Submitted by GISELLE CILAINE ILCHECHEN COELHO (gisellecoelho@bb.com.br) on 2018-10-21T22:06:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_GiselleCoelho_Aprovada_10_10_18.pdf: 834725 bytes, checksum: 0d6e8eaece862792245038faef493553 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Janete de Oliveira Feitosa (janete.feitosa@fgv.br) on 2018-10-24T12:31:04Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_GiselleCoelho_Aprovada_10_10_18.pdf: 834725 bytes, checksum: 0d6e8eaece862792245038faef493553 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-10-29T13:36:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_GiselleCoelho_Aprovada_10_10_18.pdf: 834725 bytes, checksum: 0d6e8eaece862792245038faef493553 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-10-10 / Objetivo – Este estudo pretende investigar o efeito da qualidade das práticas de governança sobre as estruturas de remuneração executiva. Metodologia – Para atingir os objetivos propostos foi realizado um estudo quantitativo, fundamentado em procedimentos estatísticos como testes das hipóteses, por meio de modelo de regressão linear múltipla. A abrangência da amostra, 174 empresas, e a utilização de variáveis de controle e a transformação logarítmica de algumas variáveis, possibilitaram modelos estatisticamente significantes e com bons níveis de capacidade preditiva. Resultados – Foi demonstrado que a qualidade das boas práticas de governança corporativa não gera influência sobre a remuneração executiva, bem como sobre o CEO pay slice. No entanto, há evidências de que o efeito das boas práticas de governança corporativa reduz o conformity gap e, portanto, possibilita maior aderência às boas práticas de remuneração executiva. Limitações – A principal limitação da pesquisa deve-se à análise de apenas um ano, podendo trazer efeitos sazonais como o desligamento de executivos. Outro ponto importante é que inúmeras empresas não forneceram as informações de remuneração de seus executivos, estando amparadas, naquele ano, pelo mandado de segurança obtida pelo IBEF, abrangendo cerca de 19% das empresas da amostra, podendo gerar algum tipo de viés nos resultados. Contribuições práticas – A partir dos resultados, conclui-se que no Brasil as estruturas de governança não geram influência sobre as práticas de remuneração, no entanto, o incentivo à aderência às boas práticas deve estar sempre presente como forma de reduzir o conflito de agência. Contribuições acadêmicas – Este estudo contribui para a pesquisa de um conceito pouco conhecido no Brasil, conformity gap, demonstrando estatisticamente que as empresas mais maduras em governança corporativa possuem maior conformidade às boas práticas de remuneração executiva. Originalidade – Conforme observou-se em uma pesquisa prévia acerca do tema, este é o primeiro estudo sobre remuneração executiva que apresenta o efeito da qualidade das práticas de governança sobre a remuneração executiva, com a utilização de expressões pouco conhecidas no Brasil como variável dependente, conformity gap e com o CEO pay slice. / Purpose – This study intends to investigate the effect of quality of governance practices on structure of executive compensation. Design/Methodology – In order to reach the proposed objectives, a quantitative study was carried out, based on statistical procedures as hypothesis tests, using a multiple linear regression model. The sample coverage, 174 companies, and the use of control variables and the logarithmic transformation of some variables, allowed for statistically significant models with good levels of predictive capacity. Findings – It has been demonstrated that the quality of good corporate governance practices does not generate influence on executive compensation, as well as CEO pay slice. However, there is evidence that the effect of good corporate governance practices reduces the conformity gap, thus, it allows greater adherence to good executive remuneration practices. Research limitations – The main limitation of the research is due to the analysis of only one year and can have seasonal effects such as the dismissal of executives. Another important point is that numerous companies didn’t provide the compensation information of their executives, being supported in that year by the security order obtained by the IBEF, covering about 19% of the companies in the sample and may generate some type of bias in the results. Practical Implications – Based on the results, it can be concluded that in Brazil, governance structures do not influence remuneration practices, however, encouraging adherence to good practices should always be present as a way to reduce agency conflict. Academic Implications – This study contributes to the research of the little known concept in Brazil, conformity gap, statistically demonstrating that more mature in corporate governance have greater compliance with good executive remuneration practices. Originality – As noted in a previous research, this is the first study on executive compensation that presents the effect of the quality of governance practices on executive compensation, using the expression little known in Brazil as a dependent variable, conformity gap and with CEO pay slice.

