John A. Warden's airpower theory, The Enemy as a System, has had a major influence on the strategic discourse ever since the foundation of this normative framework was presented in The Air Campaign in 1988. Warden’s theoretical impact was reinforced by the American successes during the Gulf War, but since then, little research has tested the theory outside the context of conventional wars of aggression. This study analyzes The Enemy as System against a peace enforcing context, characterized by multilateral cooperation. It also identifies intermediate variables that help explain why the theory is strengthened or weakened in relation to this particular context. Through qualitative methods, Operation Allied Force and Operation Unified Protector are analyzed against operational indicators within the central concepts of the five-ring model and parallel attacks. The results of the study show that NATO did not use airpower in accordance with Warden's normative theory in either of the examined operations. The absence of operational indicators could hypothetically explain why NATO failed to produce strategic effects within the operational time limits, although this remains a speculative conclusion. The result instead suggests a number of intermediate variables, such as political disagreement and strategic dissonance, which combined reduced the possibility of using airpower in accordance with Warden's theory. In addition, the fear of civilian casualties and the risk of exacerbating the post-war humanitarian situation, further reduced the possibility of attacking targets within certain subsystems of the five-ring model. The conclusion is therefore that Warden’s theoretical applicability, and thus universal validity, is weakened within the examined context.

This thesis examines whether NATO’s air operation Allied Force was appropriate to expect concession when compelling the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, or if there were other circumstances to explain the NATO failure of success. I analyse the conditions in accordance with previous research and theories of compellent threats. I find that NATO’s efforts meet the expectations for successive coercion and therefore it has to be other explanations why they failed. I argue that NATO misjudged Milosevic when he did not follow the tacit and expected rules of reaction and behaviour, which explains why the outcome became unpredictable and resulted in failure. To complete the theories of successful compellent threats, I suggest that future research should consider the target states strategic culture and ethnic, cultural and historical heritage as well as the state’s public defense will and leadership.

Zugl.: Konstanz, Univ., Diss., 2006. / Includes bibliographical references.

The theories on how to use airpower as coercion are divided between those who advocate strategic bombing and those who advocate support for land operations. The purpose of this study is to analyze whether Pape and/or Warden´s airpower theories applied on Operation Allied Force can explain how NATO´s air force was used. The result shows that both the Warden´s Enemy as a system and Pape´s Denial strategy can partly explain the outcome. Warden´s 5-ring system is the only variable in the survey assigned with a high variable value; this is because the analysis shows that it is judged to influence the outcome extensively. Parallel attacks occurred at low frequency and have a low variable value. Pape´s theory occurred with high frequency in variable support for the ground forces, however, the analysis shows that no variable value from Pape´s theory received higher variables than the medium. The conclusion is that both theories can explain how NATO used airpower during the operation but to different degrees.

Svensk doktrin stipulerar att grunden för Försvarsmaktens uppträdande att avskräcka olika aktörer från att använda våld. Detta ifrågasätts här grundat på att avskräckning oftast utgår ifrån numerär överlägsenhet, och Sverige kan anses ha en hotbild från regionala stormakter. Vilka luftoperativa förmågor kan då ligga bakom en avskräckande effekt hos en numerärt underlägsen luftstridskraft?  Syftet är att förklara detta genom en flerfallstudie utifrån avskräckningsteorier kopplade till luftmaktsteori i ett småstatsperspektiv. I en avslutande diskussion återkopplas detta mot Sveriges luftoperativa förmågor för att utröna om dessa bidrar till den avskräckande effekt som beskrivs som grundläggande i Försvarsmaktens doktrin. Fallstudien gav att Jaktflyg var den enda variabeln som sågs samvariera med lyckad avskräckning. I diskussionen om Sveriges motsvarande förmågor framkom att Försvarsmakten har en relativt hög förmåga till jaktflyg.

The two operations in Bosnia and Kosovo named Deliberate Force and Allied Force took place in 1995 and 1999. Both operations show clear signs that the use of air power was the main contributor to the outcome of the operations. Earlier research states that there are signs of coercive air power in both of these operations but fail to explain in what way. The purpose of this essay is to examine if Robert A. Papes theory about denial strategy in air operations can explain the different outcomes of the operations as the operation in Bosnia took 21 days and the operation in Kosovo took 78 days to reach its designated goals. This essay will also test Papes Theory on what constitutes a successful air campaign by comparing the two operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. The result supports Papes theory and shows that operation Deliberate Force acted according to Papes theory on denial in five out of six parts, excluding the strategic interdiction. Whereas operation Allied Force acted according to the theory as well but in a smaller extent. It can be argued that there are other background factors that also contributed to the outcome of the operations but by looking at the usage of the air power in both operations it shows that by acting accordingly to Papes theory the outcome was a success. By supporting Papes theory this essay adds to the earlier research a wider knowledge about coercive air power in military interventions. / <p><strong>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2017 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 15-18 med inriktning </strong><strong>mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2018.</strong></p>

Thesis: Operation Allied Force in Selected Czech Daily Newspapers Author: Mgr. Lucie Božková Annotation In my thesis Operation 'Allied Force' in Selected Czech Daily Newspapers I am tracing the representation of the topic - NATO's air strikes in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the so called Operation 'Allied Force') in 1999 in selected Czech Daily Newspapers. I am observing the effects, media's impact, frames and agenda setting. To support the integrity of the topic I added a chapter about the Kosovo crisis which enlightens the initiation of the air attacks. Furthermore, and mainly I am focusing on professional studies dealing with military news. The dominant theme of these articles is the foreign media coverage of the Kosovo War. In the experts 'outputs I predominantly center on their choosing and the method of analysis, on which I then base my analysis on. I decided to use the method of the quantitative content analysis for my own research. The first period of exploration is the bombing period (March 24, 1999 - June 10, 1999). Here the aim of my analysis is to find out what attention have the daily newspapers MF Dnes, Hospodářské noviny, Právo and Blesk paid to the Operation 'Allied Force'. In addition, I followed the placement of the articles, media resources and also the presentation of...

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 2, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.