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In recent years urban violence has become understood as a 'reproduced', multi-causal and socially generated phenomenon. Less is understood about why young men reproduce the majority of this violence. This thesis uses original empirical data based on thirty-two life-histories of youths living in two poor and violent neighbourhoods in Medellín, Colombia. It argues that urban violence is reproduced by male youths because it is linked to 'masculinity'; that is, the process of 'becoming men' where youths strive to fulfil productive or 'successful' models of masculinity. These processes are related to contexts of poverty, inequality and exclusion, so this thesis does not reduce the generation of urban violence to masculinity alone. Rather, understanding masculinity provides us with further insight into the reproduction of violence. This thesis further argues that male youths are disposed by their habitus - after Pierre Bourdieu - to negotiate a pathway to manhood that largely reflects traditional masculine values in their context. Striving to achieve prevailing versions of manhood contributed to some of these youths joining armed groups, such as gangs. The gang acted as a mechanism to fulfil their dispositions to become men, by providing them with a way to perform a version of 'successful' masculinity. This is prevalent in urban contexts of exclusion and high levels of social violence, because there are limited opportunities to achieve legal and dignified versions of manhood, whilst there are significant opportunities to join the local gang. The youths interviewed that did not join gangs tended to come from families that taught them to reject violence at a young age, whilst supporting them in pursuing alternative pathways to manhood. Youths that joined gangs tended to have more problems at home and often had family members already in gangs.

In recent years urban violence has become understood as a 'reproduced', multi-causal and socially generated phenomenon. Less is understood about why young men reproduce the majority of this violence. This thesis uses original empirical data based on thirty-two life-histories of youths living in two poor and violent neighbourhoods in Medellín, Colombia. It argues that urban violence is reproduced by male youths because it is linked to 'masculinity'; that is, the process of 'becoming men' where youths strive to fulfil productive or 'successful' models of masculinity. These processes are related to contexts of poverty, inequality and exclusion, so this thesis does not reduce the generation of urban violence to masculinity alone. Rather, understanding masculinity provides us with further insight into the reproduction of violence. This thesis further argues that male youths are disposed by their habitus - after Pierre Bourdieu - to negotiate a pathway to manhood that largely reflects traditional masculine values in their context. Striving to achieve prevailing versions of manhood contributed to some of these youths joining armed groups, such as gangs. The gang acted as a mechanism to fulfil their dispositions to become men, by providing them with a way to perform a version of 'successful' masculinity. This is prevalent in urban contexts of exclusion and high levels of social violence, because there are limited opportunities to achieve legal and dignified versions of manhood, whilst there are significant opportunities to join the local gang. The youths interviewed that did not join gangs tended to come from families that taught them to reject violence at a young age, whilst supporting them in pursuing alternative pathways to manhood. Youths that joined gangs tended to have more problems at home and often had family members already in gangs. / ESRC, and University of Bradford

Although drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) exist and have an effect on health, crime, economies, and politics, little research has explored these entities as political organizations. Legal interest groups and movements have been found to influence domestic and international politics because they operate within legal parameters. Illicit groups, such as DTOs, have rarely been accounted for—especially in the literature on interest groups—though they play a measurable role in affecting domestic and international politics in similar ways. Using an interest group model, this dissertation analyzed DTOs as illicit interest groups (IIGs) to explain their political influence. The analysis included a study of group formation, development, and demise that examined IIG motivation, organization, and policy impact. The data for the study drew from primary and secondary sources, which include interviews with former DTO members and government officials, government documents, journalistic accounts, memoirs, and academic research. To illustrate the interest group model, the study examined Medellin-based DTO leaders, popularly known as the “Medellin Cartel.” In particular, the study focused on the external factors that gave rise to DTOs in Colombia and how Medellin DTOs reacted to the implementation of counternarcotics efforts. The discussion was framed by the implementation of the 1979 Extradition Treaty negotiated between Colombia and the United States. The treaty was significant because as drug trafficking became the principal bilateral issue in the 1980s; extradition became a major method of combating the illicit drug business. The study’s findings suggested that Medellin DTO leaders had a one-issue agenda and used a variety of political strategies to influence public opinion and all three branches of government—the judicial, the legislative, and the executive—in an effort to invalidate the 1979 Extradition Treaty. The changes in the life cycle of the 1979 Extradition Treaty correlated with changes in the political power of Medellin-based DTOs vis-à-vis the Colombian government, and international forces such as the U.S. government’s push for tougher counternarcotics efforts.

