Orientador: Lucas Angioni / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-25T16:26:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Zuppolini_BrenoAndrade_M.pdf: 1697211 bytes, checksum: 90a25cb07732228ac68e4afe94a0fb34 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Resumo: A teoria da demonstração de Aristóteles, desenvolvida no tratado Segundos Analíticos, não se limita a determinar os requisitos formais para a elaboração de argumentos probatórios que estabeleçam adequadamente os resultados da investigação científica. Ao aspecto probatório da demonstração, acrescenta-se o seu caráter prioritariamente explanatório, orientado por teses de forte conteúdo ontológico-metafísico, as quais envolvem noções como substância, essência e causalidade. Pretendemos analisar a relação entre estes dois âmbitos da filosofia aristotélica da ciência e investigar em que medida as características formais da demonstração mantêm uma afinidade com o arcabouço metafísico a que está condicionada a atividade científica / Abstract: Aristotle's theory of demonstration, developed in the Posterior Analytics, is not restricted to determining the formal requirements for formulating probative arguments that establish properly the results of scientific investigation. To the probative aspect of demonstration it shall be added its primarily explanatory character, orientated by theses of strong ontological and metaphysical content and involving notions like substance, essence and causation. We shall analyze the relation between those two ranges of Aristotle's philosophy of science and investigate how the formal features of demonstration maintain an affinity with the metaphysical background to which scientific activity is conditioned / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

Orientador: Francisco Benjamin de Souza Netto / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-20T04:22:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bezerra_David_D.pdf: 2857425 bytes, checksum: 4d079f11450e92069b74a7de1ddc95fe (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: Inicialmente o propósito do trabalho era apenas definir e comparar os conceitos de felicidade para dois autores dos período helenístico, distantes no tempo e afastados por um universo cultural: o grego Epicuro e o romano Sêneca. Mas a hipótese inaugural da tese exigiu que se fosse além, primeiro operando com um conceito encontrado no inverso ou negativo do conceito inicial, ou seja, a infelicidade, e depois lidando com as razões que fundamentam a movimentação dos autores pesquisados, isto é, os motivos pelos quais eles se dedicaram a tal tema em particular. Esse impulso secundário levou-nos a um estágio ulterior, que foi a caracterização do universo no qual existiram os pensadores, pois descobrimos ter sido ele o responsável pela pergunta acerca da felicidade tanto em um quanto em outro caso. Quer dizer, a produção filosófica tinha uma base histórico-social e em segundo plano acadêmica. Esta situação nos forçou a, por fim, determinar o que é um produto filosófico helenístico, já que a motivação dos autores se deveu tanto ao entorno no qual se viam envolvidos, que assim deveriam trazer a marca desse tempo (a preocupação com a felicidade gerou, inclusive, manuais de vida produzidos pelos homens de baixa cultura), separando-o, por exemplo, do tempo imediatamente anterior, a chamada época clássica. Particularizando o assunto, estabelecemos que Sêneca foi mais do que um leitor de Epicuro, e assim as suas idéias em relação ao problema da felicidade são tributárias relativamente às idéias de Epicuro sobre o tema. Por outro lado, em ambos os autores é preciso uma leitura ulterior a suas próprias falas para completar a sua definição de felicidade, pois a base dessa, o retiro da vida civil, não está relacionado em tal definição. E ainda, vemos que a virtude ideal, cultivada pelos estóicos radicais, como Crisipo, e entendida como a própria felicidade, cede lugar a uma virtude do possível em Sêneca e que em Epicuro a luta pela felicidade encontra sentido no esmagamento dos desejos / Abstract: Firstly, the purpose of this work was just defines and compares the concepts of happiness for two authors of the Hellenistic period, far way one of each other and separated by a cultural universe: the Greek Epicurus and the Roman Seneca. Therefore, the inaugural hypothesis ordered that we move farther, first working with a concept found at the reverse or negative of the initial concept, its says, the unhappiness, and then operating with the reasons which establishes the movimentation of the authors pesquised, i.e., the motives by which they dedicated themselves to this particular theme. This secondary impulse pushed us to another stage, the characterization of the universe in which the thinkers lived, for we found it as the responsible by the ask about happiness in both of them. In another words, the philosophical production had a socio-historical basis and, in second plane, an academic one. Such situation put us, at the end, to determine what is a philosophical Hellenistic product, once the motivation of the authors is owe so much to the environment in which they kept themselves involved that by this they should bring the stamp of this time (the preoccupation with happiness spawn, includes, manuals of how to live by men of low culture), separating it, for instance, of the time immediately posterior, the so called Classical Era. Particularizing the matter, we establishes that Seneca was more than a reader of Epicurus, and thus your ideas relating to the problem of happiness are tributaries to the ideas of Epicurus about the theme. By the other side, in both thinkers we demanded a interpretation beyond their own speeches to complete your definition of happiness, because the basis of this, the retirement of civil life, is not related in such definition. And more, we observe that the ideal virtue, defended by the radical stoics, like Chrysippus, and took as the happiness itself, gives place to a virtue of the possible in Seneca and that in Epicurus the fight for happiness find meaning in the smashing of the desires / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

