內容大要如下： 序言 第一章 導論 第一節 研究目的 第二節 研究範圍 第二章 中共國際金融策略之實質 第一節 策略之緣起 第二節 策略之演變 第三節 策略之實質 第三章 中共金融管理及銀行制度 第一節 貨幣信用制度的基本結構 第二節 現階段金融制度的改革和發展 第三節 外匯和外決管理 第四節 中共金融制度與政策的評估 第四章 中共國際金融策略類型別狀況 第一節 引進外資的類型 第二節 發行債券 第三節 對外投資及放款 第四節 對外援助 第五章 引進外資與中外合資經營 第一節 開辦中外合營企業 第二節 開展國際信託投資之狀況 第三節 中外合資經營的當前問題 第六章 中共對香港的金融策略 第一節 中共與香港的經濟發展 第二節 中共參加香港金融市場的狀況 第三節 所謂「香港問題」對中共經濟的影響 第七章 結論

第一章 近代中國工運的背景與萌芽 近代中國工運發生的背景與近代中國經濟環境、社會條件、政治情勢及教育文化的變動有關。其發韌則始於十九世紀末，如清末的民間排外風潮、革命運動等，都有工人參加。民國成立後，風氣一新，工人運動更蓬勃，五四運動以後，乃成為重要的社會運動。 第二章 國民黨改組前後的勞工政策與活動 國民黨與工人運動關係悠久而密切，民國以後歷次革命之役如討袁、護法等，至革命基地建立，都有工人參加。而孫中山先生對勞工問題向極重視，國民黨的勞工政策即本之三民主義，針對中國事實情況而定。十三年改組以後，工運成為正式的民眾運動。 第三章 反帝運動與北伐初期的工潮 反帝運動促成國民革命運動，而工人反帝尤為先趨。在這期間，由於反帝運動的興起，大規模的工潮也很多，如五卅罷工、省港罷工都是因反帝而起。北伐初期工人踴躍參加，也是基於這種愛國意識。 第四章 國共鬥爭與北伐後期的工運 自中共加入國民黨後，藉國民黨名義發展自己的勢力，工人群眾被其裹□者甚多，工 人運動幾乎為其包辦。不甘受其利用的工人與黨員乃起而抗爭。此為北伐後期的工運特色。直到清黨以後，赤色工運氣焰才稍戢，然工人運動卻已變質，造成經濟、社會許多破壞。 第五章 中共與工運 共產黨以無產階級的政黨自居，成立以來即很注意工人運動。加入國民黨之後，以聯合戰線為名，藉國民黨名義使本身組織發展不少。然由於其鬥爭的本質。赤色工運祗是其奪取政權的手段而已，純正工運因之被大肆破壞，北為中國工人階級的不幸。

國立西南聯合大學（簡稱「西南聯大」或「聯大」）是與抗戰相始終的大學。它以戰時教育聞名，成立於抗戰初期（1938 年），由國立北京大學、國立清華大學和私立南開大學聯合組成，抗戰結束後三校解散北歸（1946 年），各自復校。日本的入侵和國家的貧弱，聯大師生共有的民族情感，聯大民主自由的人文環境和「雲南王」龍雲對戰時民主力量的保護等因素，合力構成了聯大地下黨統戰工作的發展空間。這一發展空間與重要的歷史事件的時間點（如1941 年1 月「皖南事變」、1945 年8 月「抗戰勝利」和10 月「龍雲下台」）一起，構成了一個國共角逐的時空。 / 中共中央和南方局對地下黨組織統戰工作的重視和具體指導的時間恰是在聯大成立初期；在聯大中期，為適應局勢，爭取大多數「中間派師生」的支持，中共先後製定了「十六字」方針（即「蔭蔽精幹，長期埋伏，積蓄力量，以待時機」）和「三勤」（即「勤學」、「勤業」、「勤交友」）政策；在聯大後期，中共統戰的方針政策在實踐中得到檢驗，取得成效。 / 聯大地下黨的統戰工作是中共雲南省工作委員會（簡稱「雲南省工委」）統戰工作的重要組成部分。南方局和雲南省工委統戰工作的重點是介於國共兩黨間的「中間力量」。聯大地下黨統戰的人群以聯大師生為主，他們用知識份子所能接受的語言和交友方式對其做統戰工作，突出中共是眾望所歸的力量。一方面，地下黨人以「民族主義」和「愛國」來把如聯大教授等「中間力量」團結起來，通過組織集會探討時事以引發高級知識份子思考抗戰失利、貪污腐敗、物價飛漲、民不聊生的根源，由此孤立國民黨。另一方面，聯大地下黨人在品學兼優的基礎上，以「中間學生」的姿態出現，為聯大同學辦實事（如解決吃飯難問題），由此贏得了大多數「中間學生」的好感。如果說在雲南民主運動高潮到來前，聯大地下黨對「中間派師生」的統戰成效限於潛移默化的影響，那麼在1944-1946年民主運動高潮來臨時，其統戰成效已體現為促使「中間派師生」走出書齋，用文字和行動來爭取「民主與和平」，反抗國民黨當局的獨裁專制。 / 誠然，在四十年代中期，「中間力量」所認同的是介於美蘇政治體制間的「第三條道路」。因此，雲南省工委和聯大地下黨通過扛起「民族主義」和「新民主」的旗幟將聯大師生等「中間力量」凝聚在一起，在孤立國民黨的同時，促使「中間力量」放棄「第三條道路」，服膺於「新民主主義」的「革命」之路。無疑，毛澤東的話語吸引了愛國的知識份子群體，使其感到儘管中共提倡的「新民主」並非西方強調的「民主」，但卻是一條可行的救國之路，「中間力量」感到可參與其中，輔助中共並影響其決策，甚至共同決定中國未來發展的方向。的確，大多數的聯大師生等「中間力量」對於中共及其所提倡的「新民主」是有期待的。南方局、雲南省工委和聯大地下黨的統戰成效亦於此可見。 / 然而，本文也提及，在中共成為執政黨後，當「中間力量」對「革命」勝利發揮作用的歷史使命完成後，受西方教育理念影響的知識份子的「自由主義」與中共的「思想統整」間的弔詭性矛盾即被凸顯。因此，在中共建國後，對知識份子的思想改造不可避免，在這個靈魂改造的過程中，受沖擊的不僅僅是聯大師生 等「中間力量」，即使雲南省工委和聯大地下黨人亦不能幸免。 / 事實上，聯大地下黨對聯大師生等「中間力量」的統戰工作的深遠影響並未隨著聯大的解體和新中國的成立而結束。聯大地下黨人及其統戰對象聯大「中間派師生」，在經歷了新中國對知識份子的思想改造運動後，如何反思民族主義、革命與民主的關係亦值得作進一步的梳理和檢討。這是本文的一個後續研究方向。 / "The emergence of National South-west Associated University (hereafter abbreviated as NSAU) coincided roughly with the war of the Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression. Because of the Marco Polo Bridge (Lugou Qiao) incident on 7 July 1937 and the subsequent Japanese invasion of China, three renowned universities of north China, Peking University, Tsinghua University and Nankai University, were consolidated into one temporary university, National Changsha Temporary University (hereafter abbreviated as NCTU), by the Ministry of