The strong part of Horkheimer and Adorno&rsquo / s philosophy is their critique of the Enlightenment. They argue that the consequent of the Enlightenment has been the destruction of the Enlightenment itself. There are two main reasons in the background of this destruction. First of them is the destruction of individual because of the understanding of reason in the Enlightenment. Individuals cannot define their existence beyond the determined roles of society any more. The second reason is the certain distinction between the human beings and nature. The epistemology of the Enlightenment makes nature an object of knowledge and views the world as a summation of facts. This understanding makes subjects passive in providing the objectivity of knowledge. Accordingly, the subject is alienated from his or her knowledge. Horkheimer and Adorno&rsquo / s critical thinking provides possibility for the human autonomy. It tries to understand human beings and society in a dialectical process. It considers the relation between parts and the whole as a mutual relation. According to Horkheimer and Adorno, the relation between subject and object is neither an absolute duality nor an absolute unity.

O presente trabalho é o resultado dos estudos realizados sobre a reconstrução das investigações empreendidas por Habermas acerca da gênese da crítica da razão instrumental, as quais estão contidas no quarto capítulo do primeiro tomo de sua Teoria da Ação Comunicativa. O percurso realizado parte de uma breve apresentação sobre o exercício da racionalidade na modernidade e como as mudanças histórico-sociais implicaram em mudanças teóricas acerca da leitura sobre o exercício da racionalidade. Seguidamente a isto, buscou-se recuperar a conceitualização habermasiana sobre racionalidade, a qual permitiu compreender suas críticas à teoria da racionalização social de Weber; as investigações sobre as teses weberianas ensejam proporcionar a compreensão da análise que Habermas realizou sobre a crítica da razão instrumental a partir da apropriação do marxismo ocidental de Lukács, o qual assumiu a racionalização social como um processo de reificação, visto que, de acordo com Habermas, esta foi a leitura que proporcionou a Horkheimer e Adorno elaborarem uma crítica da razão instrumental que buscou atestar a existência de um mundo totalmente administrado e sem perspectivas de emancipação. O percurso trilhado no presente trabalho recupera a discussão habermasiana de que a perspectiva discursiva assumida pela Teoria Crítica da primeira metade do século XX se enredou em aporias insolúveis por ter assumido que a crise da razão seria resultante do exercício unilateral do modelo cognitivo-instrumental de razão nas modernas sociedades capitalistas. / The current work is the result of the studies undertaken about the preambles of the investigations realized by Habermas about the root of his own critique of instrumental reason, restricted to the fourth chapter of the first volume of his Theory of Communicative Action. The main course taken over here starts with a briefly presentation about rationality and its exercises in Modernity and how the sociological-historical changes boosted into a theoretical change about the development of rationality. After that, the current work aims to recover the Habermasian conceptualization of rationality, which might allow an understanding of his criticism over Webers theory of social rationalization. Habermass investigations on Webers theses aims to provide a further understand of his analysis of his critique of instrumental reason from the Lukacss Western Marxism appropriation of Webers theory, which recognized social rationalization as a reification process. For sure it is close to Habermass thought that this theoretical course allowed Horkheimer and Adornos elaboration of their critique of instrumental reason that sought to attest the existence of an entire administered world with no prospects of emancipation. The path assumed over the current work aims to recover the Habermasian discussion which affirms that the Critical Theory of early XX Century is enclosed into insoluble aporias since it was assumed a crisis of reason in a so large scale, resulted from an unilateral exercise of the cognitive-instrumental reason in modern capitalist societies.