Em virtude de sucessivas crises e fraudes envolvendo grandes empresas ocorridas nos últimos anos, a sociedade e os governos passaram a buscar novas formas de controle, além de revitalizar antigas formas que haviam sido deixadas de lado. Sendo o Comitê de Auditoria (CA) uma das fontes mais importantes de controle dentro das atuais necessidades das organizações, o presente trabalho tem como objetivo identificar e analisar os aspectos mais relevantes que o caracterizam. Diversos regulamentos e orientações para regular este órgão (CA), tal como a lei Sarbanes-Oxley, foram criados tanto no Brasil como no exterior e uma comparação entre os normativos e orientações das autoridades e organismos brasileiros com os normativos internacionais foi efetuada. Como contribuição ao conhecimento sobre o tema, uma pesquisa documental foi desenvolvida em 112 empresas de grande porte no Brasil, identificando as principais informações sobre o comitê de auditoria, evidenciadas por essas organizações, utilizando o canal de comunicação da internet. Um índice para efetuar comparações entre as empresas foi criado: o Índice de Disclosure do Comitê de Auditoria (IDCA). Os resultados mostraram que a maioria das empresas componentes da amostra não apresentou um grau de evidenciação sobre o Comitê de Auditoria que permita uma visualização efetiva sobre esse organismo nas organizações pesquisadas. / Successive crises and frauds involving large companies in recent years have driven the society and the governments to seek new forms of control and to revive old forms previously set aside. Since the Audit Committee (AC) is one of the most important sources of control within present needs of the organizations, this research aims to identify and analyze the most relevant aspects that characterize audit committees. Various regulations and guidelines, such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act, were created to regulate AC in Brazil and other countries as well, so a comparison was performed between the Brazilian regulations and guidelines produced by Brazilian and international authorities and regulatory bodies. As a contribution to the knowledge on the subject, a documental research was performed in 112 large companies in Brazil to identify the main information on audit committees disclosed by these organizations using the Internet communication channel. An index to compare companies disclosure on audit committees was created (IDCA). The findings show that most companies of the sample did not present a level of disclosure on the IDCA index to allow an effective view of the audit committee in these organizations.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:31:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Patricia Amaral Merofa.pdf: 2153805 bytes, checksum: d2abcf4aa1bee3746d766d1d0624bdd1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-11-04 / Fundo Mackenzie de Pesquisa / The purpose of this work is to investigate the relationship between executive compensation and corporate debt in the Brazilian market. The research is focused on interactions between capital structure and compensation in the Brazilian public companies listed on the BM&FBovespa, particularly when they use debt as a disciplining factor on the behavior of managers to mitigate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. The sample of 234 companies and the information about variable compensation were collected from the Formulário de Referência, in subsection on remuneration of executive officers. Using panel data for the period from 2009 to 2012, this empirical study describe the effects that the variables have on companies debt level. The results confirm the negative relationship between debt and executive compensation. / Este trabalho se desenvolveu com o propósito de investigar a relação entre a remuneração dos executivos e o endividamento das empresas, no contexto do mercado brasileiro. O foco da pesquisa é explorar se as empresas brasileiras de capital aberto listadas na BMF&Bovespa utilizam a dívida como elemento disciplinador sobre o comportamento dos gestores para mitigar os conflitos de interesse entre gestores e acionistas. A amostra foi de 234 empresas, as informações sobre remuneração variável foram coletadas do Formulário de Referência, no subitem sobre remuneração dos diretores estatutários. Para testar a hipótese da relação negativa entre o endividamento e a remuneração variável, os dados foram tratados pelo método de painel de dados sob a técnica de mínimos quadrados generalizados por efeitos fixos e, também, por efeitos aleatórios, no período entre 2009 e 2012. Os resultados alcançados confirmam a hipótese de pesquisa, corroborando a perspectiva de que os compromissos da dívida podem alinhar os interesses entre acionistas e gestores.

