This dissertation addresses party-culture in political parties represented in the Swedish parliament. Party-culture is investigated by studying collective self-images and norms in Swedish parliamentary party-groups (PPG). The aim of this investigation is to contribute to understanding of the conditions under which parliamentary work is carried out. In order to expand our understanding of these conditions this dissertation looks beyond the formal processes by which party-groups deliver their political message and make decisions, and instead highlights the cultural aspects of these party organizations in the parliament. The method of analysis is qualitative and the material for the study consists of 53 interviews with members of parliament from all represented parties. The parties studied are thus the Social Democratic, Moderate, Liberal, Christian Democrats, Left, Centre, and Green. In addition, some participant observation for the 1998-2002 mandate period in used. The empirical investigation shows that party-culture is revealed via four basic themes: political ability, feelings of political responsibility, the importance social fellowship, and the party’s strength in relation to individual party members. The party’s culture based on the four themes noted above provides a theoretical structure for interpretation that combines an Aristotelian idea about basic knowledge types, sophia and phronesis, with cultural theorists Mary Douglas’ grid-group-analysis. Based on this interpretation method it is shown that party-cultures distinguish themselves from each other in a way that diverges from the left-right spectrum that dominates Swedish politics. At the same time as the parties demonstrate differences in party-culture, there are also some similarities between the parties, and these similarities suggest that the parties have adjusted themselves to a more general culture within the parliament, most visibly the focus on factual knowledge and a certain requirement for modesty from party members.

