Face2Face is a photographic project realized by JR, an undercover photographer and Marco, a technology consultant, in 2007 in the Middle East context. It consisted of taking the portraits of Israeli and Palestinian people who were doing the same job, printing them in huge formats and putting them on various unavoidable places in Israeli and Palestinian cities. The project was based on the idea that Israeli and Palestinian people were so much similar to each other, as if they were &lsquo / twin brothers raised in different families&rsquo / but that they were not aware of that. Therefore, the artists decided to provide them with images of the other side which would make people be surprised, laugh, stop for a while and think about the other side once again. The artists hoped that such a reworking of the ideas about the other side would hopefully motivate people to enter into dialogue with each other, which would eventually end up in peaceful co-existence. This thesis sets this photographic project as its starting point. It focuses upon its conceptualization of dialogue, which is based on the idea of seeing the other from a new perspective, and compares it with Mikhail Bakhtin&rsquo / s concept of dialogue and Emmanuel Levinas&rsquo / s concept of face-to-face, which are based on the idea of disrupting the self. It then criticizes the project for its neglect of various dimensions which shape Israeli and Palestinian identities, such as diaspora, nostalgia and home and of the heavy burden of the past on these two communities&rsquo / present. As a result, the thesis focuses upon the concept of collective memory at length and then discusses photography at the service of collective memory. Another section is devoted to the analysis of Israeli and Palestinian collective memories. The photographic project Face2Face is discussed all throughout the thesis in terms of its failure to spot the crucial dimensions in Israeli-Palestinian context, no matter how well intended it was.

This thesis investigates the relationship between the social movement and theatre art in Turkey between 1960 and 1971 and investigates how the development of a dependent capitalism influenced the development of the classes and the political theatre. It tries to reveal the convergences between the political ideology of the classes, their organizations and the aesthetic ideology of the field of cultural production. While doing so it investigates the ties between the ideological and practical aspects of the class struggle, the artists&rsquo / aesthetic views and their relations of production.

This thesis addresses the problem of the analysis of knowledge. The persistent failure of analyses of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions is used to motivate exploring alternative approaches to the analytical problem. In parallel to a similar development in the theory of truth, in which the persistent failure to provide a satisfactory answer to the question as to what the nature of truth is has led to the exploration of deflationary and minimalist approaches to the theory of truth, the prospects for deflationary and minimalist approaches to the theory of knowledge are investigated. While it is argued that deflationary approaches are ultimately unsatisfactory, a minimalist approach to epistemology, which characterises the concept of knowledge by a set of platitudes about knowledge, is defended. The first version of a minimalist framework for the theory of knowledge is developed. Two more substantive developments of the minimalist framework are discussed. In the first development a safety condition on knowledge is derived from the minimalist framework. Problems for this development are discussed and solved. In the second development, an ability condition is derived from the minimalist framework. Reason is provided to believe that, arguably, the ability condition can avoid the problems that beset traditional analyses of knowledge. It is also shown that even if this argument fails, minimalist approaches to epistemology may serve to provide a functional definition of knowledge. Reason is thus provided to believe that minimalist approaches to epistemology can make progress towards addressing the problem of the analysis of knowledge.

The purpose of this thesis is to research the relation between spatial structures and social relations including the cultural ones. This study specifically researches the relation between the construction and the representation of urban space and urban culture in Sakarya Caddesi as an instance of society-space interaction. This research focuses on Sakarya Caddesi where various urban cultural practices such as entertainment, has intensified. It deals with the constitution and representation of this entertainment space and researches how a particular place is constructed materially and imaginarily, how different social actors perceive, interpret and constitute a particular place in different ways. Accordingly, the contestation over the representation and use of place is discussed in this study. In order to comprehend a local place and culture, the issues should be thought in a wider context. Therefore, Sakarya Caddesi which is a part of urban space and the urban practices which occur in this area, are evaluated in global context. This study, discusses the influences of global changes on urban space, urban cultural practices and lifestyles. Discussing Sakarya Caddesi and its culture through discourses, this thesis relates spatial categories with some concepts of cultural politics such as identity.

