本論文共一冊，共約四萬字∼五萬字，可分為六章節。 第一章是緒論；第一節是研究動機與目的，第二節是研究方法與內容，第三節是寡占 市場的基本特徵。 第二章探討天真假定下的古典寡占模型，包括柯爾諾模型、柏爾淳模型、艾吉渥滋模 型、郝德凌模型。 第三章探討廠商相互依存性的古典寡占模模，包括秦伯霖模型、史達克堡模型、史威 吉模型。 第四章探討寡占廠商為了減少因相互依存性而產生不確性，以增加彼此間的利潤，包 括卡特爾模型、成本優勢之價格領導模型、規模優勢之價格領導模型。 第五章探討寡占理論的其它分析法，包括最大銷售額模型、成本加成定價理論、遏阻 性定價理論、市場佔有率模型。 第六章結論。

撰寫本文的目的在於分析台灣水泥工業經營的現況，並探索其面臨的問題。全文計分七章，各章要點簡述如次: 第一章: 證明問題，確定研究目的及進行方法。 第二章: 介紹台灣水泥工業的一般概況，包括其發展沿革，原料之供應及目前各水泥公司產能等。 第三章: 說明水泥生產及銷售概況，並討論銷售通路現狀及形成原因。 第四章: 分析水泥銷貨成本之結構比例，並選擇其中主要項目如石灰石、燃料、貨物稅、運驗及財務融通等問題深入探討。 第五章: 根據寡占市場產品定價的基本理論研究台灣民用水泥價格之訂定，復將中、日、韓三國民用水泥價格加以比較，並檢討影響外銷水泥價格的因素。 第六章: 以各種不同尺度分析水泥工業的財務狀況，衡量某經營效能，並評估某經濟效益。 第七章: 分述台灣水泥工業之回顧與前瞻。

中游廠商面臨產業結構屬於獨寡占的上游廠商，兩者之間由於中游的經濟規模小於上游形成不對稱組織交易，再者中游廠商與上游存在依賴關係，前者需要後者提供原物料或技術服務以滿足下游顧客需求。本研究利用策略行銷成本架構(4C analysis)，並針對國內各大產業之中介廠商為研究對象，包含電機機械通路產業、半導體設計製造業以及旅遊資訊服務業等產業進行深度訪談。此獨寡占上游─中游─下游情境中，分別解釋產業鏈中的從屬關係。 首先是權力處於相對弱勢的中游廠商與上游的交易關係：中游廠商看似被上游供應商套牢陷入的狀況，但除了存在專屬陷入成本外，影響該交易關係尚存在外顯單位效益成本以及道德危機成本。接著，中游廠商為了與上游持續交易的目的下，採取的策略成本選擇為降低外顯單位效益成本，以及提高上游廠商對於中游的專屬陷入成本以達到與上游持續交易的目的，另一方面，順應此不利環境下，中游廠商滿足下游需求的做法有降低外顯單位效益成本、資訊搜尋成本、道德危機成本以及提高專屬陷入成本的方式。最後一部分為中游為減少對上游廠商的依賴，對於上游或下游投資抵銷性資產，使中游廠商提高本身的議價能力，對於上游廠商的依賴程度獲得減緩。 / In comparison to monopoly or oligopoly up-stream suppliers, mid-stream firms has smaller scale in terms of revenue, the transaction between the two can be described as asymmetric interorganizational relationship. Besides, the mid-stream firms depend on its supplier for key material or services, in order to fulfill the demand of their down-stream customers. This study focus on the monopoly/oligopoly upstream supplier to mid-stream firms to down-stream customer chain, interviewing mid-stream firms in different industries including dealer in electrical machinery industry, semi-conductor industry and tour agent and delve into the relationships between these characters by 4C analysis structure. First of all, the study took a closer look at the relationship between the mid-stream firms and their suppliers; the formers have an inferior bargaining power position and seemed being locked up by the latters, as known as cost of asset-specificity. But we also found that over cost per utility and cost of moral hazard would also be considered by the mid-stream firms. The mid-streams took some actions in order to assure the continuous cooperation with the suppliers, and under this circumspect they will also make efforts to save down-stream customers. We found that the 4C analysis can explain the strategies taken by those mid-stream firms. Finally, the mid-streams would like to reduce the control of the up-streams, so they would put resources in establishing offsetting investments to accumulate their bargaining power to the suppliers, to mitigate the dependence.

