This paper examines the occurrence and outcome of auditor litigation related to financial statement misstatements and the effect of auditor misstatement-based litigation on subsequent auditor behavior. The study is motivated by recent calls to limit auditor legal liability and the need to examine the ability of litigation to deter non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) financial reporting. I find that misstatement severity is the primary driver of auditor litigation. Specifically, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a regulatory investigation, a larger stock price decline, and/or a greater number of accounting application [i.e., Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)/GAAP) failures. In addition, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with engagement fees that consist of a greater magnitude or a greater proportion of non-audit service fees. Further, I find that misstatement severity and the size of the plaintiffs? claims are the primary drivers of auditor settlements resulting from misstatement-based litigation. Specifically, I find that an auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a greater amount of alleged income or equity inflation over the class action time period, and/or a larger alleged percentage drop in share price over the class action time period. With respect to subsequent auditor behavior, I find evidence that auditor litigation results in more conservative subsequent auditor behavior across a litigated auditor?s office-wide client portfolio (that excludes the litigated client). Specifically, in the year following auditor litigation, I find evidence that litigation results in increased auditor constraint of client-reported positive and signed discretionary accruals, as well as longer audit report lags.

From the Asian Finance Crisis in 1997, to many scandals in U.S.A. in 2001, and lots of fraudulent practices for many years in Taiwan, these cases severely injured the investors and the whole society. In fact, before these fraud cases happening, a lot of scholars have proposed that manager can manipulate reports with accounting tactics to manage earnings and window dress the performance of the company. After these scandals bursting, the researches which discuss how to regulate CEO¡¦s behavior by using corporate governance mechanism get more attentions. A lot of researches point out that CEO¡¦s option-based compensation might be one of the reasons which result in the self-interested behavior, and provide their views about the monitoring effects of the corporate governance mechanism. However, the researches that discuss whether CEO¡¦s self-interested behavior will influence the monitoring effects of the corporate governance mechanism are few. This paper divides the pubic listed company that had issued warrants to CEO from 2001 to 2005 into two groups by the ratio of option-based compensation in CEO¡¦s total compensation. We want to know that whether the corporate governance mechanism has the same influence in earnings management and company¡¦s performance in different CEO¡¦s option-based compensation ratio. The corporate governance and compensation variables we used are institutional ownership in the firm, the number of institutional directors, board size, percent of independent outside directors on the board, percent of inside directors on the board, director and executive officer stock ownership, company size, and CEO¡¦s option-based compensation ratio. The conclusions as follows: 1. CEO¡¦s option-based compensation ratio forms the threshold effect to the monitoring effect of the corporate governance mechanism. When CEO¡¦s option-based compensation takes particular proportion of total CEO¡¦s compensation, the corporate governance mechanism will be more effective. 2. The corporate governance mechanism that has significant influence in earnings management and operating performance will be different when CEO¡¦s option-based compensation ratio is different. 3. Among these corporate governance mechanism, percent of independent outside directors on the board is the only one that can have similar and significant influence in earnings management no matter how high the CEO¡¦s option-based compensation ratio is. It may relate to the independence of independent outside directors.

This paper examines the value-relevance of Scandinavian earnings information and book values over the past decade in order to shed some light on whether the extensive global adoption of IFRS/IAS has contributed to an increased accounting quality in terms of economic decision-usefulness to equity investors. We address this research question using a sample of 4.310 firm-year observations for 431 exchange-listed companies at NASDAQ OMX Nordic and Oslo Stock Exchange between 2001 and 2010. The degree of value-relevance in our firm-sample is operationalized through two price regressions and one return regression and empirically tested via the statistical association between capitalized values of equity or annual changes in capitalized values of equity and the study’s three explanatory accounting variables: (i) book values, (ii) accrual-based earnings and (iii) cash-flow-based earnings. Taken as a whole, our results show significant empirical signs of an increased value-relevance in both Scandinavian earnings information and book values, allowing us to draw significant as well as contributing conclusions on the information content of financial statement information disclosed in the Scandinavian region. We believe our study adds empirical substance to practical debates over the function of financial reporting as well as resourceful material to both Scandinavian investors and to the ongoing international discussion on the harmonization of financial reporting standards.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of the new Financial Fair Play regulations set forth by the United European Football Association (UEFA) in 2011 on levels of earnings management in European professional football. The Financial Fair Play regulations were imposed as a means of controlling the exorbitant amounts of debt and player’s wages that have threatened the financial stability of many professional football clubs throughout Europe. While UEFA has boasted early success of the new regulations, citing reduced aggregate losses of all football clubs, reduced overdue payables, and less outstanding debt, this study examines levels of discretionary accruals before and after the new regulations were instated to determine if teams are managing earnings to avoid UEFA sanctions. This study collected data from 137 different teams competing in UEFA competition from 2007 to 2013. Discretionary accruals were estimated using the Jones model (1991) as modified by Kothari et al. (2005). The findings of this study were largely inconclusive as a significant difference could not be found in levels of abnormal discretionary accruals before and after the introduction of Financial Fair Play. These findings may suggest that UEFA has succeeded in creating regulations that have curbed an era of extreme leveraging and club losses while simultaneously restricting additional opportunities for club owners to manage earnings that reduce both earnings quality and financial transparency. Overall, the findings from this study highlight the need for more widely available financial information from European football clubs and additional years of financial data under the new regulations.

