台灣金融產業的經營環境在存放利差快速縮小、銀行業者獲利板塊(存放匯款收入→交易手續費收入→財富管理手續費收入)挪移下，對外尋求可開發市場是台灣金融業者向來積極努力拓展，而“西進策略”更是台灣的銀行業者寄予厚望且持續進行中的，然兩岸的法規限制與敏感的政治議題，使得這條西進的道路佈滿荊棘，走起來特別地艱辛坎坷；本研究係透過兩岸財富管理發展歷程的檢視、探討與剖析，將”前進大陸財富管理市場”探討方向著眼於單純的商業活動(服務)，以麥可‧波特提出的五力分析模型進行台灣與中國大陸財富管理市場的競爭力優劣勢分析如下： 一、面對中國大陸財富管理市場既有業者，台灣的銀行業者有何優勢與劣勢? 二、面對中國大陸財富管理市場潛在進入者，台灣的銀行業者有何優劣勢? 三、面對中國大陸財富管理市場各種創新替代商品，台灣的銀行業者有何優劣勢? 四、面對中國大陸的財富管理高端客戶，台灣的銀行業者有何優劣勢? 五、面對中國大陸的財富管理商品供應商，台灣的銀行業者有何優劣勢? 台灣的銀行業者透過上述面對中國大陸財富管理市場中五個影響要素的優劣勢分析，與深知金融行業在各個國家都是高度監理且必須具備一定資格始得申請核准設立的特許行業，台灣的銀行業者要在中國大陸設立獨資的銀行難度極高，因此，前進大陸市場時必須做出的唯一選擇→合資，而非獨資；因此，本研究同時亦從上述的影響要素來剖析台灣的銀行業者在前進大陸財富管理市場時，找尋合資對象應為何者? 一、與有意願的非金融業者合資的優劣勢 二、與大陸既有的財富管理業者合資的優劣勢 三、與金融業的潛在進入者合資的優劣勢 四、與財富管理商品的供應商或替代性商品業者合資的優劣勢 台灣與中國大陸數十年來的糾葛，讓原是優勢的同文同種完全無法發揮，所幸，其自1980年開放第一家外資銀行─日本輸出入銀行在北京設立代表處開始，中國大陸對外資銀行正式張開雙臂，迎接外資銀行進入中國大陸金融界發展已近40個年頭，此時同文同種的台灣的銀行業者在兩岸政策多有鬆綁之際，勢必加速腳步迎頭跟上，唯中國大陸市場開放的有關法規常有更新，台灣業者將如何因應？台灣金融業者進入中國大陸市場真正面臨國際級的競爭，是否能有效地將本身優勢發揮？台灣金融業者面臨前進大陸市場所需的龐大資金的注入，是否會影響原本台灣市場的發展？這將有賴於市場更進一步開放，待業者產生更多經驗後，很值得吾等持續關注研究的問題。

2001年底，中國大陸加入WTO，2006年12月11日屆滿五年，從這一天開始中國大陸兌現了入世的承諾。為了因應入世之後的金融發展，中國大陸陸續在2006年11月頒布了「中華人民共和國外資銀行管理條例」及「中華人民共和國外資銀行管理條例實施細則」並規定從進入WTO滿五年的同一天開始施行。也就是說中國大陸的銀行業將從這一天開始完全開放市場給外資銀行，世界各主要國家的銀行業也早就準備好了進入中國大陸這個被看作是二十一世紀新的經濟強國。 中國大陸從1978改革開放到現在己經跨越了29個年頭，其金融體系從人民銀行的「統存統貸」一元化管理逐步開放，外資銀行也從當時僅有的渣打銀行、匯豐銀行、東亞銀行和華僑銀行四家自國民政府時代即已存在的代表處快速增加，到2006年底在中國註冊的外資獨資銀行和合資的法人銀行機構共有14家，下設19家分支行及附屬機構；22個國家和地區的74家外資銀行在中國大陸的25個城市設立了200家分行和79家支行；42個國家和地區的186家外資銀行在中國大陸的24個城市設立了個242代表處。 從1980年代台灣開放赴大陸探親之前，台商就陸續透過各種管道進入大陸市場發展，根據經濟部的統計，經核准對中國大陸的投資從1996年的12.29億美元增加到2006年的76.42億美元，這還不包括未經正式管道進入大陸市場的投資在內。台灣的銀行業也視大陸為未來不得不進入的市場，但由於兩岸特殊的政治環境，雖然目前己有彰化銀行、國泰世華銀行、合作金庫、華南銀行、中國信託銀行、第一銀行和土地銀行七家銀行在大陸設有代表處，兩岸的金融往來仍然極不明確。早在七家銀行進入大陸之前就有上海商業儲蓄銀行運用其兩岸三地長期經營的關係建構了上海商業儲蓄銀行模式運作，此一模式到目前為止仍可能是運作最有成效的模式之一；其他如華一銀行模式則屬於大陸註冊銀行，可能面臨股改問題；富邦銀行(香港)模式則是想利用大陸與香港簽訂CEPA的途徑進入，但仍未能如願；至於建華銀行模式則更為迂迴，期望藉由在美國的子銀行建立兩岸四地的環太平洋金融圈，目前仍在持續發展中。 本研究期望就台灣銀行業的競爭優劣勢和可能面對的機會與挑戰，探討各種可能進入大陸市場的方式。經本研究探索發現台灣銀行業進入大陸市場的最大障礙為政治面的意識型態，由於意識型態的影響，金融面的可行方案變得困難重重，這使得對台灣銀行業最有利的直接進入方式，包括設立代表處、分行、子行等方式受到嚴重的局限，更嚴重的是目前已在大陸設有代表處的七家銀行，明(2008)年將陸續面臨換照問題，如果因政治面的影響而喪失換領新許可的機會，對台灣銀行業的影響將更為鉅大。而以迂迴模式進入則宜避開外資銀行競爭激烈的地區進行策略聯盟，或採行對大陸城市商業銀行、農村商業銀行、可能面臨股改的銀行等進行參股，可能是比較可能採行的途徑。 此外，本研究除就探索發現的情形，對政府提供建議，設法儘速簽訂金融監理備忘錄(MOU)，讓台灣銀行業能及早進入大陸市場發展外，也期望台灣銀行業能增強其核心業務、大陸金融管理人才及系統化的台商資料庫，以利加強在進行參股或策略聯盟談判時的優勢，讓台灣銀行業未來的發展能在較為有利的位置。因為，經濟面的發展對政治面議題要求有極重要的影響力。 / As of December 11, 2006, China had become a member of World Trade Organization (“WTO”) for five years since she entered the WTO in the end of 2001. As of the date, China started exercising to fulfill her promises on joining the WTO. Among all her endeavors, Chinese administration promulgated “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Administration of Foreign-funded Banks” in November, 2001, in order to adapt to the new development of the financial service industry after entering the WTO. The law went in effect on December 11, 2006. China, abide by the law, opened her domestic financial market to foreign banks. In the meantime, major foreign banks had prepared to compete in, and benefit from, Chinese market, the most fast-growing market in the 21st century. It has been 29 years since China adopted the “reform and opening up” policy in 1978. The Chinese financial institution has gradually transformed from the “monopolistic lending-and-deposit” by The People’s Bank of China to a more pluralistic one. The number of foreign-funded banks has drastically increased from four in the year 1949, Standard Chartered Bank, Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (“HSBC”), The Bank of East Asia, and OCBC Bank, to a much larger number. In 2006, 14 wholly foreign-funded or Chinese-foreign joint venture banks were registered in China; 74 foreign-funded banks from 22 different countries found 200 branches and 79 sub-branches in 25 cities in China; 186 foreign-funded banks from 42 countries set up 242 representative offices in 24 cities in China. Even prior to the 80s, the era in which Taiwanese administration first allows its citizens to visit families in Mainland China, Taiwanese business persons have undertaken various kinds of measures to enter the Chinese market. According to Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwanese investment on Mainland China has increased from 1.229 billion USD in 1996 to 7.642 billion USD in 2006. This number does not take into account the informal/unauthorized investments. Certainly, Taiwanese financial service industry considers Mainland China an imperious market to enter. Nonetheless, due to special political circumstances between Taiwan Strait, the commerce of financial industries between the two sides is uncertain; though seven Taiwanese banks, Chang Hwa Bank, Cathay United Bank, Taiwan Cooperative Bank, Hua Nan Bank, Chinatrust Commercial Bank, The First Commercial Bank, and Land Bank of Taiwan, have set up their representative offices in Mainland China. In fact, even before the entry of the seven banks, The Shanghai Commercial and Saving Bank Ltd. took advantage of its long-term business relation between and among Mainland China, Hong-Kong, and Taiwan to establish and practice a model which has been proven one of the most successful models regarding banking business in the “greater China economic sphere”. There are other banks that experiment different models and encounter different hardships. For instances, First Sino Bank registered in China, and therefore recently faced the