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This master thesis presents a reconstruction of the problem of the unity of reason in Kant s critical-transcendental philosophy. Bearing in mind that there is much disagreement in the literature, not only as to the critical answer to this problem, but also as to its specificity and systematic function within the various moments in which it is considered by Kant, this approach centers essentially on Kant s own argumentation. The aim of this research is to show that Kant s treatment of the problem follows the development of the critical-transcendental philosophy and that it can only be understood insofar as this development is presented. Therefore, a search for the systematic localization of the moments in which Kant approaches the problem of the unity of reason has been carried out, with the intention of justifying that this approach is fundamentally connected with the critical intention of establishing the boundaries that guarantee legitimacy to reason and assure its authenticity to operate in the theoretical as well as in the practical domain. The investigation is guided by the necessity to understand that both the negative results at which Kant arrives in the search of the demonstration of the unity of reason and the only critical answer admitted to this problem have their genesis in the systematic possibilities considered by the critical philosophy as a whole. Initially, in view of the argumentation that corresponds to the first period of this philosophy, an examination of Kant s search for a solution to the problem of the unity of reason from the theoretical use is carried out. Secondly, the systematic identification of the impossibility of solving the problem through this route leads to the consideration of an effort to establish the unity from the practical use and, likewise, to the discovery that the theoretical and practical uses of reason must be legitimized in two distinct domains of reason and, thus, the unity of reason cannot be guaranteed from either of its uses. Finally, faced with this situation, an exploration of the answer guaranteed to the problem of the unity of reason by the Kantian argumentation that considers the relation of the theoretical and practical domains in a regulative manner is carried out. As a result of the systematic impossibility to establish the unity of reason from one of its uses, the necessary self-sufficient validation of these uses, and, also, the fact that the relation of their domains can only be admitted as regulative, the conclusion reached is that the unity of reason is a fundamental presupposition of the critical philosophy in the articulation of its entirety, but that the critical answer to this problem consists in the justification of the impossibility of its demonstration. / Este trabalho apresenta uma reconstrução do problema da unidade da razão na filosofia crítica-transcendental kantiana. Dado que a literatura discorda não apenas acerca da resposta crítica a esse problema, mas até mesmo sobre a sua especificidade e a sua função sistemática nos diversos momentos nos quais ele é considerado, a abordagem centra-se essencialmente na própria argumentação kantiana. Procura-se, outrossim, mostrar que o tratamento do mesmo problema segue o desenvolvimento da filosofia crítica-transcendental e que ele só pode ser compreendido desde que apresentado tal desenvolvimento. Assim sendo, busca-se uma localização sistemática dos momentos onde Kant aborda o problema da unidade da razão no intuito de justificar que a mesma abordagem é fundamentalmente vinculada à intenção crítica de determinar os limites que garantem legitimidade à própria razão e asseguram que esta tem autenticidade para operar tanto no domínio teórico como no domínio prático. A investigação é conduzida pela necessidade de se compreender que tanto os resultados negativos que Kant chega na busca da demonstração da unidade da razão como a única resposta crítica admitida para tal problema têm sua gênesis nas possibilidades sistemáticas consideradas pela filosofia crítica no seu todo. Tomando em consideração a argumentação que corresponde ao período do início da mesma filosofia investiga-se, primeiramente, a procura de Kant de uma solução para o problema da unidade da razão a partir do uso teórico. A identificação sistemática da impossibilidade de qualquer tentativa de resposta mediante esse percurso conduz, num segundo momento, ao apreço de uma tentativa de estabelecer a unidade a partir do uso prático e, ainda, à descoberta sistemática de que os usos teórico e prático devem ser legitimados em dois domínios distintos e, assim, a unidade da razão não pode ser garantida partindo-se de um dos seus usos. Frente a essa situação, num último momento, pondera-se a resposta ao problema da unidade da razão garantida pela argumentação kantiana que considera de modo regulativo a relação dos domínios teórico e prático. Como resultado da impossibilidade sistemática de estabelecer a unidade da razão a partir de um dos seus usos, da necessária legitimação auto-suficiente dos mesmos e, ainda, do fato de que a relação dos seus domínios só pode ser admitida como regulativa, apresenta-se a conclusão de que a unidade da razão é um pressuposto fundamental para a articulação da filosofia crítica-transcendental em todos os seus momentos, mas que a resposta crítica a esse problema consiste na justificativa da impossibilidade da sua demonstração.