Depuis l’aube des civilisations, l’humanité a essayé d’exprimer ses pensées. Pour exprimer ces pensées, l’homme utilise des langages. Les langages peuvent prendre différentes formes qui vont de la parole à l’image en passant par l’écriture. Pour garantir une cohérence et la compréhension de ce qui constitue une double traduction, celle de l’émission d’un message et celle de la réception d’un message, la philosophie a elle aussi tenté d’expliquer la signification de cette suite de caractère que constituent les mots, les phrases, les livres et des discours. Pour arriver à garantir cette cohérence de la signification d’un message, les philosophes ont généralement utilisé des méthodes analytiques dont Descartes a été le premier à décrire les principes. Nous avons donc appliqué ces principes aux différentes philosophies pour arriver à une impasse. L’analyse ne nous permet pas de garantir la compréhension de la signification d’un message. C’est l’intelligence artificielle qui nous a offert une solution. En effet, les travaux de Simon H. A. nous ont conduits à ne plus considérer la signification comme un système simple ou compliqué, mais comme un système complexe. Les méthodes appliquées aux systèmes complexes sont différentes des méthodes appliquées aux autres systèmes. Pour garantir la cohérence entre pensée et langage nous donc avons modélisé la signification au moyen de la systémique. Sur cette base, nous avons ouvert des réflexions sur les mécanismes que le cerveau utilise pour gérer la signification et appliquer notre modélisation à la recherche d’information sur internet non plus sur la base de mots, mais celle de leur signification. / Since the dawn of civilisation, humanity has tried to express its thoughts. To express these thoughts, man uses languages. Languages can take different forms, ranging from speech to images and writing. To ensure consistency and understanding of what constitutes a double translation, that of the transmission of a message and that of the receipt of a message, philosophy has also tried to explain the meaning of this sequence of characters that constitutes words, sentences, books, and speeches. To guarantee this coherence of the meaning of a message, philosophers used analytical methods, of whom Descartes was the first to describe the principles. We have applied these principles to different philosophies to reach an impasse. Analysis does not allow us to guarantee the understanding of the meaning of a message. Artificial intelligence that offered us a solution. Indeed, the work of Simon H. A. led us to no longer consider meaning as a simple or complicated system, but as a complex one. The methods applied to complex systems are different from the methods applied to other systems. To guarantee the coherence between thought and language, we have modelled the meaning using systemic. Using this as a base, we began to reflect on the mechanisms the brain uses to manage meaning and apply our modelling to the search for information on the Internet, based, not on words, but on their meaning.

La thèse reconstitue un débat entre Hegel et Heidegger à partir de la question sur la constitution du sens. La thèse propose une notion méthodologique de la négativité, qui soutient qu’une détermination conceptuelle est caractérisée par le paradoxe d’être simultanément révélatrice et dissimulant. Le constituant d'un phénomène se dissimule en faveur de l’immédiateté du phénomène constitué. Le rapport de tension entre sens et concept, et donc la confrontation entre Hegel et Heidegger, découle de cette conception de la négativité. Car si elle suppose que le constituant du sens est latent, il faut clarifier comment cette dimension de latence peut être révélée et articulée. Et si la détermination conceptuelle dissimule ce qu'elle révèle, se pose la question si la pensée peut conscientiser et surmonter cette tension inhérente. La dimension latente du sens est-elle une dimension non-conceptuelle ou, à l'inverse, le non-conceptuel est-il incapable d’avoir une portée dans le domaine sémantique? / My thesis maps out a debate between Hegel and Heidegger starting from the question concerning the constitution of meaning. It proposes a methodological notion of negativity, according to which a conceptual determination is characterized by the paradox of being simultaneously revealing and concealing. In other words, the constituent of a phenomenon is concealed in the immediacy of the constituted phenomenon. The tension between meaning and concept, reflected in the dispute between Hegel and Heidegger, arises from this conception of negativity. If the constituent of meaning is latent, it is necessary to clarify how this dimension of latency can be revealed and articulated. And if every conceptual determination conceals what it reveals, the question arises whether thought can become aware of this inherent tension and overcome it. Is the latent dimension of meaning non-conceptual, or is the non-conceptual irrelevant in the semantic domain?

