<p>The subject of this thesis is <i>formal axiology</i>, i.e., the discipline that deals with structural and conceptual questions about value. The main focus is on <i>intrinsic</i> or <i>final</i> value. The thesis consists of an introduction and six free-standing essays. The purpose of the introduction is to give a general background to the discussions in the essays. The introduction is divided into five sections. Section 1 outlines the subject matter and sketches the methodological framework. Section 2 discusses the supervenience of value, and how my use of that notion squares with the broader methodological framework. Section 3 defends the concept of intrinsic or final value. Section 4 discusses issues in value typology; particularly how intrinsic value relates to final value. Section 5 summarises the essays and provides some specific backgrounds to their respective themes.</p><p>The six essays are thematically divided into four categories: The first two deal with specific issues concerning analyses of value. Essay 1 is a comparative discussion of competing approaches in this area. Essay 2 discusses, and proposes a solution to, a significant problem for the so called ‘buck-passing’ analysis of value. Essay 3 discusses the ontological nature of the bearers of final value, and defends the view that they are particularised properties, or <i>tropes</i>. Essay 4 defends <i>conditionalism</i> about final value, i.e., the idea that final value may vary according to context. The last two essays focus on some implications of the formal axiological discussion for normative theory: Essay 5 discusses the charge that the buck-passing analysis prematurely resolves the debate between consequentialism and deontology; essay 6 suggests that conditionalism makes possible a reconciliation between consequentialism and moral particularism. </p>

The subject of this thesis is formal axiology, i.e., the discipline that deals with structural and conceptual questions about value. The main focus is on intrinsic or final value. The thesis consists of an introduction and six free-standing essays. The purpose of the introduction is to give a general background to the discussions in the essays. The introduction is divided into five sections. Section 1 outlines the subject matter and sketches the methodological framework. Section 2 discusses the supervenience of value, and how my use of that notion squares with the broader methodological framework. Section 3 defends the concept of intrinsic or final value. Section 4 discusses issues in value typology; particularly how intrinsic value relates to final value. Section 5 summarises the essays and provides some specific backgrounds to their respective themes. The six essays are thematically divided into four categories: The first two deal with specific issues concerning analyses of value. Essay 1 is a comparative discussion of competing approaches in this area. Essay 2 discusses, and proposes a solution to, a significant problem for the so called ‘buck-passing’ analysis of value. Essay 3 discusses the ontological nature of the bearers of final value, and defends the view that they are particularised properties, or tropes. Essay 4 defends conditionalism about final value, i.e., the idea that final value may vary according to context. The last two essays focus on some implications of the formal axiological discussion for normative theory: Essay 5 discusses the charge that the buck-passing analysis prematurely resolves the debate between consequentialism and deontology; essay 6 suggests that conditionalism makes possible a reconciliation between consequentialism and moral particularism.

Les arguments de concevabilité sont des arguments philosophiques reposant sur le principe selon lequel tout ce qui est concevable est possible. Cette thèse se propose d'évaluer à un niveau général cette forme d'argumentation en s'appuyant sur des exemples historiques et contemporains. les arguments de concevabilité, quelle que soit la position philosophique qu'ils visent à défendre, soulèvent en effet des difficultés qui leur sont communes et ont trait principalement (i) à la définition de la notion de possibilitée, (ii) à la définition de la notion de concevabilité, et (iii) à la légitimité de l'inférence allant de l'une à l'autre. Le travail consiste d'abord (chapitres 1-3) à construire la catégorie que constituent les arguments de concevabilité en spécifiant notamment le genre de thèses philosophiques qu'ils peuvent chercher à établir. Une fois précisés les objectifs que les arguments de concevabilité peuvent viser, il s'engage (chapitres 4-8) dans l'examen de savoir si les ressources fournies par Ia concevabilité et l'inférence menant du concevable vers le possible suffisent à les atteindre. Pour ce faire, le travail propose une analyse détaillée des différentes formes de possibilité (chapitres 4-5) et de concevabilité (chapitres 6-8) impliquées dans ces arguments. II aboutit à une position dite sceptique modérée au sujet de la validité de cette forme d'argumentation, sur la base de la démonstration que, pour les thèses philosophiques qui nécessitent l'etablissement d'une possibilité métaphysique, la concevabilitée s'avère être un guide insuffisamment fiable, quelle que soit la manière dont on comprend la concevabilité. Mais il défend aussi l'idée que le fait que les arguments de concevabilité ne soient pas toujours concluants n'implique pas qu'ils sont depourvus d'utilité argumentative: car ils nous obligent à clarifier les implications modales de nos conceptions philosophiques et la manière dont nous pouvons raisonner au sujet de ces implications. Cette conception des arguments de concevabilité est appliquée pour finir à la clarification d'un chapitre essentiel de la philosophie de la cognition contemporaine relatif à la possibilité de fournir une explication naturaliste (physicaliste) de la conscience phénoménale, et ou un argument de concevabilité qui a fait couler beaucoup d'encre, dit argument des zombis, joue un rôle essentiel. / Conceivability arguments are philosophical arguments which rely crucially on the principle according to which conceivability entails possibility. This dissertation provides an analysis and a critical assessment of this kind of argumentative strategy, on the basis of contemporary and historical examples. Various possible explanations of the notion of conceivability are considered and it is argued that the inference from conceivability to possibility does not enable conceivability arguments to reach all their intended conclusions, especially those pertaining to substantial metaphysical issues.