[pt] O presente trabalho visa a apresentar a discussão sobre a natureza e o objeto da phronesis na Ética Nicomaquéia de Aristóteles, tomando como ponto de partida o célebre debate ocorrido na França há cerca de quarenta anos: nas ações humanas, a phronesis é essencialmente conhecimento dos meios para realizar os fins desejados, ou, ao contrário, é essencialmente o conhecimento destes fins? Primeiramente, apresentam-se os antecedentes deste debate, nas discussões a respeito da phronesis entre aristotélicos e neokantianos na Alemanha do final do século XIX e suas influências na interpretação de Jaeger. Em seguida, no capítulo central, apresenta-se o debate entre autores franceses. Para ilustrar os pontos de vista opostos, tomam-se, respectivamente, as posturas de Pierre Aubenque, para quem a phronesis é conhecimento somente dos meios, e do Pe. René-Antoine Gauthier, para quem ela é sobretudo conhecimento dos fins. Posteriormente, partindo da constatação de que a questão ainda permanece aberta após este célebre debate, são apresentados seus desdobramentos posteriores, a fim de oferecer o estado atual da questão, apresentando algumas soluções propostas nas duas últimas décadas, na linha de uma superação das oposições. / [en] The following work strives to ponder on the nature and object of phronesis in Aristotle`s Nicomachean Ethics, using as a starting point the renowned debate staged in France around forty years ago: in human actions, phronesis is essentially the knowledge of the means necessary to attain the desired end, or is it on the other hand the knowledge of these ends? In first place the antecedents of this discussion are presented, concerning the debate on the concept of phronesis between Aristotelians and Neokantians in Germany towards the end of the XIXth century and its influences on the interpretations of Jaeger. Following that, in the second chapter, the debate among the French authors is presented. In order to illustrate opposing viewpoints, two exemplary postures are taken into consideration, those of Pierre Aubenque, for whom phronesis is essentially the knowledge of means, and that of Fr. René-Antoine Gauthier, for whom it is essentially the knowledge of the ends. Finally, taking into consideration that the debate is still open even after all arguments are presented, a follow-up is done taking into consideration some of the main proposals of the recent decades in order to have an idea of how the debate has evolved to its present state and with the intention of solving oppositions.

Orientador: Carlos Eduardo Ornelas Berriel / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-27T03:35:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Basile_ThiagoVillela_M.pdf: 1409965 bytes, checksum: dec97225a696681958381ddc0b2b6fd8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 / Resumo: Pretendemos, neste trabalho, verificar, no plano ético, a alusão presente em o Decameron, de Giovanni Boccaccio, ao epicurismo. Para isso, apresentamos a filosofia epicurista, especialmente o conceito de prazer e de clinâmen, para estabelecermos as bases necessárias de comparação. Observamos também a história da fortuna crítica de o Decameron, para entendermos o porquê de só recentemente haver um estudo aprofundado da moral do livro, feito por Marco Veglia, em seu La vita lieta. Em seguida, fazemos uma leitura da moldura narrativa do Decameron para demonstrarmos a alusão ao epicurismo, e, por fim, tentamos compreender que efeito isso traria para a releitura dessa obra de Boccaccio / Abstract: The purpose of this work is to present the Decameron through a philosophical perspective, by comparing the Epicurean philosophy and the narrative frame of the text. To achieve this, we present the Epicurean philosophy, especially the concept of pleasure and clinamen, to establish the necessary bases of comparison. We also take into consideration the history of literary criticism of the Decameron, to understand the reason why only recently there is an in-depth study of the book¿s moral, made by Marco Veglia, in his "La vita lieta". Then, we intend to do a reading of the Decameron narrative frame to demonstrate the allusion to Epicureanism, and finally, we try to understand what effect this would bring to the reading of this work of Boccaccio / Mestrado / Teoria e Critica Literaria / Mestre em Teoria e História Literária

