Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernando de Sa Moreira.pdf: 900127 bytes, checksum: e6dca220fe2a2ad340fec9e410b1d430 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-01 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This dissertation investigates the conception of asceticism on two German philosophers, Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche. Whereas there isn't a precise language to mediate this two philosophies, we apply the concepts of pathos and ethos to make a dialog between the German philosophers, which allow us to investigate how these concepts appear in the cosmological and ethical parts of their theories. Especially in the Nietzsche's philosophy, we concentrate the researches on his third period. We use mainly the books Genealogy of Moral, Beyond Good and Evil and The Antichrist. About Schopenhauer's books, we use mainly the two volumes of The World as Will and Representation. Our conclusion is that, on Schopenhauer's doctrine, the cosmological effectiveness (Wirklichkeit) is pathos, but the metaphysical reality (Realität) is ethos. Therefore the asceticism is a sui generis pathos on Schopenhauer: when the will extraordinarily makes a turn, it makes the negation of the will, it does not become an absolute nothing. It become a relative nothing, a negative pathos. The same does not occur to Nietzsche. According to the philosopher of the will to power, the will never negates itself. All the effectiveness is always pathos and there is no ethos: the world is always pathos, in all aspects. The asceticism is an ordinary case of the will to power (Wille zur Macht) and the ascetic pathos is merely a strategy of a form of life to conserve itself in existence. / Esta dissertação investiga a concepção de ascetismo nos filósofos alemães, Arthur Schopenhauer e Friedrich Nietzsche. Considerando que não há uma linguagem precisa para mediar estas duas filosofias, aplicamos os conceitos de pathos e ethos para criar o diálogo entre os dois filósofos alemães, o que nos permite investigar como esses conceitos aparecem nas partes cosmológicas e éticas das suas teorias. Na filosofia nietzschiana, concentramos nossas pesquisas no seu terceiro período, principalmente os livros Genealogia da moral, Além de bem e mal e O anticristo. Em relação às obras schopenhauerianas, utilizamos principalmente os dois volumes de O mundo como vontade e representação. Nossa conclusão é que, na doutrina schopenhaueriana, a efetividade cosmológica (Wirklichkeit) é pathos, mas a realidade metafísica (Realität) é ethos. Assim, o ascetismo é um pathos sui generis em Schopenhauer: quando a vontade extraordinariamente faz uma viragem, ou seja, faz a negação da vontade, ela não se torna um nada absoluto, mas se torna um nada relativo, um pathos negativo. O mesmo não acontece em Nietzsche. Para o filósofo da vontade de potência, a vontade jamais nega a si mesma. Toda efetividade é sempre pathos e não há ethos algum: o mundo é sempre pathos, em todos os seus aspectos. O ascetismo é um caso ordinário da vontade de potência (Wille zur Macht) e o pathos ascético é apenas uma estratégia de uma forma de vida para conservar-se na existência.

Proposed thesis is an attempt to summarise the term object in the work of American philosopher Graham Harman, he himself named Object oriented ontology. The accent will be given also to other terms such as realism, essence, quadruple dimension of object, withdrawal of object, intentionality, conception of time and space, emanation and others. It attempts to create a certain genealogy of those terms in the work of other authors (Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzche, Merleau-Ponty) and consequent comparison with the use of those terms in Harman's work. The aim is to create a certain critical overview of Harman's conception of o object and in general speculative realism theory and point out certain other approached to the classical subject-object dimension.