Education and relocated to Changsha in 1937. At the end of 1937, Nanjing fell, and Wuhan was in crisis, NCTU was forced to move again then to Yunnan province in 1938 and changed its name to NSAU. NSAU, known as an exemplar of wartime education in modern China history, is an important arena of the Chinese Communist Party’s (hereafter abbreviated as CCP) United Front activities between 1938-1946. A number of factors such as Japanese invasion, the country’s poverty and weakness, the sense of nationalism of the University’s teachers and students, the humanistic environment of democracy and freedom of the University, and the protection of the democratic forces by the “King of Yunnan” Long Yun during war times had combined to form a space for the development of the underground CCP's United Front activities in NSAU. / NSAU, known as an exemplar of wartime education in modern China history, is an important arena of the Chinese Communist Party’s (hereafter abbreviated as CCP) United Front activities between 1938-1946. A number of factors such as Japanese invasion, the country’s poverty and weakness, the sense of nationalism of the University’s teachers and students, the humanistic environment of democracy and freedom of the University, and the protection of the democratic forces by the “King of Yunnan” Long Yun during war times had combined to form a space for the development of the underground CCP's United Front activities in NSAU. / NSAU’s underground party’s United Front work was an important part of the Southern Bureau’s and the CCP Yunnan Work Committee's activities. The Southern Bureau was in charge of the underground party branches in Chiang Kai-shek’s districts. The United Front work of the Southern Bureau and the CCP Yunnan Work Committee focused on “the third force” or “the middle force”. In order to win the support of almost all intellectuals especially NSAU’s students and professors, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai separately formulated the Sixteen-Character Guideline of the CCP’s underground party work: Hiding Elites (yinbi jinggan), Long-term Ambushes (changqi maifu), Saving Force (jixu liliang) and Waiting for the Opportunity (yidai shiji) and the policy of the Three Diligences that refers to Working with Diligence, Studying with Diligence, and Making friends with Diligence. The policy of the Three Diligences was the concrete application of the Sixteen-Character Guideline, according to Zhou Enlai’s idea. / NSAU’s underground party undertook United Front work to influence “the middle force” by cultural activities, propaganda skills and the ways of making friends that were accepted by most of the intellectuals, and stressed that CCP could meet the expectations of the patriotic masses in China. On the one hand,the Communists united “the middle force” such as NSAU’s professors who adhered to nationalism and patriotism, and isolated the Nationalists by organizing rallies and discussing current events, and then led the senior intellectuals to