Studies on earnings management usually hypothesise that managers manage accruals opportunistically. Few studies however, argue that managers can also use accruals to improve the value relevance of reported earnings to help investors better assess the firm's operating performance. While substantial evidence on managers' opportunistic behaviour on accruals has been documented in the literature, empirical evidence on the informativeness of accruals is scarce and inconclusive. The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether managers use accruals to communicate private information regarding the firm's operating performance, or as reported in the literature, use them for their own benefit. This thesis finds that on average, firms reporting high earnings accompanied by high accruals have significantly negative subsequent period stock returns suggesting that these firms manage their accounting earnings. Focusing on stock dividend issues as an incentive to opportunistically increase accruals, the results are found to be consistent with the earnings management hypothesis. Stock dividend issuing firms are reported to significantly increase accruals in the issue year followed by poor earnings and stock price performances in the subsequent year. Moreover, discretionary accruals of the issuing firms are negatively correlated with both future earnings and abnormal stock returns. This evidence attempts to complement the earnings management literature. The analysis on the incentive to decrease accruals related to share repurchases, however, does not provide sufficient evidence to suggest that managers use their discretion to decrease accruals. To investigate the hypothesis that managers use accruals to convey information regarding their firm's future profitability, this thesis employs the contemporaneous earnings and dividend announcements as the research setting. This choice was made to increase the likelihood of detecting the use of accruals as private information communication while simultaneously mitigating the likelihood of the opportunistic income smoothing hypothesis to explain the results. The evidence strongly indicates that managers use both accruals and dividend increases as their private information communication regarding their firm's future profitability. Dividend increasing firms report positive accruals which are positively correlated with future profitability. This finding contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the accrual signalling hypothesis. Overall, the results of this thesis suggest that, depending on the incentives, managers can use the discretion accorded under the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in estimating accounting accrual, either to manage accruals opportunistically or to help investors better assess the firms' operating performance.

Submitted by Automa??o e Estat?stica (sst@bczm.ufrn.br) on 2017-08-02T10:58:41Z No. of bitstreams: 1 RodolfoMaiaRosadoCascudoRodrigues_DISSERT.pdf: 1221368 bytes, checksum: 4d8ff8598c075ee77063237af6f16389 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Arlan Eloi Leite Silva (eloihistoriador@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-08-09T15:27:09Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 RodolfoMaiaRosadoCascudoRodrigues_DISSERT.pdf: 1221368 bytes, checksum: 4d8ff8598c075ee77063237af6f16389 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-09T15:27:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 RodolfoMaiaRosadoCascudoRodrigues_DISSERT.pdf: 1221368 bytes, checksum: 4d8ff8598c075ee77063237af6f16389 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-06-16 / Este estudo tem por objetivo investigar o comportamento do n?vel de gerenciamento de resultados trimestrais das companhias abertas brasileiras. Para isso, selecionou-se uma amostra de 112 empresas listadas na BM&FBovespa e estimou-se os accruals discricion?rios trimestrais entre 2012 e 2015 atrav?s do modelo Paulo como proxy para o gerenciamento. Esses accruals foram ent?o analisados quanto ?s m?dias de todos os trimestres do per?odo analisado, assim como consolidado por cada trimestre (1T, 2T, 3T e 4T). Em seguida, utilizou-se uma segunda regress?o com os accruals discricion?rios trimestrais e vari?veis dummy representativas de cada trimestre. Os resultados indicam que, em m?dia, a magnitude dos accruals discricion?rios s?o maiores no quarto trimestre, seguidos pelo terceiro trimestre, primeiro trimestre e, por ?ltimo, o segundo trimestre. A an?lise de regress?o demonstrou, ainda, que os n?veis dos accruals discricion?rios para o quarto e o primeiro trimestres se mostraram estatisticamente significantes. Esses achados sugerem que o n?vel de gerenciamento de resultados do quarto trimestre ? maior que nos demais trimestres. Al?m disso, o n?vel de gerenciamento de resultados do primeiro trimestre ? estatisticamente diferente dos n?veis do segundo e terceiro, causado, possivelmente, pela revers?o dos accruals do per?odo anterior no per?odo seguinte. O estudo contribui para a literatura ao demonstrar que o gerenciamento de resultados ocorre de maneira diferente ao longo do ano, evidenciando que os incentivos para o gerenciamento de resultados tendem a ser mais fortes nas demonstra??es anuais em rela??o ?s demonstra??es trimestrais, merecendo aten??o de investidores, analistas, reguladores, auditores e demais usu?rios da informa??o cont?bil. / This