研究顯示，家族企業之數量與經濟影響力在全球企業環境中迅速成長並占有一席之地，成為具競爭力的存在，本研究以我國2001至2008年的上市（櫃）公司為樣本，探討財務分析師針對家族與非家族企業在預測行為上之差異，本研究之迴歸模型以分析師預測誤差、追蹤意願及預測離散程度三種特性分析財務分析師的預測行為，研究顯示相較於非家族企業，分析師對家族企業之預測意願較低，追蹤數量明顯較少，在預測結果上，家族企業會使分析師的預測產生較大的誤差，且各分析師間預測結果的差異程度也較大，本研究藉此結果推論家族企業中控制股東與其他股東代理問題的存在，及家族成員擔任管理者或董事等重要職位導致董事會喪失監督職能，在資訊揭露的數量與品質上表現較差。 / Prior research shows that family firms have grown rapidly and played an important role in the global corporate environment. This study examines the relation between family firms and financial analysts’ earnings forecast behaviors in Taiwan from year 2001 to 2008. I use several analysts forecast attributes: forecasts error, number of analysts following, and forecast dispersion. The results indicate that family firms generally have less analysts following, greater analysts’ forecast errors and greater forecast dispersion. These findings support the argument that the existence of conflict between majority and minority shareholders and that family members serving as managers or members of the board may weaken the disclosure of the quantity and quality of firm-specific information.

財務預測相較於歷史性財務報表而言，其決策之攸關性較大。我國自民國80年5月起開始實施強制性財務報表迄今，已成為資本市場中相當重要的訊息，惟隨著我國證券市場規模逐步擴大，公司面臨之經濟環境日趨複雜，為符合國際作法及實務需要，故行政院金融監督管理委員會證券期貨局於93年12月9日依據證券交易法第三十六條之一，發布金管證六字第930005938號函，修正財務預測制度改採自願公開方式（並得以簡式或完整式方法擇一為之），並參考國外有關預測性資訊公開之相關規定及實務運作方式，配合相關配套措施，以增進資本市場效率及決策品質。 　　宣告取消財務預測強制公開揭露制度後，實證結果顯示：(1)對股價會產生一負向的效果，有顯著的負向異常報酬產生，且消息提前反應於市場上；在交易量方面，有顯著異常增加的情形發生。(2)對資訊特性不同分組採單變量分析，結果顯示公司規模及分析師人數可解釋宣告效果大小，兩組之間均達顯著水準。(3)公司規模越大時，股價反應越小，顯示公司規模與宣告異常報酬率間呈負向關係，亦即規模效果存在；但交易量反應越大。(4)分析師人數越多時，股價反應越小；但交易量反應越大，且較少分析師人數公司來得顯著。 / Financial forcast is more relevant than historical financial statements. Our country began to implement the mandatory financial forcast since May, 1991, has already become a very important information in the capital market. While the economic environment becoming complicated, in order to meet international practices, so on December 9, 1993, change the firm can dicide disclosure their financial forcast by themselves, in order to promote the efficiency of capital market and decision quality. The empirical results show that：(1) For stock price, it will produce negative effect; on the other hand, trading volume is significant increaseing. (2) For groups with different level of information characteristics, the results show that firm size and the number of ananlysts can explain that declaring effect. (3) When the size of firm is larger, the stock price is smaller; but the trading volume is larger. (4) The number of analysts is larger, the response of stock price is smaller; but the trading volume is larger in response.

