In early 2001, as I began exploring the role of religion in conflict, I came across a declaration by a then little-known leader, Osama bin Laden, and his fellows. That declaration was of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders. Many analysts now see it as one of the founding documents of al Qaeda, the amorphous terrorist umbrella group. The purpose of the declaration was to issue a fatwa that, because United States troops were stationed in the holy Arabian peninsula and threatened Muslims, particularly in Iraq, it was every Muslim's duty 'to kill the Americans and their allies - civilians and military - ... in any country in which it is possible to do it'. Of course, the first thing that struck me, as an American, was that here was a group that wished to kill me solely because of my birthplace. They did not seem to care that I might not support specific actions of my government, even if I supported that government generally. Nor was there any discussion of whether methods other than violence might be more useful in persuading my fellow citizens as to the justice of their cause. I wondered, as a student of peace studies, what I could do in the face of such seemingly implacable hatred. The second thing that struck me about the declaration was its language. I noticed, in particular, a certain flourish that one does not often find in political analysis. The image that 'nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food' has always stayed in my mind because the simple image has such rhetorical power. I also noticed, in accordance with my research interests, the use of religious teachings as a justification for violence. Yet poetic rhetoric and religious dogma were not the only contents of that declaration. Bin Laden and his fellows made coherent political points. They cited as examples of the harm caused by the United States: the post-Gulf War presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia, 'dictating to its rulers [and] humiliating its people;' the continued bombing of Iraq 'even though all [Saudi] rulers are against their territories being used to that end;' and, finally, the way that these actions contributed to the security of Israel by weakening Arab nations. Thus, beneath its religious expression the declaration contained political points with which I could engage. Now, as I categorically oppose the use of violence, I unreservedly reject the conclusion of the fatwa. Moreover, I do not assume that a single statement is evidence of this group's true intent. It may very well be the case, as analysts more versed in their politics than I have argued, that al Qaeda's real goal is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Its affiliation with Afghanistan's Taliban certainly supports this argument. In spite of these things, though, their use of political arguments meant they were trying to reach an audience that cared about such things. I could address that audience as well, and try to propose different courses of action that would address the same concerns. Thus, I could step outside of my original framework, in which I envisioned implacable hatred, and argue for nonviolent ways of addressing the issues. Yet the religious idiom of the declaration was also an important factor. Given that the declaration addressed Muslims as Muslims, by only trying to argue political points with them I might alienate people for whom the religious language meant a great deal. Already in my research I had come to the conclusion, drawing on R. Scott Appleby's The Ambivalence of the Sacred, that the people best placed to show the peaceful potential of a religion are believers in that religion. I am not, however, religious. Thus, this conclusion left me with no recourse in the face of the religious aspects of conflict. I began to wonder what role a nonreligious - or, as I came to think of myself, a secular - person could play in peacemaking when religion is an element of a conflict. Moreover, I saw that different seculars would have different reactions to bin Laden's arguments. Some would reject the message because of the religious medium. Some, like I first did, would perceive the sociopolitical elements but continue to ignore the religious language. Others, as I also briefly did, might consider the religious element but leave out the issue of their own secular nature. Yet no perspective provided a good model for what I, as a secular, might do. Thus, the goal of my thesis became to analyze the various models of secularity, find the most beneficial principles, and construct from these a model for secular best practice. That Osama bin Laden's words should catalyze this thesis brings me to two important points. First, this is not a thesis about Islam. If a disproportionate number of the examples that I use throughout the thesis focus on Islam, this should not indicate that Islam deserves special attention concerning conflict and violence. Rather, the focus here is always on secularity and secular responses to religion in situations of conflict. However, particularly after September 11th, the largely secular policy and scholarly establishments of Europe and North America have produced a great deal of material concerning Islam. Thus, while I sought out more diverse sources dealing with secularity, I often used the religion most commented on by secular sources as an exemplar. That leads to the second point, which is that this is not a thesis about terrorism. Given its scope and the place of religion in it, most obvious case study to use in this thesis is the 'war on terror' - which I call such for ease of use, as that is what the Western media generally call it, not because I think it is an adequate designation. I will cover this topic in the final chapter, but because the thesis is about peace and violence in conflict, and not about specific forms of violence, it will not figure elsewhere. Because this thesis is concerned with violence and, specifically, with the promotion of peace, it has an overt prescriptive element. This stems in large part from my Peace Studies background. Peace Studies entails a normative commitment to pursue peaceful situations through nonviolent means. Thus, at several points I actively enjoin readers to take or not take certain types of action because, by my analysis, that is the best way to promote peaceful relationships. More generally, by the title of this thesis, I ask readers to 'rethink secular and sacred' - both what these terms mean, and more importantly how they relate to one another. In particular, this goal leads me to avoid discussing the concept of tolerance. Tolerance is often held to be a virtue by those who seek to promote nonconfrontational religious interaction. However, as many other writers have pointed out, the word 'tolerance' itself stems from physiological and biological studies, where it means the ability to withstand negative factors, such as poisons or drugs. Thus I find that its social meaning is essentially negative, denoting forbearance of what one finds repugnant. While in a very limited sense I feel that tolerance is necessary, it is only as a first step to actively engaging with what one might at first find off-putting.