Though often seen as a panacea for organizational objectives, nonprofits must be judicious in deploying social media, particularly due to resource limitations. Nonprofits deploy many types and styles of digital texts, including social media. Classical rhetorical appeals can be effective means for achieving positive impact in that context. When used correctly, these ‘digital texts’ can be leveraged for maximum engagement with audiences. This study examines both a large, national organization – the National Sexual Violence Resource Center – and a small, regional one – Branch House Family Justice Center – for not only what sort of digital texts are utilized, but also how rhetorical appeals play into building narratives. A census of postings is taken, categorized, and organized. Findings suggest these appeals can and are used for strategic effect in nonprofit contexts. In addition to ethos, logos, and pathos, Kairos is drawn upon to construct organizational narrative in the pursuit of organizational goals.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the problem of soul in Plato's Timaeus while paying due respect to its close connection with the topics of cosmology and cosmogony. The inquiry proceeds from the highest level of the cosmos itself to the lowest level of the souls of mortal beings. In the first chapter, an important question, whether the cosmos singularly came into being or not is being examined. In this context, two traditional approaches are distinguished and it is argued that a proper answer to this question has to contain some elements of them both. The second chapter examines the nature of Plato's maker of this world, the demiurge. It is argued that he is a primordial deity who should not be identified with any aspect of the created cosmos or the intelligible being and who not only creates the bodily world and its soul but serves as a sort of paradigm for the soul in respect to its capacities as well. The topics of soul and cosmos blend equally in the third chapter which is devoted to the world-soul. It concentrates on three main topics which are relevant also for the souls occupying a lower position in the hierarchy. These are the blending of the soul that explains its basic properties, the structuring of the soul and attributing it a particular motion and finally the problem of cognition...

[pt] O presente trabalho objetiva mostrar a natureza não divina de Eros no discurso socrático, a partir da leitura interessada e exclusiva do Banquete de Platão, obra em que o referido autor se concentra no tema do amor. Trata-se de uma sucessão de elogios feitos pelos convivas presentes no evento social, que acaba por descrever a sociedade ateniense; temos o cômico, o trágico, o médico, o filósofo, entre outros, refletindo assim a construção do discurso filosófico a partir dos discursos que o antecedem. Há, portanto, uma filtragem em que Sócrates aproveita ou não alguns aspectos dos discursos anteriores para formatar o seu elogio. Para chegar a tal hipótese, passamos pela análise da concepção grega do amor centrada na questão da pederastia, pela investigação dos vários discursos que correspondem às várias faces do amor, e, por fim, chegamos ao ponto principal, que é a não divindade do Eros para a filosofia, ou ainda, que o Eros não possa ser divino por sua natureza filosófica. Se o divino possui conhecimento e é perfeito, então ele não é condizente com o desejo e a busca filosófica pelo que lhe falta. Porém, ele também não é mortal, mas emana uma força que influencia o mortal. O exercício da filosofia condiciona-se pelo exercício erótico, o Eros que possibilita a atividade da filosofia, a busca de nova perspectiva no comum que está diante de nós, mas sobre o qual não nos debruçamos para refletir e questionar. Eros acende a chama do saber na alma humana, e sem a vontade de saber, a filosofia não é. / [en] This work aims to analyze the non-divine nature of Eros in the Socratic discourse from the reading of Plato s Symposiun, a work in which the author focuses on the theme of love. It is a succession of compliments made by the present guests at the social event of the symposium, which ends describing the Athenian society. There are the lover of oratory, the general, the doctor, the comedian, the tragediography, among others, so that the construction of the philosophical discourse is generated of discourses that precede it.There is, therefore, a filter in which Socrates takes or not some aspects of his previous speeches to format his compliment. In order to reach this hypothesis, we begin by analyzing the Greek conception of love centered on the issue of pederasty; we investigate the various discourses that correspond to the various faces of love; and, finally, we reach the main point which is the non-divinity of Eros according to philosophy. Eros cannot be considered divine due to his philosophical nature. If the divine has knowledge and is perfect, then it is does not match the desire and the philosophical search to what it lacks. But, he is not mortal also: he emanates a force that influences the mortal. The exercise of philosophy is conditioned by the erotic exercise, the Eros that enables the activity of philosophy, the quest of a new perspective in common which stands before us, but on which we concentrate not to reflect and question. Eros kindles the flame of knowledge in the human soul, and without the will to know, philosophy is not.

