction of a voluntary deposit insurance program to address several important questions concerning bank runs, market liquidity and funding liquidity. I first document a depositors run on small and medium banks in Brazil after the worsening of the global financial crisis. Second, I find that the bank run was led mainly by institutional investors. Third, I show that, in response to the weakening position on the liability side, banks responded by liquidating their credit position on the asset side of the balance sheet. Fourth, I find evidence that the introduction of a new voluntary insurance instrument called DPGE (Time Deposits with Special Insurance) seemed to have helped stabilize banks positions. Under DPGE, Certificates of Deposit (CD) are insured up to 20 million reais, while standard non-DPGE other time deposits are secured up to 60 thousand reais. Fifth, I show that banks whose assets were more illiquid selected themselves into expensive DPGE (issuers have to pay monthly premium of more than six times the value charged on conventionally insured deposits). Thus, providing funding liquidity was more important for banks that were more affected by market liquidity (having less liquid assets). An investigation of the determinants of issuing DPGE shows that: 1) banks that relied more on credit assignments before the crisis are more likely to issue under the new insurance scheme; 2) banks with higher credit-to-assets ratios are also more likely to issue under the new scheme, although the results on credit-to-assets are a little less precise. These results are important for several reasons. First, they are the first empirical results to document the relationship between market and funding liquidity. In particular, self-selecting into DPGE allows us to see that banks with more illiquid assets need more funding liquidity in the midst of a crisis. Second, the fact of the voluntary nature of the program is interesting per se. By providing voluntary, albeit expensive, insurance, banks may self-select only when they have little option (because of asset-side market illiquidity). Although I do not perform a full welfare analysis, this suggests that mandatory insurance may be sub-optimal for two reasons. First, banks that do not need it may be paying excessive premiums. Second, mandatory insurance may

2008年次貸風暴橫掃全球金融市場，Basel II制度歷經多年的實施，卻無法有效防阻金融風暴的發生。觀察2008已採用內部模型法之主要國際金融機構之年報，亦發現採用蒙地卡羅模擬法之代表銀行『德意志銀行』於該年度竟發生了35次穿透，市場風險管理到底出了什麼問題？這是被極度關心的現象，產官學界也對此現象提出了許多議題。2012年的現在，次貸的風暴尚未遠去，新的歐債危機也正在蔓延，若金融風暴再次來臨，市場風險管理是否能克服次貸風暴後所凸顯的缺失，市場風險管理的價值除被動管理外，是否還可以進階到主動預警，以作為經營決策的重要參考資訊？這些都是國內金融機構需積極面對的急迫的市場風險管理議題。 個案金控的市場風險管理機制致力於解決次貸以來所凸顯的市場風險管理議題、提升市場風險衡量的精準度、擴大市場風險管理之應用範圍，並將市場風險管理的價值由被動管理角色進階到主動預警角色，以期作為經營決策的重要參考。經過多年的淬煉，其發展理念與經驗應具相當參考價值，故本論文以個案金融控股公司(以下簡稱個案金控)之實務經驗進行個案研究，除分析個案金控市場風險管理機制的基礎架構外，也將研究重心放在個案金控如何在此基礎架構下，開發多種進階市場風險量化管理功能。 本論文除研究個案金控如何完善市場風險值量化機制外，也對各量化功能的實施結果進行分析，以期研究成果可更客觀的作為其他金融控股公司未來發展進階市場風險衡量機制之參考。

In this paper, market participants’ tendency to form investor herds in the stocks listed on Nasdaq First North Growth Market of Sweden is examined for the period from 2018 to 2023. The models used in this study to detect herd behavior in stocks consist of two measures of dispersions, Cross-Sectional Standard Deviation of returns (CSSD) and Cross-Sectional Absolute Deviation of returns (CSAD), which were proposed by Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang, et al. (2000), respectively. An equally-weighted index consisting of all of the stocks that have traded on this market during the period is created and a quantitative analysis is conducted. Evidence showed absence of herd behavior when using both models, as well as when accounting for robustness tests consisting of small, mid-and large cap portfolios. Our results also support the prediction of rational asset pricing models, which suggest that stock return dispersions around the market returns increase during periods of market stress.