Ma thèse montre la présence et le rôle de la métaphysique dans Vérité et méthode. Elle tente de démontrer que Gadamer s'inspire du néoplatonisme pour surmonter le subjectivisme de la modernité et propose une métaphysique à cette fin. Après avoir expliqué comment Gadamer se réapproprie l’héritage de la pensée grecque pour critiquer la modernité en situant son interprétation de Platon par rapport à celle de Heidegger, je montre que Gadamer s’approprie la conception de l’être de Plotin de façon telle qu’il peut s’y appuyer pour penser l’autoprésentation de l’être dans l’expérience herméneutique de la vérité. L’art va, pour ce faire, redevenir sous la conduite du néoplatonisme source de vérité. Gadamer redonne en effet une dignité ontologique à l’art grâce à la notion d’émanation, notion qui permet de penser qu’il y a une présence réelle du représenté dans sa représentation, celle-ci émanant du représenté sans l’amoindrir, mais lui apportant au contraire un surcroît d’être. La notion d’émanation permet ensuite à Gadamer d’affirmer le lien indissoluble qui unit les mots aux choses. En effet, la doctrine du verbe intérieur de Thomas d’Aquin implique ce lien que Platon avait occulté en réduisant le langage, comme la logique, à n’être qu’un instrument de domination du réel. L’utilisation de la notion néoplatonicienne d’émanation permet donc de dépasser la philosophie grecque du logos et de mieux rendre compte de l’être de la langue. Je montre ensuite comment Gadamer radicalise sa pensée en affirmant que l’être qui peut être compris est langage, ce qui veut dire que l’être, comme chez Plotin, est autoprésentation de soi-même. Pour ce faire, Gadamer rattache l’être du langage à la métaphysique néoplatonicienne de la lumière. Les dernières pages de Vérité et méthode rappellent en effet que la splendeur du beau est manifestation de la vérité de l’être. On rattachera alors le concept de vérité herméneutique à ses origines métaphysiques. La vérité est une manifestation de l’être dont on ne peut avoir part que si on se laisse submerger par sa lumière. Loin d’être affaire de contrôle méthodique, l’expérience de la vérité exige de se laisser posséder par ce qui est à comprendre. Je démontre ainsi que Gadamer a découvert dans le néoplatonisme des éléments permettant de s’opposer à la dictature du sujet moderne, dictature qui doit être renversée, car elle masque le réel rapport de l’homme à la vérité en faisant abstraction de la finitude de son existence concrète. La critique du subjectivisme moderne sous la conduite du néoplatonisme ouvre ainsi le chemin vers une métaphysique de la finitude. / My thesis shows the presence and role of metaphysics in Truth and Method. It attempts to show that Gadamer builds upon Neoplatonism to overcome the subjectivism of modernity and offers a metaphysics in this regard. It explains how Gadamer reclaims the legacy of Greek thought to criticize modernity, placing his interpretation of Plato compared to that of Heidegger, I argue that Gadamer appropriates Plotinus’ concept of being in such a way that it may lean to think of self-presentation of being in the hermeneutic experience of truth. In that sense, art is going to be a source of truth under the leadership of Neoplatonism. Gadamer gives an ontological dignity to art through the concept of emanation, a concept which suggests that there is a real presence of the represented in its representation, the latter derived from the represented without weakening it, providing it instead with more being. The concept of emanation then gives Gadamer an opportunity to affirm the indissoluble bond that unites words and things. Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of the inner word indeed implies the link that Plato had covered up by making language, like logic, a mere domination instrument of the real. The use of the Neoplatonic concept of emanation makes it possible to overcome the logos of Greek philosophy and to better account for the being of language. I then show how Gadamer radicalized his thinking as he says that the being that can be understood is language, which means that being, as in Plotinus, is self-presentation. To this end, Gadamer links the being of language to Neoplatonic metaphysics of light. The last pages of Truth and Method recall indeed that the splendor of beauty is an expression for the truth of being. The concept of hermeneutic truth is then connected to its metaphysical origins. Truth is a display for the being in which we can partake only if one gets overwhelmed by its light. Far from being a matter of methodical control, the experience of truth requires to be possessed by what must be understood. In this way, I demonstrate that Gadamer found in Neoplatonism elements to challenge the dictatorship of the modern subject, which must be reversed because it hides the real relationship of man with truth by ignoring the finitude of its concrete existence. The criticism of modern subjectivism led by Neoplatonism opens the way to a metaphysics of finitude.