Les rapports entre islam et droit international son traditionnellement étudiés en termes de résistances et de conflits. Certes, cela est la traduction d’une réalité indéniable, mais cette approche ne permet pas de saisir les dynamiques complexes qui conduisent à de pareilles réactions. Afin de dépasser ce point de vue figé, il semble opportun d’approcher les deux sujets d’étude en interaction et tenter de modéliser les réactions qui s’ensuivent. Cette tentative ne peut être concrétisée qu’à partir d’une méthode systémique et qui prenne en compte tous les éléments pouvant influencer les réactions du système juridique et ordonner son évolution. Cette méthode, c’est celle offerte par la théorie de la raison juridique développée par A.J. Arnaud et appliquée à l’exemple islamique. Dans ce sens, il transparaît que l’interaction avec l’ordre juridique international pourrait aussi être porteuse d’un mouvement d’innovation au delà des réactions primaires de préservation. Cela permet de déconstruire les points devue traditionnels sur les rapports entretenus entre droit international et islam. Aussi, cette tentative propose un point de vue qui se veut multidimensionnel et non parcellaire. Elle constitue une prise de position sur la façon d’aborder les phénomènes juridiques. Au lieu de se résoudre à reconnaître, telle une fatalité, l’impossibilité de rapprocher les idéaux du droit international et des systèmes à raison juridique islamique, cette étude tente de comprendre la dynamique qui a lieu afin de prédire les réactions et prévoir les transformations. Le résultat de ce pragramatisme est que le rapprochement n'est plus perçu comme une finalité mais plutôt comme une possibilité. / The relationship between Islam and international law is traditionally studied in terms ofresistances and conflicts. Despite being the translation of an established reality, this approach fails to grasp the complex dynamics which lead to such reactions. In order to overcome this fixed point of view, it seems appropriate to approach the study subjects while in interaction and attempt to deduce a model from the ensuing reactions. This attempt could only be realised by following a systemic method which is capable of taking into consideration all the elements influencing the reactions of the studied legal systems and their evolutions. This method could be found in the theory of legal reason developed by A.J. Arnaud and applied to the Islamic example. In this regard, the legal reason method shows that, beyond the primary reactions of preservation, the interaction with the international legal order could also be the bearer of a movement of innovation. This method allows the deconstructing of the traditional point of views on the relationships between international law and Islam. It also allows to offer a multidimensional point of view and constitutes a stance on the appropriate way to study legal phenomena. Thus, instead of resolving to recognise the impossibility of harmonising the ideals of the international law and the legal systems based on a Islamic legal reason, this study attempts to understand the dynamics which take place during these interactions in order to predict the reactions and the transformations. The result of this pragmatism is that the reconciliation is no longer seen as finality but a possibility.

<p>A fundamental problem in political philosophy is how the freedom and equality of persons can be reconciled with the authority of social morality or law. The Kantian solution is to hold that the exercise of authority can be legitimate if and only if it is freely endorsed by the subjects of its exercise; thereby allowing persons to act as both subject and legislator. However, the fact of reasonable pluralism makes this approach problematic. A recent attempt to solve this conflict between authority and the free and equal idea, while also accounting for the fact of reasonable pluralism, is the theory of public reason liberalism developed by Gerald Gaus. The aim of this thesis is to give a critical evaluation of how successful Gaus is in solving this fundamental problem, while also situating public reason liberalism within the larger debate. The first chapter gives an overview of Gaus's theory and introduces some preliminary worries about the possibility of successfully converging on a workable set of socio-moral rules under public reason liberalism. Chapter two goes further, developing an internal critique of Gaussean public reason liberalism, and showing how this critique could play out using real-world examples. Chapter three explores alternative approaches to realizing the free and equal ideal in an attempt to situate Gaus's theory within the larger debate; finally concluding that Gaussean public reason liberalism is deeply problematic, both on a theoretical and a practical level, yet still offers important insights into the relationship between social-morality and the freedom and equality of persons.</p> / Master of Philosophy (MA)