L’objectif de cette thèse est d’élucider l’intention, la pertinence et la cohérence de l’appropriation par Heidegger des concepts principaux de la philosophie pratique aristotélicienne dans ses premiers cours. Notre analyse portera principalement sur les notions clefs d’energeia et de phronēsis. La première section de la thèse est préparatoire : elle est consacrée à une analyse étroite des textes pertinents de l’Éthique à Nicomaque, mais aussi de la Métaphysique, en discussion avec d’autres commentateurs modernes. Cette analyse jette les fondations philologiques nécessaires en vue d’aborder les audacieuses interprétations de Heidegger sur une base plus ferme. La deuxième et principale section consiste en une discussion de l’appropriation ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque que Heidegger entreprend de 1922 à 1924, à partir des textes publiés jusqu’à ce jour et en portant une attention spéciale à Métaphysique IX. Le résultat principal de la première section est un aperçu du caractère central de l’energeia pour le projet d’Aristote dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque et, plus spécifiquement, pour sa compréhension de la praxis, qui dans son sens original s’avère être un mode d’être des êtres humains. Notre analyse reconnaît trois traits essentiels de l’energeia et de la praxis, deux desquels provenant de l’élucidation aristotélicienne de l’energeia dans Métaphysique IX 6, à savoir son immédiateté et sa continuité : energeia exprime l’être comme un « accomplissement immédiat mais inachevé ». L’irréductibilité, troisième trait de l’energeia et de la praxis, résulte pour sa part de l’application de la structure de l’energeia à la caractérisation de la praxis dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque, et du contraste de la praxis avec la poiēsis et la theōria. Ces trois caractéristiques impliquent que la vérité pratique ― la vérité de la praxis, ce qui est l’ « objet » de la phronēsis ― ne peut être à proprement parler possédée et ainsi transmise : plus qu’un savoir, elle se révèle surtout comme quelque chose que nous sommes. C’est ce caractère unique de la vérité pratique qui a attiré Heidegger vers Aristote au début des années 1920. La deuxième section, consacrée aux textes de Heidegger, commence par la reconstruction de quelques-uns des pas qui l’ont conduit jusqu’à Aristote pour le développement de son propre projet philosophique, pour sa part caractérisé par une profonde, bien qu’énigmatique combinaison d’ontologie et de phénoménologie. La légitimité et la faisabilité de l’appropriation clairement ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque par Heidegger est aussi traitée, sur la base des résultats de la première section. L’analyse de ces textes met en lumière la pénétrante opposition établie par Heidegger entre la phronēsis et l’energeia dans son programmatique Natorp Bericht en 1922, une perspective qui diverge fortement des résultats de notre lecture philologique d’Aristote dans la première section. Cette opposition est maintenue dans nos deux sources principales ― le cours du semestre d’hiver 1924-25 Platon: Sophistes, et le cours du semestre d’été 1924 Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. Le commentaire que Heidegger fait du texte d’Aristote est suivi de près dans cette section: des concepts tels que energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis ou hexis ― qui trouvent leur caractérisation ontologique dans la Métaphysique ou la Physique ― doivent être examinés afin de suivre l’argument de Heidegger et d’en évaluer la solidité. L’hypothèse de Heidegger depuis 1922 ― à savoir que l’ontologie aristotélicienne n’est pas à la hauteur des aperçus de ses plus pénétrantes descriptions phénoménologiques ― résulte en un conflit opposant phronēsis et sophia qui divise l’être en deux sphères irréconciliables qui auraient pour effet selon Heidegger de plonger les efforts ontologiques aristotéliciens dans une impasse. Or, cette conclusion de Heidegger est construite à partir d’une interprétation particulière de l’energeia qui laisse de côté d’une manière décisive son aspect performatif, pourtant l’un des traits essentiels de l’energeia telle qu’Aristote l’a conçue. Le fait que dans les années 1930 Heidegger ait lui-même retrouvé cet aspect de l’energeia nous fournit des raisons plus fortes de mettre en doute le supposé conflit entre ontologie et phénoménologie chez Aristote, ce qui peut aboutir à une nouvelle formulation du projet heideggérien. / The purpose of this thesis is to sort out the intent, the philosophical relevance and the consistency of Heidegger’s appropriation of the basic tenets of Aristotle’s practical philosophy in his early lecture courses. Our analysis will focus mainly on the key notions of energeia and phronēsis. The first preparatory section of the thesis is devoted to a close analysis of Aristotle’s relevant texts of the Nicomachean Ethics, but also of the Metaphysics, in discussion with other modern commentators. This lays the philological groundwork which will enable us to engage Heidegger’s challenging interpretations on a more secure footing. The second and main section discusses Heidegger’s ontological appropriation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics from 1922 to 1924 on the basis of the texts so far published, and with a special attention to Metaphysics IX. The main result of section I is an insight into the central character of energeia for Aristotle’s project in the Nicomachean Ethics and, more specifically, for his understanding of praxis, which in its genuinely original sense turns out to be a way of being of human beings. Our analysis recognizes three essential traits to energeia and praxis, two of which stemming from the analysis of Aristotle’s own elucidation of energeia in Metaphysics IX 6, namely immediacy and continuity: energeia expresses being as an ‘immediate unfinished fulfillment’. Irreducibility, the third trait of energeia and praxis, results from applying the structure of energeia to the characterization of praxis in the Nicomachean Ethics, and from contrasting it with poiēsis and theōria. These three features entail that practical truth―the truth of praxis, the ‘object’ of phronēsis―cannot be properly possessed and thus transferred: more than something we know, it is something we are. It is this special character of practical truth that primarily attracted Heidegger to Aristotle in the early 1920s. Section II, devoted to Heidegger’s texts, starts by reconstructing some of the intellectual steps that led him to resort to Aristotle for the development of his own philosophical project, characterized by a profound, yet intriguing intermingling of ontology and phenomenology. The legitimacy and feasibility of Heidegger’s pointedly ontological appropriation of the Nicomachean Ethics is also discussed, on the basis of the results of section I. The analysis of these texts is characterized by the sharp opposition set by Heidegger between phronēsis and energeia in his 1922 programmatic Natorp Bericht, a perspective that strongly diverges from the results of our philological reading of Aristotle in section I. The assessment of this opposition is maintained throughout the discussion of the two main sources―the 1924-25 winter course Platon: Sophistes, and the 1924 summer course Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. Heidegger’s direct commentary of Aristotle’s text is followed closely in this section: concepts such as energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis and hexis―which find their ontological characterization in the Metaphysics or Physics―need to be scrutinized in order to follow Heidegger’s argument and to assess its soundness. Heidegger’s hypothesis from 1922―namely, that Aristotle’s ontology does not fit the insights of his more penetrating phenomenological descriptions―eventually culminates in a clash between phronēsis and sophia which divides being into two irreconcilable spheres and brings Aristotle’s ontological efforts to a dead end. Yet, this conclusion of Heidegger is built upon a specific interpretation of energeia that critically leaves in the shade its performative side, one of its essential traits as Aristotle conceived it. The fact that in the 30s Heidegger himself comes to see this side of energeia provides us with stronger grounds to question the supposed conflict between ontology and phenomenology in Aristotle, which can result in a new formulation of the Heideggerian project.