L’œuvre philosophique de Kierkegaard s’apparente à une dialectique du paradoxe. De fait, dans son cheminement existentiel, l’individu parcourt trois sphères d’existence – l’esthétique, l’éthique et le religieux –, chacune d’elle étant une modalité de l’activité humaine qui comporte un paradoxe particulier. Il s’agit d’un itinéraire de l’intériorité qui vise, dans l’existence, le télos qu’est le devenir soi-même. Ainsi l’esthéticien est-il déchiré entre les idées et la réalité dans la réalité immédiate, tandis que l’éthicien, par la médiation du langage, préfère s’affirmer comme individu dans l’immanence concrète, ignorant toutefois qu’il intériorise des règles sociales qui lui sont impersonnelles. Quant au religieux, non seulement découvre-t-il que la vérité vers laquelle il tend ne se trouve pas en son sein, mais il fait face au plus élevé des paradoxes, fondé sur la transcendance – à savoir le paradoxe absolu, où l’éternité se temporalise sous la forme de l’Homme-Dieu. Du reste, le présent mémoire se penche spécifiquement sur le concept du paradoxe, mis de l’avant par Kierkegaard afin de brosser un portrait du devenir individuel de chaque existant. / The philosophical work of Kierkegaard deals with a dialectic of the paradox. Actually, in his existential progress, the individual goes through three spheres of existence – the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious –, each of which is a modality of the human activity that contains a particular paradox. His thought follows the progress of interiority, which aims, in existence, at the end of becoming a single individual. In this way, the aesthete is torn between the pure idea and reality, whereas the ethicist, through the mediation of language, prefers to assert himself as an individual within concrete immanence, ignoring however that he interiorizes social rules which are impersonal him. As for the religious believer, not only does he discover that the truth at which he aims is not within himself, but he faces the highest of the paradoxes, based on transcendance – that is the absolute paradox, whereby eternity temporalizes itself in the shape of the Man-God. In general, the present master’s thesis analyzes the concept of the paradox put forward by Kierkegaard to present the progress of every existing being towards becoming a single individual.

Will Kymlicka a formulé une théorie libérale du droit des minorités en arguant que l'on doit protéger les cultures minoritaires des influences extérieures, car, selon lui, ces cultures fournissent aux individus un contexte de choix significatif qui permet la prise de décision autonome. Il limite donc la portée de sa théorie aux minorités « culturelles », c'est-à-dire les minorités nationales et immigrantes, qui peuvent fournir ce contexte de choix significatif aux individus. Évidemment, les injustices vécues par ces deux types de minorités, aussi sévères soient-elles, n'épuisent pas les expériences d'injustices vécues par les membres de groupes minoritaires et minorisés (i.e. minorités sexuelles, femmes, Afro-Américains, etc.). On pourrait donc être tenté d'élargir la portée de la théorie du droit des minorités pour rendre compte de toutes les injustices vécues en tant que minorité. Toutefois, je défends la thèse selon laquelle cette extension est impossible dans le cadre d'une théorie libérale, car une de ses méthodes typiques, la « théorie idéale », limite la portée critique des thèses de Kymlicka et parce que l'autonomie individuelle a un caractère si fondamental pour les libéraux, qu'ils ne peuvent rendre compte du fait que certaines décisions individuelles autonomes peuvent contribuer à perpétuer des systèmes et des normes injustes. / Will Kymlicka defends a liberal theory of minority rights, arguing that we must protect minority cultures from outside influences, as these cultures provide individuals with a meaningful context of choice that allows autonomous decision-making. This defence of minority rights limits the scope of his theory by focusing on 'cultural' minorities, that is to say, national minorities and immigrants, which can provide individuals with this meaningful context of choice. Obviously, the injustices experienced by these two types of minorities, however severe they are, do not exhaust the injustices experienced by members of minority groups and minoritized groups (i.e. sexual minorities, women, African Americans, etc.). One might be tempted to expand the scope of the theory of minority rights to account for all the injustices experienced as a minority. However, I argue that this extension is not possible within a liberal theorical framework where 'ideal theory' limits the critical force of Kymlicka’s thesis and in which the centrality of individual autonomy prevents liberals to realize that certain individual decisions contribute to the perpetuation of unjust systems, values and norms.

