Cette thèse prend pour point de départ la valorisation croissante de la nouveauté qui s’impose au cours de la modernité, et se radicalise au XXe siècle. Nous faisons le constat que l’omniprésence de cette notion à la fois puissante et familière soulève les questions du sens et de la valeur de la nouveauté, au-delà même de son appropriation moderne. Du point de vue du sens, la question est de savoir comment traiter l’irréductible polysémie de la nouveauté. Nous montrons d’abord que, sous ses diverses modalités, la nouveauté se distingue non seulement par la différence avec le passé mise de l’avant par le discours moderniste, mais plus encore par sa dimension de commencement, que nous analysons comme introduction de puissance et ouverture d’avenir. Cela constitue le critère premier de toute nouveauté, et ce qui en fait un enjeu humain fondamental. La nouveauté est au cœur de notre expérience du temps, de la manière dont nous vivons notre finitude et particulièrement notre mortalité. Cependant, cela ne fait pas de la nouveauté une valeur à proprement parler. Ce lien doit être interrogé à travers la pluralité des temps et des activités humaines. Nous considérons donc ensuite comment se décline la nouveauté, concrètement, au sein de l’existence humaine. Ce deuxième volet est développé à travers un dialogue avec la pensée de Hannah Arendt. Par sa conception de l’homme comme être de naissance et d’innovation, et par l’articulation des multiples temporalités corrélatives de l’activité humaine, Arendt nous permet de poser les bases d’une articulation différentielle et raisonnée de la polysémie de la nouveauté, en lien avec les conditions de natalité et de mortalité. La question de la valeur de la nouveauté se pose alors en fonction du contexte et de la réalité où elle s’inscrit. Il apparaît que plus on s’approche de la dimension de la liberté humaine, plus se radicalise la nouveauté, en même temps que le jugement de valeur devient plus problématique, et se présente comme une tâche et une exigence pour le jugement. Mots-clés : Nouveauté; Modernité; Temps; Innovation; Rénovation; Philosophie; Hannah Arendt. / This dissertation stems from the growing importance of the new throughout modernity, and its radicalization during the 20th century. The overwhelming presence of a notion so potent and yet so familiar raises the questions of the definition and of the value of novelty itself, beyond its modern appropriation. The problem with establishing its meaning lies in the polysemous nature of the notion. We show that novelty, in its multiple modalities, distinguishes itself not only as different from the past, something modernist discourses consistently insist upon, but more importantly, as a beginning. We understand this feature as a gain of power and an opening into the future. We also show that this constitutes the prime criteria for any novelty, and makes it a fundamental human issue. Novelty is at the core of how we experience time, our finitude and particularly our mortality. It does not follow, however, that novelty is a value or has value in itself. This must be examined through a study of the plurality of human temporalities and activities. Thus we also examine how novelty concretely manifests itself in human existence. This part of the dissertation is developed through a dialog with the thought of Hannah Arendt. Her conception of man as a being of birth and innovation, and her articulation of the multiple temporalities pertaining to human activity allows us to establish a differential and reasoned approach to the multiple meanings of novelty, in relation with the conditions of natality and mortality. The question of the value of novelty thus arises in relation to the context and reality in which it appears. As we get closer to the issue of human freedom, the more radical novelty gets, and the more the question of its value appears as a problem and as a task with which our judgment must deal. Keywords: Novelty; Modernity; Time; Innovation; Renovation; Philosophy; Hannah Arendt.