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Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2015. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Practical reason can help make sense of the decisions that face humankind in a complex planetary age, and notably so regarding the development and use of technology. Human agency and functioning as a self-understanding person, as well as certain ideas related to complexity and co-evolution are crucial aspects of this side of practical reason. Exploring these aspects from different perspectives can help uncover some constructive insights into the special nature of the moral goals, and the uniquely human significance of some of our intentions and actions that inform our decision-making on the development and use of technology. The insights gained here can furthermore serve to expand certain mainstream conceptions in Western intellectual culture on the character of reason as such, which proceed from a classical, or naturalistic stance. In the latter case reason typically calls for the use of explicit criteria, and is foundational and procedural in nature. This view is important and useful. However, the model of practical argument that accompanies it paints a characteristically sceptical picture of rational choice in the moral sphere. Yet such scepticism is not always warranted. Instead, an expanded model of practical reason is called for, notably if human agency and self-understanding, as well as ideas related to complexity and co-evolution are taken seriously. In this thesis it is demonstrated that such an approach can serve to express in richer, less sceptical terms the sense of significance we find in our societal choices, and particularly so in those decisions for technology that confront humanity in an inclusive, interdependent age. In light of the above, the thesis discussion attempts to review some central naturalistic beliefs in Western intellectual culture on the nature of reason and related patterns of practical argument. The thesis aim is to point out some of their ontological and epistemological assumptions, note their particular strengths and weaknesses and relate them to models of reason employed in the natural and human sciences – especially those that concern the nature of explanation and understanding. Furthermore, these beliefs are linked to a generally sceptical, but at times unwarranted attitude towards the sphere of practical moral argument. Such matters are treated in the first two chapters of the thesis discussion. Other ways of picturing this attitude of doubt towards the moral sphere can be found in alternative notions about human agency and self-understanding, as well as from complexity and co-evolution. The concepts behind these perspectives point to certain ontological and epistemological insights which arguably take thinking beyond the normal range of naturalistic abstractions. As a result, different characterizations, or patterns, of practical reason become possible, the nature of which can help to rework the usual warrants for scepticism when it comes to judging the significance of our intentions and actions. Thinking in terms of human agency, self-understanding, complexity and co-evolution holds another advantage. These conceptualisations can also serve to formulate a defining link between practical reason and consultation, be it among individuals, communities or the institutions of society. Such ideas speak in part to emerging notions of collective maturity in the organization of human affairs, and the well-being of all peoples. More particularly, consultation can offer additional resources for replacing entrenched patterns of conflict in society with patterns that are more unifying and just. It can as well provide for a certain quality of understanding of the principles and issues involved. The exploration of these and similar ideas begins with the discussion in Chapters Three and Four, and continues into subsequent chapters. In addition to their naturalistic counterpart, these patterns of practical reason also suggest some useful notions regarding the broader import of our societal and developmental choices on a planetary scale. The thesis discussion will attempt to explore some of these ideas. Among other things, it considers the implications they have for notions of development in general viz the unfolding of humankind’s social, cultural, ethical and spiritual potential, as well as for conceptions of technology that speak to that unfolding. It will include in its study the notion of future-regarding social choices and the transformative potential of time. From there the focus will shift to what it might mean to recast existing technology aspirations in light of the urgent requirements of a co-evolving world, and with it the need to safeguard the interests of humanity as a whole. These and related topics are addressed in Chapters Five and Six. Finally, three broad questions