近年來國內外許多企業層出不窮的發生管理階層舞弊案，使得投資人以及債權人對於企業公開發佈財務資訊之信心大受影響，公司若能開誠佈公告知利害關係人其相關之資訊，不僅能提升公司之資訊透明度，亦能重拾投資人的信心，故公司資訊透明度為廣受重視之議題。分析師擁有專業知識分析公司的財務報表且能提供額外的資訊給投資大眾，並扮演了公司重要的外部監督機制。 本研究旨在探討公司資訊透明度、分析師跟隨與公司績效之關聯性。採用台灣證券暨期貨發展基金會所公布的資訊揭露評鑑系統結果作為資訊透明度的替代變數，來探討當公司資訊透明度揭露程度較低時，分析師跟隨人數愈多是否愈能增加公司之績效。此外，本研究採用標準普爾之評等分數作為穩健性測試，來驗證結果是否相ㄧ致。研究結果顯示：公司資訊透明度較佳的公司相較於揭露程度較差之公司，其績效愈高。公司績效愈好，分析師跟隨人數愈多。資訊透明度揭露程度較差的公司，分析師的跟隨人數會愈少。無論公司資訊透明度好或壞時，分析師跟隨人數愈多，均能增加公司之績效，且資訊透明度揭露程度較差的公司相較於資訊透明度揭露程度較好的公司，分析師跟隨人數愈多，愈能增加公司之績效。穩健性測試之結果亦有相ㄧ致的發現。 / In recent years there were lots of frauds by managers in domestic and international enterprises, causing investors and creditors lose confidence on financial reporting. It is believed that if the company management can frankly and earnestly disclose related information to the stakeholders, the company’s transparency and thus the investors’ trust will be promoted. Corporate information transparency has become an important issue. Analysts have professional skills to analysis financial statements and disclose additional information to investors and also play an important role in supervising corporation’s operating condition. The purpose of this study is to discuss the association among corporate information transparency, analysts following and firms performance. The research uses the evaluated result of The Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking System as the disclosure transparency proxy variable to examine whether the companies with lower disclosure level have higher firms performance if more analysts follow these enterprises. In addition, this paper uses Standard and Poor’s rating scores to do robust check. The empirical results indicate follows: 1.The higher information disclosure level companies have higher firms performance than the lower information disclosure level companies. 2.Enterprises with better firm performance have a larger analyst following. 3.Analysts are less likely to follow firms with lower corporate information transparency. 4.Corporate information transparency plays an important role in analysts’ willingness to follow firms and that increased analyst following is associated with higher firm performance, particularly for firms with lower corporate information transparency. 5.The result of robust check reaches a consistent conclusion.

歷經國內外多起知名企業的財務弊案後，各國政府及投資人開始關注公司的資訊透明度，企業也意識到資訊透明度對於企業永續經營的重要性，因此，本研究主要探討資訊透明度對於企業價值之影響。研究貢獻在於以具有專業和分析能力之分析師預測行為作為判斷企業資訊透明度之依據，進而探究其與企業價值之關聯性。本研究以2008年到2013年台灣上市(櫃)公司為樣本，以企業價值(Tobin’s Q)為應變數，資訊透明度相關之變數(分析師追蹤意願、分析師盈餘預測偏誤與分析師盈餘預測離散性)為主要解釋變數，在控制公司成長面、獲利面、風險面與公司規模因素，並固定產業和年份，利用追蹤資料迴歸模型(panel regression)來進行分析。 實證結果分為兩部分，（1）代表資訊透明度之變數－分析師預測意願、分析師預測精準度及分析師預測離散性與企業價值具有顯著正向關係。另利用前述之結果，本研究自行建立一個衡量企業透明度的模型，以整合性資訊探討資訊透明度對於企業價值的影響，實證結果顯示（2）資訊透明度與企業價值間確實具有顯著正向關係，結果支持良好的資訊透明度，有助於公司治理，長期間更能夠提升企業價值與永續經營。此外，本研究以整合資訊衡量企業資訊透明度，相較於單一資訊更為完善，也提供企業利害關係人及一般大眾不同面相去了解企業的資訊透明度，進而保護其權益。 / Since the occurrences of financial scandal, issues surrounding corporate governance and information disclosure have been widely discussed in these few years. Not only have government and investors started paying more attention on information transparency, but more and more firms have noticed that well corporate governance could help its sustainable development. The main purpose of this study is to examine the influences of information transparency on corporate value. Based on the samples of Taiwan listed firms for the period from 2009 to 2013, this study employs panel regression model with Corporate value (Tobin’s Q) as the dependent variable against various combinations of explanatory variables (analysts following, analysts’ earnings forecast bias and analysts’ earnings forecast derivation). The results of this research reveal that (1) the firms with high corporate value significantly have more analysts following, less analyst's earning forecast error and the greater forecast derivation. And by using an integrated model to do further analysis, the evidence shows that (2) higher information transparency could improve the corporate governance, gain more corporate value and benefit sustainable development in the long term. What’s more, instead of unitary source, this research measures corporate information transparency via integrated sources to ensure credibility, and provides various angles for corporate stakeholders and the general public to learn further more about corporate information transparency and be able to protect their rights.