Se comprendre soi-même dans l'existence c'est comprendre concrètement l'abstrait, telle est chez Kierkegaard la tâche de celui qu'il nomme « le penseur subjectif ». Sortir de la plainte et accéder à la vérité de soi c'est se poser dans un rapport particulier à soi-même. Dans ce cadre, Kierkegaard indique différentes postures de vie qui sont autant de réponses fragmentaires que l'existant donne aux questions qui le pressent à son insu car, fondamentalement, ce n'est pas l'homme qui donne un sens à l'existence, mais il est bien lui-même l'interrogé. Ce qui effectue ce travail de questionnement chez le philosophe danois est sa pensée de la répétition dont la fécondité est grande puisqu'elle ouvre le champ de la pensée contemporaine sur ce point. Cette question de la répétition chez lui est paradoxale : elle est le lieu de l'attestation de soi du sujet qui ne devient lui-même que par le jeu d'infimes variations rendues possibles dans le mouvement religieux de la répétition-reprise de soi impliquant dans le creusement de l'être qui se fissure ouverture à l'Autre. Dans ce mouvement, il ne peut pas faire l'économie de l'épreuve de l'angoisse et du désespoir / Understanding oneself in the existence means understanding concretely the abstract : this is the task Kierkegaard appoints to the « subjective thinker ». Getting out of the complaint and reaching the truth about oneself implies setting one's being into a particular relationship with oneself. In this scope, Kierkegaard indicates various postures of live which are so many fragmentary answers the subject gives to these questions that urge him unknowingly, because it's not essentially the man who gives sens to existence but he is the one who is being questioned. What performs this questioning work in the Danish philosopher is this thought about repetition whose fertility is significant since it opens the field of contemporary philosophy in this point. This question of repetition in Kierkegaard's work is paradoxical : if is the place where the self gets certified and thus the subject becomes himself only thanks to the game of minute variations made possible by the religious movement of repetition-retake of oneself wich involves, in the depth of the being that fissures itself, the openness to the Other. In this motion, he cannot avoid the trial of anguish and despair