demand for share ownership structure reform. Fubon Bank (HK) attempted to enter the Chinese market through China-Hong-Kong CEPA, but it has not been successful. Bank SinoPac took a circuitous path by which it expected its sub-bank in the USA to establish the financial sphere around the Pacific Rim that included Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and USA, though this model is still under development. This study investigates kinds of potential paths for Taiwanese banks to enter the Chinese market, with an emphasis on the discussion on the competitive strength, weakness, opportunity, and threats of the Taiwanese banks. It was found that the major obstacle for Taiwanese banks to enter the Chinese market would be the political ideology, which rendered difficulty for Taiwanese financial service industry to practice banking business in Mainland China. The most advantageous way for Taiwanese banks, direct entrance, including founding representative offices, branches, and sub-branches, was therefore seriously limited. Worse, the seven banks which have set up representative offices in Mainland China will need to renew their licenses starting from next year (2008). If the renewal is spited for political reasons, the adverse impact on Taiwanese banks will be huge. A more feasible way might be somehow circuitous, by which Taiwanese banks build strategic alliance with, or invest in, domestic urban commercial banks, rural commercial banks, and banks reforming their share ownership structure, avoiding competitive regional markets where foreign-funded banks have already taken root. Lastly, this study not only provide tangible suggestions to the Taiwanese government, including signing the Memorandum of Understanding on supervision and regulation of the financial services and allowing Taiwanese banks to enter the Chinese market as soon as possible, but anticipate Taiwanese banks to improve their own profession and core business, and establish the database of their customers who have already established businesses in Mainland China, and promote their managerial skills of international banking. These are feasible measures to bring Taiwanese banks an advantageous position in future development in China while negotiating for shares or strategic alliances. After all, demands come from economic development can alter the political will.

本研究引用2006年經濟部「製造業對外投資實況調查」的廠商問卷資料，以255家實際赴中國大陸和香港（西進）、東南亞國家（南向）投資之民生工業廠商為實證對象，運用EViews和Stata軟體設計經濟計量模型，建立Probit模型進行實證分析，探討廠商特性與優勢、投資區位優勢及網絡連結關係，在民生工業廠商對外投資區位選擇決策中所扮演的角色。由實證結果得知，當民生工業廠商決定在中國大陸及香港（西進）、東南亞國家（南向）進行直接投資時，廠商重視網絡連結關係，為建立上下游產品鏈結而「配合國外客戶要求」對外投資，並利用當地「市場發展潛力大」、「語言溝通容易」及「基本設施完備」等區位優勢條件，以其自身所擁有「製造及銷售自有產品」的專屬優勢經營海外事業，會傾向選擇西進投資中國大陸及香港。