Les écrits aphoristiques de Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) posent une évidente difficulté. Cette difficulté n’a pas échappé à l’auteur qui a recommandé à ses lecteurs, en 1887 dans sa préface à Zur Genealogie der Moral, qu’ils pratiquent en lisant ses aphorismes un « art de l’interprétation [Kunst der Auslegung] » [KSA, V, p. 255, § 8.]. Malheureusement, Nietzsche ne dit pas précisément en quoi consiste une telle lecture. Comment le lecteur doit-il alors interpréter les écrits aphoristiques de Friedrich Nietzsche? Pour répondre à cette question herméneutique nous nous servirons de la « métaphore du théâtre », présente en filigrane dans l’œuvre du philosophe. Notre mémoire se propose d’abord d’examiner ce que Nietzsche a lui-même dit au sujet des « formes brèves » (la maxime, la sentence, mais surtout l’aphorisme), et en même temps ce qu’il attend plus particulièrement d’un lecteur de ces formes d’expression. Cette analyse philologique du corpus nietzschéen se fera aussi à la lumière des commentaires que Peter Sloterdijk (1947-) et Sarah Kofman (1934-1994) ont proposés de la philosophie nietzschéenne. Après avoir nous-mêmes analysé les propos de Nietzsche portant sur ce qu’il estime être un lecteur à la hauteur de ses écrits, il sera dès lors possible de porter un jugement critique sur la pertinence et la portée des études de Sloterdijk et Kofman qui abordent eux-mêmes la mise en scène de la pensée nietzschéenne au moyen de la métaphore du théâtre. Une part importante de notre critique portera notamment sur la nature synthétique de leurs interprétations philosophiques, menées dans une perspective thématico-synthétique et trans-aphoristique, qui marginalisent à bien des égards la particularité et l’autonomie des formes d’expression au moyen desquelles Friedrich Nietzsche s’exprime. / Reading Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) aphoristic works poses an evident difficulty for any reader. This difficulty was not lost on the author of Menschliches, Allzumenschliches (1878), Morgenröthe (1881), Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft (1882) and explains why he recommended to his readers, subsequently in 1887 in his preface to Zur Genealogie der Moral, that they read him by means of a “art of exegesis [Kunst der Auslegung]” [KSA, V, p. 255, § 8.]. Unfortunately, Nietzsche remains ambiguous with regards to what such an art of reading involves. The present dissertation will nevertheless employ the ‘theatre metaphor’ recurrent throughout Nietzsche’s works in the aim of shedding light on this fundamental (hermeneutical) question: How can we, as readers of Friedrich Nietzsche’s aphoristic writings, correctly interpret our role? The first part of the present dissertation examines what Nietzsche has himself said on the subject of “short expressions” in his work (the maxim, the adage, and especially the aphorism), along with the expectations he has of a reader of such forms of expression. This philological analysis of Nietzsche’s writings will also be followed by the commentaries of his philosophy offered by Peter Sloterdijk (1947-) and Sarah Kofman (1934-1994). I will then conduct my own analysis of Nietzsche’s expectations regarding his readership, on the basis of which I will mount a critique of Sloterdijk and Kofman’s readings, both of whom also employ the ‘theatre metaphor’ in order to show how Nietzsche stages his thought. The brunt of this critique will be directed towards the synthetic nature of their philosophical interpretations. Sloterdijk and Kofman construct their readings thematically and trans-aphoristically and in so doing neglect the distinctiveness and autonomy of the individual aphorisms through which Friedrich Nietzsche expresses himself.