近期關於組織目標的研究指出，傳統以營利為目的的公司，隨著政府與大眾對於社會議題的日益關注而開始履行企業社會責任；另一方面，傳統以解決社會問題為目的的非營利組織，為了處理資金問題而開始從事營利行為。因為營利與非營利組織的分界開始模糊，各種混合型態的組織跟著出現，構成了一個組織目標的光譜。然而，這個概念上的目標光譜並不容易呈現，目前針對社會價值的創造(Social Value Creation，簡稱SVC)在量化上的分析成果亦有限。本研究從產業經濟學的混合寡占理論出發，提出一個「SVC投資市場」以衡量組織對於社會價值的重視程度，並使用觀察到的資料描繪出SVC投資市場中的需求。再透過組織目標函數的設定以及在市場中競爭的結果，推估組織考量社會價值的比重，找出組織在目標光譜中的位置。本研究針對台灣上市公司的企業社會責任報告書資料以及財報資料進行分析後發現，目前台灣上市公司的消費者並不太重視公司的SVC活動。政府若欲提升公司對於SVC的重視程度，可以嘗試藉由改變消費者的購買決策來影響公司的目標決策。

企業の新技術導入インセンティブと市場構造の関係を分析し、政府が行うべき経済政策を示す。分析には寡占市場モデルを使い、競争、新技術の導入費用、費用関数の違い、リーダー企業の存在が与える影響を分析している。また、3章では新技術の戦略的運用方法についての分析を行う。寡占市場では、政府は新技術導入に対して補助金または課税政策を行い、企業の新技術導入を促す、あるいは抑制することが望ましい。 / This paper analyzes the relationship between the incentive for the new technology adoption and the market structure and shows the optimal policy for the new technology adoption by using oligopoly models. The competitivenesss among firms, fixed cost for new technology adoption, the form of cost function and the existence of leader firm affect the incentive for new technology adoption and optimal policy. The concluding chapter analyzes the optimal strategic uses of new technology which include licensing to the other firm in the new market or entry to the new market or both of them. / 博士(経済学) / Doctor of Economics / 同志社大学 / Doshisha University

本論文為關於營利與非營利機構之營運管理策略之兩篇理論性質的文章。 第一篇文章旨在探討營利機構之實質盈餘管理策略。本研究檢驗在產品市場競爭下，公司如何透過實質盈餘管理策略來滿足盈餘目標之要求以及公司之實質盈餘管理動機會如何影響市場競爭對手之行為。本文考慮一個兩期非合作之R&D競爭寡占模型。本文假設存在資訊不對稱；具有私人資訊的廠商為追求獲利最大亦或追求盈餘目標達成兩種類型。本文透過完美貝氏均衡 (perfect Bayesian equilibrium) 解出分離均衡 (separating equilibrium) 與混和均衡 (hybrid equilibrium)。 本研究指出追求獲利最大類型之廠商可以藉由影響競爭對手之猜測來進一步左右追求盈餘目標達成類型之目標達成之可能性。在分離均衡中，當外在成本衝擊未超過預期時，追求獲利最大類型之廠商無誘因藉由R&D 投資水準之提升來規避負向成本衝擊以影響市場對手猜測並且進一步提升其產品市場競爭力。因此，追求盈餘目標達成類型之盈餘目標無法達成。 在混和均衡中，當外在成本衝擊超過預期時，追求獲利最大類型之廠商有誘因採取混合策略以誤導市場對手之猜測;該類型之廠商可以藉由部分模仿盈餘目標達成類型之R&D 投資策略以混淆競爭對手之信念並且提升其產品產出、獲利水準。在此，追求盈餘目標達成類型之盈餘目標能夠達成。本研究之結果有別於傳統R&D盈餘管理實證文獻中，公司內部當局有誘因透過R&D支出的減少用以滿足公司短期之盈餘目標 (Barber et. al., 1991; Bushee, 1998; Graham, 2005) 。本研究指出公司可以藉由R&D 投資水準之提升，以創造“cookie jar” 並且有助於公司獲利提升與盈餘目標之達成。此外，本研究與盈餘奇異現象之實證研究 (earnings kinky) 結論一致: 公司可以藉由盈餘管理策略來達成盈餘目標，但是盈餘目標之達成不盡然是透過盈餘管理策略 (Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003)。 第二篇文章旨在探討非營利機構提供非獲利性質服務之策略性之影響。本研究指出非獲利性質服務之提供不僅有助於非營利機構於獲利性質服務之競爭優勢的提升，相對於營利機構。當所有權與經營權分離時，若市場需求彈性為不具彈性時，非獲利性質服務之提供對非營利機構之經理人而言，可以做為一個策略工具藉以促使該機構之所有人提供一個於獲利部分過分補償之薪酬水準。此外，隨著非獲利性質服務之外生價格的提升，當非營利性質服務之外生價格的提升對於非營利機構之所有人與經理人利益衝突影響之間接效果大於對獲利性質服務價格影響之直接效果時，非營利機構之所有人仍然會提供一個獲利部分過分補償之薪酬水準。這會有助於非營利機構於獲利性質服務之競爭優勢的提升。 / This dissertation consists of two theoretical studies on the operation strategies of for-profit and non-profit firms. Chapter 1 addresses how firms use real earnings management to meet or beat their earnings targets, and how this influences sequential product market competition. We study this issue in a two-period non-cooperative R&D competition with one-sided asymmetric information in which the informed firm could be either the maximizing type or the target-meeting type (or target-beating). We show that the maximizing type of the informed firm’s R&D investment level could influence rival firm’s conjecture about the informed firm’s type which in term affects the success of meeting or beating the target for the target-meeting type of the informed firm. We find that the privately informed firm can increase its R&D investment in the first period to meet or beat the earnings target. This can help the firm increase profits in a sequential product market competition. More precisely, once the cost uncertainty realized is realized to exceed expectations, the maximizing type of the informed firm could hide its identity by adopting a mixed strategy and setting its R&D investment and output level higher than in the separating equilibrium. Contrary to popular claims that meeting or beating short earnings targets induces an R&D investment reduction (Barber et. al., 1991; Bushee, 1998; Graham, 2005), we show that R&D overinvestment can give an opportunity to create some reserves, i.e., a cookie jar, to be used later to earn a higher profit and reach later targets. Our result is also supporting the observation of firms meeting or beating the earnings target, but not necessarily using earnings management (Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003). Chapter 2 shows that the provision of not-for profit service would not only give not-for-profit organizations a competitive advantage over for-profit organizations. Under the separation of control and ownership, we illustrate that once market demand is inelastic, the provision of not-for-profit service serves as a strategic device for the manager of a not-for-profit organization and thus induces the owner of a not-for-profit organization to overcompensate his manager regarding the margin of profit. Moreover, as the regulated price of not-for-profit service increases, a not-for-profit organization could still over-compensate his manager in regard to profit, when the indirect effect on increasing preference difference between the owner and manager of the not-for-profit organization dominates the direct effect on market price. Thus, a not-for-profit organization could charge more in for-profit service.