study aims to investigate the behavior of the quarterly earnings management level of Brazilian public companies. For this, a sample of 112 companies listed on the BM&FBovespa was selected and the quarterly discretionary accruals among 2012 and 2015 were estimated using Paulo model as a proxy for earnings management. These accruals averages were analyzed for all quarters in the period, as well as consolidated for each quarter (1Q, 2Q, 3Q and 4Q). Then, a second regression with the quarterly discretionary accruals and dummy variables representative of each quarter was used. The results indicate that, on average, the magnitude of discretionary accruals are higher in the fourth quarter, followed by the third quarter, first quarter and the second quarter. The regression analysis also showed that discretionary accruals for the fourth and first quarters were statistically significant. These findings suggest that the earnings management level in the fourth quarter is greater than in the other quarters. In addition, the earnings management level in the first quarter is statistically different from the levels of the second and third, possibly caused by the accruals reversal from the previous period in the next period. The study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that earnings management occurs differently throughout the year, as the incentives for earnings management tend to be stronger in the annual financial statements in relation to quarterly statements, deserving attention of investors, analysts, regulators, auditors and other users of accounting information.

A presente pesquisa foi desenvolvida com o objetivo de avaliar a capacidade dos investidores em interpretar os dados emanados pela Contabilidade; mais especificamente, analisou sua habilidade em compreender informações relativas ao lucro. De forma complementar, buscou analisar a existência de oportunidades de obtenção de ganhos econômicos por intermédio da adoção de estratégias de investimento com base em informações relativas aos accruals. A amostra compreendeu empresas não financeiras para as quais o banco de dados Economática dispunha de informações relativas ao período de 1995 a 2010. Foram descartadas da amostra as empresas com patrimônio líquido negativo, companhias com dados faltantes (missings), bem como observações com comportamento distinto dos demais (outliers). Por conta do baixo impacto dos números contábeis no mercado de capitais brasileiro detectado por Lopes (2005) esperava-se uma baixa presença da anomalia dos accruals no mercado de capitais brasileiro. Isso porque, países em que a importância dos lucros para os preços de mercado é reduzida, a precificação de ações seria menos influenciada pela fixação funcional no lucro final reportado o que, por sua vez, provocaria interferências na anomalia dos accruals (EL MEHDI, 2011). Para avaliar se a persistência dos componentes dos accruals era significativamente inferior aos componentes de fluxos de caixa, estimou-se uma regressão com dados em painel, na qual foi possível comprovar a hipótese de que os ajustes do regime de competência exibem uma menor persistência, com um parâmetro padronizado e estatisticamente significativo na regressão estimada de 0,43, enquanto os componentes de fluxos de caixa apresentaram um parâmetro de 0,53. A falta de significância estatística entre os accruals correntes e retornos anormais futuros das companhias estudadas, bem como, da ausência de retornos anormais significativos de estratégias baseadas em accruals demonstraram que uma baixa qualidade dos lucros correntes - devido a um alto nível de accruals - não resultou em retornos anormais negativos no período posterior. As proxies relativas a adoção das normas IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) e ao nível de investimentos - incluídas no modelo de regressão - compreendem parte das contribuições deste tralho, ainda que não se tenha identificado significância estatística para tais variáveis. Isso porque, por intermédio do teste-t, foi explicitada a ocorrência de uma relação entre o nível de acrruals e o crescimento do imobilizado. Tal resultado sugere indícios de que ambas as variáveis captariam o mesmo efeito, qual seja, a atividade investimento por parte das firmas (WEI; XIE, 2007; ZACH, 2007). Os resultados coadunam com as evidências detectadas por Cupertino (2010), ampliando os indícios sobre o comportamento do mercado frente a informações emanadas pela Contabilidade em mercados emergentes, além de explicitar a ausência da denominada anomalia dos accruals no mercado de capitais brasileiro. / This research was developed to evaluate investors\' ability to interpret Accounting data, more specifically, to examine its ability to effectively understand earnings information. As a complement, we have analyzed the existence of economic opportunities to obtain abnormal returns through investment strategies based on accruals. The sample was composed by nonfinancial companies with available information in Economatica database from 1995 to 2010. We\'ve excluded firms with negative equity, missing data, as well as outliers. In countries in which profits importance to market price is lower, pricing of shares would be less influenced by the bottom line functional attachment, which in turn, would decrease the Accruals Anomaly (El MEHDI, 2011). Since Accounting numbers in Brazilian stock market have demonstrated