O presente trabalho pretende estudar as relações entre a ética, a política e o direito em Aristóteles. Primeiramente, tentar-se-á dar uma ordem interna a cada tema, conforme a teoria das causas, isto é, as quatro causas aristotélicas. Depois de identificadas as causas da ética, da política e do direito, através da análise das causas de seus objetos, seguir-se-á, ao tempo da conclusão, a análise se há identidade de causas, parcial ou total, perfeita ou imperfeita. Ainda, buscar-se-á quais os elementos estudados por Aristóteles em uma das obras que são condições necessárias à outra. Por fim, investigar-se-á se as orientações para a ação de uma estão presentes na outra, isto é, se a atividade política básica é operada por um tipo de razão apresentada pela ética e se as orientações para a ação ética, ou seja, a ação humana conforme a virtude, é operada por um tipo de razão apresentada pela política. Finalmente, dar-se-á uma apresentação geral de como o direito se situa e se organiza nessa relação. / This dissertation intends to study the relations between ethics, politics and law, in aristotelian philosophy. First of all, it atempts to give an internal order to each of those themes, according to the four aristotelian causes; Aristotle’s theory of causes. After identifying the causes of ethics, politics and law, through analysis of its object’s causes, in conclusion it will be verified if there is any identity between them - partial or total, perfect or imperfect. Furthermore, elements studied by Aristotle in one of them which are necessary conditions to the others will be investigated. The next question to be answered will be whether the orientation to action are given by ethics, that is, whether the basic political action is performed by a type of reason presented by ethics, and wheter the orientation to ethical action, the human action according to virtue, is performed by a type of reason presented by politics. Finally, a general approach about how law is situated and organized in the context of the referred relation.

O presente trabalho pretende estudar as relações entre a ética, a política e o direito em Aristóteles. Primeiramente, tentar-se-á dar uma ordem interna a cada tema, conforme a teoria das causas, isto é, as quatro causas aristotélicas. Depois de identificadas as causas da ética, da política e do direito, através da análise das causas de seus objetos, seguir-se-á, ao tempo da conclusão, a análise se há identidade de causas, parcial ou total, perfeita ou imperfeita. Ainda, buscar-se-á quais os elementos estudados por Aristóteles em uma das obras que são condições necessárias à outra. Por fim, investigar-se-á se as orientações para a ação de uma estão presentes na outra, isto é, se a atividade política básica é operada por um tipo de razão apresentada pela ética e se as orientações para a ação ética, ou seja, a ação humana conforme a virtude, é operada por um tipo de razão apresentada pela política. Finalmente, dar-se-á uma apresentação geral de como o direito se situa e se organiza nessa relação. / This dissertation intends to study the relations between ethics, politics and law, in aristotelian philosophy. First of all, it atempts to give an internal order to each of those themes, according to the four aristotelian causes; Aristotle’s theory of causes. After identifying the causes of ethics, politics and law, through analysis of its object’s causes, in conclusion it will be verified if there is any identity between them - partial or total, perfect or imperfect. Furthermore, elements studied by Aristotle in one of them which are necessary conditions to the others will be investigated. The next question to be answered will be whether the orientation to action are given by ethics, that is, whether the basic political action is performed by a type of reason presented by ethics, and wheter the orientation to ethical action, the human action according to virtue, is performed by a type of reason presented by politics. Finally, a general approach about how law is situated and organized in the context of the referred relation.

