[pt] Esta investigação tem por objetivo apresentar um modelo de cooperação entre filosofia e ciência experimental, por meio de um domínio comum, a matemática, especialmente a álgebra. Essa coordenação entre dois domínios situados em níveis distintos de conhecimento da realidade natural chama-se filosofia da natureza, e havia sido proposta por Aristóteles nos oito livros da Física. Com o advento da ciência experimental moderna entre os séculos XVI e XVII, tal tipo de investigação passou a ter um caráter secundário, porquanto se entendeu que as teorias, especialmente as de base matemática, e o método experimental em conjunto seriam suficientes para dar conta da estrutura da realidade. No entanto, faz-se necessário -- e esta é nossa proposta --, em decorrência das questões de limite suscitadas pela própria ciência experimental, retomar uma investigação complementar à científica ou epistêmica, e coordenada com esta, de modo a prover um conhecimento integral, totalizante, da realidade natural. Portanto, analisa-se o alcance da ciência experimental quanto à compreensão científica da natureza da matéria, expondo certas limitações deste tipo de enfoque, tendo por base a epistemologia proposta pelo filósofo Jacques Maritain. Em seguida, analisa-se o estatuto metafísico ou ontológico da matéria, com base em vários textos de Tomás de Aquino, e propõe-se um modelo algébrico para a representação de elementos daquela ontologia. Por fim, apresentam-se algumas conseqüências que se podem extrair desse modelo, com vistas à compreensão de aspectos da realidade natural como espaço-tempo e movimento, não-localidade quântica, e uma proposta de visão totalizante da realidade física,denominada holomovimento, sugerida pelo físico David Bohm. / [en] The main purpose of this enquiry is to provide a cooperative framework for philosophy and experimental science. This should be accomplished by means of a common domain, namely mathematics, specifically through algebra. Such a coordination between two different levels of knowledge of the natural world is named philosophy of nature, and had been proposed by Aristotle in his eight book Physics. As an outcome of the rise of modern science between 16th and 17th centuries, this kind of enquiry has been left aside as a secondary enterprise. For it has been a common understanding that modern scientific theories together with experimental methods would suffice to account for the structure of reality.However, I shall propose that it is necessary -- as a consequence of edge research on experimental sciences -- to resume a complementary enquiry to the scientific (epistemic) research, in such a coordinated way with this latter as to provide a whole knowledge of the natural world. Thus, I shall analyze the concept of matter as it is understood by experimental science, and based upon Jacques Maritain´s proposed epistemology I shall present some of the shortcomings of scientific approach to matter. Shortly afterwards, I shall analyze the metaphysical (ontological) status of matter based upon several writings from Thomas Aquinas, and I shall propose an algebraic model to represent some of the ontological elements that build up matter from a metaphysical point of view. Lastly, I shall present some of the consequences that can be obtained from that model in order to gain a metaphysical understanding of physical aspects such as space-time and movement, quantum non-locality, and also a whole perspective of physical reality as proposed by David Bohm which he called holomovement.

This dissertation analyzes the solipsism subject in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Wittgenstein, exploring its possible interpretations and the result of each of them. While solipsism is held to be true and likely to match the realism, although it is not possible to be approached by the language with meaning, which is carried forward in the mystical and showed fields and where we encounter the metaphysical subject, the one that thinks, represents but does not exist as object alongside other objects. Since then, we will demonstrate that it is not possible for Wittgenstein to use the term solipsism in a usual manner, but in a different format, where it can be conceivable the me (solipsism) and the world (realism) simultaneously and in harmony, and the acceptance of other minds in the world. Thus being able to know the truth of solipsism through the mystical feeling. / A presente dissertação analisa o tema do solipsismo no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus de Wittgenstein, explorando algumas possíveis interpretações e suas decorrências. O solipsismo é tido como verdadeiro e passível de coincidir com o realismo, mesmo não sendo possível de ser abordado pela linguagem com sentido, o que o faz transitar pelos campos do místico e do mostrável, onde nos deparamos com o sujeito metafísico, aquele que pensa, representa mas não existe como um objeto ao lado dos demais. Tentaremos mostrar não ser possível para o Wittgenstein do Tractatus fazer uso do termo solipsismo de uma forma usual, mas sim de uma forma diferenciada, onde possa ser concebível o eu (solipsismo) e o mundo (realismo) ao mesmo tempo e em harmonia, bem como a aceitação de outras mentes no mundo, podendo-se, assim, conhecer a verdade do solipsismo através do sentimento místico.