本研究旨在探討投資人情緒是否影響到分析師的報導決策，以及分析師發佈預測和推薦時是否會注意到投資人情緒，亦即當投資人情緒較樂觀時，分析師是否會發佈較長期的預測以及較有利的股票推薦。本文以中央大學台灣經濟研究中心所編制之消費者信心指數作為投資人情緒的替代變數。研究結果與本文預期相符，當投資人情緒較高昂時，分析師會發佈較長期之盈餘預測以及較有利之推薦評等；同時也發現當投資人情緒上升，分析師之推薦評等亦向上修正。顯示分析師雖為專精且較為理性之投資人，然其行為仍受到消費者信心所影響。 / This study investigates the relation between investor sentiment and analysts' coverage decisions. Secondly, we also examine whether analysts who pay attention to investor sentiment issue longer-horizon earnings forecasts and more favorable stock recommendations during high-sentiment periods. We use the Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) survey from the National Central University to measure sentiment. We find that analysts tend to issue longer-horizon earnings forecasts and favorable stock recommendations when investor sentiment is more optimistic. Moreover, analysts tend to revise upward their stock recommendations during investor sentiment raise period. Taken together, these findings suggest that analysts are affected by investor sentiment even though they are more rational investors.

法人說明會是公司傳遞內部訊息給外部使用者方法之一，透過法人說明會宣佈財務及非財務資訊，藉以消弭因資訊不對稱所產生之代理問題，亦為分析師作出盈餘預測參考依據之一。在半導體供應鏈中，其上、下游產業間關聯緊密，資訊具有垂直移轉效果，因此，本研究欲探討半導體供應鏈中，下游公司分析師參考上游關聯公司法人說明會資訊並作出盈餘預測調整之程度。 本研究針對國內2005年至2011年半導體上市、櫃公司，進行法人說明會資訊與分析師盈餘預測修正之關聯性。實證結果發現，下游公司財務分析師會參考上游關聯公司召開法人說明會所宣佈之預測財務及非財務資料，並修正對公司之盈餘預測；且供應鏈中，上、下游關係越遠及國籍為外國之分析師，對上游關聯公司法人說明會資訊依賴程度越高，作出的盈餘預測調整幅度越大。

研究使用2000~2016年台灣證券交易所1887家公司，包含所有上下市櫃分析師預測公司，分析師預測資料除研究常用之盈餘預測外，亦將營收、毛利與毛利率等預測項目納入研究，此外加入額外因子，如:規模因子、淨值市價比因子、系統性風險因子、非流動性因子等進行多因子研究，使用Fama and French(1992)之Fama Macbeth迴歸模型，進行時間序列與橫斷面迴歸測驗，檢驗各因子之有效性，最終依據各績效評估因子決定出最適之投資組合，並附上各因子組合之權益曲線與績效。 實證結果發現，在台灣分析師樣本公司中，分析師歧異度、短期動能與長期動能三因子的影響較為顯著，分析師預期歧異度較高的公司未來預期報酬相對低於分析師預期歧異度較低的公司，而短期動能與長期動能較強的公司相較於短期動能與長期動能較弱的公司，擁有較高之未來預期報酬，以此三因子構建之投資組合，在2000~2016年間夏普值達0.78；而Fama and French使用的三因子在此樣本空間解釋力並不顯著，非流動性因子亦不顯著。 / This paper used the 1887 companies in Taiwan from 2000 to 2016, including all the analysts forecasting listed and delisted companies in either exchange market or over-the-counter market. The data of analyst’s prediction not only used the earnings forecast, but also revenue, gross profit and gross profit forecast in this research. In addition, other factors such as size factor, B/M factor, systemic risk factor, non-liquidity factor were used in this study. This paper used the Fama Macbeth regression model, which contains both time series and cross section Regression test, test the effectiveness of each factor, and ultimately based on the performance factor to determine the optimal portfolio, and finally obtain the equity curve and performance of the combination with various factors. The empirical results show that the analyst's earning dispersion, short-term momentum and long-term momentum three factors are more significant in the analyst forecasting companies in Taiwan. Companies with higher degree of earning prediction dispersion have relatively lower return in the future, and companies with higher short-term momentum and long-term momentum have a higher expected return. Build a portfolio with the three factor in 2000~2016 could obtain 0.88 Sharpe ratio! Neither Fama and French three factors nor non-liquidity factor in this sample space is significant.