<p>This thesis deals with cooperation between France, Germany and the United Kingdom within the area of foreign and security policy. Two case studies are presented, one of them concerning cooperation between the three states within and outside institutions in 1980 following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the other dealing with cooperation concerning the crisis in Macedonia in 2001. In accordance with the approach of neoliberal institutionalism the primary hypothesis is that cooperation is primarily determined by the interests of states but it is also limited by norms and affected by the institutions of which the three states are members. The study describes the large variety of forms of cooperation that exist between France, Germany and the United Kingdom, in which the United States also plays an important part, and which also includes their cooperation within a number of international institutions. The study also points to the new forms of interaction between states and institutions that have come about since the Cold War ended, and which give a stronger role to institutions and the cooperation between them. Still, however, states retain a decisive role in cooperation within the field of foreign and security policy.</p>

Through historical and content analyses of war coverage, this study qualitatively addresses emotional quality, use of sources, and implied use of technology to better understand the tension between Vietnam and Afghanistan war correspondents and their military counterparts. Early American democracy aspired to give total freedom to its people. But the American military, in its quest to uphold the ideas of democracy, has often challenged the freedom of press clause set forth by the United States Constitution. Since the Vietnam era, the relationship between the military and the media has been plagued by questions of censorship, assertions of falsehood, and threats to national security. But it is the technological advancements in both reporting and combat techniques that have caused a disappearance of the nostalgic war coverage that American correspondents once prospered from. The possibility of returning to journalists' vision of unrestricted press access is all but lost due to such advancements.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This thesis explains the military relationship between the United States and Pakistan in the context of their divergent national security interests. During the Cold War, U.S. concerns focused on the global contest between democracy and communism. In this competition, Pakistan was seen as an important ally. However, Pakistan viewed India as its primary threat and considered global ideological concerns as secondary in importance. At times, each country benefited from the other, but neither ever fully met the other's most important needs. The United States did not support Pakistan in its wars with India and Pakistan did not confront communism except to help oust Afghani governments non-compliant with Pakistan's interests. Pakistan's military held power for more than half of Pakistan's existence and became the U.S.' key ally in South Asia. Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapons distanced U.S. relations in the post-Cold War environment. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 catapulted Pakistan's importance as an ally but at the cost of supporting a military regime and the erosion of a democratic government in Pakistan. This thesis argues that Pakistan's military now shares a relationship with the United States that builds regional stability but which may also hold political consequences in the United States. / Major, United States Marine Corps

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Reissued 5 May 2017 with typographic corrections to degree, abstract. / Broadly, this thesis argues that success in Afghanistan—for Afghans and their neighbors alike—entails establishing state-building measures, supremacy of law and human rights, rapid economic growth, and strong Afghan National Security Forces who can encourage the Afghan public to accept the practices of stable democracy and good neighborly relations. To fix some of the myriad variables in Afghanistan's likely state in 2026, which will mark the end of the transformation decade following the U.S. withdrawal in 2016, the proposed project installs three hypothetical scenarios: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly. These scenarios do not predict the future in Afghanistan but rather shed light on the factors and variables that will shape the postwar period. Examining such scenarios may allow strategic planners to develop alternative measures for complex situations. Sustained political stability and the will to reform by the Afghan establishment, fortified by consistent international financial and military support for at least 10 to 15 or more years, would likely be the key to success in the Afghanistan end game. Otherwise, Afghanistan will slip back into a situation much like the one that emerged once after the Soviet withdrawal—extremism, war, and instability. The scenarios are developed by examining several factors: the criticality of the Afghan issue throughout history; Afghanistan's indigenous facts and prospects; Pak–Afghan cross-interests and policy dimensions; Global War on Terror implications; conflicting interests; and regional and extra-regional politics. / Commander, Pakistan Navy