Alors que l’applicabilité des mathématiques est devenue un sujet d’intérêt pour le débat philosophique récent, celui-ci n’a pas encore clairement mis l’accent sur les questions épistémiques posées par l’intervention des mathématiques dans les sciences et dans la vie quotidienne. Ces questions peuvent être formulées comme suit : comment pouvons-nous connaître la vérité d’une proposition scientifique, ou plus généralement d’une proposition sur certaines caractéristiques du monde naturel, lorsque cette proposition comprend des éléments mathématiques? Quelle sorte de justification avons-nous pour les parties mathématiques de notre connaissance empirique? Cette thèse de doctorat a un double objectif : d’une part, offrir une systématisation critique du débat philosophique en cours sur l’applicabilité. D’autre part, clarifier le problème épistémique posé par l’applicabilité des mathématiques et le séparer des problèmes métaphysiques corrélés. La première partie du travail est consacrée à la formulation des questions propres à une enquête épistémologique sur les mathématiques appliquées, ainsi qu’à la présentation de l’analyse classique de l’applicabilité offerte par Steiner. Dans la partie II, la présentation du débat récent sur l’applicabilité est organisée autour d’une distinction entre les approches qui considèrent les mathématiques pures et appliquées sur le même niveau épistémique, et celles qui distinguent le niveau de mathématiques pures du niveau des applications. Les positions étudiées sont, respectivement, les points de vue fregéen et néo-fregéen, et ce que l’on considère comme des points de vue ‘structurels’, à savoir le structuralisme mathématique (à la fois ante rem et éliminatif), la position de Field et la théorie de la mesure. La partie III introduit le débat sur l’indispensabilité des mathématiques dans les sciences, pour montrer comment les différentes formulations des arguments d’indispensabilité et les critiques qui leur sont adressées renouvellent l’attention sur les questions philosophiques liées à l’applicabilité, et clarifient la séparation entre les questions épistémiques sur les mathématiques pures (par exemple, le problème de l’accès) et les questions épistémiques sur les applications (par exemple, la justification des parties mathématiques de notre connaissance scientifique). La position de Christopher Pincock, qui théorise un traitement épistémique distinct pour les mathématiques pures et appliquées, est spécifiquement analysée. Enfin, la dernière partie en conclut ce que peuvent être les caractéristiques d’une théorie épistémologique adéquate pour les mathématiques pures et pour les mathématiques appliquées, et présentent plusieurs problématiques connexes et cruciales pour de futures recherches. / While the applicability of mathematics has become a topic of great interest in recent philosophical debate, the debate has not yet clearly focused on the fundamental epistemic questions that arise from the use of mathematics in science and in daily life. These questions can be basicallystated as follows: how can we affirm to know the truth of a scientific statement, or more generally that of any statement about a feature of the natural world, when that statement includes some elements of mathematics? What kind of justification do we have for the mathematical portions of our empirical knowledge? My PhD dissertation has a twofold purpose: on the one hand, it offers a critical systematization of the on-going philosophical debate on applicability. On the other hand, the epistemic problem posed by the applicability of mathematics is clarified and separated from correlated metaphysical issues. The first part of the work is devoted to the definition of the specific epistemic questions and the presentation of the classic analysis of applicability problem(s) offered by Steiner. In Part II, the recent debate on applicability is organized around a distinction between those approaches that take pure and applied mathematics to be on the same epistemic level, and those that keep the level of pure mathematics separate from the level of application. The positions investigated are, respectively, Fregean and Neo-Fregean views for the one-stage side, and what I refer to as ‘structural’ views for the two-stageside, namely, mathematical structuralism (both ante rem and eliminative), Field’s account, and measurement theory. Part III takes into account the related debate on the indispensability of mathematics to science, showing how the different formulations of indispensability arguments and the criticisms led to renewed attention to the philosophical questions about applicability in the early 2000s, along with a clarification of the separation between epistemic questions about pure mathematics (e.g. the access problem) and epistemic questions about applications (e.g. the justification of the mathematical portions of scientific knowledge). The account offered by Christopher Pincock, which provides a separate epistemic treatment for pure and appliedmathematics, is specifically analyzed. Finally, in the last part of the work, we draw particular conclusions about what would be, following our analysis, the features of a suitable epistemological treatment of both pure and applied mathematics, while several connected issues are identified as crucial for further inquiry. / L’applicabilità della matematica è diventata un argomento di grande interesse per il dibattito filosofico recente, ma il dibattito non si è ancora focalizzato sulle fondamentali questioni epistemologiche poste dall’uso della matematica nella scienza e nella vita quotidiana. Queste domande possono essere formulate come segue: come possiamo dire di conoscere la verità di un asserto scientifico, o più in generale di qualsiasi asserto su alcune caratteristiche del mondo naturale, quando tale asserto include elementi matematici? Che tipo di giustificazione possiamo avere per le porzioni matematiche della nostra conoscenza empirica? La presente tesi di dottorato ha un duplice scopo: da un lato, si offre una presentazione sistematica deldibattito filosofico in corso sull’applicabilità. Dall’altro lato, il problema epistemico posto dall’applicabilità della matematica è chiarito e separato dai correlati problemi metafisici. La prima parte del lavoro è dedicata alla definizione delle specifiche domande epistemiche sulla matematica applicata; si presenta inoltre l’analisi classica dei problemi legati all’applicabilità offerta da Steiner. Nella seconda parte, la presentazione del dibattito recente sull’applicabilità è organizzata attorno ad una distinzione tra le posizioni che considerano matematica pura e applicata sullo stesso livello epistemico e quelle che mantengono il livello della matematica pura separato dal livello applicativo. Le posizioni indagate sono, rispettivamente, la posizionefregeana e neo-fregeana da un lato, e le posizioni che definiremo ‘strutturali’ dall’altro, ovvero lo strutturalismo matematico (sia ante rem che eliminativo), la posizione di Field e la teoria della misura. La terza parte del lavoro affronta il dibattito sull’indispensabilità della matematica nella scienza, mostrando come le diverse formulazioni degli argomenti di indispensabilità e le critiche ad esse rivolte contribuiscano a rinnovare l’interesse per le domande filosofiche sull’applicabilità, oltre che a chiarire la separazione tra domande epistemiche sulla matematica pura (ad esempio Il problema dell’accesso) e domande epistemiche sulle applicazioni (ad esempio la giustificazione delle porzioni matematiche della nostra conoscenza scientifica). La proposta teorica di Christopher Pincock, che tratta separatamente l’epistemologia di matematica pura e applicata, è analizzata in modo specifico. Nell’ultima parte del lavoro, si traggono alcuni conclusioni su quali potrebbero essere, in seguito allo studio svolto, le caratteristiche di un trattamento adeguato dell’epistemologia della matematica pura e applicata. Infine, alcuni ulteriori problemi connessi sono individuati come cruciali per indagini future.

