This thesis investigates the relationship between Fascist Italy and the League of Nations (LoN) during the interwar period, with a particular focus on the years from 1922 to 1935. This relationship was contradictory, shifting from moments of active collaboration to moments of open disagreement. The existing historiography on the Italian membership of the League has not reflected this oscillation in policy, focusing disproportionally on the crises Italy caused at the League. However, Fascist Italy remained in the League for more than 15 years, ranking as the third-largest power, and was fully engaged in the institution's work. This dissertation investigates the dynamics that developed between Fascist Italy and the LoN through a systematic study of the Italians involved. In so doing, it contributes to the historiography of the LoN and of the Italian foreign policy in the interwar period. The thesis argues that there was more to the Italian membership of the LoN than the Ethiopian crisis. It reveals the extent of the Italian presence and activity in the institution from the beginning, and demonstrates that the organization was more important to the Italian government than previously recognized. Membership of the League was essential to guarantee Italy international legitimation and recognition. Through an active appropriation of internationalism, the Italian government hoped to obtain practical benefits in the colonial sphere. The thesis uncovers the depth and variety of interactions between nationalism and internationalism in the case of Italy and the League, establishing that they did not oppose each other but rather interacted. This dissertation illustrates the complexity of being an Italian working in the League, as well as the grey areas between nationalism and internationalism evident within individual experiences. Finally, it shows the continuity of actors and expertise in Italy's international cooperation between the interwar and the post-1945 period.

This dissertation attempts to determine what Britain expected from participation in the Supreme Economic Council (SEC) of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and to what extent its expectations were realized. An investigation of available sources reveals that access to European markets and raw materials and a balance of power to prevent French, German, or Russian hegemony in Europe were British foreign policy goals that SEC delegates sought to advance. Primary sources for this study include unpublished British Foreign Office and Cabinet records, published British, United States, and German government documents, unpublished personal papers of people directing SEC efforts, such as David Lloyd George, Austen Chamberlain, Cecil Harmsworth, Harry Osborne Mance, and John Maynard Keynes, and published memoirs and accounts of persons who were directly or indirectly involved with the SEC. Secondary accounts include biographies and histories or studies of the Peace Conference and of countries affected by its work. Primarily concerned with the first half of 1919, this dissertation focuses on British participation in Inter-allied war-time economic efforts, in post-war Rhineland control, in the creation of the SEC, and in the SEC endeavors of revictualling Germany, providing food and medical relief for eastern Europe, and reconstructing European communications. It concludes with Britain's role in the attempt to convert the SEC into an International Economic Council in the last half of 1919 and with the transfer of SEC duties to the Reparations Commission and to the League of Nations. Through participation in the SEC, Britain led in negotiating the Brussels Agreement and in establishing the Rhineland Commission and the German Economic Commission, reversing French attempts to control the Rhenish economy, preventing French hegemony in Europe, and gaining access to German markets for British goods. Although it failed to achieve its goals of strong eastern European states and access to markets and raw materials there, Britain led in restoration of communications and participated in the relief effort which saved the new states from anarchy in 1919.

This thesis considers how attitudes shaped British, French, and American policy regarding the rebirth of Poland. From the outbreak of war in 1914 to the plebiscite in Upper Silesia in 1921, Allied and American policy-makers first considered whether Poland should be an independent state and then where its borders should be. As they did this, they developed attitudes about these questions, for instance about Poles and the right or ability of the Polish nation to administer a modern state. Such considerations assumed that national character exists and is important in the success or failure of a country. My research draws on literature from social psychology in defining the development of such understandings as consistent with stereotyping, in other words using generalisations about social groups to understand those groups or individuals. Allied and American policy-makers considered Poles to be, for instance, quarrelsome, aggressive, anti-Semitic, pitiable, passionate, or loyal. The thesis begins by examining pre-war attitudes to Poland and the impact of the war on these and on the diplomacy of the Polish question. It then discusses the re-emergence of an independent Poland in 1918 and the impact on policies and attitudes of the Polish delegation’s claims at the Paris Peace Conference, of events on the ground, and of the Russo-Polish War. Allied and American decision-making on the rebirth of Poland was central for European diplomacy not only because the attitudes they expressed left lingering grudges on both sides, but also because Poland’s frontiers were an irritant throughout the interwar period until Germany and Russia invaded Poland in September 1939. Moreover, the conclusion that attitudes were a factor in decision-making contributes to a growing recognition among international historians and international relations theorists that it is necessary to look beyond individuals' 'rational' motivations.

