Dissertation "A thought journey of a philosopher-disident Bohumír Janát" deals with the life and work of a Christian philosopher and spokesman of Charter 77. The work is not divided into two parts, but each chapter includes both his personal and professional life as well as analysis of Janáts texts. The work begins with Janáts childhood and his studies at the Faculty of Arts at Charles University in Prague and continues with the period from graduation until the year 1989 when his texts already contain motifs he was developing for the rest of his life. Year 1988 was particularly important as at this time he was the spokesman for Charter 77. The third section is the period from 1989 to Janáts death in November 1998 when he produced most of his work. The work is especially pointing out that Bohumir Janát was always a critic of present, he ran against the spirit of the time - during and even after a totalitarian regime end in November 1989. He saw the coup as a revelation of God's power, not as a revolution. He hoped for a change in the mindset of the nation, for a turnover to the sphere of ethics and spiritual deepening. Post- revolutionary development, however, was a deep disappointment for him. His inspiring thinkers were S. Dunne, H. D. Thoreau, T. G. Masaryk and F. Nietzsche, whose philosophy...

[pt] Este é um estudo acerca da natureza ontológica do tempo, ou seja, um estudo que visa distinguir, no âmbito da experiência, o tempo subjetivo do tempo em si mesmo, tentando delimitá-los por critérios de necessidade lógica e adequação formal as criticas e descobertas da filosofia e da ciência moderna e contemporânea. O trabalho consta também de um apanhado historiográfico das principais abstrações da ciência, bem como, das principais contribuições de filósofos, como, p.ex., Santo Agostinho e Kant, para a questão do tempo, abarcando também as criticas da física contemporânea ao paradigma clássico do tempo e as novas tendências de abordagem e pesquisa da questão do tempo no século XXI. / [en] This is an essay on the ontologic nature of time, so to say, a study that intends to distinguish, inside the realm of experience, the subjective time from time itself, trying to bound both of them by logical necessity and formal adequation to the critics and discoveries from modern and contemporary philosophy and science. This essay also provides an historiographic resume of the main abstractions from sciense, as well as, the main contributions from philosophers, like Saint Augustine and Kant, for example, to the problem of time, approaching also the critics of contemporay physics to the classical time paradigm and the new trends of approach and research of time in the XXI century.

[pt] Trata-se de uma interpretação dos principais aspectos da filosofia platônica como origem da Metafísica, à luz do pensamento de Martin Heidegger. Com o olhar fincado no mundo contemporâneo e na compreensão da essência da tecnologia que Heidegger pela primeira vez traz à presença, o trabalho procura esclarecer o impensado da essência onto- teo-lógica da metafísica que se origina com Platão, a saber, o retraimento da aletheia como acontecimento originário, em favor de um modo de desvelamento do ser como substância, com a correlata postulação de um ente supremo que fundamenta a adequação entre ser e pensar. Mostra-se como este acorde inicial da metafísica inicia seu declínio na modernidade, com o pensamento de Descartes, dispensando um outro modo de desvelamento: o Gestell, a essência da tecnologia. Sob esta ótica, são abordados os seguintes diálogos de Platão: Mênon, República, Banquete, Sofista e Timeu. Faz-se também uma análise dos desdobramentos do eclipse da noção de substância na modernidade, nas filosofias de Descartes e Kant, assim como uma exposição crítica das concepções contemporâneas que entendem a tecnologia como sendo de caráter essencialmente instrumental. / [en] This work is an interpretation of the main aspects of Plato`s philosophy as Metaphysic`s beginning, enlightened by Martin Heidegger`s thinking. With the regard founded in the contemporary world and the comprehension of the technology`s essence that first came to light with Martin Heidegger, it aims to enlighten the forgotten ground of metaphysic`s onto-theo-logical essence that begins with Plato, i.e., the retrial of the aletheia as original happening favoring a way of unconcealment of being as substance, with the correlate postulation of a supreme being that founds the adequacy between being an thinking. It shows how this original accord starts metaphysic`s decline in the modernity, with Cartesian thinking, giving another way of unconcealment: o Gestell, the technology`s essence. In this perspective the study analyses the next Plato`s dialogues: Meno, Republic, Symposium, Sophist and Timaeus. The work presents too an analysis of the consequences of the decline of substance notion in the modernity, in Descartes and Kant`s philosophies, as well as a critical exposition of those contemporary conceptions that understand technology as essentially having an instrumental character.

Cette thèse porte sur l’unité du concept de liberté chez Spinoza. Aussi passe-t-elle par les trois objets privilégiés du philosophe, Dieu, l’homme et la multitude. A ces trois objets correspond une certaine forme de la liberté : liberté métaphysique, liberté éthique et liberté politique. Etant données, d’une part la définition de la liberté (en EID7), d’autre part l’affirmation faite par Spinoza selon laquelle seul Dieu est cause libre, le problème se pose en effet de savoir dans quel sens ou dans quelle mesure l’homme peut, du point de vue éthique et du point de vue politique, être dit libre. Nous avons tenté de résoudre le problème par l’étude d’un aspect peu ou pas étudié de la théorie spinoziste des affects, la notion de jouissance. Nous avons commencé par une étude du champ lexical motivé par l’absence de définition du terme fruitio, pour s’étendre ensuite vers d’autres termes proches, tels le gaudium (qui a deux sens différents chez Spinoza) et la delectatio. Ensuite, nous avons situé ces termes du point de vue de l’histoire de la philosophie au sein du débat auquel ils appartenaient : la question de la jouissance dans la philosophie médiévale chrétienne. Ainsi nous avons été amenés à nous interroger sur le concept central d’Amor intellectualis Dei, qui est ce en quoi consiste la liberté, à partir de l’idée de jouissance, et ce dans les deux domaines de Dieu et de l’homme. Enfin, nous avons montré qu’en politique l’unité du concept de liberté était maintenue aussi grâce à l’idée de jouissance (obtinentia). Bref, c’est toujours l’être qui jouit de sa puissance constitutive en tant que telle, parce qu’il existe et qu’il agit nécessairement, qui est dit libre. / This thesis refers to the unity of the concept of freedom in Spinoza, focusing in the three privileged objects of the philosopher: God, man and multitude. To each one belongs a certain form of freedom: metaphysical, ethical and political. Given that, in one hand, the definition of freedom (E1D7) and in the other hand the affirmation made by Spinoza, that God is the only free cause, the problem is indeed, knowing in which sense or measure man can, from the ethical and political point of view, called free. We have tried to solve the problem studying a barely or not studied at all issue of Spinoza’s theory of the affectus: the notion of fruitio (enjoyment). We started by studying the lexical field motivated by the absence of definition of the term fruitio, in order to go further with nearby terms, such as gaudium (which has two different senses in Spinoza) and the delectatio. Furthermore, we have placed these points of view of the history of philosophy in the core of the discussion where they belong: the question of fruitio in Christian medieval philosophy. Thus, we question ourselves about the main concept of Amor intellectualis Dei, which is freedom itself, starting from the idea of fruitio, and the same in both God’s and man’s domains. Finally, we showed that in politics, the unity of the concept of freedom was sustained also due to the idea of obtinentia (enjoyment). In brief, we call free the being that enjoys its constitutive power as such, because it exists and acts out of necessity.

[pt] O objetivo desta tese é discutir o desenvolvimento da crítica de Nietzsche à Modernidade, explorando as relações entre tal crítica e aquela dirigida pelo filósofo ao Cristianismo. Tentamos mostrar que a radicalização da crítica de Nietzsche aos valores modernos é parte de seu projeto de transvaloração de todos os valores. / [en] The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the development of Nietzsches s criticism to Modernity, exploring links between that criticism and the one directed against Christianism by the philosopher. We try to demonstrate that Nietzsche s radical cristicism against modern values is part of his project of transvaluating all values.

Este estudo pretende dar continuidade ao mesmo tema abordado em monografia de conclusão de curso de graduação em filosofia. Assim, nosso intento é perceber as razões metodológicas e filosóficas do problema do "é" em Heidegger situado em Ser e Tempo a partir na noção de que as línguas ocidentais são em geral, línguas do pensamento metafísico, e a forma com que este pensamento metafísico exposto por Heidegger se apresenta na relação entre a pergunta pelo ser e o "é". O tema de nossa investigação parte de um ponto imediatamente inserido no cerne do pensamento de Heidegger: O problema do “é“; problema que se estabelece no sentido de perceber o Horizonte que essa pequena palavra representa na ontologia fundamental e em escritos que traçam a elaboração da atmosfera de investigação que Heidegger permite a esta questão. O própósito que se pretende por em discussão realiza a sua intervenção a partir da tarefa hedeggeriana de recuperar as experiências de esquecimento presentes na metafísica, e particularmente, a significação metafísica do "é", ou seja, o ponto investigativo que estabelece a necessidade de elucidação do "é" no interior da experiência heideggeriana de desocultamento do universo metafísico. / This study intends to give continuity to the same subject addressed in a monograph of conclusion of graduation course in philosophy. Thus, our intent is to perceive the methodological and philosophical reasons for Heidegger's "is" problem in Being and Time from the notion that Western languages ​​are in general languages ​​of metaphysical thought and how this metaphysical thinking Presented by Heidegger is presented in the relationship between the question of being and the 'is'. The subject of our investigation starts from a point immediately inserted in the core of the thought of Heidegger: The problem of "is"; Problem that is established in the sense of perceiving the Horizon that this small word represents in the fundamental ontology and in writings that trace the elaboration of the atmosphere of investigation that Heidegger allows to this question. The purpose of this discussion is to work out the Hedeggerian task of recovering the experiences of forgetfulness present in metaphysics, and particularly the metaphysical meaning of the "is", that is, the investigative point that establishes the need for elucidation Of "is" within the Heideggerian experience of unveiling of the metaphysical universe.

