[pt] A forma desta tese é a de um longo ensaio filosófico. Ela atravessa o circuito das eras do pensamento metafísico, tendo por questão nuclear o que nela se define pelo conceito de metalugar. O termo metalugar, presente no título do trabalho, remete a uma estrutura labiríntica, ou melhor, à forma de um palíndromo feito não com letras, mas com signos e ideias cuja escrita e articulação convidam a travessias de pensamento pelo âmago de cada era metafísica. A escrita que se desenvolve nesse ensaio excursiona por giros especulativos e possui como inspiração o escudo de Aquiles, artefato e, também ele, uma espécie de metalugar, cuja fabricação pelas mãos do deus Hefesto, na Ilíada, inaugura no Ocidente uma imagem-concepção de mundo. A tese desenha-se na similitude do escudo heféstico, plasmada para pensar forças que imperaram metafísicamente desde as origens do Ocidente, desenhando mundos (ou melhor, eventos) que com base nelas se definiram. Compõe-se de três capítulos: 1) Khôra, metalugar onde a phýsis ganha os traços que lhe dão contornos inteligíveis; 2) Díesis, metalugar de onde emerge o absoluto, onde se inscreve a dúplice composição da natura e da subjetividade; 3) Sýnkhysis, metalugar onde se verte a tradução de Babel em caos turbilhonante da produção das diferenças. A khôra de égide platônica, a díesis de égide cartesiana e a sýnkhysis de égide babélica formam uma tríade dos metalugares. A estruturação triádica da tese, em três capítulos, não se dá por acaso. Corresponde à intuição de que cada era da metafísica vem a ser dominada por um metalugar. Cada era desenha-se sobre a superfície de um metalugar e a ela corresponde a criação de um nome. O nome é como se fosse um escudo. A tese é, em outras palavras, um metalugar que cria nomes de metalugares, a partir dos quais se fiam os conceitos fundamentais que urdem cada era. O metalugar é, em suma, onde se desenha o evento de uma era, o útero de onde se dá a eclosão do seu ser e seu devir. / [en] The form of this thesis is that of a long philosophical essay. It crosses the circuit of the ages of metaphysical thought, having as its nuclear question what is defined by the concept of metaplace. The term metaplace, present in the title of the work, refers to a labyrinthine structure, or rather, to the shape of a palindrome made not with letters, but with signs and ideas whose writing and articulation invite the crossing of thought at the heart of each metaphysical era. The writing developed in this essay tours through speculative turns and is inspired by the Achilles shield, an artifact and, also, a kind of metaplace, whose manufacture by the hands of the god Hephaestus, in the Iliad, inaugurates in the West an image-conception of world. The thesis draws on the similarity of the hephetic shield, shaped to think of forces that have prevailed metaphysically since the origins of the West, designing worlds (or rather, events) that were defined based on them. It consists of three chapters: 1) Khôra, metaplace where phýsis gains the features that give it intelligible contours; 2) Díesis, metaplace from which the absolute emerges, where the double composition of natura and subjectivity is inscribed; 3) Sýnkhysis, metaplace where Babel s translation is seen in turbulent chaos in the production of differences. The platonic aegis khôra, the cartesian aegis díesis and the babelic aegis sýnkhysis form a triad of the metaplaces. The triadic structuring of the thesis, in three chapters, is not by chance. It corresponds to the intuition that each age of metaphysics comes to be dominated by a metaplace. Each era is drawn on the surface of a metalugar and it corresponds to the creation of a name. The name is like a shield. The thesis is, in other words, a metaplace that creates names of metaplaces, from which the fundamental concepts that weave each era are based. The metaplace is, in short, where the event of an era is drawn, the uterus from which the outbreak of your being and your becoming occurs.

[pt] O objetivo central da presente investigação é o de ressignificar o lógos cristão de modo não metafísico. Para dar conta dessa proposta, assumimos a crise das metanarrativas metafísicas caracterizadas por Heidegger como narrativas onto-teo-lógicas. Com a morte de Deus tal qual anunciada por Nietzsche, os supostos ontológicos da ontoteo-logia se deterioraram. Porquanto historicamente a teologia cristã serviu-se das narrativas metafísicas para legitimar seus discursos, torna-se necessário um outro regime de verdade não onto-teo-lógico para estruturar, no tempo da morte de Deus, as narrativas cristãs. Vislumbramos na obra de Jean-Luc Marion uma possibilidade de reestruturação do lógos cristão, uma vez que ele se abre para a possibilidade de inscrever na filosofia a revelação divina para além da onto-teo-logia. Consequentemente, por meio dele, é possível não somente ressignificar de modo não metafísico o lógos cristão, como também relacionar-se criativamente com a tradição teológica cristã. Por um lado, tal possibilidade é garantida por meio do que entendemos por hermenêutica mística, a saber, a interpretação fundada na mística entendida como experiência fruitiva do mistério divino, experiência essa que desvela um novo horizonte (não metafísico) de inteligibilidade dos discursos teológicos da tradição cristã. A partir da caracterização da hermenêutica mística, ensaiamos um confronto interpretativo com as obras de Mestre Eckhart e Martinho Lutero, com o intuito de assinalar o poder interpretativo mística como hermenêutica. Desse modo, tanto Eckhart quanto Lutero desvelam-se à hermenêutica mística de modo não metafísico, o que exemplifica a possibilidade de ressignificação da tradição cristã no tempo da morte de Deus. / [en] The main objective of this research is to reframe the Christian logos of non metaphysical way. To account for this proposal, we assume the crisis of metaphysical meta-narratives characterized by Heidegger as onto-theo logical narratives. With the death of God as is announced by Nietzsche, the ontological assumptions of onto theo-logy deteriorated. Because historically Christian theology served up the metaphysical narratives to legitimize his speeches, it is necessary to another regime of truth not onto-theo-logical to structure, at the time of death of God, the Christian narrative. We see the work of Jean-Luc Marion a chance to restructure the Christian logos, since it opens the possibility to subscribe to the philosophy divine revelation beyond the onto-theo-logy. Consequently, through it, it can not only give new meaning not metaphysical way the Christian logos, as well as to relate creatively to the Christian theological tradition. On the one hand, such a possibility is guaranteed by means of what we mean by mystical hermeneutics, namely, the interpretation based on the mystical understood as fruitive experience of the divine mystery, experience this unveiling a new horizon (not metaphysical) intelligibility of theological discourses Christian tradition. From the characterization of mystical hermeneutics, we rehearse an interpretive confrontation with the works of Meister Eckhart and Martin Luther, in order to mark the interpretive mystical power as hermeneutics. Thus, both Eckhart and Luther unfold to the mystical hermeneutics of non-metaphysical way, which exemplifies the possibility of reinterpretation of the Christian tradition in the time of the death of God.

My interest in Thomas Merton began two years ago in my last year of an M.A. program in Church History at the Wheaton Graduate school outside of Chicago. In particular, I was impressed with Merton's ability to carry on a dialogue with D.T. Suzuki, communicator of Rinzai Zen to the west, while retaining his commitment to Christianity. Hence I chose to work on an aspect of the Merton/Suzuki dialogue recorded in Zen and the Birds of Appetite. The impulse for such a study arose from my own questions regarding Christianity. Did Christianity alone contain the formula for truth or did Christianity contain one of many formulas to find ultimate reality or God? It became evident as I progressed in my research that the kingpin in Merton's dilemma between the Kerygma of Christianity and Zen consciousness was the epistemological question. The epistemological road of Zen Buddhism is that of experience. The epistemological road of Christianity equally emphasizes experience and rationality. Inasmuch as the experience of the reality of the Kerygma is a vital component of Christianity, and inasmuch as this sphere is often downplayed in a society which puts the scientific method on a pedastle, Merton correctly assimilates Zen Buddhist themes in order to inform that neglected aspect of Christianity. However, the irreconcilable difference between Zen Buddhism and Christianity is apparent. Christianity is not just an experiential, romantic feeling of unity with 'the one'. Conversely, Zen Buddhism refuses the imposition of content on its central thrust. I conclude that we are faced with a 'Mexican standoff’ between Christianity and Zen Buddhism inasmuch as in the