believe that the root cause of the defeat in the anti-Japanese war, corruption, soaring prices and hardship suffered by people wasGuomindang, the Nationalist Party. On the other hand, NSAU’s underground party members, who excelled others in both morals and studies, solved practical problems for their classmates (such as the lack of food), thus winning most of their classmates’ support. / Admittedly “the middle force” was identified with “the third way” whose political stand was between the American and Soviet models in mid-1940s. But the CCP Yunnan Work Committee and NSAU’s underground party combined elements of “the middle force” such as NSAU’s students and professors to isolate the Guomindang, and prompted them to give up “the third way” and believe in the revolutionary way of New Democracy. / There is no doubt that Mao Zedong’s words moved the patriotic intellectuals and made them feel that although the New Democracy advocated by CCP was not Western democracy, it was a feasible way to save the country, and these intellectuals and democrats could participate in and influence the CCP’s decisions on the developmental direction of China in the future. Indeed, most of followers of “the middle force” such as NSAU’s teachers and students believed in both CCP and its New Democracy. In this sense, it is obvious that the United Front activities of the Southern Bureau, the CCP Yunnan Work Committee and NSAU’s underground party were highly effective. / This thesis also mentions that, however, after CCP became the ruling party and “the middle force” had completed its historical mission of being an important ally and follower of CCP in the revolutionary victory, the paradoxical contradiction between the liberal intellectuals influenced by Western value on the one side, and CCP, on the other, became notable. Therefore, a movement of thought reform for intellectuals had to be launched after the founding of the People's Republic of China. In this campaign to reform the soul, those purged were not only “the middle force” including NSAU’s students and professors, but even the CCP Yunnan Work Committee and NSAU’s underground party members. / In fact, the profound influence of NSAU’s underground party’s United Front work on “the middle force” did not end with the disbandment of NSAU and the establishment of new China. After the movement of thought reform for intellectuals, how the former NSAU’s underground party members and their targets of United Front work (i.e., the former NSAU’s teachers and students of “the middle force”) reflected upon the relations between nationalism, revolution and democracy is worth further examination and review. This will be one of the dimensions of a follow-up study of this dissertation. / 劉宇. / Thesis Ph.D. Chinese University of Hong Kong 2016. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 339-365). / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on September 8, 2017). / Liu Yu . / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only.