本論文主要是在agent-based計算經濟體系下，利用Holland(1975)所提的遺傳演算法(genetic algorithms)作為計算工具，分別探討連鎖店賽局及寡占市場廠商價格策略的生態演化。 在連鎖店賽局的研究中，藉由agent-based計算經濟分析掠奪性定價的特性，並進一步探討參賽者價格策略的共演化(co-evolutionary)特性，及多元均衡賽局中均衡移轉的動態過程。針對賽局中不同的不確定性進行模擬，結果顯示廠商長期總合行為是否穩定，和賽局中的不確定程度有相當的關聯。另外，弱獨占者和潛在競爭者的價格策略存在著共演化特性。在此演化賽局中，Nash均衡雖非穩定均衡解，但卻最常浮現在長期總合行為中。因此，Nsah均衡對agent-based演化賽局的結果而言，相當具有參考價值。在特定的不確定程度下，長期總合行為似乎只在某些特定的Nash均衡中徘徊。這些移轉途徑並不具有對稱性，甚至移轉速度也非對稱。本研究所呈現的演化結果跳脫一般對均衡的觀念，展現出傳統理論所無法預知的共演化特性，並呈現出非對稱的吸引環。 此外，同樣在Agent-based計算經濟下探討寡占市場廠商策略生態。本研究首先闡明N參賽者囚犯兩難重複賽局和N廠商寡占賽局之間的異同，經由寡占賽局廠商償付矩陣(payoff matrix)的狀態相依馬可夫移轉矩陣( state-dependent Markov transition matrix)性質，說明N廠商寡占賽局和N參賽者囚犯兩難重複賽局的差異。其次，透過三家廠商寡占賽局的模擬實驗，以遺傳演算法建構參賽廠商的適應性行為，分別以寡占市場生態上的表現型(phenotypes)和基因型(genotype)進行分析。20次模擬結果所呈現的最終市場狀態相當分歧，有形成吸引環的三廠商寡占市場、有收斂到價格戰的三廠商寡占市場。另外也成功的模擬出三廠商寡占市場演化至雙佔市場、甚或獨占市場的過程。但是，在眾多模擬中並沒有發現持續的勾結定價狀態，反而掠奪性價格是較主要的價格策略。這些結果相對於實際經濟社會中的寡占市場，給予一個活潑生動的範例。 / Recently, genetic algorithms have been extensively applied to modeling evolution game in agent-based computational economic.　While these applications advance our understanding of evolution game, they have generated some new phenomena that have not been well treated in conventional game theory. In the first topic, we shall systemize the study of one of these new phenomena, namely, coevolutionary instability. We exemplify the basic properties of coevolutionary instability by the chain store game, which is the game frequently used to study the role of reputation effects in economics.　In addition, we point out that, while, due to uncertainty effects, Nash equilibria can no longer be stable, and they can still help us predict the dynamic process of the game.　In particular, we can see that the dynamic process of the game is well captured by a few Nash equilibria and the transition among them.　A careful study can uncover several interesting patterns and we show the impact of uncertainty on these patterns. In the second topic, the relation between the N-person IPD game and the N-person oligopoly game is rigorously addressed.　Our analytical framework shows that due to the path-dependence of the payoff matrix of the oligopoly game, the two games in general are not close in spirit.　We then further explore the significance of the path-dependence property to the rich ecology of oligopoly from an evolutionary perspective.　More precisely, we simulated the evolution of a 3-person oligopoly game, and showed that the rich ecology of oligopoly can be exhibited by modeling the adaptive behavior of oligopolists with genetic algorithms.　The emergent behavior of oligopolists are presented and analyzed.　We indicate how the path-dependence nature may shed light on the phenotypes and genotypes coming into existence.