Pour la pensée humaine, l’image a toujours constitué une interrogation laissée sans réponse définitive : de l’interdit biblique à la possibilité technologique infinie, l’image a traversé des étapes conceptuelles complexes et hétérogènes. Aujourd’hui, on conçoit l’image comme une présence incontournable de l’existence quotidienne et comme une forme de réflexion mystérieuse. Cette thèse propose une analyse de la vision sur l’image chez Walter Benjamin et Aby Warburg à travers quelques concepts essentiels : image de pensée, survivance, espace de pensée, coupure, représentation de l’histoire. Située énigmatiquement entre les arts visuels et la pensée philosophique, l’image devient un sujet de réflexion à la fin du 19e siècle et au début du 20e siècle; les deux penseurs mentionnés ont été les premiers à interroger les valeurs conceptuelles de l’image et à chercher de l’évoquer en tant que spectre de la pensée. Les morceaux aphoristiques et les articles critiques de Benjamin rencontrent discrètement les études esthétiques de Warburg au point où l’idée de l’image amorce toute réflexion. Pour l’imaginaire contemporain, les structures conceptuelles bâties par Benjamin et Warburg constituent des éléments dominants dans l’engrenage réflexif atonal d’aujourd’hui. Lorsque le Denkraum (espace de pensée) et le Denkbild (image de pensée) gèrent la dynamique de la philosophie de Benjamin et Warburg, le Nachleben (survie) et la coupure nuancent le grand tableau de l’histoire (Geschichtsdarstellung). L’analyse comparatiste de ces concepts aboutit à la conclusion que l’image est intimement et paradoxalement liée à la vision de l’histoire; en fait, l’image n’est qu’une représentation de l’histoire qui, à son tour, se représente dans chaque image. / After a long history of using the image as a basis for knowledge, the human mind began to examine its possibility as a critical tool. Thus, the multifaceted concept of image brings into focus two decisive theoretical positions developed at the end of 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th. Walter Benjamin’s critical essays and Aby Warburg’s studies on the history of art are considered to be the most influential academic works on the image as a concept. They take the form of series of diverse reflections on image as thought (Denkbild), afterlife (Nachleben), thought- space (Denkraum), and the representation of history (Geschichtsdarstellung). The following thesis explores the possibility of analyzing these notions both in terms of image proper and with regard to the multiple meanings that emerge from the “specter” of the image. In a historical sense, both Benjamin and Warburg were the first who attempted to define the image in a new perspective situating the image as a critical space where the history becomes visible. While Benjamin works with the paradigm of “thinking” in order to position the image (Denkbild), Warburg suggests an esthetical link between history and image (Denkraum and Nachleben). Inasmuch as the image simultaneously entails the act of imaging, representation, and history, the very primary impetus of the image is historical thought. The transposition of the German Bild into the Latin imago leads to a mystery zone where temporality itself becomes an issue; in this context, the benjaminian concept of “constellation” describes the alchemy of representation as a historical (in)stance conveying a vision of the world. In conclusion, in taking into consideration the multiple nature of image, this thesis examines the role of the imaginary in the contemporary world in conjunction with human historical meaning.

The dissertation re-examines the philosophy of Georges Bataille within the context of post-Kantian aesthetics and argues for a re-evaluation of Bataille’s notion of expenditure [depenser] within this context. The dissertation argues further that the artistic practice of Robert Smithson is an exemplary case of an ‘aesthetics of expenditure.’ It is our contention that Bataille’s cosmic-energetic philosophy finds a complementary material expression in Smithson’s abstract geology and its confrontation with post-Kantian aesthetics. We will argue that this occurs through Smithson’s varying strategies, which are grouped conceptually according to the broader logic of their expression:seriality, sedimentality, monumentality, and meandering. While Smithson’s own references to Bataille in the early 1970s are discussed in detail, it is not our position that Smithson was enacting Bataille’s philosophy ‘aesthetically’; rather, by reading Bataille’s evaluation of Kant’s aesthetics and teleology in relation to Smithson’s artistic practice, we emphasize instead that the politics of disgust shared by both figures advance a radical decentring and repositioning of the human in relation to planetary and geological forces. If, as geologists now agree, our present age is that of the Anthropocene1, our argument is that Bataille and Smithson anticipate this precarious condition analytically, and, perhaps more importantly, that their analysis suggests further important diagnostic considerations at the level of social organization and political composition that might help defer, if not entirely prevent, the catastrophic end of this all-too-human period.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / How meaning is articulated, suggested or repressed in transition processes is an inherently social phenomenon. The history of theorising about ornament bears evidence to this as much as do current practices of ornamentation. From myths, as narratives of meaning, to ‘mere ornament’ – the various signifying practices (and forms of life within which they take place) determine how meaning changes. People will perceive such change differently, depending on their perspectives and circumstances and, under certain conditions, change can be conceived of as loss. This thesis, in its theoretical part, explores issues pertaining to meaning and ornament in epistemology, philosophy, sociology, semiotics, aesthetics and psychoanalysis. In its practical part it seeks to make connections with signifying practices involving ornament in the life-worlds of users, the use of ornament in public buildings, bicultural