本研究檢測會計師事務所總所審計與分析師盈餘預測行為的相關性。以中國大陸2010年至2015年A股上市公司為研究對象，構造分析師盈餘預測行為的回歸模型，並以分析師追蹤人數、分析師盈餘預測準確度及預測分歧度三種特性進行分析。 研究結果顯示，會計師事務所總所審計與分析師追蹤人數、盈餘預測準確度皆呈顯著正相關，與預測分歧度呈顯著負相關。進一步檢測發現：總所的審計公費更高，經會計師事務所總所審計的企業，分析師更願意對其股票給予較高的投資評級。這也顯示會計師事務所總所付出的努力更多，審計品質更好，因而分析師對其會計資訊信賴程度更高，對該公司之追蹤意願更高，盈餘預測誤差與預測分歧度更低，分析師也更願意推薦其股票。 / The primary objective of this thesis is to explore the association between headquarter office auditors and analysts’ earnings behaviors. I use a sample of firm observations from China during 2010-2015. The main findings can be summarized as follows. I find that firms audited by headquarter office auditors have more analysts following compared to those audited by branch office auditors. Secondly, I find that analysts’ earnings forecasts are more accurate and less dispersed for firms audited by headquarter office auditors than firms audited by branch office auditors. Further analysis indicates that the reason for the above results is that headquarter office auditors exert more effort, measured as audit fees, than branch office auditors. Finally, the empirical results indicate that analysts make more favorable recommendations for firms audited by headquarter office auditors than for those audited by branch office auditors. Overall, the findings suggest that headquarter office auditors have better audit quality and in turn result in more analysts following and issuing higher-quality forecasts and favorable recommendations.

本研究主要是探討公司治理結構與資訊透明度之間的關聯性，並進一步檢視公司治理結構與資訊透明度對於權益資金成本及分析師盈餘預測之影響。 在本研究的實證分析結果中，發現企業的資訊透明度確實會受到公司治理結構因素的影響。在股權結構方面，當控制股東所持有的現金流量權比率增加時，由於外部股東的持股相對減少，在監督成本大於效益的情況下，對於公司資訊的需求會降低，因此，管理當局會降低資訊的揭露水準，導致資訊透明度下降。在董事會組成方面，本研究的發現支持財富侵佔假說的論點，當控制股東所掌握的董監事席次比率與現金流量權比率之偏離程度愈大時，會提高控制股東剝奪外部股東財富的動機，使得控制股東傾向利用控制力以影響被投資公司的資訊揭露政策，造成被投資公司的資訊透明度下降。除此之外，研究結果也支持監督假說的預期，即獨立董監事的設置，能有效發揮監督管理當局與制衡控制股東的功能，有助於提昇公司的資訊透明度。 在公司治理(公司治理結構與資訊透明度)對於權益資金成本的影響，本研究的實證結果發現企業之公司治理的良窳確實會影響外部投資人對於企業風險的評價，進而影響投資人所要求的必要報酬率(即企業的權益資金成本)。在公司治理結構方面，當控制股東的持股比率增加時，其與外部股東的目標會趨於一致，發生代理問題的風險會降低，投資人承擔較低的代理風險。因此，控制股東持股比率增加所傳達予投資人是一項有利的訊息，以致於投資人願意降低必要的投資報酬率，使得公司的權益資金成本降低。董監事持股質押的行為對於投資人而言，可能是一項風險的訊號，理性的投資人預期未來可能被董監事剝奪財富的風險，以致於要求的投資報酬率會提高，企業的權益資金成本會增加。 在公司治理(公司治理結構與資訊透明度)對於分析師預測的影響，本研究的實證結果發現企業之公司治理的良窳會影響企業資訊環境的品質，進而影響分析師預測誤差與離散性。在公司治理結構方面，當控制股東所掌握之投票權比率與現金流量權比率之偏離程度愈大時，會加深控制股東與外部股東之間的代理問題，降低財務報導的可靠性，因而導致分析師對於公司未來績效與前景的瞭解程度相對較低，分析師之間對於公司未來的盈餘並無一致的看法，即預測的離散性會增加，但是並不影響預測的誤差；當控制股東所掌握之董監事席次比率與現金流量權比率的偏離程度愈大時，會加深控制股東與外部股東之間的利益不一致，使得控制股東有誘因剝奪外部股東的權益，操縱公司的會計資訊，使得會計資訊的可靠性降低，以致於分析師預測未來盈餘所面臨的不確定性會愈大，預測誤差與離散性也會愈高。 關鍵詞：公司治理結構；資訊透明度；權益資金成本；分析師預測；控制股東；獨立董監事 / This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance structure and transparency, which in turn examines the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on the cost of equity capital and the analyst’s earnings forecasts including forecast error and forecast dispersion. On the relationship between corporate governance structure and transparency, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the transparency is lower with higher cash flow rights owned by controlled stockholder. Second, the transparency is lower with higher divergence between the control rights, which are numbers of directors and supervisors, and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Finally, the transparency is higher with higher percentage of independent directors and supervisors. On the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on cost of equity capital, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the cost of equity capital is lower with higher cash flow rights owned by controlled stockholder. Second, the cost of equity capital is higher with higher percentage of cash flow rights pledged by directors and supervisors. On the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on analyst’s forecasts, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the forecast dispersion is higher with higher divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Second, the forecast error and dispersion are higher with higher divergence between the control rights, which are numbers of directors and supervisors, and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Keywords: Corporate governance structure；Transparency；Cost of equity capital；Analyst’s forecasts；Controlled stockholder；Independent directors and supervisors.