have played an important background role in carrying out this study. First, what is the nature of the unity that exists between our capacity to know the world in an epistemological sense, and our ability to judge the moral significance of our actions? Second, on the basis of what can we make sense of our decisions about technology in so far as they might be said to contribute to an advance or a decline in human social well-being? Third, what insights can we gain into our patterns of practical reason and decisions for technology when viewed in the context of a planetary age, and considered in light of the principle of the oneness of mankind? / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die praktiese rede kan help sin maak van die besluite wat die mensdom in ʼn komplekse planetêre era in die gesig staar, veral met betrekking tot die ontwikkeling en gebruik van tegnologie. Menslike agentskap en funksionering as ’n persoon met selfbegrip, sowel as sekere idees oor kompleksiteit en ko-evolusie is almal deurslaggewende aspekte van hierdie sy van die praktiese rede. Deur hierdie aspekte vanuit verskillende perspektiewe te ondersoek, kan konstruktiewe insigte blootgelê word in die besondere aard van die morele doelwitte en die uniek-menslike betekenis van die bedoelings en handelinge wat ons besluitneming oor die ontwikkeling en gebruik van tegnologie onderlê. Die insigte wat hier verwerf word, kan daarby help om bepaalde hoofstroom-opvattings in die Westerse intellektuele kultuur oor die aard van die rede as sodanig te verruim – opvattings wat uit ’n klassieke of naturalistiese standpunt stam. Volgens laasgenoemde standpunt vereis die rede gewoonlik duidelike maatstawwe, en lê dit in wese grondslae en stel prosedures daar. Só ʼn siening is belangrik en bruikbaar, maar op grond van die model van praktiese redenering wat hiermee gepaardgaan, word ’n tipies skeptiese beeld geskets van redelike keuses binne die morele ruimte. Hierdie skeptisisme is egter nie altyd geregverdig nie. ’n Verruimde model van die praktiese rede word eerder benodig, veral as menslike agentskap en selfverstaan, asook die idees wat met kompleksiteit en ko-evolusie verband hou, ernstig opgeneem word. Só ʼn benadering kan help om die betekenis wat ons in ons maatskaplike keuses vind in ryker en minder skeptiese terme uit te druk. Dit geld veral vir daardie besluite vir tegnologie waarvoor die mensdom in ʼn inklusiewe, interafhanklike era te staan kom. In die lig hiervan is die proefskrif ‘n poging om ’n oorsig te gee van ’n paar sentrale naturalistiese opvattings binne die Westerse intellektuele kultuur oor die aard van die rede en patrone van praktiese argumentvoering wat daarmee verband hou. Die proefskrif poog om sommige van hierdie opvattings se ontologiese en epistemologiese voorveronderstellings uit te wys, hulle sterk- en swakpunte aan te toon en hulle in verband te bring met rasionele modelle wat in die natuur- en menswetenskappe gebruik word, veral dié oor die aard van verklaring en verstaan. Daarby word hierdie voorveronderstellings gekoppel aan ʼn algemeen skeptiese, maar by tye ongeregverdigde, ingesteldheid teenoor die sfeer van praktiese morele argumentvoering. Hierdie aspekte word in die eerste twee hoofstukke van die tesis behandel. Hierdie twyfel ten opsigte van die morele sfeer kan egter anders voorgestel word as alternatiewe idees oor menslike agentskap en selfverstaan in ag geneem word, asook kompleksiteit en ko-evolusie. Die begrippe wat hierdie perspektiewe ten grondslag lê, dui op bepaalde ontologiese en epistemologiese insigte wat stellig kan help dat ons denke die gebruiklike grense van naturalistiese abstraksies kan oorstyg. Die gevolg is dat die kenmerke of patrone van die praktiese rede anders verwoord kan word, wat kan bydra tot die hersiening van die gebruiklike regverdiging vir skeptisisme wanneer ons die betekenis van ons bedoelings en handelinge beoordeel. Om in terme van menslike agentskap, selfverstaan, kompleksiteit en ko-evolusie te dink, hou ook ’n verdere voordeel in. Sodanige konseptualiserings kan ook dien om ’n beslissende verband te lê tussen die praktiese rede en raadpleging [oftewel konsultasie] – of dit nou op die vlak van individue, gemeenskappe of samelewingsinstellings plaasvind. As sodanig vind hierdie gedagtes gedeeltelik aanklank by opkomende idees oor kollektiewe volwassenheid in die organisering van menslike aangeleenthede, en die strewe na die welsyn van alle samelewings wêreldwyd. In die besonder, raadpleging kan bykomende hulpmiddels bied om die ingewortelde konflikpatrone in die samelewing te help vervang met patrone wat meer verenigend en regverdig is. Dit kan ook voorsiening maak vir ʼn soort volwasse begrip van die beginsels en kwessies wat ter sprake is. Die verkenning van hierdie en verwante idees begin met die bespreking in Hoofstukke Drie en Vier en word in die daaropvolgende hoofstukke voortgesit. In onderskeiding van die naturalistiese interpretasie kan