[pt] Para Schopenhauer, o conhecimento humano não se constitui apenas pelo saber racional. Pelo contrário, a própria razão - ou representação abstrata, segundo o filósofo - é derivada de uma forma de compreensão mais originária: a representação intuitiva. Esta, por sua vez, encontra seu fundamento na Vontade, conceito central à metafísica Schopenhaueriana, o qual configura a essência de todos os fenômenos particulares, como é o caso do homem. O propósito do presente trabalho é investigar as relações entre estas duas formas de conhecimento, reafirmando a importância dos elementos não racionais para a prática de vida e para uma adequada compreensão da realidade. / [en] According to Schopenhauer, human knowledge does not concern just about rational think. Reason or, the abstract representations are products of a kind of comprehension more primitive: the intuitive representation, that takes its fundament from will. Will is the central concept to shopenhauerian metaphysics, end configures the essence to all individual phenomenon in the world. The objective of this text are to investigate the relationships between this two kinds of knowledge and, according to that, to reiterate the importance of the non-rational elements to the human being and to an adequate comprehension of the reality.

Cette étude se consacre à l’avènement du Je anti-lyrique dans la poésie italienne des années soixante. C’est à ce moment que la pensée post-métaphysique peut se dire assimilée par la culture italienne, qui y trouve une nouvelle clef de lecture de l’expérience de la guerre et du miracle économique. C’est aussi la période où le réel, cru et changeant, fait irruption dans l’expérience artistique. Elio Pagliarani, Mario Luzi et Vittorio Sereni nous ont parus des représentants emblématiques de cette nouvelle posture du sujet poétique. Nous avons étudié leurs ouvrages des années soixante par le biais de trois catégories principales : la mise en question du Je, le rapport entre le Je et le monde, le rapport entre le Je et les autres. Cette articulation nous a permis d’une part de suivre les trois étapes principales de la reformulation anti-lyrique du Je (face à lui-même, face au monde et face aux autres), et d’autre part de reconnaître une progression dans la perte de l’identité lyrique traditionnelle. Le poète, ayant perdu la consolation métaphysique, commence à rechercher la vérité dans le monde physique ; il comprend ensuite que la vérité des choses est éphémère et que toute unité est brisée ; et il donne enfin la voix à d’autres personnages, dans l’effort de comprendre ce questionnement polyphonique qui est désormais la véritable voix du monde et du poète lui-même. / This research focuses on the rise of the anti-lyrical I in the Italian poetry of the Sixties. This was the time when the post-metaphysical philosophy had been fully assimilated by the Italian culture, which started using it as a new reading key to under- stand WW2 experience and the so-called economic miracle. This was also the time when the raw and ever-changing real broke into the artistic experience. Elio Paglia- rani, Mario Luzi and Vittorio Sereni seemed to us emblematic representatives of this new poetic subject's posture. We studied their poems from the Sixties under three main categories: the questioning of the I, the relationship between the I and the world, and the relationship between the I and the others. This structure allowed us firstly to follow the three main stages of the anti-lyrical reformulation of the I (confronted to himself, to the world and to the others) and secondly to recognize a progression in the loss of the traditional lyrical identity. Aware of the loss of any metaphysical consolation, the poet begins to seek the truth inside the physical world; he the realizes that even objects/things bear a fleeting truth and that any unity is broken; and he finally gives voice to other characters in the effort to understand the polyphonic questioning which has become by now the real voice of the world and of the poet himself.