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-04-09T13:03:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Jeferson Tadeu Martins.pdf: 1332410 bytes, checksum: 83dcc9eedfc7d3309e7885c7cd112abd (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-09T13:03:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jeferson Tadeu Martins.pdf: 1332410 bytes, checksum: 83dcc9eedfc7d3309e7885c7cd112abd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-06 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This work aims to study the category of political action in the book The Human Condition by Hannah Arendt. This is a category that evidences the search of the author in valorizing the vita activa, understood as labor, work and action. Considering that the totalitarianism of the twentieth century caused a rupture with the tradition of western political thought, Arendt proposes to think of the category of political action from a recovery of what she believes has been relegated to oblivion throughout tradition, to investigate some political phenomena, as originally manifested. In this dissertation, after the proposal of Arendt’s work is presented in general, the author's understanding about vita activa was evidenced, briefly addressing the categories of labor and work, and then presenting the main aspects of the action, based on the book The Human Condition. Finally, Arendt's analysis of modernity is clarified, along with the process of alienation from the world and the reflection on the system of councils, in which, for Arendt, political action is manifested in an authentic way / Este trabalho tem como objetivo estudar a categoria da ação política na obra A Condição Humana de Hannah Arendt. Essa é uma categoria que evidencia a busca de Arendt em valorizar a vita activa, entendida enquanto trabalho, obra e ação. Partindo da consideração de que o totalitarismo do século XX ocasionou uma ruptura com a tradição do pensamento político ocidental, Arendt se propõe a pensar a categoria de ação política, a partir de uma recuperação daquilo que ela acredita ter sido relegado ao esquecimento ao longo da tradição, para investigar alguns fenômenos políticos, tal qual se manifestaram originalmente. Nesta dissertação, após se apresentar de modo geral a proposta de trabalho arendtiana, evidencia-se sua compreensão a respeito da vita activa, abordando de maneira sucinta as categorias de trabalho e obra, para depois apresentar os aspectos principais da ação, tendo como base sua obra A Condição Humana. Por fim, esclarece-se a análise arendtiana a respeito da modernidade, juntamente com seu processo de alienação frente ao mundo e à reflexão acerca do sistema de conselhos, nos quais, para Arendt, a ação política se manifesta de modo autêntico

This dissertation addresses forgiveness as a philosophical matter, understanding that whenever forgiveness happens (or even when it is talked about) unnoticed theories of selfhood and time are at play. To bring these unobserved models of time and the self to the fore, this study explores a series of commonalities and divergences in some selected works by Augustine, Kierkegaard, and Arendt. In these texts, forgiveness is understood as the gathering of a self that is scattered in time (Augustine), as present participation in an earlier redemptive moment (Kierkegaard), or as an event that resists the otherwise rectilinear, death-oriented course of human life (Arendt).Why has forgiveness been mostly ignored in Western philosophy? What does this omission reveal about Western thought? Contemporary authors have argued for the (imperative) need to (re)think what forgiveness is, the conditions under which it (supposedly) occurs, and its relation to justice, since the inexpiable events of the past and present centuries maintain forgiveness an unresolved question. This study rests on a fundamental intuition: that for forgiveness to pass in history nothing must be passed from the one who forgives to the one who is forgiven. To support this claim, I undertake close readings of Augustine’s Confessions, Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, and Arendt’s The Human Condition. In these works, forgiveness is understood as a paradox —it must be contained to be given (Augustine), granted-yet-not-granted (Kierkegaard), and forgotten the moment it is given, as if never given at all (Arendt). Can forgiveness be thought of as a hidden existential capacity, and not as a magnanimous display of mercy? Can we imagine forgiveness as undoing the transgression we see, and secretly engaging with the invisible?

