Corporate governance practice differs regionally and nationally, depending on how each legal environment protects minority investors, capital markets and company ownership structure. Governance can also change spectacularly in regions or countries with comparatively high levels of institutional investment. The notion of institutional investors' activism is increasingly important in developed markets as the ideal corporate governance mechanism to monitor corporate managers and overcome agency problems arising from dispersed corporate ownership in modern companies. These institutions can work together on an improved corporate governance framework more effectively than individual investors, monitoring corporate controllers of listed companies in emerging and developing markets, using their influence more vigorously and in ways more fitting to a concentrated ownership environment such as that in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the role of institutional investors in emerging and developing markets will depend strongly on institutional investors' activism and the arrangements determined and undertaken by the corporate governance regulatory framework in these markets. In considering the influential role of institutional investors to improve corporate governance practice, a high level of minority shareholder protection thus remains an indicator of good corporate governance and regulatory pressure of rights and incentives, which are necessary to empower non-controlling shareholders in these concentrated ownership markets to exert a strong activist influence in monitoring corporate activities, thus improving the corporate governance practices of investee companies. In this context, this thesis contends that in Saudi Arabia in particular, shareholder involvement in corporate governance is inadequate, as a result of a variety of economic and regulatory obstacles. It goes on to identify what improvements are necessary and where, to ensure a sound framework for effective institutional investor activism and to improve the level of minority shareholder protection. It also cautions Saudi legislators against erecting hurdles to the future engagement of Saudi and foreign institutional investors in monitoring corporate activities which may affect the conditions for access, allocation and monitoring of equity, which is so important for value creation and sustainable economic growth. The main benefit to be derived from this research is that it facilitates a fuller understanding of the Saudi approach to corporate governance, the corporate ownership environment and trends in the capital market. The analysis also deepens knowledge of corporate governance regimes, including the role of institutional investors, and of their characteristics and investment behaviours. In short, it considers whether institutional investors are willing or have been encouraged to use their power to engage in the companies in which they invest and whether they are qualified to solve the agency problem.

Obwohl der Konzern eine hohe praktische Relevanz im europäischen Binnenmarkt aufweist, besteht kein einheitliches europäisches Konzernrecht. Die Arbeit entwickelt einen Regelungsvorschlag für ein europäisches Konzernleitungsrecht und schließt damit diese Lücke. Zunächst werden die rechtlichen Grundlagen des Konzerns dargestellt. Anschließend werden die Akteure des Konzerns und deren Eigeninteressen beschrieben. Die wirtschaftlichen Anreize und Risiken der Konzernierung werden diskutiert. Die ökonomische Analyse des grenzüberschreitenden Konzerns gibt die optimale Konzernstruktur vor, die rechtlich abgesichert werden muss. Das sekundärrechtlich zu gewährleistende Weisungsrecht muss sich nahtlos in die Rechtsordnungen der einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten einfügen. Es werden die bestehenden Möglichkeiten einer einheitlichen Konzernleitung und deren Grenzen aufgezeigt. Letztere sind die Haftungsrisiken für die Geschäftsführer der Mutter- und der Tochtergesellschaft und die Rechte der Minderheitsgesellschafter. Als Beispiele dienen die deutsche sowie die französische Rechtsordnung. Anschließend wird untersucht, ob und inwieweit die Grenzen der einheitlichen Leitung durch die Anerkennung des Gruppeninteresses überwunden werden können. Das französische und das deutsche Recht halten unterschiedliche Antworten bereit, so dass die Begriffskonturierung nicht den nationalen Rechtsordnungen überlassen werden sollte, sondern auf der Grundlage von binnenmarktorientierten Effizienzerwägungen autonom bestimmt werden sollte. Diese Überwindung durch die Anerkennung des Gruppeninteresses wird ihrerseits durch das Insolvenzrecht begrenzt. / Although the corporate group is of great practical importance in the European internal market, there is no uniform European corporate group law. The thesis develops a regulatory proposal for a European group management law and thus remedies this absence. First, the legal basis of the corporate group is presented. Then, the actors of the group and their own interests are demonstrated. The economic incentives and risks of integration into a group are discussed. The economic analysis of the cross-border group prescribes the optimal group structure, which must be legally secured. The right to issue instructions, which is to be guaranteed by secondary legislation, must fit smoothly into the legal systems of the individual Member States. The existing possibilities of uniform group management and the limits are highlighted. The latter are the liability risks for the managers of the parent and the subsidiary and the rights of minority shareholders. The German and French systems serve as examples. It is then examined whether and to what extent the limitations of uniform management can be overcome by the recognition of the group interest. French and German law provide different answers, so that the contours of the concept should not be left to the national legal systems but should be determined autonomously based on efficiency considerations oriented towards the internal market. This overcoming by the recognition of the group interest does not apply without limitations in insolvency law.