low impact (LOPES, 2005) we previously expect a lower presence of the Accrual Anomaly. To assess whether persistence of accruals was significantly lower than cash flow component, we\'ve estimated a panel data regression, in which it was possible to prove our first hypothesis, that accrual\'s exhibit a lower persistence with a 0.43 estimated parameter, while the cash flows have presented a 0.53 parameter, both significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level. The lack of statistical significance between current accruals and future abnormal returns among studied companies and the absence of significant abnormal returns in strategies based on accruals have demonstrated that a low quality of current earnings - due to a high level of accruals - did not result in a negative abnormal return, thereafter. Adding proxies to IFRS adoption and investment level can be considered as an additional contribution. Although these variables have shown no statically significance, we\'ve found a relationship, explicit by T-test, between accruals level and inventory growth, providing evidences that both variables would capture the same effect, namely, investments activity by firms (WEIK; XIE, 2007; ZACH, 2007). The results are consistent with Cupertino (2010) research, have increased evidences about market behavior to Accounting information in emerging markets, and explicit the absence of the Accrual Anomaly in Brazilian stock market.

Det är genom den finansiella redovisningen som företag redogör för sina prestationer. Företag eftersträvar att redovisa höga vinster i syfte att värna om relationen till intressenter, vilken är relaterad till finansiell information. Earnings management utgör ett verktyg för att styra redovisad information i önskad riktning. Det bidrar till snedvridning och minskad trovärdighet för den finansiella rapporteringen.Dåvarande ordförande för U.S. Security and Exchange Commission, Arthur Levitt, uttrycker att earnings management är problematiskt, det försämrar kvaliteten på redovisat resultat och finansiella rapporter. Earnings management innebär ett utnyttjande av bedömningsutrymmen i syfte att manipulera den finansiella informationen. En redovisningspost som skapar tillfälle för företeelsen är avsättningar, vilka baseras på bedömningar. Avsättningar kan övervärderas för att skapa utrymme för framtida återföring, med avsikt att öka redovisat resultat. Av tidigare forskning framgår att återföring av avsättningar används mer frekvent när företag redovisar ett negativt resultat. Det har även konstaterats att företag återför avsättningar för att nå upp till förväntningar eller för att undvika att rapportera nedgång i vinster.Syftet med studien är att, inom ramen för earnings management, studera effekter av när företag på Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Large Cap återför avsättningar. Detta med fokus på företagens resultat samt måluppfyllelse. I studien är relationen mellan redovisat resultat och återföring av avsättningar central. Det undersöks huruvida avsättningar återförs, antingen för att undvika att redovisa ett förlustresultat eller för att nå upp till vinstmål. Det ska mynna ut i en slutsats om huruvida earnings management förekommer. Tidigare forskare har uttryckt ett behov av denna sortens studie, då det finns få empiriska studier där återföring av avsättningar granskas med koppling till earnings management.Studien har en deduktiv ansats och en kvantitativ metod har tillämpats för att besvara forskningsfrågorna. Datamaterialet utgörs av 222 stycken årsredovisningar under tidsperioden 2010-2015. Relevant finansiell information har hämtats ur dem för att testas och vidare analyseras. Datamaterialet har testats genom statistiska sambandstest och dess resultat analyseras med hjälp av tidigare forskning och studiens teoretiska referensram. Den teoretiska referensramen utgörs av positiv redovisningsteori, systemorienterade teorier och designad redovisning.Studien resulterar i ett enhetligt svar på forskningsfrågorna. Svaren indikerar på att earnings management genom återföring av avsättningar inte förekommer på Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Large Cap. Resultatet skiljer sig från tidigare forskning. / The financial statements are meant to convey the performance of a company. Companies strive to report high profits in order to safeguard their relationships with stakeholders, which are related to the financial information. Earnings management represents a tool for controlling reported information in a desired direction. It contributes to distortion and reduced credibility of the financial reporting.Former chairman of the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission, Arthur Levitt, states that earnings management is problematic, it’s causing an erosion in the quality of reported earnings and the financial reports. Earnings management involves the use of discretion in order to manipulate the financial information. Provisions, which are based on estimates, create an opportunity for the phenomenon. Provisions can be overstated to provide reserves for future reversals, with the intention to increase reported earnings. Prior research shows that reversals are used more frequently when companies report a loss. It has also been stated that companies use reversals to meet forecasts or to avoid reporting a decline in profits.The purpose of this study is to examine, in