This ethnological study represents personal experiences about the voice of a place and its instrumentality in the Swedish Arctic, based on interviews and observations. The appearance of the voice is connected to the existential meeting between humans and different kinds of bodies, from non-physical beings with metaphysical appearance to non-human bodies such as silicates (sand), rhizomes and animals. The metaphysical voice of a place can be understood as the genius of a place, a spirit or ancestor. It can be understood as a real sound in old forests, tactile feeling in the underground mine and as a whole culture dwelling in a region. The instrumental agency of the place-voice acts through personal characters found in places and is a potential tool in creating liminal places and use of the place creativity.

Cette étude souhaite interroger la théorie de l’âme de Platon par l’intermédiaire de sa conception de l’enfant et de l’enfance. Pour ce philosophe, l’humain est un être dichotomique composé d’un corps et d’une âme qui n’appartiennent pas à un même domaine. D’un côté, le corps est une entité qui se régule à partir des règles du lieu sensible, qui sont temporelles, corporelles et imparfaites. De l’autre, l’âme souscrit aux lois de l’intelligible, qui sont éternelles, abstraites et parfaites. Toutefois, cette dernière est confrontée aux obstacles et imperfections du monde sensible, lorsqu’elle se fait prisonnière d’un corps. Elle doit tenter au mieux de ses capacités de retrouver le lieu parfait auquel elle appartenait autrefois, notamment par l’exercice de la philosophie, parce que celle-ci rappelle à l’âme ce qu’elle était et par le fait même ce qu’elle doit être. Pour Platon, l’enfant souffre d’une carence philosophique qui complique le retour de l’âme vers la perfection. Ce dernier est complètement dominé par son corps et les effets qu’il lui cause. Dès lors, il devient un synonyme d’imperfection. L’enfance comme premier stade de la vie humaine sera la première difficulté que l’âme doit surmonter pour retrouver sa véritable nature. Cette recherche aimerait montrer que l’enfant est un sujet central du système platonicien, puisqu’il devient l’enjeu fondamental d’une philosophie dont le but est l’atteinte d’une vie meilleure voire parfaite pour soi-même et les autres. / This study wants to question Plato’s theory of soul through his conception of child and childhood. For this philosopher, human is a mixture of body and soul, which do not belong to the same domain. On the one hand, the body functions following the rules of the sensible world, which are temporal, corporeal and imperfect. On the other, the soul responds to the laws of the intelligible world which are eternal, transcendant and perfect. But the soul is confronted to the obstacles and the imperfections of the sensible world when it becomes the prisoner of a body. A human must try as best as he can to retrieve the perfection that his soul once possessed, especially through the practice of philosophy, which reminds him of what he was and therefore what he has to be. For Plato, the child suffers from a philosophical deficiency that complicates the return of the soul to perfection. He is completely dominated by his body and what his body provokes within his soul. Thus the child becomes a synonym of imperfection. As the first period of human life, childhood is the first obstacle that the soul must overcome to retrieve its true nature. This research would like to show that the child is a central subject of the Platonic system, because he becomes the fundamental stake of a philosophy whose goal is to achieve a better life for humans.