本研究探討我國於2004年發佈之第35號財務會計準則公報，有關『資產減損之會計處理準則』。35號公報要求企業必須評估公司資產之價值，以避免資產價值之虛列，增加資產價值資訊之透明度。本研究就公開資訊之揭露與資訊透明度的觀點，探討與資產減損有關的三項議題：(1)資產減損之股價反應幅度與公司特質及減損資產類別的關聯性；(2)資產減損對分析師盈餘預測特性之影響；(3)資產減損對本益比之影響。本文之研究結果顯示：(1)對於提前於2004年年報適用的樣本與準時於2005年第一季季報適用的樣本，公司特質變數與股價反應幅度的關聯性有不同；而減損資產類別變數與股價反應幅度則未有顯著之關係；(2)相較於同產業且資產總額接近之未宣告認列資產減損的控制組公司，宣告認列資產減損之公司，其分析師盈餘預測之離散性與預測誤差降低；並且公司揭露認列的減損比率愈大，其分析師間盈餘預測的離散性及預測誤差愈小；(3)在與同產業且資產總額接近之未宣告認列資產減損之控制組公司相較下，宣告認列資產減損之公司，其減損認列後的本益比較減損認列前的期間為高，且認列減損之比率愈大者，其認列減損之後的本益比愈高。這些結果顯示35號公報之公布實施，強制規定公司全面檢視資產或重大投資之潛在未實現損失，將有助於增加資產及盈餘資訊之透明度與穩健性，並提高了分析師對公司盈餘預測能力及市場對公司盈餘資訊之評價。 / This paper studies the effects of the implementation of Statement on Financial Accounting Standards (hereafter, SFAS No. 35) in 2004 on “Accounting for Asset Impairments”. SFAS No. 35 requires that the company has to assess its assets to reflect the potential unrealized losses of assets and improve the transparency of the value of assets in financial statements. From the viewpoints of the disclosure on public information and the transparency of financial statements, this study examines the following three issues related to the asset write-offs: (a) how is the association between the magnitude of market reaction to write-off announcements, firms’ characteristic, and the categories of the asset written-off? (b) what is the impact of asset write-offs on analysts’ forecast dispersion and errors? (c) what is the impact of asset write-offs on price/earnings ratios? The results show that the magnitudes of market reaction in the early adoption samples in 2004 financial statements are different from that in the timely adoption samples in first quarter of 2005’s financial statement. However, The magnitudes of market reactions to the write-off are not significantly associated with categories of asset written-off. Furthermore, compared to control sample of non-adopting firms in the same industry and with similar total assets, the adopting firms have less analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion and errors. And, the larger the asset write-offs, the smaller the analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion and errors. Finally, the adopting firms have larger price/earnings ratios after the asset write-offs than control sample. The larger proportions of asset write-offs to total assets, the larger the price/earnings ratios after the firm the asset write-offs. Accordingly, the above evidence indicates that the reports implementations of SFAS No. 35 improves the transparency and conservatism of assets and earnings information, and to increase the valuations of earnings in the stock market in that the adopting firms are required to evaluate the potential unrealized losses on their long-lived assets and investments.

本研究以台灣上市櫃公司及分析師投資報告為研究對象，探討會計師忙碌程度與審計品質之關聯性，以及產生學習或互斥效果。審計品質以裁決性應計項目、財務報表重編及迎合或擊敗分析師預期三種特性進行分析。 研究結果發現，會計師忙碌程度與裁決性應計項目、財務報表重編及迎合或擊敗分析師預期皆呈現顯著負相關。此結果表示，會計師忙碌程度愈高，受查公司管理當局進行盈餘管理之可能性愈低。本研究藉此結果推論，會計師忙碌程度愈高，透過累積查核經驗，促進知識改善，產生正向的學習效果，進而提高審計品質。 / This thesis examines the association between the busyness of auditors at partner level and audit quality and whether the association stems from learning effect or crowding-out effect, by using the listed firms’ data and the analysts’ reports in Taiwan. I use the following three measures of audit quality to examine my hypotheses: discretionary accruals, financial restatement, and meet or beat analyst forecast. The empirical results indicate that firms experience lower discretionary accruals, are less likely to restate financial statements and have lower likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ expectations when auditors are busier. The results are consistent with the notion that auditor busyness is positively related to audit quality. Taken together, the findings provide strong evidence in favor for learning effect rather than crowding-out effect of auditor busyness. Further analyses reveal that the results remain unchanged, regardless of lead auditor busyness or concurring auditor busyness.