In this essay I examine the plausibility of theism and naturalism. I will do this by applying the principle of simplicity as a criterion for measuring the probability of these two worldviews. Theism is the view that God exist as a transcendent being and that the ultimate reality is personal. Naturalism on the other side opposes theism and postulate that only the natural world exist and that the ultimate reality is impersonal. The principle of simplicity measures which of competing theories is simpler and one aspect of simplicity is that if a theory F is simpler than a competing theory H, then F postulates none or fewer ad hoc hypotheses than H. Another aspect of simplicity is that if H means postulating an explanation that goes beyond necessity and F does not, then F is simpler than H.    It is easy to think that theism, because it postulate a supernatural being, is more complex than naturalism. It is tempting to make the fast conclusion that theism is more ad hoc than naturalism, and because we can understand nature by using the naturalistic method that assumes that God does not intervene in nature, has the conclusion that theism is unnecessary. One of the reasons for making the above conclusion is because theism does not correspond well with background knowledge i.e. facts we know by experience to be true. Some philosophers assumes that we can use background knowledge to measure whether F is simpler than H. They assume that simpler metaphysical theories are those with more background assumptions into the body of the metaphysical theory. A crucial task in this essay will be to evaluate that assumption.   I propose that it is problematic to apply background knowledge when assessing the simplicity of metaphysical theories because assuming that one can measure metaphysical simplicity with background knowledge is to assume that all that exist is relatively symmetrical. Also, I suggest that naturalism is more ad hoc than theism when it comes to explain diverse phenomena in the world.

O objetivo deste trabalho é comprovar a criação de um gênero híbrido e inovador - a prosa poética - , ligada ao jornalismo e à literatura do final do século XIX. Esta pesquisa analisa a prosa poética de Raul Pompéia, a partir de textos selecionados como corpus, publicados no periódico, A Gazeta da Tarde, de 21 a 29 jan. 1986. Paralelamente comparamos os textos equivalentes em sua versão de livro, publicados pela primeira vez em 1900, comentando também o conjunto das Canções sem metro. / The main objective of this work is to compare the creation of a hybrid and new genre - the poetic prose -, by Raul Pompéia, related to journalism and literature at the end of the XIX century. This research analyses the poetic prose written by Raul Pompéia, by selecting texts as its corpus, published in the periodic \"A Gazeta da Tarde\", from January 21st to January 29th, 1986. At the same time we have compared the equivalent texts published on book for the first time in 1900, also discussing the other texts which form the whole group.

Le mythe de la caverne de Platon qui ouvre le livre VII de La République, plonge ses racines dans l’héritage spirituel et immémorial de l’humanité. Les multiples interprétations qui en ont été données, ont, chacune, mis en lumière un aspect particulier du mythe platonicien. Ainsi, le sens du mythe de la caverne n’est pas invariable ; bien au contraire, il est sujet au changement, car la difficulté d’interprétation qui le caractérise, ouvre la voie à une forte variabilité de la signification à donner à chacun des symboles et à la façon dont ces derniers se définissent les uns par rapport aux autres. En conséquence, la signification originale du mythe de la caverne échappe, de fait et depuis toujours, à toute la tradition philosophique interprétative ultérieure ; c’est pourquoi Heidegger a réinvesti massivement ce récit, en sautant par-dessus toutes les interprétations antérieures, afin de nous en proposer une approche originaire. Toutefois, est-il raisonnable d’affirmer que l’interprétation originaire de Heidegger donne le fin mot du sens initial du mythe ? Notre recherche se propose donc de démontrer, au contraire, que le mythe de la caverne recouvre une signification platonicienne originale qui n’a jamais été entièrement développée et exploitée par les interprètes de ce dernier. En effet, si le livre VII de La République constitue le commentaire original de Platon vis-à-vis du mythe de la caverne, ce commentaire natif platonicien pourrait recéler tous les philosophèmes métaphysiques, épistémologiques et politiques nécessaires pour éclairer, puissamment et à nouveaux frais, la symbolique du mythe de la caverne. De facto, s’en dégagerait-il une signification platonicienne originale et surtout inédite qui pourrait soit se rapprocher du sens de l’interprétation originaire de Heidegger, soit s’en éloigner de façon irréductible ? / The myth of Plato’s cave which opens Book VII of the Republic, has its roots in the age-old intellectual heritage of humanity. The various interpretations of Plato’s cave, have, each, elucidated a particular element of the Platonic myth. Thus, the meaning of the myth of the cave is not invariable ; on the contrary, it is subject to change as the particular difficulty of its interpretation paves the way for a high degree of variability in the meaning of each symbol and how it is defined in relation to the others. In fact and from the outset, the original signification of the myth of the cave has eluded the entire interpretive philosophical tradition that follows it; this is why Heidegger massively reinvested in this tale in bypassing all previous interpretations in order to offer an originary approach. But can one reasonably assert that Heidegger’s originary interpretation gives the final word on the original meaning of the myth ? This thesis intends to show, on the contrary, that the myth of the cave holds an original Platonic meaning that has never been completely developed and elaborated by its interpreters. Indeed, if Book VII of the Republic constitutes Plato’s original commentary on the myth of the cave, this native Platonic commentary could hold all of the metaphysical, epistemological and political philosophemes necessary to powerfully elucidate the symbolism of the myth of the cave in a fresh light. Would this in fact draw out an original and unprecedented Platonic meaning ? And would it approach Heidegger’s originary interpretation, or distance itself from it irreducibly ?