In this study, I consider the possibility of extending Hannah Arendt's critiques of conformity and behavior and her insights on thinking and moral philosophy to Christian life and culture. With Arendt, I argue that the possibility to refrain from perpetrating great evils made possible by uncritical conformity resides within the activity of thinking itself, as she defines it. Furthermore, I argue, again with Arendt, that refraining from such evils is a moral decision which finds its ultimate standard in the self. Although she culls many helpful insights from religious traditions, Arendt refrains from extending her moral philosophy into any realm in which religion is considered to be the valid standard of what constitutes moral behavior. Instead, I argue, against Arendt, that Christians can, and perhaps should, develop a more mature understanding of religion and a more "covenantal" understanding of their relationship with the divine.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 427823.pdf: 408542 bytes, checksum: 2a89eceaf16f9f9596ccad07761cf568 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-12-14 / A presente disserta??o ? uma an?lise da obra de Hannah Arendt, retratando o seu pensamento em rela??o aos conceitos do mal e da moralidade, partindo dos questionamentos sobre a incompreens?vel forma totalit?ria de governo ocorrida na Alemanha nazista, que n?o s? trouxeram os horrores da viol?ncia humana, mas os questionamentos filos?ficos perceb?veis e influenciadores de uma ?poca pol?tica din?mica e amea?adora. O trabalho ir? mostrar a forma como a autora utiliza a hist?ria do antissemitismo e totalitarismo para fazer as rela??es filos?ficas da quebra da tradi??o e da pol?tica atual moderna. A abordagem do mal, para Arendt, inicia no momento da nega??o da liberdade pelo totalitarismo, o qual considera fundamento b?sico da conceitualiza??o de pol?tica. Com essa aus?ncia de liberdade pelo totalitarismo, verificou-se a invers?o do conceito de pol?tica, caracterizada pela for?a, tendo o poder desp?tico como resultado e a consequente perpetua??o do movimento pelo terror. O mal, conforme a autora afirma, ocorre pela aus?ncia do pensar, ent?o encontra no ju?zo reflexionante de Kant, o conceito que mais se aproxima de sua interpreta??o da forma??o de um ju?zo livre. O Estudo reflete tamb?m, sobre a mentira e a propaganda ideol?gica de massa, sua base para a invers?o dos valores morais. Valores esses, que Arendt demonstra n?o encontrar sustenta??o, nem na religi?o, nem nos princ?pios kantianos, levando a autora a buscar, ent?o, os princ?pios socr?ticos. Com esses conceitos da autora o trabalho far? uma rela??o com modelos atuais e com governos democr?ticos que permite um liberalismo econ?mico e pol?tico, oportunizando a posse desse espa?o pelos indiv?duos quando os princ?pios morais desvirtuam-se da forma p?blica.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:26:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcos Valerio Carvalho Manzato.pdf: 1037727 bytes, checksum: 39eaec356029c63de6837480c1d054f8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-11-09 / It is reasonable believing that the idea of power construction produced by Hannah Arendt and registered in the philosophy and politics circles, that it is taking up spaces in different moments, has her personal experiences as inspiration. The intellectual trajectory of the writer has begun in philosophy, next to important germane characters and philosophers, in special Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers, leaving after for the politics theory by the influence of Henrich Blücher, in the United States of America, and has gotten back, at last, for the philosophy. It is possible grasping in the Arendt s thought tries to show a meaning of politics that develops itself inside of a conception of world and with the men, included in their various human activities and that had divided in 1. labor that activity said by needy and at the same time, trivial inside a biological process, that it is derived, once that it consumes in its own metabolism individual or collective; 2. the work by it and its extraction done from nature of the things are created by the homo faber, with its consequent world conversion in a space of shared objects by the human being; and the 3. action the only activity that fulfills directly among the men without the objects or the material mediation. The action occupies, at the arendtian context, one of the fundamental conditions in the man s life, united by the capacity of leading free his own destiny, represented still the only way of individual expression. Arendt searches to show a power conception that it is not limited from domination or hierarchies aspects, but free from those situations of pure submission, subordination or leadership circumstances by the men. The power for Arendt is built by the interactions of three elements, in other words, 1. the whole action, 2. the communication and the 3. common sense. Arendt, with her thought about power, includes every mechanism of whole action function, which becomes one of the biggest collaborators in the democratic process, serving as incentive for communities and organizations in their fights or demands for rights that can take to formation and development of specific ideas, including the direct and continuous participation. Nevertheless, there are difficulties for introducing