Augustine, the fourth-century Christian philosopher, is perhaps best-known for his spiritual autobiography Confessions. Two aspects of the problem of evil are arguably critical for comprehending his life in Books 1 through 9 of the work. His search for the nature and origin of evil in the various philosophies that he encounters (the intellectual aspect) and his struggles with his own weaknesses (the experiential aspect) are windows for understanding the actual dynamics of his sojourn. I defend the idea above by providing a fuller examination of the key role that both aspects play in his spiritual journey. Examining relevant events from Augustine's life chronologically, I analyze his philosophical wanderings from his encounter with Cicero's work Hortensius through his eventual disillusionment with the Manichaean religion, and finally, his move in the direction of Christian teachings with the help of Neo-Platonism. Along the way his philosophical questions (the intellectual aspect) and his struggles with his own depravity (the experiential aspect) have an effect on each other until his ultimate move toward Christianity resolves both problems of evil.

This dissertation has three parts. In "Quantum Entanglement, Bohmian Mechanics, and Humean Supervenience," I defend David Lewis's metaphysical doctrine of Humean supervenience, and traditional metaphysical reductionism more generally, against an alleged holistic threat encapsulated in the non-separability argument from quantum entanglement. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, realism about quantum mechanics is compatible with Humean reductionism. / Philosophy

The filmic oeuvre of auteur director David Lynch has a reputation among average spectators as being too “difficult” to understand. In particular, the Lynch films Lost Highway and Mulholland Drive are considered by the average spectator to be devoid of any real meaning. Spectator theory provides insight into the structures through which spectators find or fail to find meaning in films. Spectator theory explains that the average spectator has a set of schemas for “reading” and understanding film, and that these schemas are shaped by the conventions of popular Hollywood cinema. The films of David Lynch do not adhere to these conventions, and thus challenge the average spectator’s competency with regard to their ability to emplot a coherent and meaningful narrative from these films. In the case of Lost Highway and Mulholland Drive, the films present the spectator with multiple mysteries, yet never provide any solutions to these mysteries. If a spectator is to find meaning in Lost Highway and Mulholland Drive, then such a spectator needs an appropriate schema for interpreting these films. This dissertation aims to develop one possible schema which can be used to find meaning in Lost Highway and Mulholland Drive. To this end, the films Lost Highway and Mulholland Drive are shown to qualify as metaphysical detective films, a genre of narrative which playfully interprets the conventions of classical detective narrative. Under the neologism “transtextual detective” this dissertation traces the characteristics of a spectator who would assume the role of a detective figure, existing outside of the borders of the film text, and calling upon a diverse collection of texts and schemata to solve the mysteries identifiable in these metaphysical detective films. In order to test the applicability of the schema of the transtextual detective, the writer undertakes a demonstration of an investigation into the films Lost Highway and Mulholland Drive while assuming the role of a transtextual detective. The writer firstly indentifies the mystery of identity as a salient mystery in both films, before demonstrating how solutions to this mystery can be found in Lost Highway. / Thesis (MA (English))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2013.

The filmic oeuvre of auteur director David Lynch has a reputation among average spectators as being too “difficult” to understand. In particular, the Lynch films Lost Highway and Mulholland Drive are considered by the average spectator to be devoid of any real meaning. Spectator theory provides insight into the structures through which spectators find or fail to find meaning in films. Spectator theory explains that the average spectator has a set of schemas for “reading” and understanding film, and that these schemas are shaped by the conventions of popular Hollywood cinema. The films of David Lynch do not adhere to these conventions, and thus challenge the average spectator’s competency with regard to their ability to emplot a coherent and meaningful narrative from these films. In the case of Lost Highway and Mulholland Drive, the films present the spectator with multiple mysteries, yet never provide any solutions to these mysteries. If a spectator is to find meaning in Lost Highway and Mulholland Drive, then such a spectator needs an appropriate schema for interpreting these films. This dissertation aims to develop one possible schema which can be used to find meaning in Lost Highway and Mulholland Drive. To this end, the films Lost Highway and Mulholland Drive are shown to qualify as metaphysical detective films, a genre of narrative which playfully interprets the conventions of classical detective narrative. Under the neologism “transtextual detective” this dissertation traces the characteristics of a spectator who would assume the role of a detective figure, existing outside of the borders of the film text, and calling upon a diverse collection of texts and schemata to solve the mysteries identifiable in these metaphysical detective films. In order to test the applicability of the schema of the transtextual detective, the writer undertakes a demonstration of an investigation into the films Lost Highway and Mulholland Drive while assuming the role of a transtextual detective. The writer firstly indentifies the mystery of identity as a salient mystery in both films, before demonstrating how solutions to this mystery can be found in Lost Highway. / Thesis (MA (English))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2013.

