This thesis interrogates the political effects of sustainable development discourse as seen through the lens of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), held in Johannesburg, South Africa. By approaching sustainable development from the perspective of Michel Foucault’s work on power, discourse and government, it argues that negotiations at the Summit re-orientated sustainable development in terms of cooperation, consensus and voluntary partnerships. By showing how summits are more than just institutional mechanisms for producing agreement but are also stages on which theatrical and symbolic modes of exemplary politics are performed, the thesis draws attention to how the WSSD functioned as a key technique of exemplary governmentality. Yet the Summit also facilitated the emergence of new constellations of political actors, and provided a stage for myriad political protests and demonstrations. One of these protests – a mass march on 31 August 2002 – was the largest anti-government protest in South Africa since the end of Apartheid. By approaching these protests as Foucauldian ‘counter-conducts’ rather than ‘pure’ acts of resistance or revolution, the thesis shows how they were implicated within forms of advanced liberal rule. As such the thesis contributes to a discursive understanding of sustainable development in the post-Johannesburg era; to an appreciation of the evolving role of global summits as forms of theatrical exemplary government; and to the political effects of resistance and protest. It concludes that the WSSD worked to make politically sustainable a global order which is manifestly unsustainable – whilst also providing opportunities for the status quo to be protested and resisted.

Impartiality has long been a core norm of United Nations peacekeeping. However, since 2000 the dominant conception of impartiality has changed, leading to more coercive forms of peacekeeping. Claims to impartial authority are no longer based exclusively on terms to which all parties consent. Instead, they are premised on a more ambitious and expansive set of norms related to human rights, around which consensus is presumed but not always affirmed. This dissertation critically examines the change in both the conception and practice of impartiality, which, it argues, is an integral part of the emergence of a more assertive liberal internationalism. In doing so, it challenges dominant constructivist approaches within IR that conceive of norms as linear and static. It advances a framework for a multi-level analysis of impartiality as a “composite” and “contested” norm. Through this framework it elucidates the macro-level politics surrounding the norm’s institutionalisation at the UN, as well as the micro-level politics surrounding its implementation in the specific case of the UN mission in Congo (MONUC). The analysis of the processes of both institutionalisation and implementation reveals an absence of consensus over the norm itself, and over the purposes of and actions involved in contemporary peacekeeping. This contestation, together with varying expectations and incentives created by the norm amongst local actors, frequently results in unintended consequences, which are contrary to the norm’s original intent. And yet, despite these consequences, the very nature of assertive impartiality makes it difficult for those who claim such authority to change course. Given that the legitimacy of peacekeeping derives both from whether it is seen to reflect and promote shared values, as from the degree to which it is actually effective, this difficulty raises troubling questions for peacekeeping itself and for the UN, the institution to which it has become so symbolically linked. This dissertation argues that, ultimately, the UN’s role may be to reflect, rather than to resolve, the differences of normative interpretation among its member states. It concludes that a more practical and prudent conception of impartiality – one which recognises that impartiality is necessarily and inextricably political – will be necessary if scholars and practitioners alike are to navigate the normative tensions inherent to a more assertive liberal international order.

La France a obtenu de ses partenaires l’inclusion des territoires d’outre-mer dans le traité de Rome instituant la CEE. L’objectif était, en période de décolonisation, de maintenir des liens entre les métropoles et les anciennes colonies dans un contexte nouveau. Entre 1958 et 1963, les Six expérimentent un système d’association avec les pays tiers, en particulier les états africains et malgache associés (EAMA) qui permet de maintenir des liens économiques particuliers avec ces états souverains, sous couvert d’une aide au développement. La Convention de Yaoundé de juillet 1963 marque la volonté des Six d’institutionnaliser et de coordonner leurs relations avec les pays tiers africains et malgache et jette les bases d’une politique de coopération, consolidée par des renouvellements de cette Convention. Celles-ci furent basées au niveau commercial, sur des préférences tarifaires et contingentaires réciproques et une assistance financière et technique. Aux termes d’une décennie d’association, le bilan du soutien au développement fut très maigre. Excepté la coopération dans le domaine de l’enseignement et de la formation où il y a eu une hausse de la scolarisation dans la plupart des EAMA, les résultats au niveau économique furent dérisoires : les préférences dont ils bénéficièrent se réduisirent progressivement à peu de chose, ils restèrent encore très dépendants et fortement endettés. Leur économie était toujours basée sur l’exportation des produits tropicaux et l’extraction des minerais et les termes de l’échange très déséquilibrés. / France has obtained from its partners the inclusion of the overseas territories in the Treaty of Rome which established the EEC. The goal was to maintain relations between the mainlands and the former colonies in a new context during the decolonisation.Between 1958 and 1963, the Six experienced a partnership system with third countries, particularly the African and Malgach Associated States (AMAS) which allowed to maintain particular economic ties with these sovereign states on behalf of development aid. The July 1963 Convention of Yaounde marked the will of the Six to institutionalise and coordinate their relations with African and Malgache third countries and laying the foundations of cooperation policy, consolidated by the renewal of this convention. On the commercial level, These agreements were based on mutual preferencial tariffs and quotas and financial and technical assistance.At the end of a decade of association, the development aid assessement was very poor, except for the field of education and training where an increase in schooling was witnessed in most of the AMAS, but in terms of economy, results were insignificant: the preferences they benefited from gradually decreased into little, They still remained very dependent and heavily indebted. Their economy was still based on the export of tropical products and mining and the very unbalanced terms of trade.

Cette thèse analyse les raisons qui ont poussé le Japon à se retirer en 1936 du système de contrôle des armements navals établis en 1922. La littérature sur le sujet est particulièrement pauvre pour ce qui est de la science politique et ne parvient pas à systématiser les différentes variables afin de mieux comprendre l’extrême complexité du processus de décision japonais. Appréhender ce processus permet d'aborder une problématique plus générale, qui est de comprendre pourquoi les états mettent fin à des relations de nature coopérative, préférant poursuivre une politique de sécurité unilatérale malgré les coûts que cela peut engendrer. Le modèle théorique de cette thèse propose l’hypothèse suivante: certains changements dans le système international affectent l'influence relative des différentes institutions domestiques prenant part à la formulation des politiques étrangères. En cas de tensions internationales, l'expertise des forces armées prend de l’importance pour la formulation des politiques étrangères. Dans un tel scénario, il est probable que le pays se retire de l'accord de contrôle des armements si ses forces armées s’opposent au maintien de cet accord. Les forces armées désavouent l'accord si ce dernier est intrusif dans des domaines relevant de l'expertise de l’institution militaire au point de menacer sa capacité à répondre à une nouvelle menace extérieure. Le degré d'influence des forces armées et l'intensité du conflit entre militaires et civils pour ce qui concerne la politique de défense nationale constituent les deux variables qui déterminent la propension d'un état à privilégier une approche unilatérale de sa politique étrangère en matière de sécurité. / This thesis aims at assessing the causes of Japan's decision to withdraw in 1936 from the so-called Washington system of naval arms control. The existing literature is weak in the field of political science and fails to efficiently systematize the different variables to understand the highly complex Japanese decision-making process. To better understand this process helps in addressing a more general question: Why do states choose to pursue an independent and unilateral foreign security policy instead of a cooperative approach, despite the cost a withdrawal may engender? This thesis' theoretical framework is based on the academic literature on civil-military relations, and proposes the following hypothesis: Changes in the international system affect the relative influence different domestic institutions have on the formulation of foreign policy. In case of emerging international tensions, the military’s expertise acquires new importance for the formulation of foreign policy. In such a scenario, the arms control agreement does not survive if the military establishment advocates against the maintenance of the agreement. The military establishment opposes the agreement if it is so intrusive into its traditional sphere of responsibility that it negatively affects its ability to deal with a worsening security environment. The level of influence the military establishment possesses over the formulation of foreign security policy and the intensity of conflict in civil-military relations are the two variables of the thesis, which account for a state's propensity to privilege a unilateral approach to its foreign security policy.

La thèse a pour objectif principal de contribuer à l’étude des déterminants de l’engagement des pays donateurs en matière de développement. En constatant une progression universaliste dans la recherche de tels déterminants, qui consiste à identifier des variables indépendantes communes pour l’ensemble des bailleurs de fonds, la thèse est partie pour défier cette recherche tout en l’enrichissant. Le défi renvoie à l’étude de cas spécifique de l’engagement balte en faveur de l’aide. Il s’agit d’un défi pluriel, empirique comme méthodologique. Sur le plan empirique, c’est un contexte historique particulier des pays baltes, celui de l’adhésion à l’UE et l’obligation de contribuer aux efforts de la communauté des bailleurs de fonds européens, qui est à noter. De repères méthodologiques font défaut en raison du manque de données et de recherche systématique sur le sujet. La thèse propose de neutraliser les biais qui peuvent en résulter en mettant l’engagement balte en perspective par rapport aux pays de Visegrád, disposant de l’expérience en matière d’aide étrangère de l’époque d’avant 1989. En dépit du manque d’une expérience propre, le trio balte affichent des efforts en faveur des populations plus démunies à la hauteur des pays de Visegrád. L’engagement en ressort comme une réalité sociopolitique complexe, dépassant le registre incrémental et la contrainte de l’UE. Il s’affirme à l’échelle européenne comme un processus d’émulation intergouvernementale. Un ancrage social de ce processus relève pourtant moins d’une croyance absolue en ce qui est adéquat que d’un effort raisonné de ne pas se distinguer parmi ses pairs. / The dissertation aims to contribute to the research on determinants of the commitment of donor countries in the area of development aid. Given the progress of a universalist approach towards studying these determining factors (an approach aiming to identify common independent variables for the donor community as a whole), the dissertation takes the position of challenging the current research while, at the same time, enriching it. The main challenge, empirical as well as methodological, lies within the choice of a specific case study, which is the commitment of the Baltic states. Empirically, the specificity of the Baltic countries relates to their historical context, that is, their accession to the EU and their obligation to contribute to the efforts of the European donor community. Yet another specificity relates to the lack of relevant data and systematic research on the subject. Considering the biases which may result from this state of play concerning the Baltic countries, the dissertation frames their commitment in a comparative perspective with regard to the Visegrad Four, which possess relevant experience from the pre-1989 period. Despite the lack of their own national experience, the Baltic states deploy efforts akin to those of the Visegrad countries. Hence, their commitment reveals itself as a complex sociopolitical reality, determined by factors other than incrementalism or the EU’s pressure. The commitment appears as a process of intergovernmental emulation. A social nature of this process is however less linked to an unconditional belief in what is considered to be appropriate than to a reasoned effort not to stand out among one’s peers.

