蘇哈托（Soeharto）執政時期的印尼執政黨—戈爾卡（Golongan Karya；GOLKAR）為蘇哈托在一九六四年，合併了一百多個民間組織之後所產生的，其主要成員為公務員、國營企業員工、技術官僚、軍方將領與政府部會首長。藉由政治上的恩侍主義，加上政治資源、資訊與資金上的壟斷，戈爾卡總能在歷次大選中順利勝出。 然而蘇哈托所領導的威權政體，於一九九八年五月以垮台收場；一年半之後，印尼舉行了四十多年以來首次公平且自由的民主選舉。原本執政的戈爾卡黨在面臨這種巨變之後，有什麼樣的因應措施？是否能以反對黨的身分，重新適應民主時代的角色？對此，本文從戈爾卡的創立，「新秩序」（Orde Baru）政權時期的戈爾卡運作，一直到蘇哈托垮台、戈爾卡開始以民主政黨的身分參與政治活動的過程，進行了一連串討論，並且希望從歷史的脈絡當中，驗證印尼戈爾卡黨在新秩序時代，乃是印尼執政菁英手中的選舉機器，負責替蘇哈托塑造出統治上的正當性。而戈爾卡本身並不強的威權屬性，一旦到了印尼步入民主化的過程時，反而有助於該黨在民主時代當中的生存與轉型。 此外，本文也將探討新興民主國家當中的問題之一，就是政策的達成不一定能換得選票，得到選票也不一定能得到權位。對於民主鞏固階段中的戈爾卡黨而言，政治權位的爭奪，會比推行政策或是爭取選民支持來得重要。 本文第一章部分先敘述筆者的研究動機與目的、研究途徑與方法，並對相關文獻進行檢驗工作。第二章則描述印尼早期的政黨體系運作，以及「戈爾卡」成立的過程。第三章則探討蘇哈托執政時期戈爾卡所扮演的角色。第四章則分析戈爾卡的組織架構，以及在選舉、立法機關與行政體系當中的功能。第五章則探討戈爾卡黨在民主化過程中的角色。第六章則是替本文作出結論。

本論文之研究目的是企圖從前蘇聯文武關係研究途徑與克里姆林宮政治研究途徑來探討蘇聯解體後俄羅斯軍方之政治參與範疇與背後之動機。 就軍方政治參與之範疇而言，蘇聯於1991年底解體後，俄羅斯軍方在政治舞台上扮演了重要的角色。首先，我們可以從軍方在1993年俄羅斯新軍事準則成型的過程中，其強硬主張佔了主導的地位。第二、軍方在「近鄰」與前南斯拉夫維和行動的政策即便與外交部意見相衝突仍獲得最後主導權。第三、軍方在1993年10月政爭中並未完全保持中立，而最後軍方是站在葉里欽總統一方結束了此一政治危機。第四、軍方試圖從俄羅斯獨立後歷屆國家杜馬選舉中，藉由其投票行為或是主動參與競選來表達其政治態度與影響有關軍事方面之政策。 本論文以為，蘇後俄羅斯軍方的政治參與背後動機之主要原因有二。其一是蘇聯解體以後俄羅斯軍方制度利益嚴重惡化：蘇聯解體以後，軍方在軍事改革上無法有效進展、軍事預算嚴重不足、軍中生活條件惡化以及國防工業轉產上面臨了嚴重的問題。這些皆使得軍方為了自救不得不試圖從政治層面來解決軍隊之問題。其二是受到克里姆林宮政治互動之影響：葉里欽為了鞏固政軍大權，運用高超的政治手腕以及「分而治之」的統御方式，引用軍方的力量來打擊政治對手，另一方面也運用政治危機分化軍隊之團結性，使其無法在政治上形成對統治者之威脅。 / The purpose of the thesis attempts to analyze the scope and motives of post-soviet Russian military’s political participation by using former Soviet civil-military relations approach and Kremlin politics approach. As far as the scope of military’s political participation is concerned, since the dissolution of USSR in 1991, the Russian military has been playing an important role in Russian politics. First of all, during the process of formulating Russian new military doctrine in 1993, Russian military’s hard-line position dominated this process and its opinion finally won out. Secondly, peacekeeping operation took by the Russian military in the “Near Abroad” and former Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo, usually conflicted the peaceful option hold by the Ministry of Russian Foreign Affairs, but the Russian military still took control of the final policy initiative. Thirdly, in October 1993, the Russian military didn’t remain neutral in the political struggle between president and Congress of People’s Deputies. It sided with president and therefore ended this severe political crisis. Fourthly, in each Duma election hold after Russia’s independence, the Russian military tried to express its political inclination and exerted its influence by voting, even actively took part in the election. This thesis is taking the position that the political participation of post-soviet Russian military is driven by two motives. First and foremost is the institutional interest of Russian military suffered great damage since the breakup of the USSR：military reform hasn’t made much progress; military budget received hasn’t sufficed the need of military; military faced the growing acute social problems within itself; the conversion of defense industry encountered difficulties. These problems made the Russian military try to preserve itself by political means. The second motive is affected by Kremlin political interaction：in order to strengthen his control over politics and military, Yeltsin used brilliant political art and managed the military by means of “divide and rule”. He used the military to attack his political opponent, on the other hand, he made use of each political crisis to split the military and therefore the military couldn’t constitute a political threat to the ruler of Russian polity.