Submitted by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-24T18:08:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-rineu-quinalia-filho.pdf: 1281232 bytes, checksum: 567502ac00788106db2f061afa627942 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-24T18:09:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-rineu-quinalia-filho.pdf: 1281232 bytes, checksum: 567502ac00788106db2f061afa627942 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-24T18:09:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-rineu-quinalia-filho.pdf: 1281232 bytes, checksum: 567502ac00788106db2f061afa627942 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-11 / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo oferecer uma leitura do Hípias Maior de Platão pretendendo discutir a respeito da possibilidade de o diálogo apresentar as primeiras discussões sobre o conceito inteligível do Belo. / This paper aims to offer a reading of Plato's Greater Hippias intending to discuss about the possibility of dialogue present the first discussions on the concept of Fine intelligible.

[pt] A linguagem, de acordo com Heidegger, não é um instrumento disponível que possibilita a comunicação entre os homens, ou seja, a linguagem não se resume a um meio de expressão. Contudo, na era da técnica, a linguagem é vista exclusivamente como meio que serve à troca de informação. Por isso, o filósofo afirma que para pensar a linguagem é preciso penetrar na fala da linguagem e não na fala do homem. E, para Heidegger, a linguagem fala primeiramente no poema. No entanto, o homem só pode dizer, ou melhor, mostrar e fazer aparecer aquilo que se mostra a ele. Por isso é que, antes de se tornar um dizer, a poesia é na maior parte do tempo uma escuta, ato que só se torna possível quando o homem compreende a palavra não apenas como signo que remete ao significado, mas como abrigo permanente, capaz de arrancar do esquecimento abissal o próprio existir das coisas. Para Heidegger, é este dizer e, ao mesmo tempo, a escuta deste imenso silêncio que permite ao homem tornar-se mortal, impedindo dessa maneira que ele permaneça congelado na idéia do animal racional. / [en] Language, according to Heidegger, is not an available tool which makes the communication between human beings possible, in other words, language cannot be reduced to a means of expression. However, in the technical age, language is seen exclusively as a means that serves the purpose of exchanging information. Therefore, the philosopher suggests that in order to understand language it is necessary to embark upon into the speech of language rather than the speech of men. And, for Heidegger, language speaks first in poems. Yet, men can only say, or rather, show and reveal, that what is shown to him. For that reason, before becoming a speech, poetry is, for most of its time, a hearing, an act that is only possible when men understand the word not only as sign referring to a meaning but also as a permanent shelter capable of seizing the very existing of things from the immense forgetfulness. For Heidegger, it is this speech and, at the same time, the hearing of this immense silence which allows the human being to become mortal, preventing him, in this way, from remaining frozen in the idea of the rational animal.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Arquivototal.pdf: 404618 bytes, checksum: 7478f1ecc220c20fee27f99bfacf2d86 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-09-19 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The present dissertation consists in a research theoretical and bibliographical about the concepts of will and representation in understanding of the world, In order to demonstrate the connection between the concept of Will and the pessimistic aspect of philosophy by Schopenhauer, and between the concept of representation and the singular possibility of quieting the suffering generated by Will, this work is supported by the writings of the author himself and some commentators therefore was constructed as a dialogue with the philosopher on his theory, a bibliographic analysis thereof. The world is divided in two realities: the noumenal, the thing itself, a blind force, named Will, and the phenomenal, the subjective representations made by the the knowing subject. The noumenal reality, the Will, in humans causes a cycle of desires never satiated and prevent them from being happy. Schopenhauer's pessimism is sustained in the concept of Will. However, a state of bliss can be achieved, since we subdue the will to knowledge by the aesthetic contemplation , which abstracts the man momentarily from suffering; from compassion, which makes the individual forms disappear, making the man understand the other as himself, and finally through the asceticism, which mortifies definitely the Will, suppressing the material desires and bodily. Therefore, the possibility of a Blessed life, always singular, can only be achieved by the singularity existing in concept of representation. / A presente dissertação constitui-se de uma pesquisa teórico-bibliográfica acerca dos conceitos de Vontade erepresentação no entendimento do mundo, segundo o pensamento do filósofo voluntarista Arthur Schopenhauer. No intuito de explicitar a conexão existente entre o conceito de Vontade e o aspecto pessimista da filosofia schopenhaueriana, e entre o conceito de representação e a possibilidade singular de aquietar o sofrimento gerado pela Vontade, este trabalho apóia-se nos escritos do próprio autor e de alguns comentaristas, portanto foi construído como um diálogo com o filósofo sobre sua teoria, uma análise bibliográfica do mesmo. Segundo o pensador alemão, o mundo é dividido em duas realidades: a numênica, a coisa em si, uma força cega, denominada Vontade; e a fenomênica, as representações subjetivas realizadas pelo sujeito cognoscente. A realidade numênica, a Vontade, provoca nos humanos um ciclo de desejos jamais saciados e que os impedem de ser felizes. O pessimismo schopenhaueriano sustenta-se, então, no conceito de Vontade. Entretanto, um estado de beatitude pode ser alcançado, desde que subjuguemos a Vontade ao conhecimento por meio da contemplação estética, que abstrai o homem momentaneamente do sofrimento; da compaixão, que faz desaparecer as formas individuais, fazendo o homem compreender o outro como a si; e, finalmente, por meio da ascese, que mortifica definitivamente a Vontade, suprimindo os desejos materiais e corporais. Portanto, a possibilidade de uma vida beata, sempre singular, só pode ser alcançada mediante a singularidade existente no conceito de representação.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 858804 bytes, checksum: d33d0d374db2644b70b655febb7ceaa0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-04-10 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This writing concerns the study of Leibnizs concept of the Monad. Therefore, the present work investigated the fundamental constituents which take part on such a concept. From the notions of attribute, we have perceptions, appetites and apperceptions, as well as the notions of possibility and representation that are present in the Monad, resulting in the idea of World. Such an idea also plays an important role in this writing. The idea of Monad and the idea of World generate relations and structures that were considered as well. Thus, the elements forming the process of knowledge (understanding and language) and the basic components of the Monad (e.g. the idea of substance) were studied according to Leibnizian concept of world. Furthermore, in our analysis of fundamental principles leading to a cosmological, epistemological and ontological perspective in Leibniz, we used a metaphysical approach. / Esta dissertação tem como tema o conceito de Mônada em Leibniz. No encalço desta investigação este texto trata dos constituintes fundamentais que participam deste conceito. As noções de atributo (à partir destas aparecem as percepções, apetites e apercepções); bem como a de possibilidade e representação; subsidiam na Mônada uma idéia de Mundo, outro arranque investigativo deste escrito. As idéias de Mônada e Mundo geram relações e estruturas que da mesma forma são vislumbradas. Desta forma, os elementos que dão forma ao processo do conhecimento (entendimento e linguagem), bem como os componentes essenciais da Mônada (a idéia de substância) são tratados nesta descrição acerca da concepção leibniziana de Mundo. O recorte metafísico dá o tom desta análise na busca pelos princípios fundamentais que orientam uma perspectiva cosmológica, epistemológica e ontológica em Leibniz.