Tens of thousands of contractors work for private military and security companies (PMSCs) in armed conflicts around the world, often hired by states to fulfil functions that were once the exclusive domain of the armed forces. In this context, PMSCs have performed a wide range of activities including offensive combat, prisoner interrogation, military advice and training, armed security, intelligence and logistics. The proliferation of PMSCs during the past two decades has challenged conventional conceptions of the state as the primary holder of coercive power in the international arena. Nonetheless, this Thesis argues that the traditional state-centred frameworks of international law remain vitally relevant to the regulation of private security activity in contemporary armed conflict. Three states are in a strong position to influence PMSCs in this context—the state that hires the PMSC, the state in which the company is based or incorporated, and the state in which the company operates—and this capacity for influence enables international law to regulate PMSC activities indirectly using these states as an intermediary. This Thesis critically analyses the pertinent international obligations on these three categories of states and identifies the circumstances in which PMSC misconduct may give rise to state responsibility in each case. It also examines the recent practice of certain key states in order to evaluate their compliance with these obligations. By providing a clear and in-depth analysis of states' international obligations to control PMSCs in armed conflict, this Thesis may not only facilitate the assessment of state responsibility in cases of PMSC misconduct; it may also play an important prospective role in setting standards of conduct for states in relation to the private security industry. This in turn may encourage and assist states to develop their domestic laws and policies in order to improve overall PMSC compliance with international law.

The WikiLeaks Afghanistan war logs contain nearly 77,000 reports of incidents in the US-led Afghanistan war, covering the period from January 2004 to December 2009. The recent growth of data on complex social systems and the potential to derive stories from them has shifted the focus of journalistic and scientific attention increasingly toward data-driven journalism and computational social science. In this paper we advocate the usage of modern statistical methods for problems of data journalism and beyond, which may help journalistic and scientific work and lead to additional insight. Using the WikiLeaks Afghanistan war logs for illustration, we present an approach that builds intelligible statistical models for interpretable segments in the data, in this case to explore the fatality rates associated with different circumstances in the Afghanistan war. Our approach combines preprocessing by Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) with model trees. LDA is used to process the natural language information contained in each report summary by estimating latent topics and assigning each report to one of them. Together with other variables these topic assignments serve as splitting variables for finding segments in the data to which local statistical models for the reported number of fatalities are fitted. Segmentation and fitting is carried out with recursive partitioning of negative binomial distributions. We identify segments with different fatality rates that correspond to a small number of topics and other variables as well as their interactions. Furthermore, we carve out the similarities between segments and connect them to stories that have been covered in the media. This gives an unprecedented description of the war in Afghanistan and serves as an example of how data journalism, computational social science and other areas with interest in database data can benefit from modern statistical techniques. (authors' abstract)

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / This thesis defines the strategic utility of Special Operation Forces (SOF), identifies why SOF only provide limited strategic utility, and presents an operational concept for the reorganization, alignment, and employment of SOF to overcome these shortf alls. The thesis is presented in a deductive manner that argues that SOF were designed for strategic purposes, and leads the reader to conclude that reformation must occur for SOF to provide strategic utility and meet their intent. SOF would be in an optimal position to meet their organizational intent by becoming a fifth armed service within the Department of Defense (DoD). Through the creation of mission-based units and a holistic employment strategy, SOF would become a strategic instrument capability of assisting national decision -makers in blending the elements of national power. Finally, the thesis concludes with additional required areas for research to make this concept become a reality, but that are beyond the scope of this study. / Major, United States Army

Normatively, protecting civilians from the conduct of hostilities is grounded in the Geneva Conventions and the UN Security Council protection of civilian agenda, both of which celebrate their 70 and 20 year anniversaries in 2019. Previous research focusses heavily on protection of civilians through peacekeeping whereas this research focuses on ‘non-armed’ approaches to enhancing civilian protection in conflict. Prior research and experience reveals a high level of missingness and variation in the level of available data on civilian harm in conflict. Where civilian harm is considered in the peace and conflict literature, it is predominantly from a securitized lens of understanding insurgent recruitment strategies and more recent counter-insurgent strategies aimed at winning ‘hearts and minds’. Through a structured focused comparison of four case studies the correlation between the level of quality, timely and consistent data on civilian harm and affect on the conduct of hostilities will be reviewed and potential confounders identified. Following this the hypothesized causal mechanism will be process traced through the pathway case of Afghanistan. The findings and analysis from both methods identify support for the theory and it’s refinement with important nuances in the factors conducive to quality, timely and consistent data collection on civilian harm in armed conflict.

Sverige har länge haft ett stort biståndsengagemang gentemot Afghanistan som innefattat ett stort ekonomiskt bidstånd och mindre civila insatser för civilbefolkningens del. Efter terrorattackerna i New York, USA, den 11 september kom det svenska engagemanget i allt större utsträckning att handla om säkerhet, både för den afghanska befolkningens räkning men också för Sverige som stat. Studien undersöker huruvida en diskursförskjutning skett i den svenska afghanistandiskursen i kontexten Kriget mot terrorismen.