relationships involving appropriation or misappropriation, and the education of designers in New Zealand. For that, data derived from four empirical research projects are presented and theorised. In the fourth part, theories and practices are brought together to shed light on struggles with ornamental meaning in the past and in the present. Theories, with their classification of myths, symbols and ornament, ignore wide ranges of signifying practices and privilege some form of significations at the expense of others. Because of their separation from the language- games and forms of life of ornamental practice, they often fail to grasp issues that are important to non-theorists. All the research projects demonstrated that the large majority of participants like and relate to ornament. They also showed, however, that Pakeha traditions of ornament are not only perceived to have suffered the same historical rupture as those in the West but also that the theoretical discreditation upon which they were based was used as a tool of oppression when applied to Maori art. Attempts to explain bicultural practices of appropriation or misappropriation without reference to the history of colonisation and present power configurations must fail. Whether or not a cultural image retains or loses its meaning depends on factors such as knowledge, understanding, relationality and co-operation. If culture is, however, treated as a resource for commodification – as it is by the culture industries – cultural elements are subjected to rules inherent in marketing and capitalist economies and their meaning is deliberately changed. Those who ought to be able to deal competently with these issues (designers and other cultural intermediaries) receive little in their education to prepare them for the ornamental strategies and tactics of their future clients. The academic environment is still largely determined by modernist agendas, and ornament as a topic and as practice – continues to be repressed. If a meaningful ornamental language and practice relevant to Aotearoa is to be shared, created, and sustained the divisions between theory and the life-world need to be interrogated; the distance through an assumed superiority of Pakeha to Maori history, culture and people relinquished; and a type of conversation must commence that takes seriously the Treaty of Waitangi as the founding document of this country. The partnership concept of this document facilitates conversation about differential positions and rules and can ‘take us out of our old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings’ (Rorty, 1980: 289).

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / How meaning is articulated, suggested or repressed in transition processes is an inherently social phenomenon. The history of theorising about ornament bears evidence to this as much as do current practices of ornamentation. From myths, as narratives of meaning, to ‘mere ornament’ – the various signifying practices (and forms of life within which they take place) determine how meaning changes. People will perceive such change differently, depending on their perspectives and circumstances and, under certain conditions, change can be conceived of as loss. This thesis, in its theoretical part, explores issues pertaining to meaning and ornament in epistemology, philosophy, sociology, semiotics, aesthetics and psychoanalysis. In its practical part it seeks to make connections with signifying practices involving ornament in the life-worlds of users, the use of ornament in public buildings, bicultural relationships involving appropriation or misappropriation, and the education of designers in New Zealand. For that, data derived from four empirical research projects are presented and theorised. In the fourth part, theories and practices are brought together to shed light on struggles with ornamental meaning in the past and in the present. Theories, with their classification of myths, symbols and ornament, ignore wide ranges of signifying practices and privilege some form of significations at the expense of others. Because of their separation from the language- games and forms of life of ornamental practice, they often fail to grasp issues that are important to non-theorists. All the research projects demonstrated that the large majority of participants like and relate to ornament. They also showed, however, that Pakeha traditions of ornament are not only perceived to have suffered the same historical rupture as those in the West but also that the theoretical discreditation upon which they were based was used as a tool of oppression when applied to Maori art. Attempts to explain bicultural practices of appropriation or misappropriation without reference to the history of colonisation and present power configurations must fail. Whether or not a cultural image retains or loses its meaning depends on factors such as knowledge, understanding, relationality and co-operation. If culture is, however, treated as a resource for commodification – as it is by the culture industries – cultural elements are subjected to rules inherent in marketing and capitalist economies and their meaning is deliberately changed. Those who ought to be able to deal competently with these issues (designers and other cultural intermediaries) receive little in their education to prepare them for the ornamental strategies and tactics of their future clients. The academic environment is still largely determined by modernist agendas, and ornament as a topic and as practice – continues to be repressed. If a meaningful ornamental language and practice relevant to Aotearoa is to be shared, created, and sustained the divisions between theory and the life-world need to be interrogated; the distance through an assumed superiority of Pakeha to Maori history, culture and people relinquished; and a type of conversation must commence that takes seriously the Treaty of Waitangi as the founding document of this country. The partnership concept of this document facilitates conversation about differential positions and rules and can ‘take us out of our old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings’ (Rorty, 1980: 289).