Avant même la première distribution d'un film allemand en France, la presse spécialisée s'emploie à dénigrer les productions de l'ennemi héréditaire qui sont réduites à des œuvres de propagande. Ce n'est qu'à la fin de l'année 1921 que Louis Delluc parvient à projeter un premier film germanique. Aux réactions chauvines et nationalistes succèdent rapidement des commentaires plus réfléchis. Ces analyses sont construites sur des stéréotypes issus d'une vision romantique de l'Allemagne telle que Madame de Staël a pu la décrire. Pour les critiques, le succès mondial du cinéma d'outre-Rhin montre la supériorité des cultures européennes sur la « jeune » civilisation américaine. Dès lors, les productions allemandes deviennent un modèle pour le cinéma hexagonal. Avec Les Nibelungen ou Faust, le 7ème art allemand apparaît aux yeux de la critique comme l'archétype de la culture européenne. Ces longs métrages sont représentatifs de l'identité allemande mais dépassent les cadres nationaux pour atteindre une forme d'universel qu'atteste les réussites économiques des productions du milieu des années 1920. L'apparition du cinéma parlant renouvelle les relations franco-allemandes. Les collaborations sont désormais le lot commun des réalisations du début des années 1930 ce que symbolise la production de versions multiples. De part et d'autre du Rhin, les professionnels coopèrent à l'édification d'un cinéma européen sans pour autant perdre de vue l'indispensable ancrage national des films. Des transferts culturels franco-allemands seront multiples jusqu'en janvier 1933. Toutefois l'émigration allemande ne trouvera pas un accueil favorable dans les studios parisiens. / Just after the first World War, French critics commented German film like an industrial or propaganda product. It was until the end of 1921, that Louis Delluc showed a first German movie in France. After some nationalists reactions, critics built around stereotypes an romantic vision of German films. These romantics visions maded by Madame de Staël in the beginning of 19 century. For French critics, the german production worlwide success proved the suporiority of European culture to the “ young “ american civilization. With The Nibelungen or Faust, these features represented German identity. But these film beyond nationalist space to acceded universal signification. Germans productions became the archetype of European Culture in the middle of the 1920s. In the beginning of the 1930s, talkies transformed French-German relations. There were a lot of collaboration on both side of the Rhine: of course, in Babelsberg studios – the most important in European space – and Parisians studios too. For example, Georg Wilhelm Pabst realized three differents versions of Die Dreigroschenoper : the first in german language, a second in french and the third in english. Pabst worked with differents actors and differents technincian. French and German works together – in some case English – to build European cinema without losing national identity. Until January 1933, the French German cultural transfers were multiple. However, the German Emigration didn't find acceptance in the Parisan studios. / Schon vor der ersten Aufführung eines deutschen Films in Frankreich setzt sich die französische Fachpresse dafür ein, die Produktionen des Erbfeinds als reine Propagandawerke herabzuwürdigen. Erst Ende des Jahres 1921 gelingt es Louis Delluc einen deutschen Film in Frankreich zu zeigen. Auf