本研究以1980年至2015年美國及加拿大上市公司為研究對象，探討具有會計專長之執行長（CEO）與外界反應的關係。在探討外界反應之前，本文先檢視具有會計專長之CEO對於盈餘品質的影響，透過此結果，推論專業人士（包含會計師與分析師）與市場投資人之反應。本研究預期，當CEO具有會計專長時，會使盈餘品質降低，故審計風險隨之提高，導致審計公費增加，且分析師的追隨意願降低，同時也將影響市場投資人的反應。 研究結果發現，具會計專長CEO與盈餘管理、審計公費、公司累積異常報酬呈現顯著正相關，與分析師追隨數則為顯著負相關，顯示當CEO具有會計專長時，因有盈餘操控的情況，所以審計公費提高、分析師追隨數減少；但市場投資人或許無法體認盈餘操控的事實，故仍相信具有會計專長之CEO，有可能為公司帶來正面的影響。 / This study investigates the relationship between CEOs with accounting expertise and external reactions of investors, auditors and analysts. The sample firms used in this study are all the stock-listed companies in America and Canada during 1980-2015. Before examining such external reactions, this paper explores the association between CEOs with accounting expertise and earnings quality, which help us to obtain an explanation why auditors, analysts and investors have such reactions. The empirical results show that CEOs with accounting expertise manage earnings more aggressively than CEOs without such expertise. As a consequence, the firms with such CEOs will be charged higher audit fees and have less analyst following. However, investors might not recognize this fact; they still believe that CEOs with accounting expertise will have a positive influence on firms. Our findings could offer a reference for a company looking for a CEO that could bring accounting quality.

過去國內文獻大致指出投資人難以依靠券商的投資建議獲利，此與大部份國外文獻的發現相異。本文參考Barber et al. (2001)，建構一個適用於台灣股票市場的研究方法，再以四因子模型做實證。本文以2007年3月至2015年12月，共48987筆卷商個股報告為研究樣本，來探討券商報告的投資建議能否獲利。本文研究結果發現，台灣的券商報告擁有額外的資訊價值，此與Barber et al. (2001)及其他國外文獻大致相同。 本研究依券商的推薦強度建構四個投資組合。發現推薦程度高的投資組合平均月報酬為正，且高於大盤；而推薦程度低的投資組合平均月報酬顯著低於大盤，且擁有顯著的負超額報酬。本文進一步建構買進賣出策略，即買進推薦股票高的投資組合並賣出推薦程度低的投資組合，發現此策略報酬顯著高於零及大盤，且存在顯著的正超額報酬。另外在台股多頭期間，本研究的實證結果更加顯著，推薦程度高的投資組合平均月報酬增加至顯著高於大盤，且超額報酬顯著為正；推薦程度低的投資組合之大盤調整報酬及負超額報酬的顯著程度提高；而買進賣出策略獲得超額報酬的顯著程度也大幅提高。 / Past Taiwanese literatures generally indicated that it is difficult to obtain profit from Taiwanese stock recommendations of brokerage, which is different from most of foreign literatures. Referring to Barber et al. (2001), we improve and build a research methodology applied to Taiwanese stock market, conducting empirical analysis with four-factor model. From March 2007 to December 2015, we use total 48987 brokers’ stock recommendations as sample to investigate whether inventors could earn profit from the broker recommendations. Our empirical results show that Taiwanese broker reports hold additional information, which is consistent with Barber et al. (2001) and most of foreign literatures. According to the strength of recommendation, we construct four portfolios and find that the return of the most favorable portfolio is higher than market, while the return of the least favorable portfolio is significantly smaller than market and holds significantly negative access return. We further construct a long-short strategy, which buys the most favorable portfolios and shorts the least favorable portfolios. The return of this strategy is significantly higher than market, and excess return is significantly positive. During Taiwanese bull market, the significance of our empirical result improves. The significance level of market-adjusted return and access return for both the most favorable and least favorable portfolio is higher. In addition, the significance level of excess return for long-short strategy also greatly improves.