Denna uppsats analyserar den medvetandefilosofiska debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim rörande Davidsons tes om det mentalas superveniens på det fysiska. Tesen utgör ett element i Davidsons generella teori om relationen mellan det mentala och det fysiska; anomal monism. Författaren frågar sig om Kim har rätt i att tesen om mental superveniens inte är tillräcklig för att garantera det mentala kausal kraft. I uppsatsen analyseras de båda filosofernas ståndpunkter i debatten med speciell tonvikt på deras respektive definitioner av superveniensbegreppet. Med utgångspunkt i detta argumenterar författarinnan att Kim i viss utsträckning kan sägas ha missförstått Davidsons superveniens-begrepp. Kim har definierat "svag" respektive "stark" och velat tolka Davidsons superveniens som tillhörande den sistnämnda sorten. Uppsatsförfattaren intar en ståndpunkt motsatt Kims och menar att Davidsons superveniensbegrepp snarare bör förstås som en variant av svag superveniens, men konstaterar samtidigt att det inte är helt säkert att dennes superveniens alls kan inordnas i någon av dessa kategorier; dessa refererar till "möjliga världar", vilka Davidson vägrar acceptera. / This paper analyses the debate between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim concerning Davidsons idea of the supervenience of the mental upon the physical. This thought is part of Davidson's general theory of the relation between mind and body; anomalous monism. The author asks wherther Kim is right that mental supervenience is insufficient to gurantee the mental causal power. The paper analyses the standpoints of both philosophers, especially regarding their definitions of "supervenience" and argues that Kim, to some extent, can be said to have misunderstood Davidson's notion of supervenience. Kim has offered definitons of "weak" and "strong" supervenience and interpreted Davidsons supervenience as being of the kind last mentioned. The author takes a standpoint opposite of Kim's and argues that Davidson's notion of supervenience is better understood as weak supervenience, but at the same time notes that it is by no means obvious that Davidsons supervenience can be said to belong to either of these categories since these refer to "possible worlds", which Davidson refuses to accept.

What is it for something to be good? Using the example of an Ebola-like microbe, I argue that a merely kind-based account of goodness is defective (Chapter 1). I offer instead an account that is both kind-based and platonic (Chapter 2). On such an account, goodness turns out to be non-natural (Chapter 3). However, non-naturalists can explain why the goodness of an individual supervenes on its natural properties, by appealing to the essence of the kind to which it belongs (Chapter 4).