Submitted by Raquel Pedro (ralmeidapedro@gmail.com) on 2012-10-18T19:05:40Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_MEX_Raquel Pedro.pdf: 1919219 bytes, checksum: ab40c4cbc3cfa14761dc6765204d455c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Janete de Oliveira Feitosa (janete.feitosa@fgv.br) on 2012-10-18T19:12:54Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_MEX_Raquel Pedro.pdf: 1919219 bytes, checksum: ab40c4cbc3cfa14761dc6765204d455c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2012-10-19T14:01:17Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_MEX_Raquel Pedro.pdf: 1919219 bytes, checksum: ab40c4cbc3cfa14761dc6765204d455c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-10-19T14:01:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_MEX_Raquel Pedro.pdf: 1919219 bytes, checksum: ab40c4cbc3cfa14761dc6765204d455c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-08-31 / O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar modelos de governança de subsidiárias que atuam no Brasil, buscando identificar os mecanismos mais adotados, bem como levantar os problemas de agência em relação às empresas controladoras, que podem ocorrer ou se intensificar em função de possíveis desvios nesses modelos, impactando as decisões empresariais. Tendo como referência a governança corporativa e os pressupostos e propostas da teoria da agência, o estudo constrói uma revisão da relação empresa acionista-subsidiárias em diferentes pesquisas. / The purpose of this paper is to analyze the subsidiaries governance models within Brazil, aiming to identify the most adopted mechanisms, and also recognize the agency problems related to the holdings that can happen or be intensified due to some deviations in these models, affecting the business decisions. Based on corporative governance and on the assumptions and proposals of the agency theory, the paper reviews the relationship between holding companies and their subsidiaries in different studies.

BAKGRUND: Sedan revisionsplikten avskaffades 2010 har inte fastställts hur den ekonomiska brottsligheten påverkats av att små svenska aktiebolag inte längre revideras. Trots att Ekobrottsmyndigheten varnat för att avsaknaden av revisor kan vara en riskfaktor för ökad ekonomisk brottslighet pågår en utredning om att utöka gränsvärdena för revisionsplikten för svenska aktiebolag. SYFTE: Studien syftar till att förklara sambandet mellan revision och förekomsten av ekonomisk brottslighet i små svenska aktiebolag. METOD: Denna kvantitativa studie har ett deduktivt angreppssätt. Utifrån agentteori, resursberoendeteori och beslutsteori har en hypotes formulerats. En tvär-snittsdesign har använts och sekundärdata, främst bestående av räkenskaps-information, har analyserats med Chi2-test och logistisk regression. SLUTSATS: Studiens analys visar på ett svagt negativt samband mellan revisor och ekonomisk brottslighet, vilket innebär att resultatet indikerar att ekonomisk brottslighet är mer förekommande i bolag som väljer bort revisorn. Vidare minskar revisorn risken för att ekonomisk brottslighet förekommer inom små aktiebolag med 10,35 procentenheter. / INTRODUCTION: Since voluntary audit was introduced in 2010, it has not been established how the economic crime in Swedish SMEs has been affected by no longer being revised. Although the Swedish Economic Crime Authority has warned that the absence of an auditor may affect the risk of increased economic crime, a debate about whether to increase the limit of voluntary audit has arisen. PURPOSE: The purpose of this study is to explain the relationship between audit and economic crime in Swedish SMEs. METHOD: This quantitative study is based on a deductive approach. Based on agency theory, resource dependence theory and decision theory a hypothesis has been developed. A cross-sectional design has been used and secondary data, mainly from financial statements, has been analysed using Chi2-test and logistic regression. CONCLUSION: In the analysis, a weak negative correlation between auditor and economic crime is presented. I.e. the results indicate that the risk of economic crime is more prevalent in companies without an auditor. Further, the auditor reduces the risk of economic crime in Swedish SMEs with 10,35 percentage points.