quest for satori the Zen Buddhist will not include the Kerygma, nor will the Christian eliminate the Kerygma in his quest for the experience of ultimate reality or God. Thus a merger is impossible unless severe compromise is made on both sides. I maintain that while there is a wealth of gold to be discovered in Christianity and Zen Buddhism, it is impossible to equate them. Merton’s theory of the non-religious character of Zen which can shine through any system, enabled him to espouse the Zen-way to a Christian audience. I refute the claim that Zen is non-religious and rather maintain that allegiance to non-thought represents a definite epistemological stance. Also, the authoritative edge in Zen inspired by satori contains the same degree of dogmatism as the Christian allegiance to the deity of Christ. I understand Merton’s assimilation of Zen themes with his evolved Christian thought in the following manner: 1. Disgust with a technological society whose values carried over into the religious sphere. 2. His own poetic, paradoxical nature and obsession with ultimate reality. 3. His desire that Zen Buddhists learn about Christianity in a non-threatening way, and 4. His intuition that Christianity must be more than intellectual assent to dogma which does not: change one’s lifestyle, and his discovery in Zen of a preparatory mode for the breakthrough of truth. He wanted to integrate the heart with the head. I begin with a biographical report of Merton’s life and evolved religious thought. The second chapter focusses on representative thinkers in Merton’s thought beginning with Bernard of Clairvauxs Meister Eckhart and D.T. Suzuki. Finally the third chapter focusses on the dialogue between Suzuki and Merton. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

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O objetivo deste trabalho é comprovar a criação de um gênero híbrido e inovador - a prosa poética - , ligada ao jornalismo e à literatura do final do século XIX. Esta pesquisa analisa a prosa poética de Raul Pompéia, a partir de textos selecionados como corpus, publicados no periódico, A Gazeta da Tarde, de 21 a 29 jan. 1986. Paralelamente comparamos os textos equivalentes em sua versão de livro, publicados pela primeira vez em 1900, comentando também o conjunto das Canções sem metro. / The main objective of this work is to compare the creation of a hybrid and new genre - the poetic prose -, by Raul Pompéia, related to journalism and literature at the end of the XIX century. This research analyses the poetic prose written by Raul Pompéia, by selecting texts as its corpus, published in the periodic \"A Gazeta da Tarde\", from January 21st to January 29th, 1986. At the same time we have compared the equivalent texts published on book for the first time in 1900, also discussing the other texts which form the whole group.

This thesis examines in four parts a collection of philosophical arguments dealing with war. The conclusions drawn are that war is a definable and applicable concept, that above the level of biological reactions war is the result of beliefs, that an objective distinction exists between aggressive and defensive actions, and that war is only justifiable in the protection of core rights. The first part analyses competing definitions of war. It is argued that the concept of war is philosophically appropriate and captures the conceptual common denominator between particular wars. The essence of war is defined as “a condition of open-ended violence”. Part Two explores the causal relationships between metaphysical and epistemological beliefs and war. It is held that war cannot be explained away as an unalterable fact of the universe, hence deterministic explanations fail in favour of the conclusion that wars are the product of ideas and ideas are volitionally obtained. The third part continues an exploration of determinist accounts of war and examines how various theories of human nature attempt to explain why war occurs. For methodological purposes human nature is trisected into biological, cultural, and rational aspects. Theories that attempt to interpret war using only a single aspect are inadequate, for each aspect must logically presuppose the existence and hence the influence of the others. It is concluded that human wars are the product of ideas, but ideas are distinguishable between tacit and explicit forms. Tacit forms of knowledge evolve through social interaction and sometimes have unintended consequences; war on the cultural level can be the product of human action but not of human design (Ferguson), hence attempts to abolish war by reason alone are bound to fail. Part Four assesses the application of ethical and political reasoning to war. It is argued firstly that morality, in the form of universalisable core rights and socially generated general rules of conduct, must not be removed from the sphere of war. Secondly it is concluded that the ideal just government exists to protect rights, from which it will follow that defensive wars and wars of intervention to protect rights are morally supportable.

The central aim of this thesis is to argue that the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation presents a stronger constraint on what counts as a satisfactory statement of the relation between the mental and the physical than can be acknowledged within the metaphysical framework of non-reductive physicalism. Although the chief merit of non-reductive physicalism appears to be its ability to respect the irreducibility of mental concepts to physical concepts, whilst respecting the primacy of the physical ontology, I claim that its commitment to the principles of physicalism prevents that framework from being able to accommodate what I will refer to as the deeper extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation. The deeper extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation manifests itself in the fact that the work carried out by mentalistic explanations is completely separate from the work carried out by physicalistic explanations. I claim that the deeper extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation cannot be recognised within a metaphysical framework which claims to recognise the primacy of the physical ontology because recopsing deep autonomy requires giving up the assumption that the mental must be related to the physical in the manner appropriate to discharging such metaphysical principles. I defend the claim that we can recognise the deeper extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation if we take our successful explanatory practices as the starting point of our investigation, and only then revert to the question of how best to articulate the relation between the mental and the physical. My claim is that there is an intrinsic connection between the nature of the mental and the nature of human relationships, and I therefore suggest that the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation ought to be understood in connection with the autonomous nature of human relationships. The basic ideas in this thesis are derived by combining features of Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations with features of John MacMurray’s approach to human relationships. On the basis of this combination, I argue for the more specific claim that there is an intrinsic connection between what it means to say that an individual has the capacity to think and what it means to say that he has the capacity to be involved in various types of human relationships. This connection is then used to develop a non-causal account of human action to challenge the physicalist ’s causal account, which will be used to support the claim that mentalistic explanations are autonomous with respect to physicalistic explanations in the deeper sense. I conclude by arguing that the considerations which put us in position to recognise the deeper extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation ought to constrain our statement of the relation between the mental and the physical, and I suggest that this statement should be consistent with the way in which mentalistic and physicalistic explanations carry out their work in our explanatory practices. I claim that individuals are subject to mentalistic explanations in so far as they have a life to live in the world with other people, and that individuals are subject to physicalistic explanations in so far as human beings are creatures whose life has a natural biological dimension. But rather than identifying the mental with the physical, and thereby compromise the deeper extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation, I suggest that this relation might be understood in terms of the fact that the mental is embedded in the dimension of human life which is constituted by the involvement of individuals in various types of relationshps with each other, and that the dimension of human life in which physicalistic explanations are operative is presupposed as the causal background which must be in place if individuals are to have such a life to live in the world.

Le travail de Wittgenstein exemplifie la transcendance dont se nourrit la philosophie. En effet, la recherche de fondements à notre langage, par la mise en œuvre d'un idiome logique, génère des préoccupations ontologiques insondables. De même, le désir de créer une grammaire purement descriptive révèle l'arbitraire des critères de l'ordinaire. Enfin, la négation quasi obsessionnelle d'une intériorité active ne fait pas obstacle à son retour dans les thèmes de la volonté, du silence et de l'éthique. L'Éthique dite ineffable et la volonté, dans le sens de Schopenhauer, s'imposent comme les invariants d'un Sujet en marge d'un monde dit sans valeur dans lequel, logique, éthique et esthétique ne peuvent se dire. Ici, le silence de Wittgenstein ouvre sur un non-dit éloquent. En recherchant des fondements ou des règles à notre langage, tout en expulsant certains objets hors du dicible, Wittgenstein exprime le désir de mettre en place un point de vue synoptique sur notre forme de vie. Mais en fait, il se retrouve prisonnier des entrelacs qui