Orientador : Francisco Benjamin de Souza Netto / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-28T07:36:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bezerra_David_M.pdf: 8159746 bytes, checksum: c6e141dffc721706f1b811962b356536 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2001 / Resumo: "O problema da felicidade em Sêneca e Marco Aurélio" tem como propósito definir o conceito de felicidade para os autores estóicos do segundo período, chamado Estoicismo imperial, a partir dos filósofos Sêneca( 4 a . C.- 65) e Marco Aurélio( 121-180). O texto procura estabelecer também o universo em tomo da questão felicidade, isto é, busca estabelecer os conceitos de dor, destino e paixão e de que forma eles se relacionam, segundo à razão estóica, à possibilidade ou impossibilidade do alcance da felicidade / Abstract: "The problem of happiness in Seneca and Marcus Aurelius" intent to definy the concept ofhappiness to the stoics authors ofthe second period, called Imperial Stoicism, trough out the philosophers Seneca(4 b. C.- 65 a . d.) and Marcus Aurelius(121- 180). The dissertation whishes establishes, too, the universe around the matter happiness, i. e., it wants to put the concepts of pain, destiny and passion and by which way they match, in accord to stoic reason, to the possibility or impossibility of reach ofhappiness / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

Certaines applications issues des biotechnologies sont actuellement controversées d’un point de vue sociotechnique. A l’analyse, il s’avère que les protagonistes de ces controverses utilisent des arguments évolutionnistes de façon récurrente à propos de questions très diverses et parfois de façon apparemment contradictoire. Afin de comprendre les raisons d’un tel usage, d’une part, nous avons procédé dans cette thèse à une analyse de discours des controverses relatives au diagnostic préimplantatoire (DPI) et aux OGM agricoles à partir d’essais et d’articles issus de revues spécialisées ou de vulgarisation. D’autre part, nous avons effectué une étude de l’histoire de l’évolutionnisme scientifique et non scientifique. Nous avons ainsi pu établir que se rejoue à travers ces controverses sociotechniques une partie des controverses structurantes de la pensée évolutionniste et que l’évolutionnisme constitue un cadre de représentations prégnant permettant de débattre collectivement des nouvelles techniques du vivant. / Some biotechnologies are currently socially debated. One may notice that the protagonists of the controversies make regular use of evolutionist warrants concerning very diverse subjects and sometimes in an apparently contradictory way. In order to understand this fact, on the one hand, we analysed controversies relating to preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and GMOs in agriculture on the basis of some essays, review papers and newspaper articles. On the other hand, we studied the history of scientific and non-scientific evolutionist theories. Thus, we established that some essential controversies of evolutionism were repeated into the social controversies about PGD and GMOs and that evolutionism represents a meaningful framework in which new biotechnologies can be collectively debated.