Introduction: Prior research, mainly based in USA and Asia, has shown a relationship between ownership structure and earnings quality. Low earnings quality might result in inefficient resource allocation, lower economic growth and unintended wealth transfers. Following these issues, and due to the fact that the Swedish institutional setting differs from other countries, there is a need to explain the relationship in a Swedish context. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to explain how different ownership structures affect earnings quality. Method: This study is based on a deductive approach where the hypotheses have been deducted from agency theory, alignment effect, entrenchment effect and active monitoring hypothesis. The quantitative data consists of secondary data, namely annual reports. The study has been conducted with a cross-sectional design. Conclusion: The results show a positive relationship between foreign ownership and earnings quality. The result can be explained with agency theory’s type I-problem. Other ownership structures show no significant relationship. / Introduktion: Tidigare forskning, främst i USA och Asien, har hittat samband mellan företags ägarstruktur och earnings quality. Låg earnings quality kan resultera i ineffektiv resursallokering, lägre samhällsekonomisk tillväxt samt omotiverade förmögenhetsöverföringar. Till följd av dessa problem, samt att Sveriges institutionella miljö skiljer sig åt från andra länder, finns behovet att förklara sambandet i en svensk kontext. Syfte: Studiens syfte är att förklara hur olika ägarstrukturer påverkar earnings quality. Metod: Studien utgår från en deduktiv ansats där hypoteser deducerats utifrån agentteori, alignment effect, entrenchment effect, samt active monitoring hypothesis. Kvantitativ data består av sekundärdata i form av årsredovisningar. Studien har genomförts med en tvärsnittsdesign. Slutsats: Studiens resultat visar att företag med högre andel utländskt ägande tenderar att redovisa högre earnings quality. Resultatet kan förklaras av agentteorins typ I-problem. Övriga ägarstrukturer uppvisar inga signifikanta samband.

In this thesis I investigate the impact of outside directors experience on company value. I do so by looking at a clear event, company delistings in the time period 2003 to 2011 in South Africa, a country with arguably imperfect institutions. Based on qualitative and quantitative research I am able to establish that director experience is indeed associated with company value. The qualitative analysis is based on semi-structured interviews with over 30 highly experienced, independent non-executive directors who have/had seats on over 150 South African listed company boards. Their responses confirm resource theory dependency and provide information on the nature of experience, its relevance during delisting and under other circumstances, as well as insight into the type of experience lacking on boards in corporate South Africa. The results of this research can be of practical use to nomination committees and has implications for future South African governance code reforms and/or guidelines.

L’objectif de notre travail est de vérifier s’il existe une relation entre les mécanismes de gouvernance exercée par les capital-Investisseurs et la performance financière des entreprises camerounaises. Selon les théories juridico – financières et cognitives, des mécanismes peuvent influencer la performance financière. A partir d’un échantillon de 70 entreprises, observées sur la période de cinq ans, nos résultats indiquent que, conformément aux prédictions de la théorie de l’agence et celles qui ont trait aux théories cognitives de la gouvernance, la performance financière croît en présence des mécanismes traditionnels et liés au capital-Investissement. D’autre part, les capital-Investisseurs développent un mécanisme de gouvernance disciplinaire et cognitif spécifiques à un environnement africain particulier. / The objective of our work is to test a relationship between governance mechanisms using by venture capitalist and financial performance of Cameroonians companies. According to the legal theories - Financial and cognitive, mechanisms can influence financial performance. From a sample of 70 firms over the period of five years, our results indicate that, as predicted by the theory of agency and one that features the cognitive aspects of governance, financial performance grew in the presence of traditional mechanisms and specific venture capital.