O presente trabalho pretende estudar as relações entre a ética, a política e o direito em Aristóteles. Primeiramente, tentar-se-á dar uma ordem interna a cada tema, conforme a teoria das causas, isto é, as quatro causas aristotélicas. Depois de identificadas as causas da ética, da política e do direito, através da análise das causas de seus objetos, seguir-se-á, ao tempo da conclusão, a análise se há identidade de causas, parcial ou total, perfeita ou imperfeita. Ainda, buscar-se-á quais os elementos estudados por Aristóteles em uma das obras que são condições necessárias à outra. Por fim, investigar-se-á se as orientações para a ação de uma estão presentes na outra, isto é, se a atividade política básica é operada por um tipo de razão apresentada pela ética e se as orientações para a ação ética, ou seja, a ação humana conforme a virtude, é operada por um tipo de razão apresentada pela política. Finalmente, dar-se-á uma apresentação geral de como o direito se situa e se organiza nessa relação. / This dissertation intends to study the relations between ethics, politics and law, in aristotelian philosophy. First of all, it atempts to give an internal order to each of those themes, according to the four aristotelian causes; Aristotle’s theory of causes. After identifying the causes of ethics, politics and law, through analysis of its object’s causes, in conclusion it will be verified if there is any identity between them - partial or total, perfect or imperfect. Furthermore, elements studied by Aristotle in one of them which are necessary conditions to the others will be investigated. The next question to be answered will be whether the orientation to action are given by ethics, that is, whether the basic political action is performed by a type of reason presented by ethics, and wheter the orientation to ethical action, the human action according to virtue, is performed by a type of reason presented by politics. Finally, a general approach about how law is situated and organized in the context of the referred relation.

El propósito de esta tesina consiste en realizar un análisis literario y filosófico de la novela La familia de Pascual Duarte, escrita por Camilo José Cela. En esta investigación se busca explorar los principios éticos y morales presentes en la ética nicomáquea de Aristóteles, destacando conceptos fundamentales como la felicidad, la virtud, la justicia y la prudencia. Posteriormente, se analizará la conexión entre estos principios filosóficos y las acciones y decisiones del protagonista de la novela, Pascual Duarte. / The purpose of this essay is to conduct a literary and philosophical analysis of the novel La familia de Pascual Duarte, written by Camilo José Cela. This research aims to explore the ethical and moral principles found in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, emphasizing fundamental concepts such as happiness, virtue, justice and prudence. Subsequently, the connection between these philosophical principles and the actions and decisions of the novel's protagonist, Pascual Duarte, will be analysed.

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The thesis focuses on Aristotelian-Thomist ethics system. In mainly deals with the differences in concept of beatitude, good and related issues, like the science of virtues. The emphasis is placed on understanding and covering the differences in aproach of St. Thomas Aquinas and Aristotele to these ethical topics. Firs the thesis characterises the main issue in Nicomachean Ethics, then outlines the thoughts and ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas in his Commentary, with emphasis on its diference from Aristoteles teachings. First three chapters are therefore the more descriptive part of the thesis, which is based on both primary and secondary textual sources. The fourth chapter is, then, the crucial, practical part, that summarizes St. Thomas theses and ideas concerning beatitude, good and happiness, coming from his unrivaled Commentary on the Ethics.

This thesis is engaged in the theme of natural law, especially in sources of natural law - in theories, which are labelled as "classic". The thesis focuses on these theories (Aristotle, stoicism, Thomas Aquinas) and their common points, which are proper to these theories. That is the object of this thesis. These points present the essence of natural law. The first part explains problem of the term "natural law". The second part deals with the classic theories. The third chapter summarises findings of the second part. The fourth part is devoted to the similarity between the classic theories and the modern (enlightenment) theories. This chapter is devoted to the connection between natural law and positive law too.

Medieval philosophy in the Arabic world has sought to harmonize the Greek philosophic tradition with the Islamic religion. Many rulers, scholars and theologians were against this intellectual approach and defend the Islam from the philosophers. The position of philosophy and its followers in the Arabic realm was therefore uneasy. Many scholars had to hide their opinions between the lines and avoid to doing philosophy publicly. Alongside the unfriendly environment, the position of philosophy in the Arabic society was also determined by common notion of scholars, that the revealing of the philosophical thoughts can be harmful for uneducated citizen, as well as influenced by mysticism. The aim of this thesis is to summarize the main philosophical approaches responding to the problematic position of philosophy in the Arabic world. Crucial will be the philosophy of solitary by Ibn Bajja, where the author seeks to bond tight the philosopher's life with the city and thus present a new role of philosopher in the Arabic society. Keywords Ibn Bajja, Rule of the Solitary, Al-Farabi, Political Regime, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Plato, The Republic, political philosophy, mysticism, ethics, philosopher, virtue, city, weeds, knowledge, governance, happiness