Grâce au Good Friday Agreement (GFA) signé en 1998, l’Irlande du Nord connait une période de pacification sans précédent depuis les Troubles (1969-1998). Dans cette situation de post conflit, la violence liée aux affrontements entre groupes paramilitaires et forces de sécurité britannique a très largement diminué. Cependant, de petits groupes paramilitaires républicains s’opposent toujours au traité de paix. Cette thèse a pour objectif comprendre pourquoi les paramilitaires républicains anti-GFA continuent d’utiliser la violence alors qu’ils reconnaissent que, dans le contexte actuel, la lutte armée a peu de chance de conduire à la réunification de l’Irlande. A Belfast, l’analyse spatiale des violences intracommunautaires (perpétuées dans le cadre d’un système de justice alternatif) et des attaques contre les forces de police montre que la stratégie des organisations paramilitaires anti-GFA repose sur la création d’un cycle d’agitation. Il s’agit d’une stratégie de développement locale qui vise à maintenir des territoires d’exception. Ce terme désigne ici des territoires où la normalisation voulue par le processus de paix est limitée par les actions des républicains anti-GFA et où le monopole de la violence légitime est disputé. Cependant, cette stratégie de contrôle du territoire communautaire se heurte à toute une série de problèmes. En effet, les organisations paramilitaires anti-GFA sont de petits groupes fragmentés qui tendent à se diviser dans le temps. Enfin, l’influence des paramilitaires anti-GFA est limitée par un contexte social extrêmement défavorable à la lutte armée, par les actions des forces de sécurité, et par la présence et la stratégie du Sinn Féin. / Thanks to the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) signed in 1998, Northern Ireland knows a period of pacification unknown since the Troubles (1969-1998). In this post-conflict situation, violence in the form of confrontation between paramilitary groups and British security forces has greatly decreased. Nevertheless, small republican paramilitary groups are still opposing the peace treaty. The goal of this dissertation is to understand why republican paramilitaries opposed to the GFA continue to rely on violence while recognizing that, in the current context, armed struggle has little chances of leading to the reunification of Ireland. In Belfast, spatial analysis of intracommunal violence (carried out within an alternative justice system) and attacks against the police indicate that the strategy of the paramilitary organizations opposed to the GFA relies on creating a cycle of unrest. This is a strategy of local development aiming at maintaining territories of exception. This concept here means territories where the normalization sought by the peace process is limited by anti-GFA republicans’ actions and where the monopole of legitimate violence is disputed. This strategy of communal territory control is however facing a series of problems. Anti-GFA paramilitary organisations are indeed small fragmented groups which often splinter overtime. Finally, anti-GFA paramilitary organizations’ influence is limited by a social context extremely unfavourable to armed struggle, by security forces, and by the presence and strategy of the Sinn Féin.

[pt] A dissertação visa relatar e analisar o fracasso do processo de paz realizado na Colômbia, durante o governo do presidente Andrés Pastrana, entre os anos de 1998 e 2002. A realidade local constituía-se num drama humanitário cuja solução se mostrava contrária à sustentação de mitos como o de uma democracia política estável ou o da pobreza como a principal causa da violência. O firme desígnio de resolver pacificamente a luta armada exigia que se levasse em consideração a natureza complexa e instável do Estado, a identidade dos atores armados, a realidade do agravamento da crise social e a difícil conciliação entre os interesses internos e externos. O empreendimento conduzido pelo presidente Andrés Pastrana era objeto da área de estudos de resolução pacífica de conflitos, cujas lentes conceituais foram as escolhidas como ferramenta para leitura e interpretação dos fatos. Esta literatura lida com o contexto sócio-político no qual se desenvolvia o enfrentamento armado, abrangendo as várias características específicas deste contexto. Ela preconizava o reconhecimento mútuo e a flexibilização das exigências, para que a negociação apresentasse avanços. O colapso do processo de paz colombiano, entre outros aspectos, tornou evidentes os obstáculos para a transformação do conflito. Sequer conseguiu-se fazer que os dois lados presentes à negociação renunciassem ao uso das armas. Decorridos aproximadamente quatro anos de negociação entre o governo e as FARC, os esforços não lograram substituir uma histórica, vivaz e destrutiva experiência por outra, construtiva e benéfica, a qual poderia ter se sobressaído na eventual assinatura de um acordo de paz. / [en] This essay is an account and an analysis of the failure of the Colombian peace process that took place during the presidential mandate of Andrés Pastrana from 1998 through 2002. The local reality actually became an humanitarian crisis whose solution necessarily involved abandoning shattered myths such as that of a stable democracy or that of poverty as the main root of endemic violence. The strong will to solve the armed conflict in a peaceful way has lead to reflection on the complex and unstable nature of the Colombian state, the true character of the quarrelling actors, the deepening of the social crisis and the tricky conciliation between internal and external interests. President Pastrana´s initiative falls into the area of studies of peaceful conflict resolution. The reading and interpretation of the facts will therefore be undertaken through the lenses of the literature on peaceful conflict resolution. That literature deals with the issue of the socioeconomic context in which the armed struggles occur, including its specifics. It also recommends mutual political recognition among parties and increasingly flexible demands in order to spur the smooth advance of the negotiation. The ultimate collapse of the Colombian peace process exposed the multiple obstacles to a solution to the civil war. It was not even possible to persuade either party to drop weapons. After four years of negotiations between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia had passed, all these efforts were not enough to replace an ago-old, historical, and destructive social experience for a new, constructive, and beneficial experience. Such a new reality could have been possible if a peace accord had been reached.