<p>Denna c-uppsats behandlar Nietzsches avvikelse från Schopenhauers <em>Världen som Vilja och Föreställning</em> i verket <em>Tragedins födelse</em>. Uppsatsens syfte är att undersöka varför det för Nietzsche är möjligt att förena det apolliniska och det dionysiska medan det för Schopenhauer inte är möjligt att förena vilja och föreställning.</p>

À sa publication, La Joie de vivre d'Émile Zola fut reçue comme un roman à thèse réfutant les théories d'Arthur Schopenhauer. C'était là l'intention avouée du romancier. Or, nombreux sont les critiques à avoir soulevé la dimension puissamment pessimiste de l'oeuvre, invoquant surtout le personnage fortement autobiographique de Lazare et une genèse textuelle problématique. Zola accordait une grande importance à la documentation qu'il préparait en vue de rédiger ses romans. Notre objectif premier est donc celui d'examiner la façon qu'a eu le romancier d'écrire la philosophie qu'il a lue. À cette fin, nous nous penchons sur le Dossier préparatoire de La Joie de vivre et y suivons les stades successifs du personnage schopenhauerien; nous étudions également la version publiée du roman, mais de façon ciblée: nous nous limitons aux thèmes -fort schopenhaueriens -de la douleur et du malheur. Nous constatons, à partir de l'analyse des personnages, qu'un système très proche des idées du philosophe structure l'oeuvre et hiérarchise les forces en présence. Au cours de la préparation et de la rédaction de l'oeuvre, les faits compilés se mêlent au hasard des données biographiques, idéologiques et littéraires qui viennent en former la matière narrative. Notre labeur de généticien aura été celui de démêler les diverses influences rencontrées et de les replacer en ordre chronologique. Certaines, comme celles de Guy de Maupassant ou de Paul Bourget n'avaient pas encore été attestées ou n'avaient pas fait l'objet d'études approfondies. II en résulte une vision plus complète de l'avant-texte. Nos résultats démontrent qu'Émile Zola s'est trouvé à fictionnaliser plutôt fidèlement, à plusieurs égards, une philosophie qu'il entendait au départ réfuter. Le sens philosophique de l'oeuvre demeure ambigu néanmoins, irréductible à une conclusion nette. Partant, nous nous interrogeons sur la portée philosophique d'un texte Iiltéraire aussi plurivoque qu'est La Joie de vivre. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Zola, La Joie de vivre, Schopenhauer, Philosophie, Génétique, Personnage.

Denna c-uppsats behandlar Nietzsches avvikelse från Schopenhauers Världen som Vilja och Föreställning i verket Tragedins födelse. Uppsatsens syfte är att undersöka varför det för Nietzsche är möjligt att förena det apolliniska och det dionysiska medan det för Schopenhauer inte är möjligt att förena vilja och föreställning.

This thesis examines the moral philosophical commitments that Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche advance in their respective oppositions to utilitarianism. Though not always under that title, all three reject the claim that promoting happiness is the ultimate end that we pursue, or ought to pursue, through moral principles and values. Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche see this rejection reflected in human nature itself. Each develops a distinctive conception of 'higher self,' or of higher purposes already belonging, in some sense, to each of us, in accordance with which we ought to shape our character. Self-formation, not the mere pursuit of happiness (whether our own or that of others), is thus our true moral project. I focus on each philosopher's account of agency and motivation as the locus in which this view of morality is developed, highlighting the differences that emerge from the details of their respective accounts. This thesis shows that a tight relation between cognition and motive feeling is central, though in different ways, for Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to the motivational structure of those actions through which we develop moral character. According to Kant, recognition of being bound by the moral law (our 'practical cognition' of freedom) is indissolubly linked to the feeling of respect for it, which in turn is explicable only through such recognition. For Schopenhauer, the 'intuitive cognition' that our existence as distinct individuals is illusory is the feeling of compassion. Nietzsche radically expands this point, arguing that, in every act of will, the motive feeling and guiding cognition are uniquely linked. Only a superficial grasp of human motivation supports the idea that pleasure and pain are the common motive forces underlying all our actions. The inner conflict in human nature, the creative tension in self-formation, is not, for Nietzsche, that between a uniquely moral form of motivation and a 'lower' instrumental pursuit of pleasure. Rather, this inner tension, expressed most strikingly and distressingly in extreme ascetic and guilt-ridden strands of Christian morality, is the product of a complex historical conflict between two different modes of behavioural selection – our evolutionary development and the processes of socialization.