the context of earnings management, effects of reversal of provisions on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Large Cap. This while focusing on reported earnings and earnings targets. Central for this study is the relationship between reported earnings and reversals. It is examined whether provisions are reversed in order to avoid to report a loss or with the aim to reach an earnings target. This will appear in a conclusion whether earnings management occurs or not. Prior researchers have expressed a need for this kind of study, as there are few empirical studies in which reversal of provisions, in the context of earnings management, is examined.The study has a deductive approach and a quantitative method has been applied in order to answer the research questions. The data material consists of 222 annual reports during the period 2010-2015. Relevant financial information has been collected from the annual reports in order to be investigated and analyzed. The data has been tested through statistical correlation tests and the results are analyzed using prior research and the theoretical framework. The theoretical framework consists of positive accounting theory, systems-oriented theories and designed accounting. The study results in a uniform answer. The answers indicate that earnings management through reversal of provisions does not occur on the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Large Cap. This result is not consistent with prior research.This thesis is written in Swedish.

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Interpretation No. 46 (FIN 46), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities – An Interpretation of ARB No. 51, in January 2003 and revised it in December 2003, with the objective to improve the transparency of financial information. Under FIN 46, companies are required to consolidate variable interest entities (VIEs) on financial statements if they are the primary beneficiaries of the VIEs. This dissertation empirically examines whether the implementation of this new financial reporting guidance affects firms’ accruals quality and investment efficiency. A manually collected sample comprised of firms affected by FIN 46 and firms disclosing no material impact from FIN 46 is used in the empirical analyses.The first part of the dissertation investigates the effects of FIN 46 on accruals quality. By using different accrual quality measures in prior studies, this study found that firms affected by FIN 46 experienced a decrease in accrual quality compared to firms reporting no material impact from FIN 46. Among the firms affected by FIN 46, firms consolidating VIEs were compared with firms terminating or restructuring VIEs. The accruals quality of firms consolidating VIEs was found to be lower than that of firms terminating or restructuring VIEs. These results are consistent in tests using alternative control samples.The second part of this dissertation examines the effects of FIN 46 on investment efficiency. Mixed results were found from using two different proxies used in prior literature. Using the investment-cash flow sensitivity to proxy for investment efficiency, firms affected by FIN 46 experienced a decrease in investment efficiency compared to firms reporting no material impact. It was also found that higher investment-cash flow sensitivity for firms consolidating VIEs during post-FIN 46 periods compared to both the no-impact firms and the matched pair control sample. Contrasting results were found when the deviation from expected investment is used as another proxy for investment efficiency. Empirical analyses show that FIN 46 firms experienced improved investment efficiency measured by the deviation from expected investment after their adoption of FIN 46. This study also provides explanations for the opposite results from the two different proxies.

In my dissertation, I examine the role of the audit committee chair in the financial reporting process and test if the change in audit committee chair is associated with changes in audit fees, audit report lag, and audit quality. Motivation for this dissertation comes from the increased attention paid by legislators and regulators in recent years on the role of the audit committee in the financial reporting process. While prior studies have examined diverse issues related to the composition of the audit committee, no prior study has examined the role of the audit committee chair on the oversight of financial reporting, even though the chair of the committee has significant control over the functioning of the committee. In the first essay of my dissertation, I show that audit fees are higher in firms that have a change in the audit committee chair. In the second essay, I examine the association between changes in the audit committee chair and audit report lag. In a changes regression, I find that the change in audit committee is associated with higher audit report lag. The third essay examines the association between changes in audit committee chair and two different measures of audit quality: restatements and abnormal accruals. There is no evidence in support of the argument that changes in audit committee chair is associated with higher quality financial reporting. Overall, the results suggest that the change in audit committee chair has an important impact on the financial reporting process of public companies.