[pt] O problema está adequadamente descrito no título: Sobre o Pensamento Filosófico e sua Sobrevivência num Mundo Técnico. Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), tanto pela obra como pela sua tensa inserção na cena contemporânea, foi o pensador escolhido como fio condutor e unificador de uma pesquisa que tende tanto a desdobrar-se em várias outras, como a dobrar-se sobre si mesma, posto que também sua própria existência, enquanto trabalho filosófico feito num mundo cada vez mais técnico, põe-se como problema. Questões como as do modo de ser, mudar ou adaptar-se desse pensamento, da sua constituição, atualização ou destruição na relação entre os vários pensadores, vivos e mortos, mais amplamente, da sua relação com um mundo do qual simultaneamente depende e tem que transformar - relação essa que, tratada na sua complexidade, envolve dimensões históricas, lingüísticas, físicas, políticas e, claro, técnicas -, enfim, todas essas questões perfazem a constelação com que a tese lida, e em meio à qual precisa fazer-se. Além da escolha de Heidegger como foro de aglutinação de todos esses problemas, geralmente em discussões com pensadores a ele diferentemente ligados, como Marx, Lukács, Adorno, Schürmann, Arendt, Habermas, Vattimo, Derrida, Rorty, Loparic, Safranski e Sloterdijk, perpassa todo o trabalho uma importante questão, que é a da possível disposição - equivalente ao espanto posto por Platão e Aristóteles no princípio da filosofia - para se pensar criativa, abrangente e profundamente, num mundo cada vez mais segmentado e instrumental. A forma escolhida para o desenvolvimento da tese, dados esses dobramentos e desdobramentos todos, foi a de uma compilação de textos, decerto ligados entre si pelo tema, o problema da sobrevivência do pensamento filosófico na contemporaneidade, mas também por uma rede de possíveis remissões internas: aquilo que um texto (que pode ser lido separadamente) deixa em aberto, é retomado em outro, anterior ou posterior. Sobretudo, essa escolha se origina de uma busca real, não apenas temática, do que venha a ser uma boa práxis pensante, plástica, possível, atenta ao mundo. / [en] The title of this work, On Philosophical Thought and its Surviving in a Technical World, is a good description of the problems we try to deal with. Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), through his works as well as through his tense insertion into the contemporary scene, is the thinker elected to guide and unify an investigation which tends to unfold into many others, as well as turning over into itself, because its own existence, as a philosophical work done in an increasingly technical world, also presents itself as a problem. This work deals with questions such as the mode of being of philosophical thought, how it changes and adapts, its constitution, updating or destruction in the relation among the various thinkers, dead or alive, and, in a wider sense, its relation to a world on which it depends and, at the same time, it must transform. This relation, considered in all its complexity, includes historical, linguistic, physical, political and, of course, technical dimensions. In short, all these questions constitute the universe this work deals with and, within it, has to succeed. Besides our choice of Martin Heidegger´s thought as the agglutinating point of all these problems, often viewed in interaction with thinkers as diversely related to him as Marx, Lukacs, Adorno, Schürmann, Arendt, Habermas, Vattimo, Derrida, Rorty, Loparic, Safranski and Sloterdijk, there is an important thread uniting the whole work, namely, that of the possible disposition - the equivalent of wonder, as posed by Plato and Aristotle in the origin of philosophy - to think in a creative, broad and deep fashion, in a world even more segmented and instrumental. Due to all these folding and unfolding, this work grew as a compilation of texts, all internally connected not only by the problem of the survival of philosophical thought in our times, but also as an internal cross references network: questions left open in one text (that can be read on its own), are reconsidered in another text, preceding or following the one in question. Above all, this choice arises from an actual search (not only a thematic one) of something next to a good thinking praxis, plastic, possible, attentive to the world.