This thesis examines the moral philosophical commitments that Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche advance in their respective oppositions to utilitarianism. Though not always under that title, all three reject the claim that promoting happiness is the ultimate end that we pursue, or ought to pursue, through moral principles and values. Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche see this rejection reflected in human nature itself. Each develops a distinctive conception of 'higher self,' or of higher purposes already belonging, in some sense, to each of us, in accordance with which we ought to shape our character. Self-formation, not the mere pursuit of happiness (whether our own or that of others), is thus our true moral project. I focus on each philosopher's account of agency and motivation as the locus in which this view of morality is developed, highlighting the differences that emerge from the details of their respective accounts. This thesis shows that a tight relation between cognition and motive feeling is central, though in different ways, for Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to the motivational structure of those actions through which we develop moral character. According to Kant, recognition of being bound by the moral law (our 'practical cognition' of freedom) is indissolubly linked to the feeling of respect for it, which in turn is explicable only through such recognition. For Schopenhauer, the 'intuitive cognition' that our existence as distinct individuals is illusory is the feeling of compassion. Nietzsche radically expands this point, arguing that, in every act of will, the motive feeling and guiding cognition are uniquely linked. Only a superficial grasp of human motivation supports the idea that pleasure and pain are the common motive forces underlying all our actions. The inner conflict in human nature, the creative tension in self-formation, is not, for Nietzsche, that between a uniquely moral form of motivation and a 'lower' instrumental pursuit of pleasure. Rather, this inner tension, expressed most strikingly and distressingly in extreme ascetic and guilt-ridden strands of Christian morality, is the product of a complex historical conflict between two different modes of behavioural selection – our evolutionary development and the processes of socialization.

Dissertação (mestrado) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná, Curitiba, 2006 / Inclui bibliografia / O presente trabalho é uma investigação sobre a dimensão dionisíaca na tragédia grega, encontrada na produção filosófica do jovem Nietzsche, no período entre 1870 e 1876. Tem como ponto de partida uma reflexão sobre a Teoria do Uno-primordial e sua naturez