Submitted by Sandra Raquel Correa (sandracorrea42@hotmail.com) on 2016-04-04T00:36:37Z No. of bitstreams: 1 0000010800.pdf: 1441534 bytes, checksum: c436d9dde218e35965ed59ae3dd83994 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-04T00:36:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 0000010800.pdf: 1441534 bytes, checksum: c436d9dde218e35965ed59ae3dd83994 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 / Esta tese apresenta um estudo a respeito do Ser sob duas perspectivas: a Racionalidade Metafísica e a Racionalidade Ambiental. Consideramos que tal discussão tem profundas implicações em nossa existência, visto que a crise ambiental é compreendida como uma crise da civilização, pois está ancorada em nossas formas de ser-no-mundo. Partindo da pergunta: "Em que medida o horizonte da Racionalidade Ambiental pode contribuir para (re)significar e situar o Ser?", intenta-se ampliar a noção de educabilidade a partir dos pressupostos da Racionalidade Ambiental. O estudo sinaliza que, no horizonte da Metafísica Ocidental, foi concedido ao ser humano o maior estatuto ontológico entre os entes, nos entronizando como senhores da Razão e da natureza. Com a exacerbação da dimensão instrumental da Razão no contexto da Modernidade, sociedade e natureza foram paulatinamente afetadas pelas relações de produção. A adoção de um sistema unificado de Racionalidade, justificada pela posse/domínio/consumo, passou a dar sentido e identidade ao Ser. Neste sentido, a crise ecológica é compreendida para além dos fenômenos naturais, pois está relacionada intimamente com pressupostos da racionalidade predominante na atualidade, ou seja, a Racionalidade Instrumental. Considerando que a Educação Ambiental está comprometida com novas formas de enfrentamento aos paradigmas do mundo contemporâneo e que tal desafio passa pela modificação dos valores sobre os quais se alicerçam as sociedades ocidentais modernas, entendemos que se faz necessário reconstruir nossas relações sobre o legado de outra Racionalidade. Visando alargar a compreensão das categorias postas para este estudo, optamos por uma abordagem metodológica de cunho hermenêutico. Temos a hipótese de que a Racionalidade Ambiental, além de superar as patologias da Racionalidade Instrumental, pode constituir-se em um novo indicador para nosso modo de ser-no-mundo. Tomando como referência a perspectiva teórica de Leff, propusemos alternativas para pensar um novo lugar para o Ser no horizonte da Racionalidade Ambiental, defendendo que este processo passa pela recuperação do sentido da physys; pela ressignificação do sagrado; pela superação do paradigma da subjetividade pelo da intersubjetividade; pelo reposicionamento dos saberes e da ciência; pelo engajamento ético e político e pela refuncionalização do modelo socioeconômico. Assim, se entendermos que a Racionalidade Ambiental é um processo de construção social, faz todo sentido buscar, no campo da educação, a desconstrução do saber onicompreensivo e totalizante, integrando o conhecimento sensível e o racional, valorizando os saberes e restaurando a relação entre Ser, vida e conhecimento. / This thesis is a study about Being from two perspectives: the Metaphysical Rationality and Environmental Rationality. We regard such discussion has having profound implications for our existence, once the environmental crisis is understood as a crisis of civilization, as it is anchored in our ways of being in the world. From the question: "To what extent the horizon Environmental Rationality can contribute to (re) define and locate the Being? ", attempts to expand notion of educability from the rationality of environmental assumptions. The study showed that on the horizon of Western metaphysics, it was granted to the human being the highest ontological status among other beings, being enthroned as masters of reason and nature. With the intensification of the instrumental dimension of Reason in the context of modernity, society and nature were gradually affected by relations of production. By adopting a unified system of Rationality, justified by the possession / domain / consumption, it began to give meaning and identity to the Being. In this sense, the ecological crisis is understood beyond the natural phenomena, because it is closely related to assumptions of rationality prevalent today, that is, the Instrumental Rationality. Considering that environmental education is committed to new ways of coping with the paradigms of the contemporary world and that this challenge involves the modification of the values on which are founded the modern Western societies, we believe that it is necessary to rebuild our relations on the legacy of another Rationality. To broaden the understanding of the categories mentioned in this study, we chose an approach of hermeneutic nature. We hypothesized that the Environmental Rationality, can both overcome the pathologies of Instrumental Rationality and constitute a new window to our way of being in the world. Assuming Leffs theoretical perspective as reference, we proposed alternatives to think of a new place to the Being on the horizon Environmental Rationality, arguing that this process means recovering the sense of physys; redefining the sacred; overcoming the paradigm of subjectivity by the intersubjectivity; repositioning of knowledge and science; the ethical and political engagement and refunctioning the social and economical model. Thus, if we understand that the Environmental Rationality is a social construction process, it is meaningful to seek, in the field of education, the deconstruction of knowledge omnicomprehensive and totalizing, integrating the sensitive and rational knowledge, valuing the knowledge and restoring the relationship between Being, life and knowledge.