the participating democracy, mainly in the under-developing countries. In Brazil, there is a way in this point, by some mechanisms contained in the Federal Constitution of 1988. This is the point of this investigation / É razoável acreditar que a construção da idéia de poder, como produzida por Hannah Arendt, e registrada nas esferas da filosofia e da política, ocupando espaços em momentos distintos, tem suas experiências pessoais como inspiração. A trajetória intelectual da autora inicia-se na filosofia, ao lado de importantes personagens e filósofos alemães, especialmente Martin Heidegger e Karl Jaspers, partindo posteriormente para a teoria política por influência de Heinrich Blücher, nos Estados Unidos, e retorna, finalmente, para a filosofia. É possível apreender, no pensamento de Arendt, um significado de política que se desenvolve no interior de uma concepção de mundo e com os homens, inseridos nas suas diversas atividades humanas, divididas em 1) o labor - aquela atividade marcada pela necessidade e concomitante futilidade dentro de um processo biológico, do qual é derivativa, uma vez que se consome no próprio metabolismo, individual ou coletivo; 2) o trabalho - por meio dele e das extrações efetuadas da natureza, as coisas são criadas pelo homo faber, com sua conseqüente conversão do mundo em um espaço de objetos partilhados pelo homem; e 3) a ação - única atividade que se exerce diretamente entre os homens sem a mediação das coisas ou da matéria. A ação ocupa, no contexto arendtiano, uma das condições fundamentais na vida do homem, consubstanciada pela capacidade de conduzir livremente seu próprio destino, representando ainda a única forma de expressão da singularidade individual. Busca Arendt apresentar uma concepção de poder que não está circunscrita a aspectos de dominação ou hierarquização, mas na total desvinculação daquelas situações de puro jugo, subordinação ou mando por parte dos homens. O poder para Arendt se constrói pela interação de três elementos, ou seja, a 1) ação conjunta, 2) a comunicação e o 3) senso comum. Arendt, com o seu pensamento de poder, compreende todo o mecanismo da ação conjunta, tornando-se uma das grandes colaboradoras no processo democrático, servindo de incentivo para comunidades e organizações em suas lutas ou reivindicações de direitos, que podem levar à formação e ao desenvolvimento de idéias concretas, inclusive por meio da participação direta e contínua. Não obstante, há dificuldades para se implantar a democracia participativa, principalmente em países subdesenvolvidos. No Brasil, há um caminhar neste sentido, por meio de alguns mecanismos contidos na Constituição Federal de 1988. Este é o sentido desta investigação

Esta tese pergunta pelo sentido do pária na obra de Hannah Arendt, buscando compreende-lo dentro do sentido mais amplo do pensamento político da autora. A pesquisa teve como ponto de partida artigos reunidos na coletânea Escritos Judaicos, em que a autora tratou do pária pelo viés de experiências dos judeus europeus, sobretudo entre o século 19 e o século 20; passou por Origens do Totalitarismo (1951), texto em que Arendt definiu o movimento de exclusão e destruição de párias europeus, em especial os judeus, como o “agente catalítico” do colapso da Europa; chegando a textos como A Condição Humana (1958), em que Arendt apresentou a pluralidade e a unicidade como novos princípios requeridos pela reconstrução da dignidade humana num contexto póstotalitário. Articulando-se de forma não-monística, este texto tem, como eixos, temas da obra de Arendt como a assimilação, tentativa de absorção de judeus e outros párias pelo “social”; a despersonalização, movimento radical de dissolução da personalidade e alienação do “eu” em favor de forças históricas; e a unicidade, como condição básica de seres humanos plurais e insubstituíveis. O trabalho sustenta, de forma geral, que a experiência do pária, levando em conta sua exclusão, desaparecimento e tentativa de reaparecimento, é um exemplo fundamental para a ação e o pensamento políticos na contemporaneidade. / This dissertation questions the meaning of the pariah in Hannah Arendt’s work, aiming at its comprehension within the broader context of Arendt’s political thought. The research departed from articles published in the anthology The Jewish Writings, in which Arendt approached the pariah relying on experiences of European Jews, mainly between the 19th and the 20th centuries; dealt with The Origins of Totalitarianism, text in which she defined the exclusion and destruction of European pariahs, specially Jews, as the “catalytic agent” of Europe’s broader collapse; arrived at texts such as The Human Condition (1958), in which Arendt presented plurality and uniqueness as new principles required by the reestablishment of human dignity in a post-totalitarian world. Developed in non-monistic lines, this text deals with topics of Arendt’s work, as assimilation, the attempt of absorption of Jews and other pariahs by the “social”; depersonalization, the radical movement of dissolution of personality and alienation of the ego towards historical forces; and uniqueness, as a basic condition of plural and irreplaceable human beings. It holds, in broad terms, that the pariah’s experience, its exclusion, disappearance and attempt of reappearance, is a fundamental example for acting and thinking politically in the present world.