[pt] O objetivo desse trabalho é desenvolver um essencialismo sem mundos possíveis. Alegamos que objetos ordinários são entidades complexas constituídas por entidades mais básicas como pedaços de matéria e propriedades instanciadas Os possíveis constituintes são determinados pela realidade, independentes da mente e linguagem humana, mas a constituição é convencional dependente do nosso esquema conceitual e as nossas práticas de nomeação. Consequentemente desenvolvemos uma teoria aristotélica de objetos ordinários como complexos de suas essências e da matéria que instancia essas essências. Em seguida aplicamos essa concepção de objetos para modificar a teoria da referência direta. Nessa teoria resultante, os significados de nomes próprios são as essências dos referentes desses nomes. O quadro da nossa investigação consiste numa teoria plantonista de propriedades segundo a qual as propriedades são partes integrais de uma realidade complexas sendo interconectadas com a parte concreta dessa realidade e na qual algumas propriedades podem participar em relações causais. De acordo com isso, apresentamos uma concepção atualista de modalidades na qual as modalidades ocorrem em virtude de relações de segunda ordem entre propriedades, no caso de modalidades de re em virtude de relações de segunda ordem entre essências de objetos e outras propriedades. / [en] The aim of this study is to develop an essentialist theory without possible worlds. We claim that ordinary objects are complex entities composed of entities that are more basic like pieces of matter and instantiated properties. The possible constituents are determined by reality and mind- and language-independent, the constitution, however, is conventional dependent on our conceptual scheme and our naming practices. In consequence, we develop an Aristotelian theory of ordinary objects as complexes of their essences and the matter which instantiates these essences. We apply this conception of objects in order to modify the direct reference theory. In the resulting theory, the meanings of proper names are the essences of the bearers of the names. The theoretical frame of our investigation consists in a Platonist theory of properties according to which properties are integral parts of a complex reality connected with its concrete partand in which some properties can participate in causal relations. In accordance with this view, we present an actualist conception of modalities in which modalities obtain in virtue of second order relations between properties, in case of de re modalities in virtue of second order relations between objects essences and other properties.

[pt] Nietzsche e Heidegger delineiam os caminhos que se entrecortam dando origem ao nosso horizonte de questões: É ainda possível um pensamento que resista ao mesmo tempo à tentação de uma fundamentação absoluta, mas também ao furor desenfreado da maquinação calculadora? É ainda possível um pensamento que se coloque em condições de compreender e também de se posicionar criticamente tanto em relação aos fundamentalismos nostálgicos, quanto em relação à pura efetividade e produtividade que a tecnociência nos impõe? É possível, afinal, distanciar-se da metafísica tradicional sem recair na ingenuidade anti-metafísica de uma superação definitiva e segura? É ainda possível uma outra metafísica? Partindo desse universo inicial de questões procuramos apontar que a metafísica da vontade, ao menos tal como desenvolvida por Nietzsche e pela psicanálise, traz ao primeiro plano uma dimensão estranha à tradição metafísica ocidental: a dimensão pulsional, este terceiro historicamente excluído entre matéria e espírito, corpo e mente, unidade e multiplicidade, mesmidade e diferença, configurando uma outra metafísica nem redutível à metafísica tradicional, nem simplesmente antimetafísica. / [en] Nietzsche and Heidegger determinate the paths that intersect here giving birth to our horizon of questions: Is it possible a thought that resists the temptation of an absolute basis, but also to unbridled fury calculator machination? It is also possible that a thought is put in a position to understand and also to position itself critically in relation to both nostalgic fundamentalisms, and to pure effectiveness and productivity that technoscience imposes on us? It is possible, after all, to distance itself from traditional metaphysics without falling back into naivety anti-metaphysical definitive and safe overcome? Is it still possible to conceive any kind of other metaphysics? From this initial universe of questions we seek to point out that the metaphysics of the will, at least as developed by Nietzsche and psychoanalysis, brings to the fore a dimension strange to the Western metaphysical tradition: the instinctual dimension, this third historically excluded between matter and spirit, body and mind, unity and multiplicity, sameness and difference, setting another metaphysical not reducible to traditional metaphysics, nor simply anti-metaphysical.