[pt] Pela decifração do enigma do mundo, Schopenhauer elabora uma metafísica da vontade, na qual rejeita o livre-arbítrio, mera ilusão fenomenal, e concebe o fundamento da verdadeira moralidade como compaixão, que surge misteriosamente, como uma graça. Diante da impossibilidade de liberdade para a vontade humana, a verdadeira liberdade repousa na negação da vontade, que se evidencia empiricamente no fenômeno da santidade. Todavia, paralelamente à sua investigação metafísica, mantendo-se no ponto de vista empírico, Schopenhauer elabora uma eudemonologia, uma orientação para se conduzir a vida da forma mais feliz possível, sua proposta de uma sabedoria de vida. A presente pesquisa visa investigar a Ética na obra de Arthur Schopenhauer, particularmente no sentido de compreender que liberdade nos resta para a prática de vida. / [en] In his way of decifering the world's enigma Shopenhauer works out a metaphysics of the will, in which he rejects free will as a mere phenomenal illusion and conceives of compassion as the true foundation of morality. Such compassion emerges mysteriously, as a Grace. Facing the impossibility of freedom for human will, he makes true freedom to lie on the negation of will, which is made empirically evident in the phenomenon of holiness. However, on a paralell with his metaphysical investigation, but keeping his empirical point of view, Shopenhauer elaborates an eudaemonism, that is an orientation for one to conduct oneself in life, in the most happy way possible, which is his proposal of a wisdom of life. The present research aims at investigating Ethics in the work of Arthur Shopenhauer, specially in the sense of understanding what is this freedom that is left over to us for our practice of life.