The aim of the thesis is to identify those German citizens, who were fighting in the Yugoslav wars, determine their background, actions on the ground and post-war trajectories, as well as suggest probable motivations for joining the combat in the way they did. The thesis raises the question, how these German war volunteers can be best described and if they are somehow specific within their subgroup of predominantly Western anti-Yugoslav foreign fighters. I argue that Nir Arielli, one of the few scholars dealing with the role of Westerners in the conflict, falls short by qualifying them merely as "meaning seekers" and thus overlooks the multitude of political connections and references, first and foremost among the Germans. I will offer a critique by pointing out differences and nuances, especially in origin- based motives, ideological underpinning and perspectives on the conflict. In doing so, I will raise the question of what we do know about the political situation in both Germany and Croatia in the early 1990s, and how each of that might that have facilitated decisions to join combat abroad. In addition, I will classify their appearance both within the well-known theory of "new wars" as well as within the phenomenon of foreign war volunteering, arguing that there is not much reason why this group should...

What does “success” mean for social reintegration of ex-combatants in urban settings? Although reintegration of former fighters has been at the center of academic and policy discourse for achieving peace, limited attention has been paid to unraveling how social reintegration processes occur and how they are impacted in urban contexts. This thesis studies the specific issue of successful social reintegration in urban contexts and asks why it evidences higher levels of success in some urban settings than others. Drawing on previous research on the impact of security conditions on reintegration processes, it argues that actual or suspected eroded security conditions, caused by the presence of organized armed groups as well as reintegrating ex-combatants whose former unit operated in the same host community, negatively impact levels of success of social reintegration in urban centers because they each increase levels of fear towards ex-combatants among community members. Through process tracing and structured focused comparison, this thesis assesses the explanatory power of the proposed hypotheses for the cases of Bogota and Medellin. Based on the yielded results, support for both hypotheses is identified. Nonetheless given the nuanced conceptualizations propose heiring, future research is called upon to further assess the explanatory power of the proposed models.

There is little solid research that explores counterinsurgency practices against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), not only from the standpoint of what is being done, but, rather, what should be done based on past COIN successes. Notable works on counterinsurgency in Colombia include the research of Tom Marks, who focused on operational strategy and tactics; Kevin Self, who professes the importance of controlling territory in defeating the FARC, by addressing the social and institutional ills within Colombia itself; and Dennis Rempe, who notes US involvement in shaping Colombia's COIN strategy. Using a comparative case study model, this thesis provides an analysis of Colombia?s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies and tactics through the lens of successful and unsuccessful COIN operations in Iraq, Algeria, Malaya, South Vietnam, Thailand, Algeria and El Salvador over the course of the 20th and early 21st centuries. After all, no matter how successful a COIN force is militarily, their accomplishments will ultimately be fruitless if the conditions which fuel insurgency remains present. This paper begins by providing the historical context for the conditions which shaped the Colombian social order, which led to the revolutionary movement. It then follows the growth of the FARC, examining that organization?s strengths and weaknesses. The FARC is contrasted by outlining recent COIN transformation efforts within the Colombian government, to include little acknowledged failures and successes, strengths and weaknesses. An important focus is placed on Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez? Democratic Security Policy as the model for Colombia?s current COIN efforts. After next examining various ongoing factors contributing to the Colombian insurgency?to include institutional failures, illicit funding and the problem of paramilitary groups?this thesis examines past COIN efforts by other governments. Finally, after applying lessons learned from thee past COIN efforts?cross-referencing historically successful and unsuccessful tactics with tactics used and not used by Bogota in its fight against the FARC?I provide recommendations to the government of Colombia (GOC) on how to improve its COIN efforts. Although it is important to look at this problem set from an external standpoint, we must still factor in internal factors that have limited Colombia?s ability to emerge victorious, such as allowing porous borders, airspace and coastlines; placing a priority on killing or capturing the enemy and not on engaging the population; and the primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency; disregard of basic human rights; an insufficient judiciary structure; failure to halt financial support mechanisms; and the lack of an outlet for political inclusion . From this vantage point, we will be able to see that these elements?when properly implemented?have proven successful over time and may enhance GOC success and ultimately result in victory over the insurgency that has plagued their country for 40+ years