chauvinistische und nationalistische Reaktionen folgen schnell besonnenere Kommentare. Diese Analysen basieren auf Stereotypen, die einer romantischen Vision Deutschlands entspringen, wie sie Madame de Staël beschrieben hat. Die Kritiken stellen den Welterfolg des deutschen Kinos, als Überlegenheit der europäischen Kulturen über die „junge“ amerikanische Zivilisation, dar. Von jetzt ab werden die deutschen Produktionen zu einem Model für das französische Kino. Mit „Die Nibelungen“ oder „Faust“ erscheint die deutsche Kinokunst den Kritikern wie eine Urform der europäischen Kultur. Diese Filme repräsentieren zwar die deutsche Identität, reichen aber über nationale Grenzen hinaus, um eine universelle Form zu erreichen, die durch die wirtschaftlichen Erfolge der Produktionen Mitte der 20er Jahre bezeugt wird. Das Erscheinen des Tonfilms führt zu einer Erneuerung der deutsch-französischen Beziehungen. Zusammenarbeit ist von nun ab ein Kennzeichen der Filmproduktion des Beginns der 30er Jahre. Dies wird durch Herstellung von verschiedenen Versionen deutlich. Auf beiden Seiten des Rheins kooperieren die Filmemacher bei der Erschaffung des europäischen Kinos, ohne dabei die wichtige national Verankerung des Films zu vernachlässigen. Bis zum Januar 1933 gibt es einen mannigfaltigen deutsch-französischen Kulturaustausch. Dennoch findet die deutsche Emigration in die Pariser Studios keinen wohlwollenden Empfang.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:46:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 411628.pdf: 4689901 bytes, checksum: 92fa85034b0f78953e504fc4d15aabb0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-03-30 / O presente texto aborda as rela??es diplom?ticas, pol?ticas e militares entre Alemanha e Brasil. O trabalho prop?e inovar em rela??o aos j? existentes sobre essa tem?tica, pois inverte a ?tica de an?lise, investigando as a??es diplom?ticas, pol?ticas e militares da Alemanha em rela??o ao Brasil. A base fundamental foi a documenta??o militar e diplom?tica existente no Arquivo Nacional Alem?o (Bundesarchiv), tanto no departamento sobre os assuntos relacionados com o per?odo da hist?ria alem? denominado de Reich (Abteilung Deutsches Reich), quanto no conjunto de documenta??o militar (Abteilung Milit?rarchiv); no Minist?rio das Rela??es Exteriores (Ausw?riges Amt). Nestes arquivos, est?o os registros governamentais do III Reich, tornando poss?vel compreender a rela??o da Alemanha com o Brasil. O marco temporal da tese compreende a estrutura??o dos governos de Hitler e de Vargas, da metade da d?cada de 1930 at? a declara??o de guerra brasileira ? Alemanha, em agosto de 1942, momento em que foram interrompidas todas as rela??es e possibilidades de entendimento entre os dois pa?ses. O per?odo mais espec?fico de 1937 a 1942 engloba duas conjunturas hist?ricas distintas: a primeira, de pr?-guerra, e a segunda, de guerra propriamente dita, iniciada em setembro de 1939. As rela??es diplom?ticas, pol?ticas e militares entre os dois pa?ses, nesses dois per?odos, foram de descontinuidades, isto ?, a pol?tica externa era guiada pelas circunst?ncias e n?o por uma continuidade ideol?gica. A partir de 1939, quando se iniciou a guerra, tamb?m houve a interfer?ncias da realidade da guerra. Para a realiza??o da pesquisa e o tratamento das fontes, buscou-se aporte te?rico-metodol?gico na hist?ria pol?tica, na an?lise de discurso atrav?s da intertextualidade, nas discuss?es sobre rela??es exteriores