O presente trabalho tem por objeto o estudo do instituto da incorporação de ações. Para tanto, será analisado, (i) no primeiro capítulo, o regime legal vigente e sua natureza jurídica, apresentando-se as diferenças em relação à operação de incorporação de sociedade, fazendo inclusive um contraste com o direito norte-americano; (ii) no segundo capítulo, a proteção dos acionistas minoritários em operações de incorporação de controlada e eventual impedimento de voto do acionista controlador, analisando-se os recentes pareceres de orientação emitidos pela CVM; (iii) no terceiro capítulo, o estudo do instituto do tag along e do fechamento de capital e necessidade de realização de oferta pública em operações de incorporação de ações que impliquem transferência de controle ou cancelamento de registro de companhia aberta, à luz das últimas operações realizadas no mercado; (iv) no quarto capítulo, a discussão dos principais precedentes nos quais a CVM decidiu impor restrições ou impedir a realização de operações de incorporação de ações por entender ter havido um tratamento não equitativo entre os acionistas minoritários e controladores, com o objetivo de demonstrar a alteração do comportamento do órgão regulador no decorrer dos anos / The present work aims the study of the stock-for-stock exchange transactions (incorporação de ações). For this purpose, it will be examined (i) in the first part, the current legal regime and legal nature, contemplating differences with the statutory merger (incorporação de sociedade), including a comparison with the US law, (ii) in the second part, the protection of minority shareholders in the context of parent-subsidiary mergers and possible exclusion from voting of the controlling shareholder, taking into account the recent opinions issued by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM), (iii) in the third part, the study of the tag along rights and the regulation for delisting companies and the need to conduct a tender offer in stock-for-stock exchange transactions involving transfer of control or delisting of a publicly-held company in light of recent transactions, and (iv) in the fourth part, the discussion of the key precedents on which CVM has decided to impose restrictions or prevent the conduct of stock-for-stock transaction under the understanding that there was inequitable treatment of minority shareholders and controlling shareholders, in order to demonstrate the change of the CVMs understanding over the years.

O presente trabalho tem por objeto o estudo do instituto da incorporação de ações. Para tanto, será analisado, (i) no primeiro capítulo, o regime legal vigente e sua natureza jurídica, apresentando-se as diferenças em relação à operação de incorporação de sociedade, fazendo inclusive um contraste com o direito norte-americano; (ii) no segundo capítulo, a proteção dos acionistas minoritários em operações de incorporação de controlada e eventual impedimento de voto do acionista controlador, analisando-se os recentes pareceres de orientação emitidos pela CVM; (iii) no terceiro capítulo, o estudo do instituto do tag along e do fechamento de capital e necessidade de realização de oferta pública em operações de incorporação de ações que impliquem transferência de controle ou cancelamento de registro de companhia aberta, à luz das últimas operações realizadas no mercado; (iv) no quarto capítulo, a discussão dos principais precedentes nos quais a CVM decidiu impor restrições ou impedir a realização de operações de incorporação de ações por entender ter havido um tratamento não equitativo entre os acionistas minoritários e controladores, com o objetivo de demonstrar a alteração do comportamento do órgão regulador no decorrer dos anos / The present work aims the study of the stock-for-stock exchange transactions (incorporação de ações). For this purpose, it will be examined (i) in the first part, the current legal regime and legal nature, contemplating differences with the statutory merger (incorporação de sociedade), including a comparison with the US law, (ii) in the second part, the protection of minority shareholders in the context of parent-subsidiary mergers and possible exclusion from voting of the controlling shareholder, taking into account the recent opinions issued by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM), (iii) in the third part, the study of the tag along rights and the regulation for delisting companies and the need to conduct a tender offer in stock-for-stock exchange transactions involving transfer of control or delisting of a publicly-held company in light of recent transactions, and (iv) in the fourth part, the discussion of the key precedents on which CVM has decided to impose restrictions or prevent the conduct of stock-for-stock transaction under the understanding that there was inequitable treatment of minority shareholders and controlling shareholders, in order to demonstrate the change of the CVMs understanding over the years.