Nesta tese, desenvolve-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo fundamentada na noção de mônada, ou substância simples, como elemento ontológico estruturante de um enfoque contemporâneo da mencionada relação. Na primeira parte da tese, de natureza crítica, analisam-se as teorias fisicistas contemporâneas da mencionada relação, a saber, a teoria de superveniência da mente, da emergência e da causação mental, com vistas a justificar a proposta de assunção de uma premissa dualista que visa, principalmente, propor, em contraste com o cenário epifenomenalista do fisicismo contemporâneo, uma ontologia da mente que seja compatível com as intuições realistas do senso comum e da psicológica popular sobre a força causal da mente no universo físico. Na segunda parte, de natureza positiva, propõe-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo partindo-se, para tanto, de uma assunção e duas premissas. A assunção afirma que a mente tem o mesmo importe ontológico da matéria física, sendo estes considerados como elementos composicionais, afirmação a qual se denomina dualismo elementar. No que se refere às premissas, propõe-se duas, a saber, a tese composicional holística, que afirma que a mente e a matéria são partes constitutivas de um todo chamado substância simples, e a tese composicional mereológica, que afirma que as substâncias simples ou mônadas compõem mereologicamente, por superveniência, a relação mente-corpo. Examinam-se também algumas objeções ao argumento monadista proposto. / This thesis offers an explanatory argument concerning the mind-body relation, an argument that is grounded on the notion of monad, or the simple substance, as an ontological element for proposing a contemporary approach to the mind-body relation. In the first part, a critique of the current physicalist theories of mind is given, namely, supervenience, emergence and mental causation, in order to justify the proposal of a dualist premiss which aims at an ontology of mind which satisfies the realistic intuitions of common sense and of folk psychology on the causal efficacy and relevance of the mind amid the physical, in opposition to the epiphenomenalist view of contemporary physicalist theories. In the second part, the positive one, we propose an explanatory argument for monadism about mind-body relations, based on an assumption and two premises. The assumption says that the mind has the same ontological import of the physical matter, and they, mind and matter, are considered to be elements entering the composition of psychophysical relations, an assumption called elementary dualism. Regarding the premises, we propose two, namely, the holistic compositional thesis, which asserts that mind and matter are parts entering the composition of true wholes called substances, and the mereological compositional thesis, which says that such simple substances compose, via supervenience, the mind-body relations. Some objections to the proposed monadist argument are examined and rejoindered as well.

Nesta tese, desenvolve-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo fundamentada na noção de mônada, ou substância simples, como elemento ontológico estruturante de um enfoque contemporâneo da mencionada relação. Na primeira parte da tese, de natureza crítica, analisam-se as teorias fisicistas contemporâneas da mencionada relação, a saber, a teoria de superveniência da mente, da emergência e da causação mental, com vistas a justificar a proposta de assunção de uma premissa dualista que visa, principalmente, propor, em contraste com o cenário epifenomenalista do fisicismo contemporâneo, uma ontologia da mente que seja compatível com as intuições realistas do senso comum e da psicológica popular sobre a força causal da mente no universo físico. Na segunda parte, de natureza positiva, propõe-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo partindo-se, para tanto, de uma assunção e duas premissas. A assunção afirma que a mente tem o mesmo importe ontológico da matéria física, sendo estes considerados como elementos composicionais, afirmação a qual se denomina dualismo elementar. No que se refere às premissas, propõe-se duas, a saber, a tese composicional holística, que afirma que a mente e a matéria são partes constitutivas de um todo chamado substância simples, e a tese composicional mereológica, que afirma que as substâncias simples ou mônadas compõem mereologicamente, por superveniência, a relação mente-corpo. Examinam-se também algumas objeções ao argumento monadista proposto. / This thesis offers an explanatory argument concerning the mind-body relation, an argument that is grounded on the notion of monad, or the simple substance, as an ontological element for proposing a contemporary approach to the mind-body relation. In the first part, a critique of the current physicalist theories of mind is given, namely, supervenience, emergence and mental causation, in order to justify the proposal of a dualist premiss which aims at an ontology of mind which satisfies the realistic intuitions of common sense and of folk psychology on the causal efficacy and relevance of the mind amid the physical, in opposition to the epiphenomenalist view of contemporary physicalist theories. In the second part, the positive one, we propose an explanatory argument for monadism about mind-body relations, based on an assumption and two premises. The assumption says that the mind has the same ontological import of the physical matter, and they, mind and matter, are considered to be elements entering the composition of psychophysical relations, an assumption called elementary dualism. Regarding the premises, we propose two, namely, the holistic compositional thesis, which asserts that mind and matter are parts entering the composition of true wholes called substances, and the mereological compositional thesis, which says that such simple substances compose, via supervenience, the mind-body relations. Some objections to the proposed monadist argument are examined and rejoindered as well.