La présente thèse étudie le rapport entre la vie et l’oeuvre d’Eugène Ionesco selon la perspective de l’autoportrait. Dans ses ouvrages fort divers — essai, roman et théâtre — l’écrivain se penche ouvertement sur sa vie et son passé pour y trouver l’essence de son existence. L’autoportrait ainsi dressé revêt constamment de nouvelles formes. Complexe et transgénérique, il embrasse plusieurs enjeux littéraires et métaphysiques que nous tentons d’analyser et de circonscrire dans le cadre d’une réflexion tripartite. Dans un premier temps, nous étudions la nature de « l’écriture de soi » chez Ionesco en regard des notions d’autobiographie et de journal pour en saisir l’originalité. Nous abordons ensuite l’écriture romanesque de l’auteur afin de montrer d’une part comment ce dernier introduit une dimension autobiographique dans une œuvre fictive et afin de révéler d’autre part son objectif sur le plan de l’écriture de soi. Enfin, nous analysons la nature de l’autoportrait dramatique ionescien du point de vue générique et examinons le mode de représentation de soi « hors de soi », c’est-à-dire, sur scène. / This thesis analyzes the relationship of Eugène Ionesco's life and works through a selfportrait lens. In his rich variety of works across multiple genres, e.g. essays, novels and plays, the author openly examines his life and his past to find the essence of his existence. Thus approached, the self-portrait constantly takes on new forms. Complex and cross-genre, it takes up various literary and metaphysical issues which will be analyzed and delineated through a tripartite approach. Firstly, the nature of self-writing in Ionesco's works will be considered in comparison to the concepts of autobiographical and journal writing in order to appreciate his originality more thoroughly. Next, his novelistic writing will be explored to show, on the one hand, how he adds an autobiographical dimension to fiction, and to reveal on the other hand, his goal as far as self-writing is concerned. Finally, the nature of Ionesco’s dramatic selfportrait will be analyzed from a genre standpoint as will his self-representation from “ outside himself”, that is to say, on stage.

[pt] O objetivo desta dissertação foi o de analisar as três demonstrações da existência de Deus nas Meditações Metafísicas de René Descartes. Ela contém três capítulos. No primeiro, tratamos de forma geral do método de Descartes, tendo a intenção de mostrar que este mesmo método será aplicado às Meditações Metafísicas influenciando em grande medida as provas da existência de Deus. No segundo capítulo, já no interior das Meditações Metafísicas, nos detemos na análise da dúvida metódica e do cogito. Estes dois temas são os antecedentes fundamentais para as provas da existência de Deus, na medida em que, através da dúvida, é vedado o recurso ao conhecimento dos seres materiais e à própria Natureza e, através do cogito, é descoberta a única via possível para se chegar a Deus. No terceiro e último capítulo, apresentamos a primeira, a segunda e a terceira prova da existência de Deus. Em todas essas três provas o nó da questão foi a aplicação do principio de causalidade especificado na forma da causalidade eficiente. Na primeira prova, Deus é inferido como causa eficiente de sua idéia presente no intelecto humano. Na segunda, Deus é provado como causa do próprio intelecto que tem sua idéia. Por fim, na última prova, Deus é concebido como causa formal e eficiente de si mesmo. / [en] The objective of this dissertation was to analyze three demonstrations of the existence of God in the Metaphysical Meditations of René Descartes. It contains three chapters. In the first one, we deal with general form of the method of Descartes, having the intention to show that this method will be applied to the Metaphysical Meditations influencing significantly on the tests of the existence of God. In the second chapter, where we are already talking about the Metaphysical Meditations, we withhold them in the analysis of the methodical doubt and cogitation. These two subjects are the basic antecedents for the tests of the existence of God, while through the doubt the resource to the knowledge of material beings and to the proper Nature is forbidden, and through the cogitation is discovered the only possible way to reach the God. In the third and last chapter, we present the first one, the second and third test of the existence of God. In all these three tests the main question was the application of beginning of specified cause to the form of the efficient cause. In the first test, God is inferred as the efficient cause of its present idea in the human intellect. In second, God is proven as a cause of the proper intellect that has its idea. Finally, in the last test, God is conceived as a formal and efficient cause of itself.