O mote deste trabalho se constrói a partir da noção de compreensão (understanding) em Hannah Arendt, que é trazida para o primeiro plano dos seus escritos. Esta noção não aparece de forma evidente em seus escritos, mas manifesta-se como uma linha guia que conduz seus pensamentos. Dar evidencia a tal termo não tem como razão apresentar um conceito, mas busca revelar uma atividade que se manifesta enquanto um gesto filosófico que busca dotar o mundo de sentido. A compreensão é tematizada frente ao totalitarismo, um fenômeno que rompeu com as categorias políticas de seu tempo, é a partir dele que a compreensão busca reconciliar pensamento e realidade, revelando assim o cerne do pensamento político de Arendt. No primeiro capítulo é demostrado como a compreensão se manifesta como uma forma própria de narrar os acontecimentos, e é a partir dela que busco criar uma ponte entre pensamento e realidade, retomando uma forma de filosofar que deriva de nossas experiências de mundo, e remonta um debate o qual Arendt se insere entre filosofia e política. No segundo capítulo esta perspectiva é posta frente à realidade do totalitarismo e contrastada a sua sistemática, como um fenômeno que esvazia o espaço público e destitui os indivíduos da capacidade de se reconectar com um mundo vazio de sentido. A compreensão também é contrastada com Eichmann, revelando assim essa dupla face do totalitarismo, que ao eliminar os espaços de interação, também elimina a capacidade do indivíduo exercer sua singularidade em meio à pluralidade. Este exame busca evidenciar a relevância de tal noção dentro dos escritos de Arendt revelando uma postura política que deriva de um significado gerado no mundo, mas também destacá-la como uma postura política pertinente frente a demandas políticas da modernidade. / The motto of this work is built on the notion of understanding, which is brought by Hannah Arendt to the forefront of her writings. This notion does not appear clearly in her writings, but manifests itself as a guiding line leading her thoughts. The reason for giving evidence to such a term is not to present a concept, but to reveal an activity that manifests itself as a philosophical gesture, which seeks to provide meaning to the world. Understanding is thematized in view of totalitarianism, a phenomenon that broke through political categories of its time. It is from it that understanding seeks to reconcile thought and reality, thus revealing the core of Arendt's political thinking. In the first chapter it is shown how understanding manifests itself as a proper way of narrating events, and it is based on this idea that I seek to create a bridge between thought and reality, retaking a form of philosophizing that derives from our experiences of the world, going back to a debate in which Arendt is in between philosophy and politics. In the second chapter this perspective is confronted with the reality of totalitarianism and contrasts its systematics as a phenomenon that empties public space and deprives individuals of the capacity to reconnect with a world that is empty of meaning. Understanding is also contrasted with Eichmann, thus revealing this double aspect of totalitarianism, which by eliminating spaces of interaction, also eliminates the individual's ability to exert his singularity amidst plurality. This examination seeks to highlight the relevance of such a notion within Arendt's writings by revealing a political stance derived from a meaning generated in the world, but also to highlight it as a pertinent political stance in the face of the political demands of modernity.