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / How meaning is articulated, suggested or repressed in transition processes is an inherently social phenomenon. The history of theorising about ornament bears evidence to this as much as do current practices of ornamentation. From myths, as narratives of meaning, to ‘mere ornament’ – the various signifying practices (and forms of life within which they take place) determine how meaning changes. People will perceive such change differently, depending on their perspectives and circumstances and, under certain conditions, change can be conceived of as loss. This thesis, in its theoretical part, explores issues pertaining to meaning and ornament in epistemology, philosophy, sociology, semiotics, aesthetics and psychoanalysis. In its practical part it seeks to make connections with signifying practices involving ornament in the life-worlds of users, the use of ornament in public buildings, bicultural relationships involving appropriation or misappropriation, and the education of designers in New Zealand. For that, data derived from four empirical research projects are presented and theorised. In the fourth part, theories and practices are brought together to shed light on struggles with ornamental meaning in the past and in the present. Theories, with their classification of myths, symbols and ornament, ignore wide ranges of signifying practices and privilege some form of significations at the expense of others. Because of their separation from the language- games and forms of life of ornamental practice, they often fail to grasp issues that are important to non-theorists. All the research projects demonstrated that the large majority of participants like and relate to ornament. They also showed, however, that Pakeha traditions of ornament are not only perceived to have suffered the same historical rupture as those in the West but also that the theoretical discreditation upon which they were based was used as a tool of oppression when applied to Maori art. Attempts to explain bicultural practices of appropriation or misappropriation without reference to the history of colonisation and present power configurations must fail. Whether or not a cultural image retains or loses its meaning depends on factors such as knowledge, understanding, relationality and co-operation. If culture is, however, treated as a resource for commodification – as it is by the culture industries – cultural elements are subjected to rules inherent in marketing and capitalist economies and their meaning is deliberately changed. Those who ought to be able to deal competently with these issues (designers and other cultural intermediaries) receive little in their education to prepare them for the ornamental strategies and tactics of their future clients. The academic environment is still largely determined by modernist agendas, and ornament as a topic and as practice – continues to be repressed. If a meaningful ornamental language and practice relevant to Aotearoa is to be shared, created, and sustained the divisions between theory and the life-world need to be interrogated; the distance through an assumed superiority of Pakeha to Maori history, culture and people relinquished; and a type of conversation must commence that takes seriously the Treaty of Waitangi as the founding document of this country. The partnership concept of this document facilitates conversation about differential positions and rules and can ‘take us out of our old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings’ (Rorty, 1980: 289).

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / How meaning is articulated, suggested or repressed in transition processes is an inherently social phenomenon. The history of theorising about ornament bears evidence to this as much as do current practices of ornamentation. From myths, as narratives of meaning, to ‘mere ornament’ – the various signifying practices (and forms of life within which they take place) determine how meaning changes. People will perceive such change differently, depending on their perspectives and circumstances and, under certain conditions, change can be conceived of as loss. This thesis, in its theoretical part, explores issues pertaining to meaning and ornament in epistemology, philosophy, sociology, semiotics, aesthetics and psychoanalysis. In its practical part it seeks to make connections with signifying practices involving ornament in the life-worlds of users, the use of ornament in public buildings, bicultural relationships involving appropriation or misappropriation, and the education of designers in New Zealand. For that, data derived from four empirical research projects are presented and theorised. In the fourth part, theories and practices are brought together to shed light on struggles with ornamental meaning in the past and in the present. Theories, with their classification of myths, symbols and ornament, ignore wide ranges of signifying practices and privilege some form of significations at the expense of others. Because of their separation from the language- games and forms of life of ornamental practice, they often fail to grasp issues that are important to non-theorists. All the research projects demonstrated that the large majority of participants like and relate to ornament. They also showed, however, that Pakeha traditions of ornament are not only perceived to have suffered the same historical rupture as those in the West but also that the theoretical discreditation upon which they were based was used as a tool of oppression when applied to Maori art. Attempts to explain bicultural practices of appropriation or misappropriation without reference to the history of colonisation and present power configurations must fail. Whether or not a cultural image retains or loses its meaning depends on factors such as knowledge, understanding, relationality and co-operation. If culture is, however, treated as a resource for commodification – as it is by the culture industries – cultural elements are subjected to rules inherent in marketing and capitalist economies and their meaning is deliberately changed. Those who ought to be able to deal competently with these issues (designers and other cultural intermediaries) receive little in their education to prepare them for the ornamental strategies and tactics of their future clients. The academic environment is still largely determined by modernist agendas, and ornament as a topic and as practice – continues to be repressed. If a meaningful ornamental language and practice relevant to Aotearoa is to be shared, created, and sustained the divisions between theory and the life-world need to be interrogated; the distance through an assumed superiority of Pakeha to Maori history, culture and people relinquished; and a type of conversation must commence that takes seriously the Treaty of Waitangi as the founding document of this country. The partnership concept of this document facilitates conversation about differential positions and rules and can ‘take us out of our old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings’ (Rorty, 1980: 289).