羅欣欣. / 論文(哲學碩士) -- 香港中文大學硏究院藝術學部, 1998. / 附參考文獻. / 中英文摘要. / Luo Xinxin. / 序言 --- p.1 / 論文摘要 --- p.2 / 插圖目錄 --- p.5 / 緒論 --- p.14 / Chapter 第一章 --- 中共建國前的毛澤東繪畫圖像(1927-1949) / Chapter I. --- 毛澤東政治地位的確立 --- p.28 / Chapter II. --- 土地革命戰爭時期(1927-1937)：毛澤東繪畫圖像的起源 --- p.30 / Chapter III. --- 抗口戰爭時期(1937-1945)的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.31 / Chapter 1 . --- 魯藝木刻工作團的成立1938 --- p.32 / Chapter 2. --- 晉西北木刻工廠1941 --- p.33 / Chapter 3. --- 《延安文藝座談會上的講話》1942 --- p.34 / Chapter 4. --- 赤色郵政 1944 --- p.40 / Chapter 5. --- 中共黨報 1945 --- p.41 / Chapter IV. --- 全國解放戰爭時期(1945-1949)的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.43 / 小結 --- p.47 / Chapter 第二章 --- 中共建國後的毛澤東繪畫圖像(1949-1966) / Chapter I. --- 中華人民共和國成立初年的毛澤東繒畫圖像發展 --- p.53 / Chapter 1. --- 中華人民共和國的成立194 9 --- p.53 / Chapter a. --- 延安藝術傳統的毛澤東漫畫圖像 --- p.54 / Chapter b. --- 王朝聞的繪畫領袖像指示 --- p.56 / Chapter 2. --- 土地改革 1950-1952 --- p.59 / Chapter a. --- 新年畫創作運動 --- p.59 / Chapter 3. --- 建國初年的整黨整風1950-52 --- p.66 / Chapter a. --- 革命歷史畫創作計劃 --- p.67 / Chapter II. --- 中蘇親密外交下的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.70 / Chapter 1. --- 全盤蘇化1950-55 --- p.70 / Chapter a. --- 蘇聯宣傳畫的影響 --- p.70 / Chapter b. --- 蘇聯油畫的影響 --- p.72 / Chapter c. --- 蘇聯領袖像選材的影響 --- p.74 / Chapter III. --- 中共社會經濟改革下的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.76 / Chapter 1. --- 第一個五年計劃1953-1957 --- p.76 / Chapter a. --- 中國畫的改造 --- p.78 / Chapter b. --- 油畫民族化 --- p.81 / Chapter 2. --- 大躍進及人民公社運動1958-60 --- p.84 / Chapter 3. --- 社會主義教育運動1962-65 --- p.88 / Chapter a. --- 革命歷史繪畫運動 --- p.59 / 小結 --- p.91 / Chapter 第三章 --- 文革時期的毛澤東繪畫圖像(1966-1976) / Chapter I. --- 文化大革命發動的原因 --- p.105 / Chapter 1. --- 文化大革命序幕：海瑞罷官1965 --- p.105 / Chapter 2. --- 毛澤東個人崇拜 --- p.107 / Chapter II. --- 文革時期毛澤東繪畫圖像的發展 --- p.107 / Chapter 1. --- 紅衛兵運動1966 --- p.107 / Chapter a. --- 紅衛兵藝術 --- p.108 / Chapter b. --- 《毛澤東思想照亮安源工人革命運動展覽》 --- p.113 / Chapter c. --- 「紅、光、亮」的藝術手法 --- p.115 / Chapter 2. --- 工農兵領導下的文化大革命1969 --- p.117 / Chapter a. --- 工農兵繪畫運動 --- p.118 / Chapter 3. --- 毛澤東的親密戰友一林彪的叛變1971 --- p.124 / Chapter 4. --- 毛澤東的接班人一華國鋒1976 --- p.125 / 小結 --- p.126 / Chapter 第四章 --- 文革後及改革開放時期的毛澤東繪畫圖像(1976-1997) / Chapter I. --- 文革後的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.132 / Chapter 1. --- 後文革時期的藝術1976-1978 --- p.132 / Chapter a. --- 《熱烈慶祝華國鋒同志任中央主席、中央軍委主席 