relient l'immanence et la transcendance.Ces investigations ne peuvent être dissociées, chez ce contemporain de la naissance de la psychanalyse, d'une attitude tendancielle à la sublimation des problèmes philosophiques sur fond de crise identitaire. Son attitude face aux choix, sa difficulté à donner un assentiment, son rapport ambigu au religieux, au mystique et à l'identité, sont soulignés comme les points aveugles de son expression. Ces thèmes révèlent une transcendance intrinsèque à son œuvre et une résistance forte de la métaphysique.Le travail de Wittgenstein est pris ici comme un exemple paradigmatique de la philosophie analytique, philosophie entrée en conflit contre l'abus d'expressions métaphysiques accusées de nous livrer aux illusions trompeuses. / Wittgenstein's work exemplifies transcendence which feeds philosophy. The search for foundations to our language, by the implementation of a logical structure generates unfathomable ontological concerns. Similarly, the dream of a purely descriptive grammar reveals the arbi-trariness of criteria of the ordinary. Finally, the obsessive denial of an active interiority does not preclude his return to willpower, silence and ethical themes. Ethics, as ineffable, and will, in the sense of Schopenhauer, are invariants of a philosophical subject on the sidelines of a world without value, in which, the logical, ethical and aesthetic could not be said. Here, Witt-genstein's silence opens on an eloquent unsaid. Searching for foundations or rules to our lan-guage, while expelling some objects in the indescribable, Wittgenstein expressed the desire to provide a synoptic view of our form of life. In fact, he finds himself prisoner of interlaces between immanence and transcendence.These investigations cannot be separated with this contemporary of the birth of psychoanaly-sis, a trend attitude to the sublimation of philosophical problems on substance of identity cri-sis. His attitude to choice, his difficulty to give consent, his ambiguous report to the religious, the mystic and identity are underlined as blind expression points. These themes reveal an in-herent transcendence in his work and the resistance of the metaphysical.Wittgenstein's work is seen as a paradigm of analytic philosophy, philosophy came into con-flict against the abuse of metaphysical expressions accused of deceptive illusions for us.

Dissertation "A thought journey of a philosopher-disident Bohumír Janát" deals with the life and work of a Christian philosopher and spokesman of Charter 77. The work is not divided into two parts, but each chapter includes both his personal and professional life as well as analysis of Janáts texts. The work begins with Janáts childhood and his studies at the Faculty of Arts at Charles University in Prague and continues with the period from graduation until the year 1989 when his texts already contain motifs he was developing for the rest of his life. Year 1988 was particularly important as at this time he was the spokesman for Charter 77. The third section is the period from 1989 to Janáts death in November 1998 when he produced most of his work. The work is especially pointing out that Bohumir Janát was always a critic of present, he ran against the spirit of the time - during and even after a totalitarian regime end in November 1989. He saw the coup as a revelation of God's power, not as a revolution. He hoped for a change in the mindset of the nation, for a turnover to the sphere of ethics and spiritual deepening. Post- revolutionary development, however, was a deep disappointment for him. His inspiring thinkers were S. Dunne, H. D. Thoreau, T. G. Masaryk and F. Nietzsche, whose philosophy...

[pt] Este é um estudo acerca da natureza ontológica do tempo, ou seja, um estudo que visa distinguir, no âmbito da experiência, o tempo subjetivo do tempo em si mesmo, tentando delimitá-los por critérios de necessidade lógica e adequação formal as criticas e descobertas da filosofia e da ciência moderna e contemporânea. O trabalho consta também de um apanhado historiográfico das principais abstrações da ciência, bem como, das principais contribuições de filósofos, como, p.ex., Santo Agostinho e Kant, para a questão do tempo, abarcando também as criticas da física contemporânea ao paradigma clássico do tempo e as novas tendências de abordagem e pesquisa da questão do tempo no século XXI. / [en] This is an essay on the ontologic nature of time, so to say, a study that intends to distinguish, inside the realm of experience, the subjective time from time itself, trying to bound both of them by logical necessity and formal adequation to the critics and discoveries from modern and contemporary philosophy and science. This essay also provides an historiographic resume of the main abstractions from sciense, as well as, the main contributions from philosophers, like Saint Augustine and Kant, for example, to the problem of time, approaching also the critics of contemporay physics to the classical time paradigm and the new trends of approach and research of time in the XXI century.