Instigada pelos acontecimentos a dar resposta à experiência do totalitarismo, cujas consequências ela padeceu em primeira pessoa, a obra de Hannah Arendt é uma crítica categórica da filosofia política tradicional, iniciada por Platão. Resposta à negação da política que representaram os regimes totalitários do século XX e crítica à retirada da dignidade da política por parte da filosofia, que a submeteu à sua tutela. Segura de encontrar os fundamentos da política além do seu próprio âmbito, a tradição filosófica ocidental substituiu a reflexão e o exercício da liberdade, verdadeiro sentido da política segundo Arendt, por uma teoria do governo e da dominação que esconde a fragilidade inerente ao domínio dos assuntos humanos. Pretendemos defender que o pensamento político arendtiano tem como pressuposto básico e necessário o reconhecimento da fragilidade constitutiva da política, sem que isso implique qualquer paradoxo. Para tanto, seguimos o rastro dessa fragilidade num conjunto selecionado de textos da autora e defendemos que sua reflexão entra no campo do pósfundacionalismo. Como corolário, sugerimos que, apesar dos depoimentos da própria interessada, Hannah Arendt escreveu uma obra de filosofia política, alternativa à grande tradição, que nós chamamos de filosofia da fragilidade. / Prompted by events to give response to the experience of totalitarianism the consequences of which she suffered in first person, the work of Hannah Arendt is a categorical critique of the great tradition of political philosophy initiated by Plato. Response to the negation of politics that represented the twentieth century totalitarian régimes and critique of the withdrawal of the dignity of politics practiced by philosophy that submitted it under tutelage. Sure to find the foundations of politics beyond its own realm, the Western tradition of philosophy replaced the reflection and the exercise of freedom, the true sense of politics according to Arendt, by a theory of government and domination that hides away the inherent frailty of the realm of human affairs. We intend to defend that Arendt’s political thinking has its basic and necessary requirement in the recognition of the constitutive frailty of politics, without this incurring in any paradox. Therefore, we follow the trail of this frailty across a selected set of the author's texts and argue that her reflection enters in the postfoundational field. As a corollary, we suggest that, despite her own testimony, Hannah Arendt wrote a work of political philosophy, an alternative one to the great tradition, that we may call philosophy of frailty.

What is political philosophy? Aristotle pursues that question by asking what the good is. If Nietzsche's postmodern diagnosis that modern philosophical rationalism has exhausted itself is true, it is unclear if an answer to that question is possible. Yet given the prevalence of extremist ideologies in 20th century politics, and the politically irresponsible support of philosophers for these ideologies, there is an urgent need for an answer. This thesis examines how, in these philosophical circumstances, Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, and Alasdair MacIntyre conclude that a key resource in the recovery of political philosophy, and in showing its contemporary relevance, lies in the recovery of Aristotle's political philosophy. This thesis contends that how and why Arendt, Strauss, and MacIntyre turn to Aristotle, and what they find in Aristotle, depends on their varying critiques of modernity. Convinced that the philosophical tradition is shattered irreversibly after the events of totalitarianism, Arendt argues for a retrieval of Aristotle and his understanding of politics from the fragments of that tradition. Strauss is impelled to turn to the political philosophy of Aristotle because of the crisis of radical historicism, to recover classical rationalism’s answer to what the good is. MacIntyre turns to Aristotle to find the moral justification for rejecting Stalinism that contemporary philosophical traditions fail to provide; he reconstructs an Aristotelian tradition that can answer the question of what the good is better than his contemporary rivals. Although these thinkers may appear disparate, this thesis argues that each addresses the question of what the good is by offering a vision of political philosophy as a way of life, which Aristotle helps form. This way of life probes the relationship between philosophy and politics as permanent problem for human existence. In recovering this tradition of thinking with Aristotle about the character of political philosophy, this thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of each of these thinkers, as well as to the practice of political philosophy in modern, post-Nietzschean times.