hierdie patrone van die praktiese rede vir ons ook help om die belang van ons keuses oor die samelewing en ontwikkeling op planetêre vlak in ‘n breër perspektief te plaas. Die bespreking in hierdie tesis beoog om ’n paar van hierdie idees van nader te ondersoek. Dit wil onder meer let op die implikasies van hierdie idees vir die konsep van ontwikkeling in die algemeen, met ander woorde vir die ontsluiting van die mensdom se maatskaplike, kulturele, etiese en spirituele potensiaal, asook vir die voorstellings van tegnologie wat direk op hierdie ontsluiting afgestem is. Die studie konsentreer ook op die idee van toekomsgerigte sosiale keuses en die omvormende potensiaal van tyd. Van daar verskuif die fokus na wat dit sou kon behels om bestaande tegnologiese aspirasies te herontwerp in die lig van die dringende behoefte aan ’n ko-evolusionêre wêreld, en daarmee saam die noodsaak om die belange van die mensdom in die geheel te beskerm. Hierdie en verwante onderwerpe word in Hoofstukke Vyf en Ses aangespreek. Laastens het drie oorkoepelende vrae ʼn beduidende rol gespeel as agtergrond tot die studie. Eerstens: Wat is die aard van die verband tussen ons vermoë om die wêreld in ’n epistemologiese sin te kan ken en ons vermoë om die morele betekenis van ons handelinge te kan beoordeel? Tweedens: Op grond waarvan kan ons bepaal of ons besluite oor tegnologie ‘n bydrae maak tot die bevordering van die mens se sosiale welsyn, of tot die ondermyning daarvan? Derdens: Watter insigte kan ons verkry oor ons patrone van praktiese redenering en ons besluite oor tegnologie wanneer ons dit binne die konteks van ’n planetêre era en in die lig van die beginsel van menslike eenheid beskou?

In this thesis my aims are twofold. First, I provide an auto-history of the concept of reason in Anglophone IR from 1919 to 2009. I uncover the centrality of the language of reason. I show that the concept of reason has constituted, undergirded, and empowered many prominent IR scholars’ discourses. Second, I bring out a taxonomy of four construal of rationality. I argue that IR thinkers have spoken in four languages of reason. Kantian reason stands in a relation opposed to passion, emotion and instinct, and makes the stipulation that to base actions on the intellect is prerequisite for pursuing interest and moral conduct. I argue that the British Liberal Institutionalists, Has Morgenthau, Richard Ashley and Andrew Linklater are bearers of this construal. Utilitarian reason refers to the maximization of interests under constraints, where interest can be defined as strategic preference, emotional attachment, or cultural value and constraints as a two-person game, uncertainty or risk. I demonstrate how Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, Glenn Snyder, Robert Keohane, Robert Gilpin, Helen Milner, Andrew Moravcsik and many other theorists use the concept. Axiological reason means following rules, cultures and norms, and always uses game as an analytical foundation and attends to the problem of how to enforce rules. I argue that Kenneth Waltz, Nicholas Onuf, Friedrich Kratochwil and K.M. Fierke have deployed the concept to construct their theories. Historical reason views all values as conditioned within a specific spatial-temporal background, and insists that moral problems, which are constituted in the margin of every political conduct, must be solved by overcoming universal morality and the unilateral pursuit of interest. I show that Raymond Aron, Martin Wight, David Boucher and Christian Reus-Smit have conceived of reason in this way.

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The Critique of Pure Reason inaugurated Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Commentators commonly distinguish between Kant’s Positive Project (PP), that is, his epistemology as laid out in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic, from his Negative Project (NP), expressed in terms of the destructive implications his epistemology has on speculative metaphysics and rational theology. Against this tradition I will argue that the whole of the Critique is largely a negative-destructive enterprise. I will focus on what is commonly taken as the centerpiece of the PP, that is, the Transcendental Deduction, and demonstrate that even here the NP is given normative priority. Though, to be sure, certain passages tend to encourage an interpretation of the PP as primary, I contend that this view is myopic and fails to pay sufficient attention to Kant’s global concerns in the Critique. I will demonstrate that a clear exposition of Kant’s metaphilosophical aims, commitments, and convictions is in fact corrosive to any such reading. The objective of this thesis, then, is two-fold: 1) to provide an account of Kant’s metaphilosophy in the Critique, and 2) to argue for what I will here and elsewhere refer to as the Primacy of the Negative Thesis, that is, that Kant prioritized boundary-setting over principle-generating.