Orientador: Luiz Roberto Monzan / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-16T19:32:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Germer_GuilhermeMarconi_M.pdf: 1635494 bytes, checksum: 6abc36184c5edf1a2a22448d88eb02ac (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / Resumo: Nossa dissertação tem por objetivo analisar e interpretar o esclarecimento de Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) dos conceitos do belo (schön) e do bom (gut) (moral, virtude). Segundo o filósofo, ambos não são verdadeiramente ensináveis, isto é, não se deve esperar que as estéticas desde Aristóteles tornem os seus pupilos artistas geniais, tampouco como se pode ansiar que os discursos morais tragam o caráter genuinamente ético. Pelo contrário, o pensador propõe à filosofia a tarefa puramente teórica e contemplativa, a saber, a de não prescrever regras ao espírito, mas descrever abstratamente o que de fato ocorre no belo e no bom, por meio de uma interpretação e explicitação cuja matéria e limite é "este mundo efetivo da cognoscibilidade, no qual estamos e que está em nós". Ambos os esclarecimentos são apresentados em seu essencial pelo filósofo, respectivamente, no Livro III e no Livro IV de Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (O Mundo como Vontade e como Representação) - ambos os quais compõem, portanto, a bibliografia básica de nossa investigação. Resumidamente, Schopenhauer defende que o belo consiste, pelo lado objetivo, nas Idéias eternas (ewigen Ideen) de Platão, os arquétipos dos fenômenos relativos e fugazes do princípio de razão suficiente e a "objetidade mais adequada possível da coisa em si" (die möglichst adäquate Objetität des... Dinges an sich), e pelo subjetivo, no puro sujeito do conhecimento destituído de Vontade (reines, willenloses Subjekt der Erkenntnis). Quanto ao bom, o filósofo identifica-o ao conceito da compaixão (Mitleid), cujo grau negativo é a justiça (Gerechtigkeit), no qual ela apenas obstrui a injustiça (Unrecht), e o positivo a caridade (Menschenliebe), no qual ela "não apenas me impede de causar dano a outrem, mas também me impele a ajudá-lo". Por fim, nós também comentamos os seguintes temas capitais do pensamento schopenhaueriano: o idealismo, a polêmica com Kant, o princípio de razão suficiente, a Vontade como coisa em si, senhora do intelecto, impulso cego e auto-discórdia, o pessimismo e a autonegação e afirmação da Vontade de viver / Abstract: Our work aims to analyze and interpret the clarification of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) of the concepts of the beautiful (schön) and the good (gut) (moral virtue). According to the philosopher, both are not really teachable, that is, one should not expect that Aristotle's aesthetics will make his pupils into brilliant artists, nor can one aspire that moral speeches have a genuinely ethical character. Rather, the thinker assigns to philosophy a purely theoretical and contemplative task, that is, not to prescribe rules to the spirit, but to abstractly describe what actually occurs in the beautiful and good, through an interpretation and explicitness the subject matter and limit of which is "this actual world of what is knowable, in which we are and which is in us." Both explanations are given in their essentials by the philosopher, respectively, in Book III and Book IV of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (The World as Will and Representation) - both of which make up the basic bibliography of our research. In short, Schopenhauer argues that, on the objective side, beauty consists of Plato's eternal Ideas (Ideen ewigen), archetypes of the fleeting phenomena of the principle of sufficient reason and " the best possible objectity of the thing in itself" (die möglichst adequate Objetität des ... Ding an sich), and on the subjective side, the pure subject of knowledge without will (reines, willenloses Subjekt der Erkenntnis). As for the good, the philosopher identifies it with the concept of compassion (Mitleid), the negative side of which is justice (Gerechtigkeit), negative in that it only blocks injustice (Unrecht), with charity (Menschenliebe) being the positive side, in that it "not only prevents me from causing harm to others but also compels me to help them". Finally, we also comment on the following main themes of Schopenhauer's thought: idealism, the controversy with Kant, the principle of sufficient reason, the will as thing in itself and master of the intellect, blind impulse and self-discord, pessimism and selfnegation and affirmation of the will to live / Mestrado / Metafisica do Belo e dos Costumes / Mestre em Filosofia

Orientador: Oswaldo Giacoia Junior / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-06T01:23:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bassoli_SelmaAparecida_M.pdf: 270977 bytes, checksum: 441067c587503bb1b552422662bbc150 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 / Resumo: Aplicamos o conceito matemático de grandeza negativa como um recurso que elucida aspectos da filosofia moral de Schopenhauer. Uma grandeza é negativa relativamente à outra, na medida em que só pode ser reunida a ela por oposição, quando uma suprime da outra o equivalente a si mesma. Utilizamos esse conceito para tratar da oposição entre as motivações, com o objetivo de evidenciar que um motivo leva à ação conforme suprime a influência, sobre o caráter, do motivo oposto. Também fizemos uso desse conceito para esclarecer a oposição entre a afirmação e a negação da vontade. Partindo da distinção entre nihil negativum e nihil privativum, adotada por Schopenhauer para tratar do nada que resulta da negação da vontade, mostramos que a vontade se nega à proporção que suprime o seu modo de afirmação anterior / Abstract: We apply the mathematic concept of negative magnitude as a resource that elucidates Schopenhauer¿s aspects of moral philosophy. A magnitude is negative related to another as long it can be joint to it in opposition, when one suppresses the equivalent of itself from the other. We use this concept to deal with the opposition between the motivations, in order to realize that a motive leads to the action as it suppresses the opposite motive influence, on the character. We made use of this concept to elucidate the opposition between the affirmation and denial of will as well. Starting from the distinction between nihil negativum and nihil privativum, adopted by Schopenhauer to deal with nil resulted from the denial of will, we demonstrate that will is denied as it suppresses its previous affirmation mode / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia