This thesis combines a philosophical interpretation of Epicurean attitudes to language with literary analysis of the language of DRN. Chapters 1-2 describe Epicurean attitudes to diachronic and synchronic linguistic phenomena. In the first chapter I claim that the Epicurean account of the first stage of the development of language involves pre-rational humans acting under a ‘strong’ form of compulsion. The analogies with which Lucretius describes this process were motivated by a structural similarity between the Epicurean accounts of phylogenetic and ontogenetic psychology. Chapter 2 explores the Epicurean account of word use and recognition, central to which are ‘conceptions’. These are attitudes which express propositions; they are not mental images. Προλήψεις, a special class of conception, are self-evidently true basic beliefs about how objects in the world are categorized which, alongside the non-doxastic criteria of perceptions and feelings, play a foundational role in enquiry. Chapter 3 offers a reconstruction of an Epicurean theory of metaphor. Metaphor, for Epicureans, involves the subordination of additional conceptions to words to create secondary meanings. Secondary meanings are to be understood by referring back to primary meanings. Accordingly, Lucretius’ use of metaphor regularly involves the juxtaposition in the text of primary and secondary uses of terms. An account of conceptual metaphor in DRN is given in which the various conceptual domains from which Lucretius draws his metaphorical language are mapped and explored. Chapter 4 presents a new argument against ‘atomological’ readings of Lucretius’ atoms/letters analogies. Lucretian implicit etymologies involve the illustration, via juxtaposition, of language change across time. This is fully in keeping with the Epicurean account of language development. Chapter 5 describes Lucretius’ reflections on and interactions with the Greek language. I suggest that the study of lexical Hellenisms in DRN must be sensitive to the distinction between lexical borrowing and linguistic code-switching. I then give an account of morphological calquing in the poem, presenting it as a significant but overlooked strategy for Lucretian vocabulary-formation.

The assertion that the Mahābhārata (MBh) narrative is innately incapable of achieving a conclusion has attained the status of a disciplinary truism in the epic’s study. My thesis challenges this prevalent assumption by proposing an un-investigated path of inquiry into the philological, historical, literary and semantic aspects of the epic. The thesis discusses the ending of the MBh, the Svargārohaṇa parvan (SĀ) by exploring several trajectories: the study of the SĀ in epic scholarship; its reception in the later tradition in Sanskrit literature; and finally, the problematic aspects of the SĀ and its relation to the rest of the narrative. It first points out that in comparison to other MBh episodes, the SĀ has been received with significant disregard or suppression in the literature commenting on the epic. Second, it characterizes the nature of the suppression of the SĀ in each of the three literary strands commenting on the MBh (epic scholarship, Sanskrit adaptations and theoretical discourses). It argues that all of these considerations, which are external to the MBh, have tended, in various modes, to suppress, ignore or overlook the importance of the SĀ. The thesis then proceeds to argue that on the most significant and internal level of the text itself, the SĀ is intrinsically consistent with the rest of the MBh narrative, and that this makes it thematically integral to the text as a whole. This argument derives from the importance with which this study addresses the moment of the condemnation of dharma in the SĀ, and is furthered by a philological and semantic study, as well as textual analyses of the multiple occurrences of the Sanskrit verb garh throughout the MBh. The use of this verb by the epic protagonist, Yudhiṣṭhira, in condemning his father, Dharma, at the last scenes of the SĀ comprises a key moment that bears significant and myriad implications upon the understanding of this pivotal concept (dharma), to which the entire epic is devoted.

This project examines and compares the political philosophies supporting the centralized authority of monarchs elaborated by two major figures of antiquity, Mèngzǐ (Mencius, 372-289 BC) of the Warring States period in China, and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (Μαρκος Αυρηλιος Αντωνινος, 121-180 AD) of the later Roman Empire. The texts that have transmitted the ideas of these two men--the Mèngzǐ and the Meditations--have shaped the political actions of rulers, as well as the ideas and ideals of political theorists, from their formation down to the present day. Each thinker made substantial claims concerning the role of a philosophically-oriented monarch in actualizing governance that is both benevolent and beneficent under a form of absolute authority. The present study will compare basic principles of Mèngzǐ's and Marcus's political philosophies as they relate to monarchical rule expressed in those two classic works, and draw from these principles to create a new criterion in political philosophy that can be used to critique contemporary political arrangements characterized by strong centralization of power. This project will not be a polemic for monarchy or strongly centralized political governments; it is an exploration into political philosophical principles advocated by Marcus and Mèngzǐ, demonstrating how rulers in strongly centralized political institutions can exercise their power in ways that result in good for the people, and how principles advocated by Marcus and Mèngzǐ can be transformed into a criterion for practical application in contemporary political settings, without having to resort to political philosophical principles popular in most Anglo-European contexts.

A presente tese explora, como solução para o controvertido quadro geral da moderna história da crítica sobre Pitágoras e seu movimento, a definição do pitagorismo como categoria historiográfica. Superando tanto o dilema entre ceticismo e confiança nas fontes, como a pretensão de alcançar uma única chave hermenêutica que permita resolver a questão pitagórica, procura percorrer a história da tradição em busca de uma imagem suficientemente plural a ponto de possibilitar a compreensão do pitagorismo em sua irredutível articulação de bíos e theoría e não apesar dela. A configuração da comunidade e de seu bíos é percebida como elemento central de identificação do pitagorismo. A análise das duas teorias que mais decididamente contribuíram para a definição do pitagorismo ao longo da história, a transmigração da alma imortal e a doutrina dos números, procura definir as condições de possibilidade de atribuí-las ao pitagorismo mais antigo e as formas pelas quais ambas teriam contribuído, ao longo da história, para a definição do pitagorismo como categoria historiográfica. As fontes pré-socráticas, a platonização do pitagorismo, o testemunho aristotélico sobre os assim chamados pitagóricos, a literatura pseudoepigráfica helenística e o pitagorismo de época imperial são entendidos como momentos de um percurso histórico que resulta em uma imagem poliédrica de um dos maiores fenômenos intelectuais da história ocidental. / This thesis explores the definition of Pythagoreanism as historiographical category, seen as solution for the controversial general framework of modern history of criticism about Pythagoras and his movement. Overcoming both the dilemma between skepticism and faith in the sources and the claim to achieve a single hermeneutical key to solve the Pythagorean question, in it searches are made throughout the history of tradition looking for an image sufficiently plural in order to understand Pythagoreanism in accordance with its irreducible articulation of bíos and theoría, not despite it. The setting of the community and its bíos is understood as central element for Pythagorean identification. An analysis of the two theories that more decisively contributed to the definition of Pythagoreanism throughout history, the transmigration of the immortal soul and the doctrine of numbers, attempts to define the conditions of possibility to assign them to the earlier Pythagoreanism and the ways in which these have contributed throughout history to the definition of Pythagoreanism as historiographical category. Presocratic sources, the platonization of Pythagoreanism, Aristotle\'s testimony about the \"so-called\" Pythagoreans, the hellenistic Pseudoepigrapha and Pythagoreanism in imperial age are understood as moments of an historical route resulting in a polyhedral image of one of the greatest intellectual phenomena in Western history.

Os historiadores da filosofia parecem quase todos de acordo ao atribuir a Parmênides o início da reflexão a respeito do ser. Mas no Poema encontramos também um discurso a respeito do não-ser. A deusa, a voz de Parmênides, diz que o caminho do não-ser é caminho impercorrível e que ademais, o não-ser não pode nem ser dito e nem ser pensado como origem da geração e da corrupção das coisas. Melisso aparentemente leva esse preceito à últimas conseqüências, pois se não há geração e corrupção, para ele o mundo é infinito, eterno, uno e imutável. Além disso, Melisso nega totalmente os fenômenos, julgando-os um engano dos sentidos. Surge a pergunta: eles estarão falando do mesmo não-ser? Este trabalho tem por objetivo estabelecer as noções respectivas de não-ser em Parmênides e em Melisso. Verificadas as noções de não-ser, elas são comparadas de forma a evidenciar as diferenças: a noção de não-ser de Parmênides aponta para a contradição (noção ontológica); a noção de não-ser de Melisso aponta para o nulo (noção lógica). O trabalho conclui que Melisso transgride o preceito da deusa parmenidiana, usando o não-ser no discurso e no pensamento, pois para ele já não era um conceito contraditório, mas um conceito de ausência, próximo ao nosso conceito de zero. Como complemento, a pesquisa aponta que na seqüência histórica, o conceito de não-ser criticado pelos filósofos posteriores é mais o conceito de Melisso do que aquele de Parmênides. Esse apontar complementar é obtido com um rápido sobrevôo nas filosofias de Górgias e de Platão, com o intuito de abrir a problemática dos próximos passos da pesquisa. Nosso trabalho confirma também o isolamento histórico de Parmênides, tendo sido um inovador sem seguidores. / Almost all the philosophy historians seem to agree attributing to Parmenides the beginning of the reflection about being. In the Poem, however, we also find a speech about not being. The goddess, voice of Parmenides, says that the way of not being is a non accessible way and furthermore not being cannot be said nor thought as the origin of coming-to-be and passingaway of all things. Melissus seems to convey that precept to its boundaries, for if there is no coming-to-be and no passing-away, the world is infinite, eternal, one and immutable. Furthermore, Melissus denies the entire world of experiences, considering it a mistake of senses. There arises a question: are they speaking about the same? This work aims to set up the notions of not being in Parmenides and Melissus. Once examined that notions, they are confronted to make evident he difference: the notion of not being in Parmenides points towards a contradiction (ontologic notion); the notion of not being in Melissus points towards the null (logic notion). The work reaches the conclusion that Melissus transgresses the precept of the parmenidian goddess, using not being in saying and thinking, for it wasnt, in his vision, a contradictory concept, but a concept of absence, close to our concept of zero. In order to complement, our inquiry indicates that, in the historical sequence, the concept of not being rejected by subsequent philosophers is more the Melissus concept than Parmenides one. The direction given is obtained in a quickly overflying in Gorgias and Platos philosophies, with the aim of opening the problematic to next steps of inquiry. Our work confirms also the loneliness of Parmenides, for he was a renovator without followers.

Este trabalho traduz e comenta o texto aristotélico Peri\\ (Ermenei/aj assim como, trata das relações desse texto com as obras Peri\\ Yuxh=j e Kategori/ai, também de Aristóteles. As unidades simples são investigadas por Aristóteles no livro do Organon, Kategori/ai, e as unidades declarativas no livro do Organon, Peri\\ (Ermenei/aj. A alma é investigada com mais detalhe no livro Peri\\ Yuxh=j. Buscar como se constituem as relações entre esses livros significa delimitar e especificar os campos de intersecção e de ordem. Este trabalho visa fundamentar a noção semântica, lógica, orgânica e funcional da língua a partir da apreciação do conceito de incerteza aristotélico e da noção de transposição da primeira essência para a segunda essência. A maneira escolhida envolveu de modo paralelo uma leitura linear dos textos gregos e ao mesmo tempo uma investigação da relação entre a alma e a unidade: voz, pensamento e coisa na sua forma simples e declarativa. Deixando o texto falar, - ao contrário da análise formal-, esse pensamento envolve uma visão ética e social que tem em primeiro plano a visão do bem comum e da preeminência do social em relação ao individual. A valorização da língua de forma integrada como voz, pensamento e coisa permite que a significação como parte preponderante seja constituída como formação humana e dessa maneira impede que a língua seja vista como um conjunto de regras que tem por fim alcançar fins utilitários e mercadológicos. A visão aristotélica da língua é estabelecida não por relações gramaticais, mas, por meio de uma visão que integra a alma ao pensamento, a voz e as coisas. A questão do conhecimento inesgotável dentro de um processo da língua que começa e termina estabelece como principal objetivo mostrar que o ser humano é dotado de apetite de saber e tem como finalidade a atualização de suas contradições que como uma teia se manifestam no local do humano: a totalidade da alma. Essa por sua vez é inexoravelmente ligada ao corpo, mas esse não está nem dentro nem fora dela, mas se traduz no espaço completo do deslocamento, da mudança qualitativa, do crescimento e do perecimento. / The purpose of this thesis was to translate and to comment on the text from Aristotles Peri\\ (Ermenei/aj, and to demonstrate the relation of this text with the following Aristotle\'s books: Peri\\ Yuxh=j and Kategori/ai. The simple units are investigated in Aristotle\'s book of the Organon: Kategori/ai . The declarative units are investigated in Aristotle\'s book of the Organon:. Peri\\ (Ermenei/aj The soul is investigated in more detail in the book: Peri\\ Yuxh=j. Searches on how the relationship amongst these books are constituted show the delimitation and specification of its intersection and order fields. The Semantic, logic, organic and function of the language are the fundament in this work for the appreciation of the Aristotelical concept of uncertainty, and also from the notion of transposition from the first essence to the second essence. The proposed way involved the linear reading of Greek texts and the investigation of the relationship between the soul and the unity: voice, thought and the thing in their simple and declarative form. The text speaking for itself replaces the formal analysis - this thought involves an ethical and social vision that takes into account in the first place the idea of the wellness of the human being and the prominence of the social in relation to the individual. To value the language in an integrated way as voice, thought and thing allows the predominant meaning to be constituted of human formation, this way preventing the language to be seen as a series of rules whose unique purpose is to achieve utilitarian and mercadological ends. The Aristotelican vision of language to establish a vision that integrates the soul to the thought, to the voice and to the things. The question of the copious knowledge inside a process of language that begins and ends establishing as its finality the updating of its contradictions and that as a web manifests itself in the essence of the human : the soul\'s totality. That is inexorably linked to the body, but not inside or outside it, it exposes itself in the complete space of transposition, the qualitative change, growth and fading.

Este trabalho traduz e comenta o texto aristotélico Peri\\ (Ermenei/aj assim como, trata das relações desse texto com as obras Peri\\ Yuxh=j e Kategori/ai, também de Aristóteles. As unidades simples são investigadas por Aristóteles no livro do Organon, Kategori/ai, e as unidades declarativas no livro do Organon, Peri\\ (Ermenei/aj. A alma é investigada com mais detalhe no livro Peri\\ Yuxh=j. Buscar como se constituem as relações entre esses livros significa delimitar e especificar os campos de intersecção e de ordem. Este trabalho visa fundamentar a noção semântica, lógica, orgânica e funcional da língua a partir da apreciação do conceito de incerteza aristotélico e da noção de transposição da primeira essência para a segunda essência. A maneira escolhida envolveu de modo paralelo uma leitura linear dos textos gregos e ao mesmo tempo uma investigação da relação entre a alma e a unidade: voz, pensamento e coisa na sua forma simples e declarativa. Deixando o texto falar, - ao contrário da análise formal-, esse pensamento envolve uma visão ética e social que tem em primeiro plano a visão do bem comum e da preeminência do social em relação ao individual. A valorização da língua de forma integrada como voz, pensamento e coisa permite que a significação como parte preponderante seja constituída como formação humana e dessa maneira impede que a língua seja vista como um conjunto de regras que tem por fim alcançar fins utilitários e mercadológicos. A visão aristotélica da língua é estabelecida não por relações gramaticais, mas, por meio de uma visão que integra a alma ao pensamento, a voz e as coisas. A questão do conhecimento inesgotável dentro de um processo da língua que começa e termina estabelece como principal objetivo mostrar que o ser humano é dotado de apetite de saber e tem como finalidade a atualização de suas contradições que como uma teia se manifestam no local do humano: a totalidade da alma. Essa por sua vez é inexoravelmente ligada ao corpo, mas esse não está nem dentro nem fora dela, mas se traduz no espaço completo do deslocamento, da mudança qualitativa, do crescimento e do perecimento. / The purpose of this thesis was to translate and to comment on the text from Aristotles Peri\\ (Ermenei/aj, and to demonstrate the relation of this text with the following Aristotle\'s books: Peri\\ Yuxh=j and Kategori/ai. The simple units are investigated in Aristotle\'s book of the Organon: Kategori/ai . The declarative units are investigated in Aristotle\'s book of the Organon:. Peri\\ (Ermenei/aj The soul is investigated in more detail in the book: Peri\\ Yuxh=j. Searches on how the relationship amongst these books are constituted show the delimitation and specification of its intersection and order fields. The Semantic, logic, organic and function of the language are the fundament in this work for the appreciation of the Aristotelical concept of uncertainty, and also from the notion of transposition from the first essence to the second essence. The proposed way involved the linear reading of Greek texts and the investigation of the relationship between the soul and the unity: voice, thought and the thing in their simple and declarative form. The text speaking for itself replaces the formal analysis - this thought involves an ethical and social vision that takes into account in the first place the idea of the wellness of the human being and the prominence of the social in relation to the individual. To value the language in an integrated way as voice, thought and thing allows the predominant meaning to be constituted of human formation, this way preventing the language to be seen as a series of rules whose unique purpose is to achieve utilitarian and mercadological ends. The Aristotelican vision of language to establish a vision that integrates the soul to the thought, to the voice and to the things. The question of the copious knowledge inside a process of language that begins and ends establishing as its finality the updating of its contradictions and that as a web manifests itself in the essence of the human : the soul\'s totality. That is inexorably linked to the body, but not inside or outside it, it exposes itself in the complete space of transposition, the qualitative change, growth and fading.

O volume de literatura secundária sobre o conceito aristotélico de noûs produtivo é proporcional à brevidade e à obscuridade com que ele é apresentado no quinto capítulo do terceiro livro do \"De Anima\". Esta dissertação visa investigar as razões que fazem deste texto terreno fértil para as mais diversas interpretações. Para tanto, este estudo parte do comentário analítico de DA III 4-5, destacando as possibilidades interpretativas de cada passagem e as variantes textuais mais significativas. Procurou-se explorar outras passagens do corpus aristotélico que podem ser utilizadas para elucidar o conteúdo desses capítulos, considerando as opções adotadas pelos principais comentadores antigos. Após mostrar que o texto comporta igualmente as leituras mais díspares, buscou-se evidenciar como elementos extratextuais, tais como a filosofia e o método exegético predominante no tempo de cada interprete podem ser identificados nas opções adotadas. Para tanto, adotou-se a obra de Alexandre de Afrodísia como objeto de exposição e análise, uma vez que sua identificação do nous produtivo à Causa Primeira de Met. XII 7-9 é a mais influente e polêmica das exegeses deste conceito. Para tanto, foram apresentadas suas principais teses e contrastadas com a base textual aristotélica, de modo pôr em relevo as características do método do Exegeta. / The amount of secondary literature on the Aristotelian concept of productive nous is proportional to the briefness and obscurity of its presentation in the fifth chapter of the Book Three of the De Anima. This thesis aims to investigate the reasons why this text offers a fertile ground for the most varied interpretations. Therefore, this text begins with an analytical commentary on DA III 4-5, highlighting the interpretative possibilities and the most significant textual variants of each passage. We searched for other passages of the Aristotelian corpus that could help us elucidate the content of these chapters, considering the options adopted by the main ancient commentators. After showing how the text equally accepts the most disparate readings, we tried to evidence how extra-textual elements, such as the philosophy and exegetical method predominant in the time of each interpreter can are present in the adopted options. For this, the work of Alexander of Aphrodisias was adopted as object of exposition and analysis, since its identification of the productive nous to the First Cause of Met. XII 7-9 is the most influential and polemical exegesis of this concept. His main arguments were presented and contrasted with the Aristotelian textual background, to highlight the characteristics of the Exegete\'s methods.

In this paper, I hope to do a small part to bridge the gap that has emerged in this scholarly debate between the historicist and Straussian views of Spartan society. To that end, this paper will analyze the Spartan Constitution according to the Straussian method. That is, I will engage in a close reading of the text, only referencing outside, secondary sources directly when necessary and appropriate. In other cases, their views will simply color this analysis and be referenced as supporting evidence in footnotes. Strauss chose to have only a superficial interaction with the existing scholarship at the time of publishing his essay, and I therefore believe it will be more beneficial to see what this approach would look like from the historicist perspective. When the same approach is taken, the heart of both camps’ arguments will be exposed, allowing them to be more easily compared. The paper will begin with a reading exploring the themes of Xenophon’s work according to a historicist perspective. After a brief aside explaining and motivating the Straussian esoteric argument to a greater extent, the paper will move on to a similar close-reading of the Spartan Constitution, following Strauss’ essay where appropriate and extending his arguments where necessary. Through this process, the paper aims to show that the perceived separation between the historicist and Straussian interpretations appears to be much greater than it, in reality, is.

Protreptic is a form of rhetoric, textual and oral in form, which exhorts its recipients to reorient their lives both morally and intellectually. Plato frequently portrays Socrates' use of this rhetoric with interlocutors who are enticed by the moral and political views of figures from Athens' intellectual culture. During these conversations Socrates attempts to persuade his interlocutors to reorient their lives in a way that conforms more closely to his own moral and intellectual practice of philosophy. Plato's depiction of protreptic, however, also exerts a protreptic effect on readers of his dialogues. Plato's writing thus performs a dual function, simultaneously depicting instances of protreptic at work and attempting to exert a protreptic effect on readers. In this dissertation I argue that understanding this dual function of Plato's writing is inseparable from understanding his conception of philosophy. I analyze the structure of protreptic in Plato's writing by identifying four aspects essential to an interpretive method that takes full stock of the protreptic function of Plato's dialogues. These aspects are (1) the proper recipient of protreptic; (2) the persuasive means available to protreptic; (3) the immediate target of persuasion; (4) the ultimate philosophical aim toward which protreptic advances the recipient. While some of these aspects must be determined with respect to particular dialogues, those that concern the form of Plato's writing—such as the means of persuasion and ultimate philosophical goals—can inform a general approach to Plato's dialogues. The means that Socrates uses to persuade his interlocutors are sometimes affective, influencing their emotions, and other times intellectual, appealing to them exclusively with logical argument. I argue that a combination of these means into a form I call “provocative-aporetic” better accounts for the means that Plato uses to exert a protreptic effect on readers. Aporia is a simultaneously intellectual and affective experience, and the way that readers choose to respond to aporia has a greater protreptic effect than either affective or intellectual means alone. The Republic is a crucial dialogue for studying protreptic because it addresses the ultimate moral and intellectual ends toward which Plato hopes to reorient readers, and puts the various protreptic means at Socrates' and Plato's disposal on full display. The dialogue offers both an argument for a life committed to virtue, and an outline of the theoretical insights—mathematical and dialectical—that philosophers may hope to gain from more serious study. It also portrays Socrates in conversation with characters of a variety sufficient to show his rhetorical and argumentative repertoire. In this dissertation I carry out a reading of the Republic according to the four aspects of the structure of protreptic discussed above. More specifically, I identify moments at which Glaucon and Adeimantus answer Socrates' questions in such a way that they concede to Socrates the truth of premises that contradict their defense of the unjust life. These moments reveal that the central point of dispute in the Republic concerns the nature of moral agency— particularly the functions of reason, desire, and habituation for moral agents. Accordingly, I identify two models of agency—a Technē Model and a Virtue Model— that ground their respective defenses of justice and injustice, and hold their own assumptions about reason, desire, and habituation within their respective moral psychologies. Glaucon and Adeimantus' moments of capitulation, function as moments of aporia for readers, who are then provoked to overcome the aporia by explaining why the capitulation is reasonable. In doing so, we gain an account how Glaucon and Adeimantus are coaxed to abandon their original views about justice, injustice, and moral agency and to accept those of Socrates. This account in turn yields insight into protreptic by depicting how Socrates brings about a reorientation toward philosophy from within a non-philosophical perspective.