This dissertation argues that in two different genres, oratory and political philosophy, Cicero presents to the Roman elite a variety of possible motives for pursuing a political career, and advances his vision of legitimate political engagement. It challenges recent interpretations, first, by demonstrating how Ciceronian forensic rhetoric transcends judicial goals in pursuit of broader cultural and political aims (Chapter 1); second, by demonstrating that Cicero’s political philosophy advances a new form of elite engagement, informed by Greek ethical philosophy and contemplative pursuits (Chapters 2-4); and, third, by demonstrating that Cicero viewed philosophy as essential for rhetoric, not due to its instrumental value but as an ethical grounding for both personal behavior and public oratory (Chapter 4). The first chapter argues that in the Pro Sestio, Cicero uses the prospect of civic glory to motivate his listeners to defend the republic. The second chapter, in contrast, shows how Cicero’s first dialogue on political philosophy, the De Re Publica, downplays the motive of civic glory in favor of less mercenary motives drawn from Greek ethical philosophy, especially the attraction of virtue as its own reward. Cicero attempts to persuade his potentially resistant Roman audience, however, by adopting an initial pose of hostility towards philosophy and by putting philosophical ideas in the mouths of his Roman dialogical personae. The third chapter, on the Somnium Scipionis, argues that Cicero concludes the De Re Publica by employing the authority of Scipio to inspire his audience to study cosmology in order to acquire knowledge of the motives, ends, and means of political engagement; Scipio qualifies Laelius’s earlier argument about virtue, reevaluating it as a means to an eternal reward based on Platonic eschatology. The fourth chapter shows that in De Legibus 1, the character Marcus Cicero mounts two arguments for natural law in two different styles, one aimed at Atticus the intellectual and the other at Quintus the politician, suggesting two chief segments of his potential reading audience. Marcus concludes with an inspiring speech intended to show Atticus that philosophy demands engagement in politics and to convince Quintus that philosophic knowledge gives public oratory ethical grounding.

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In this thesis I explore the emergence of the Christian triad with reference to two contemporary movements: Middle Platonism and Gnosticism. The earliest Christian writer to enumerate the three constituents of what would become the Christian Trinity is Justin. In addition to his three extant works, Justin’s triadology can be diagnosed from those he directly influenced – Tatian and Athenagoras – who I have (somewhat artificially) grouped under the heading the “school of Justin”. The ontological triad adopted by these Christian thinkers is compared with the triads of Middle Platonism and Gnosticism, both in terms of their structure and in terms of the function and ontological status of the individual constituents of these triads. In this thesis I propose that a liturgical triad of primitive Christianity, the trine baptismal formula, was conflated by the “school of Justin” with the ontological triad of Middle Platonism, resulting in three referents of the baptismal formula being embued with new functions and ontological status. Whilst emerging as a hierarchical triad, the logic of Platonic ontology when combined with Christian tradition required the sharp distinction between God, as Being, and all other things resulting in a Christian triad that was also a unity. This new triad became fixed as a central tenet of Christianity. I find no plausible connection between any known Gnostic triad and the triad of the “school of Justin”. There is some interaction between Gnostic and Platonic thought during this period. It is possible that the Triple-Powered One pre-empted the Being-Mind-Life triad of Neoplatonism.