、熱烈慶祝粉碎四人幫篡黨奪權陰謀的偉大勝 利全國美術作品展覽》 --- p.133 / Chapter b. --- 《慶祝中國人民解放軍建軍50周年美術作品展覽》 --- p.134 / Chapter c. --- 毛主席紀念堂的落成 --- p.136 / Chapter d. --- 《毛主席永遠活在我們心中´ؤ毛主席逝世一周 年美術作品展覽》 --- p.137 / Chapter 2. --- 傷痕藝術1978-1979 --- p.139 / Chapter 3. --- 星星美展1979-1980 --- p.140 / Chapter II. --- 改革開放時期的毛澤東繪畫圖像發展 --- p.141 / Chapter 1. --- 美術新思潮下的毛澤東圖像 --- p.141 / Chapter a. --- 後八九的中國新藝術一政治波普中的毛澤東圖像 --- p.143 / Chapter b. --- 毛澤東藝術圖像的拍賣熱潮 --- p.151 / Chapter 2. --- 宮方持續創作的毛澤東繪畫圖像 --- p.152 / 小結 --- p.156 / 結語 --- p.161 / 附錄一 ：1.中國藝術史中毛澤東書法圖像的社會文化意義 --- p.1-1 / 2.美術展覽中的毛澤東繪畫圖像畫目 --- p.1-6 / 附錄二：參考書目 --- p.2-1 / 附錄三：現代中國藝術史中毛澤東繪畫圖像畫目 --- p.3-1 / 附錄四：圖版 --- p.4-1

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities / Department of Government and Public Administration

滿清末年以來，中國文官節制武官的傳統受到嚴重破壞，地方團練取代政府軍，地方軍隊演變成軍閥主義，國家領導人都是由戰場上勝利的軍人擔任。江澤民時期開始，中共實施世代交替，黨、政、軍高層領導人，轉移給一批技術官僚與軍事專業人員手上，此期間中共黨、政、軍互動關係為本文研究之目的。透過歷史比較，江澤民，是一個幾乎與解放軍毫無淵源的文官，沒有任何服役與作戰的經驗，卻能順利掌握軍隊與國家，本研究證明在中國中斷數百年來「文官統制武官」的歷史傳統，已經恢復。此外，近二十年來，中共軍事現代化成就確實令人刮目相看，與江澤民的外語專長及電機專長有密切關係，這些人格特質也是他令軍隊信服的重要工具。軍政軍民關係上，江澤民堅持民主集中制，排除多黨制，造成軍隊遠離政治紛擾，並與黨充分合作，以獲致預算並做好軍民與軍政關係。在解放軍內部，推動軍事教育的改革，也造就解放軍戰略思維的重大轉變，形成解放軍現代化的動力之ㄧ。然而，敏感性的軍文關係議題，例如一黨領軍，中共有禁忌而且沒有試驗場，台灣的寶貴經驗，很值得大陸參考。 關鍵字：中國共產黨、軍隊現代化、解放軍、文人統制、軍事專業主義 / During the decline of Chin Dynasty, as an unintended result to rely upon localized National Guard defeating upraise event, the Chinese traditional Civilian Control system was replaced by warlord system. Since then, the war hero was the one who advanced to political leadership. Until Jiang Zemin, a civilian with civil college certificate took leadership over the PLA, CCP, and PRC. The purpose of this paper is to exam the civil-military interaction during Jiang Zemin’s journey. Through historical comparison, this paper confirmed that the Chinese traditional Civil-Control system has been revived. Also, Jiang Zemin was the military leadership over PLA modernization. With personal attributes of profound languages and electronic profession, he shaped his position successfully in PLA community. This paper also recognized significant relationship between one-party theory and PLA, and the relationship between PLA　NDU and strategic thinking. Key Words: Chinese Communist Party, Military Modernization, People Liberation Army, Civil-Control and Military Professionalism.