本論文主要是應用過去探討盈餘反應係數（ERC）的研究模型，驗證公司與分析師預測值間正負預測誤差的方向性與幅度對於市場反應之影響；並且在公司持續一致存在正/負向誤差的情況之下，探討市場對於此種趨勢的反應，並進一步以實證結果分析影響經理人員進行盈餘管理的可能原因。主要的研究問題有三： (1)當公司超出分析師預測時，市場獎勵公司的程度，是否更甚於當公司未達分析師預測時，市場懲罰公司的程度? (2)在控制未預期盈餘（unexpected earnings）的幅度之下，當公司超出分析師預測時，市場獎勵公司的程度，是否更甚於當公司未達分析師預測時，市場懲罰公司的程度? (3)當公司存在持續一致報導正/負向預測誤差趨勢的情況下，市場對於公司的此種趨勢給與的獎勵或懲罰的性質及程度為何? 本研究係以在台灣證券市場上市公司為研究對象，研究期間為民國77年至民國90年共計14年。研究方法分別使用Pooled regression與Annual regression兩種迴歸模式分別對樣本觀察值進行複迴歸。共計三個迴歸模型，六個迴歸結果。 本研究結果如下： 一、在是否超過分析師預測方面，當公司超過分析師預測時所得到的市場獎勵程度，並不一定大於當公司未能達到分析師預測時所得到市場懲罰的程度。因此就此部分之結論而言，公司為了得到市場獎勵而從事盈餘管理與公司為了逃避市場懲罰因素而從事盈餘管理，兩種行為之動機程度並無明顯差別。 二、倘若在控制未預期盈餘的幅度的情況之下，當公司超過分析師預測時所得到的市場獎勵程度，則是顯著的大於當公司未能達到分析師預測時所得到市場懲罰的程度。因此就本研究此部分之結論而言，公司為了得到市場獎勵的盈餘管理動機程度甚於避免受到市場懲罰之盈餘管理動機程度。 三、在是否存在持續一致報導正/負向預測誤差趨勢方面，可區分為兩部分說明： （1）對於有持續一致未達分析師預測趨勢的公司而言： 持續一致未達的未預期盈餘部分（系統因子），市場會對該系統化部分之行為失去信心而給予其懲罰。 然而，非一致性未達的未預期盈餘部分（非系統因子），相較於其他沒有持續一致未達分析師預測趨勢之公司，市場則不一定會對該部分之行為失去信心而給予其超額懲罰。意即因非系統未達之部分所得到的市場懲罰，並不一定大於沒有持續一致未達分析師預測趨勢之公司。 （2）對於有持續一致超出分析師預測之趨勢的公司而言： 持續一致超出的未預期盈餘部分（系統因子），市場不一定會將該系統化部分之行為視為經理人員從事盈餘管理之結果而給予懲罰。 然而，非一致性超出的未預期盈餘部分（非系統因子），相較於其他未能持續一致超出分析師預測之公司，市場則亦不一定予以實質肯定並給予其超額獎勵。意即因非系統超出之部分所得到的市場獎勵，並不一定大於未能持續一致超出分析師預測的公司。 / This study investigates whether the market rewards（penalizes）firms for beating（missing）analysts’ earnings forecasts. Specifically, we examine the market response to positive and negative forecast errors. In addition, we examine whether the sensitivity of stock prices to positive or negative forecast errors is affected by the firms’ history of consistently beating or missing analysts’ forecasts. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on three issues: (1) is there a differential market response to the level of unexpected earnings for firms that beat analysts’ forecasts versus those that do not? (2) does the market respond to whether firms beat or miss analysts’ forecasts independent of the magnitude of the forecast error? (3) whether the market gives rewards or penalties for firms with a historical tendency to report positive / negative forecast errors? The results indicate that the earnings multiple applied to positive unexpected earnings is not significantly greater than for negative unexpected earnings. However, we find that after controlling for the magnitude of the forecast error, the market penalty for missing forecasts is significantly greater in absolute terms than the response to beating forecasts. Finally we find that for the firms that consistently beat analysts’ forecasts, the market doesn’t give penalties to the systematic component of the forecast error, and doesn’t give excess rewards to the unsystematic component. But for the firms that consistently miss analysts’ forecasts, the market gives penalties to the systematic component of the forecast error, and doesn’t give excess penalties to the unsystematic component.