For an introductory macroeconomics course, the discussion of historical relevance helps foster important learning connections. By comparing the Great Depression to the 2008-2009 recession, a macroeconomics instructor can provide students with connections to history. This paper discusses the major causes of each recession, major fiscal policy and monetary policy decisions of both recessions, and the respective relevance in teaching the relationship of each policy to gross domestic product. The teaching points addressed in this paper are directed towards an introductory college-level macroeconomics course, incorporating a variety of theories from historical and economic writers and data from government and central bank sources. A lesson plan is included in an appendix to assist the instructor in implementing the material.

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This thesis deals with the diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the United States through the Second World War and the first few months following the end of the War. It follows in chronological order the events influencing American-Yugoslav relations. Emphasis is placed on the development of Yugoslav internal events and their political implications.

Ernest Lapointe influençait la politique des affaires extérieures du Canada. Une telle affirmation, quand elle est offerte sans plus de précision, est aussi vide et dénuée de sens que les affirmations comme 'le Québec a toujours dominé la politique canadienne,' ou 'le Québec n'a jamais eu aucun mot à Ottawa.' Cette étude aura pour but de déterminer à quel point--et comment-- Lapointe influençait la politique étrangère du Canada entre 1921 et 1941. Ses fonctions officielles, ministre de la pêche (1921-1924) et de la justice (1924-1926, 1926-1930, 1935-1941), ne suggèrent pas une influence énorme sur la politique des affaires étrangères. Cependant, durant toute sa carrière, Lapointe voyait toujours son rôle à Ottawa comme représentant les Québécois francophones dans le cabinet fédéral; donc, il cherchait à influencer toutes les questions dans le domaine des affaires extérieures risquant de diviser les anglophones et les francophones. Les questions les plus explosives concernaient les relations avec la Grande-Bretagne, la politique canadienne à la Société des Nations, et le contrôle des 'communistes.' Pour assurer que la voix de Québec fût entendue dans ces politiques, Lapointe ne pouvait pas compter sur l'aide du premier ministre Mackenzie King--un anglophone uni lingue qui démontrait peu d'intérêt à comprendre la mentalité québécoise. Afin de déterminer à quel point, et comment, Lapointe influençait la politique étrangère du Canada, cette étude mettra l'accent sur dix-huit décisions importantes. Lapointe n'a presque jamais partagé les opinions de l'impérialiste King; cependant, en comparant leurs opinions avec la décision finale en chaque cas, il devient évident que la voix du Québec est présente dans chaque décision-- à certains moments, cette voix est même dominante. Lapointe utilisait une variété de ressources: son contrôle du caucus québécois, sa capacité de mener la population québécoise, sa loyauté envers King et sa menace de démission. L'importance relative de chacune des ressources évolua pendant trois périodes de sa carrière (1921-1929, 1930-1938, 1939-1941) mais Lapointe a toujours trouvé le moyen pour s'assurer que les politiques à Ottawa incluaient la voix du Québec. Son influence fut confirmée après sa mort, en novembre 1941, quand la voix du Québec tomba soudainement et visiblement silencieuse dans la politique étrangère de King. / Ernest Lapointe influenced Canadian foreign policy. Such a statement, when offered with no more precision, is as empty and meaningless as statements such as 'Quebec has always dominated Canadian policy,' or 'Quebec has never had any say at Ottawa.' This study will attempt to determine how, and how much, Lapointe influenced Canadian foreign policy during the period from 1921 to 1941. His official titles, minister of Marine and Fisheries (1921-1924) and minister of Justice (1924-1926; 1926-1930; 1935-1941), do not suggest a great influence on foreign policy. However, throughout his career Lapointe consistently saw his role at Ottawa as representing Francophone Quebeckers in the federal cabinet; consequently, he sought to influence all External Affairs questions which risked dividing Anglophones and Francophones. The most explosive questions involved relations with Great Britain, the Canadian policy at the League of Nations, and the control of "communists." To ensure that Quebec's voice was heard in these policies Lapointe could not rely on the help of Prime Minister Mackenzie King--a unilingual Anglophone who made very little attempt to understand the views of Francophone Quebec. To determine how and how much Lapointe influenced Canadian foreign policy this study will focus on eighteen important decisions. Lapointe almost never shared the views of the more imperialist King; however, by comparing the opinions of each with the final decision in each case it becomes clear that Quebec's voice was present in every policy--at times, the voice was even dominant. Lapointe relied on a variety of resources: his control over the Quebec caucus, his ability to lead the Quebec population, his loyalty to King and his threat of resignation. The relative importance of each resource changed over three distinct periods of his career (1921-1929, 1930-1938, 1939- 1941) but he always found a way to ensure that Quebec's voice was heard. His influence was confirmed after his death in November 1941, when Quebec's voice fell suddenly and conspicuously silent in King's foreign policy. / Québec Université Laval, Bibliothèque 2013

I use variation in childhood exposure to the Dust Bowl, an environmental shock to health and income, as a natural experiment to explain variation in adult human capital. I also examine a variety of mechanisms by which the Dust Bowl influenced later-life wellbeing, and investigate the scope for recovery from this early-life shock. I find that exposure to the Dust Bowl in childhood has statistically significant and economically meaningful adverse impacts on later-life outcomes, for instance, increasing disability and reducing fertility and college completion. These results hold even after accounting for the possibly confounding effects of the Great Depression, migration, and selective fertility or mortality. The effects I find are more severe for those born in agricultural states, suggesting that the Dust Bowl was most damaging via the destruction of agricultural livelihoods. This collapse of farm incomes, however, had the positive effect of increasing high school completion amongst the exposed, likely by reducing the demand for child farm labor where such labor was not essential to production, and thus decreasing the opportunity costs of secondary schooling; in this outcome, unlike in college completion, family income and student ability were irrelevant. Many of the worst adverse effects are found amongst those exposed prenatally and in early childhood, suggesting that congenital complications in capability development, together with low parental incomes in utero and thereafter, may be to blame for such later-life disadvantage. Together, these findings imply that the Dust Bowl acted largely "indirectly," as an economic shock that in turn affected in utero and early-life conditions, rather than "directly," through personal exposure (e.g. dust inhalation) in childhood. Lastly, results - particularly those on New Deal expenditure - imply both that remediation from early-life disaster is possible under the right circumstances, and that post-shock investment may have compensated for rather than reinforced damage to child endowments. The findings in this study are consistent with a multi-stage model of human capability formation, in which investments in one period respond to endowments in a previous one, and may either reinforce or compensate for these endowments.