Depuis 2004 et la résolution 1559 appelant au retrait syrien, le Liban est l’objet d’une action internationale extrêmement intense. En effet, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies (CSNU), face à la nouvelle configuration libanaise et levantine, a déployé des mécanismes issus de la sécurité collective afin de renforcer les attributs régaliens de l’État libanais. Le maintien de la paix, à travers le renforcement de la Force intérimaire des Nations unies au Liban (Finul), et la justice internationale, à travers la création du Tribunal spécial pour le Liban (TSL), sont les deux principaux outils visant à maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales par le prisme libanais. Dans les deux cas, la France, que ce soit militairement ou diplomatiquement, a été singulièrement active.Partant de ce constat, notre thèse vise, dans un premier temps, à déconstruire les mécanismes onusiens mis en oeuvre dans le cas libanais. Il s’agira, plus précisément,d’appréhender les différentes logiques qui sont constitutives de l’action du CSNU au Liban.Que ce soit en matière de maintien de la paix ou de justice internationale, les résolutions onusiennes et les organes qui en découlent font face à la souveraineté nationale et reflètent ainsi l’éternelle opposition entre les chapitres VI et VII de la Charte des Nations unies. Or,nous verrons que dans le cas libanais, le CSNU met en oeuvre une action hybride oscillant entre une logique coercitive et une logique consensuelle.Dans un second temps, notre thèse analysera la tension permanente de l’État libanais,qualifié de quasi-État, entre des dynamiques supra-étatiques traduites par les résolutions onusiennes et des dynamiques infra-étatiques incarnées par des acteurs communautaires et confessionnels, parfois transfrontaliers, et propres au système consociatif libanais. Nous tenterons alors de mesurer le degré de consolidation de deux des attributs régaliens du quasi-État libanais : la défense et la justice. Plus largement, il s’agira de s’interroger sur la possibilité pour l’action internationale, héritière du système westphalien, de remplir ses objectifs dans un environnement national et régional qui questionne plus que jamais la possibilité de maintenir et de conforter des États-nations.À l’aune de la régionalisation des conflits depuis 2004, et particulièrement depuis2011 au Levant, nous conclurons à la difficulté pour le CSNU de faire face à des États déliquescents ainsi qu’à des conflictualités d’interface qui non seulement sont en plein essor,mais qui sont par ailleurs de plus en plus liées les unes aux autres. / Since 2004 and Resolution 1559 demanding Syrian withdrawal, Lebanon has been subjected to an exceptionally intense international action. Facing a new configuration both in Lebanon and the Levant, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has indeed implemented mechanisms of collective security aimed at strengthening national sovereignty.Peace-keeping through United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil) enhancement and international justice through the creation of the Special tribunal for Lebanon (STL) are the main tools for maintaining international peace and security in a Lebanese perspective. In both cases, France has been particularly active, be it militarily or diplomatically. Setting out from this premise, our thesis, to begin with, will aim at deconstructing the UN mechanisms implemented in the Lebanese case. More precisely, we shall try to apprehend the constitutive logics of the Security Council’s action in Lebanon. Whether in peace-keeping or in international justice, UN resolutions and the bodies created by them are faced with national sovereignty and, therefore, reflect the eternal opposition between chapters VI andVII of the United Nations Charter. Nevertheless, it will be shown that, in the Lebanese case,the UNSC has developed a hybrid action, fluctuating between coercion and consensus.Then, our thesis will show how the Lebanese State, which we will describe as a “quasi-State”, has to face an ongoing tension between supra-State dynamics expressed by UN resolutions and sub-State dynamics embodied by communitarian and religious representatives, sometimes cross-border, which are specific to the Lebanese consociationalist system. We shall later determine the extent to which two of the Lebanese quasi-State’s attributes, defense and security, have been consolidated by international action. More broadly, we will wonder whether international action, as an heir to the Westphalian system,can achieve its goal in a national and regional environment that challenges, today more than ever, the possibility to maintain and support nation-States. In a context of regionalization of conflicts since 2004, and especially since 2011 in the Levant, we shall come to the conclusion that the Security Council still has problems indealing with deliquescent States and with what we will call “interface conflicts”, which not only are booming, but also are more and more inextricably connected to one another.