婦女的政治參與是促進性別平等的重要條件。中國的經濟改革帶來了在該國的社會和經濟部門大量的改進。然而，權力，政治文化和經濟的原因與其他社會文化因素相結合的政權的壟斷，導致婦女在中國的政治生活中連續的統治。本研究結合使用的輔助研究方法與合理的數據量涵蓋1977至2013年的婦女在選擇的最高政治機構的存在。該研究發現，女性在整個政治委員會代表性不足，但最糟糕的政府高層官員（精英）和黨的機構。這意味著，在國家層面，政治仍然是男性領域，有超過黨的機構也存在著一個嚴峻的陽剛壟斷。婦女被真正發現，如議會，他們的存在只是作為在中國共產黨的利益高於性別平等或行使平等權利的真正意義上滿足全球重要的還是國內需求的來源（男人之間和女性）在確定他們的社會事務。 / Women’s participation in politics is an important requirement for gender equality. China’s economic reform has brought massive improvements in the social and economic sectors of the country. However, the regime’s monopoly of power, political culture and economic reasons in combination with other socio-cultural factors has resulted to continuous domination of women in China’s political life. This study has employed a secondary research approach in combination with a reasonable data quantity covering 1977 to 2013 on the presence of women in selected top political institutions. The study finds out that women are under-represented across the political board but worst in top government (elite) and party institutions. This means that, at the state level, politics remains a domain for men and there exist a stern masculine monopoly over party institutions also. Where women are genuinely found, such as the parliament, their presence only serves as a source of meeting an important global or domestic requirement in the interest of the Chinese Communist Party than a true sense of gender equality or exercise of an equal right (between men and women) in determining the affairs of their society.

as English abstract / Oppressed by the severe surveillance of the Japanese police in Taiwan, short-lived Taiwanese Communist Party (TCP) (1928-1931) marked a significant step in the Taiwan’s anti-Japanese movement and social thought. The TCP was the first political organization in Taiwan to put forward the slogan of Taiwan’s independence. Following the Comintern’s activation in the East in 1920s, the first contacts between the Taiwan’s leftists and the Comintern representatives took place in early 1920s. Starting from 1927, the Comintern pursued the policy of activation of the communist movement in the colonies and establishment of communist parties in these countries. Established on the Comintern directive in Shanghai with the help of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and being subordinated to the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the TCP was developing quite independently under the leadership of Xie Xuehong and in the close alliance with the Taiwan Cultural Association and the Taiwan Peasants Union, until the end of 1930 when the TCP established a contact with the Far Eastern Bureau (FEB) of the Comintern through the TCP Shanghai representative, Weng Zesheng, who served as liaison with the Comintern. As the result, the Comintern activated its work toward Taiwan, started dispatching emissaries to Taiwan who in the framework of the Comintern’s rhetoric of that time promoted the Party’s reform to eliminate the “opportunistic errors”. The activation of the Party’s work followed, the Union for Reorganization was established. The Comintern did not have chance to adjust the activity of the reformed TCP as within few months after the beginning of actual interaction between the Comintern and the TCP, the TCP was destroyed by arrests. The thesis is devoted to the Comintern’s role in the TCP’s establishment, development, reform, establishment of the Union for Reorganization, the Party’s activation and destruction. The research is based on the TCP files deposited in the former archive of the Comintern. The documents include the correspondence of the representative of the TCP, Weng Zesheng, with the Comintern FEB. The correspondence between Weng Zesheng and the FEB sheds light on the inner-party processes in the TCP, clarifies the essence of the inner-party struggle and reform, and explores the role of personal relations in the inner-party struggle which resulted in the UFR establishment without direct involvement of the Comintern. The available now text of the consultations of Weng Zesheng with the CCP representative Qu Qiubai makes it possible to clarify the CCP’s involvement in the TCP’s development and reform and to conclude as to whose directive it was to commence the struggle against Xie Xuehong. The TCP’s history was short but very intensive. Abandoned by its superior, the JCP, and not having relations with the international communist leadership, the TCP suffered lack of the financial and ideological support, and was left for the mercy of unpredictable fate of the exhausting inner factional struggle, still was able to survive under the “white terror” until the Party’s reorganization in 1931. According to the research results, the TCP inner-party struggles during 1928-1931 were in fact the result of resistance to emigrant party groupings who were attempting to take control over the TCP’s Taiwan based Party organization. Neither the JCP and the CCP, nor the Comintern had a real opportunity to influence the activities of the Taiwan-based communists. Taiwan’s communists overseas used the Comintern’s rhetoric and their contacts with the Comintern and the CCP to promote their agenda in the inner-party struggle. The implementation of the plans of Weng Zesheng and the opponents of Xie Xuehong in Taiwan on the Party’s reform and activation led to the Party’s destruction by the Japanese administration.