Cette thèse, sous forme de trois articles, tente d’expliquer le déclin des bourses organisées au profit de nouvelles plateformes de transaction, à la lumière des récents changements de gouvernance et réglementaires. Les deux premiers articles évaluent l’influence de quatre types d’actionnariat (flottant, courtiers, investisseurs financiers et actionnaires stratégiques) sur la performance de l’entreprise. Il existe une corrélation positive de la performance avec l’actionnariat institutionnel,et négative avec le flottant et avec les investisseurs stratégiques. Le deuxième article –six études de cas– valide ces résultats. L’analyse plus détaillée des actionnaires stratégiques montre que ceux-ci créent de la valeur quand ils sont fondateurs; la détruisent quand ils sont des dirigeants salariés; et augmentent la volatilité des performances de l’entreprise dans les cas de prise de contrôle avortée par un concurrent.Le troisième article analyse l’effet conjugué des changements réglementaires et technologiques. A travers une approche par comparaisons de moyennes, il apparait que les marchés exposés à la déréglementation souffrent plus de la concurrence des plateformes électroniques que les autres bourses.Cette thèse introduit deux nouveaux concepts: le «principal quasi-agent» (un actionnaire qui réduit la valeur de son investissement en raison de ses conflits d’intérêt) et l’«effet adjuvant» (ou comment la réglementation démultiplie les effets concurrentiels permis par les avancées technologiques). / This dissertation consists of three articles, examining the performance of demutualized securities exchanges from 2000 to 2011, in view of changes in governance and regulation. The first part is an empirical study of the influence of each type of shareholder (financial investor, broker, strategic or widely-held shares). The results show that fragmented owner ship is correlated with lower performance and investment managers’ presence with higher performance; strategic investors are on balance detrimental to shareholder value. The second article looks at the same exchanges individually, through case studies. The findings of the first article are validated.However,a closer look at strategic investors shows three outcomes : when they consist of founders, they increase shareholder value; when they are employed managers,they decrease it; and when the strategic investor is a competitor, the target company’s performance becomes more volatile. The third article looks at the combination of technology and regulation.Through mean comparisons and a difference-in-differences approach, this section shows that recent market deregulation has allowed high-tech start-ups to challenge the dominance of the established exchanges, just like previous coincidences of regulatory and technological change resulted in significant market up heavals: the disappearance of London’s jobbers following Big Bang and the Eurocurrency market displacing New York as a major center for dollar borrowing and lending. This dissertation introduces two new concepts: “quasi-agent principals”(shareholders who destroy value in their investment as a result of their conflicts of interest) and the “adjuvant effect” (when the combined effect of regulation and technology is a multiple of the effects of each).

Background: Females are underrepresented in Swedish boards, and in 2016 females represented 29 % of all board members. Many researchers have studied the relationship between the gender composition of company boards and company performance, but they have not managed to reach consensus in explaining the relationship. Pure shareholder theory suggests that the company philosophy is to focus on profitability and shareholder maximization. If the gender distribution in the board affects the performance of the company, some companies may underperform because of their board composition. If so, this is an issue that should be solved according to the shareholder theory and some adjustments to the composition should be done.   Purpose: The purpose of this study is to investigate whether or not companies with female directors on their boards perform better than companies without female directors on their boards. The target group of the study is Swedish listed companies with a statutory domicile in Sweden.   Method: For conducting this research, data for a period of three years (2013-2015) are collected from a sample of 94 Swedish listed companies. The performance measurements investigated are the ratios; ROE, profit margin, ROCE, EBIT margin and EPS. As for control variables, the board size and company size are used. An independent samples t-test is conducted, as well as a correlation matrix analysis and a regression analysis, to fulfil the purpose of this study.   Conclusion: The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between female representation in the boardroom and the ratio EBIT margin. However, the correlation strength is so weak that it is not fair to draw the conclusion that female representation has a positive effect on the financial performance of the companies. Also, the regression analysis shows no relationship between the two variables. However, this study contributes by showing that there is no negative correlation between the presence of females on boards and the financial performance of the companies.