The Kenyan state is currently under pressure from two sides: First, numerous non-state armed groups have taken over the provision of security in areas where the state is practically absent. Second, drug-trafficking organizations are gaining ground as the country is increasingly being used as a major transit hub for narcotics. This article investigates the relationship between drug trafficking and informal security provision in Kenya and draws analogies from comparable experiences in Latin America and West Africa. Field research in Kenya has demonstrated that profit-oriented, informal security actors in Mombasa work for drug lords, while their counterparts in Nairobi are more likely to be hired by politicians. Moreover, faith-based vigilante groups in both cities appear to be less susceptible to external manipulation by drug traffickers. The article concludes by considering the potential consequences of an expansion of the drug trade in Kenya. / © 2014 GIGA. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Africa Spectrum is an Open Access publication. It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.

Previous literature introduced forced marriage as a tool to socialize combatants and increase group cohesion. Yet, explanations for why armed groups select forced marriage, and for the variation in the occurrence of forced marriage across armed groups are lacking. The question guiding this study, then, is why do some armed groups enforce marriage, when others do not?I argue that armed groups with forced recruitment are more likely to enforce marriages, because they are confronted with an abductor’s dilemma. They need to socialize forced recruits quicklyto establish allegiance. The short time-frame makes norm-compliance strategies less feasible,while increasing the potential of role-learning mechanisms. Forced marriage best fits the rolelearning socialization, thus is more likely to occur if role-learning is prioritized. The hypothesisand causal mechanism are tested in a combination of process tracing and controlled comparison of the Khmer Rouge and the Liberation Tigers in Tamil Eelam. Empirical evidence is derived from a systematic review of primary and secondary literature. The study finds moderate support for the hypothesis. The causal mechanism finds no support. However, these findings should betreated with caution, due to limitations and biases of the study.

Since 1945, there has been a proliferation of armed groups in conflict theatres across the globe. Although these groups exist outside of the regular forces of States, they are in most instances supported and controlled by States. Despite this, the complicit support of States in the commission of international crimes by armed groups is not recognised under international law and the tests of control through which the conduct of individuals could be attributed to States are almost impossible to meet. This allows States to maintain compelling roles in international crimes committed by armed groups with impunity. Despite this, the role played by States in modern international conflict has received only intermittent attention in the literature. This thesis seeks to address this disparity by addressing the critical role of State support of armed groups in the commission of international crimes by challenging the existing tests of attribution of conduct to States under the present rules of international responsibility. Therefore this thesis asks whether there can be variation to the current tests for attribution of conduct of individuals who are members of non-State armed groups to States which provide support to them, by approaching the interpretation of "control" in a purposive, less literal manner. It argues this by analysing the limitations of the current law through selected case studies. It further examines alternative approaches in the fields of international human rights law and international criminal law, again through selected case studies with a view to determining whether they can assist in crafting more purposive approaches towards the determination of State control over armed groups. This will augment the current corpus of literature by suggesting improvements that can, hopefully, pass into the lex lata and stymie continued State impunity in this area.

This diploma thesis deals with one of the aspects of armed groups' governance, namely the institutions that are created or used by armed groups and the role these institutions play in the military-civilian relations. The case study chosen is the Eritrean People's Liberation Front. This armed group was formed in 1973 in the context of the struggle for Eritrea's independence, and in the next decades it created a management system that included taxation, political committees, education, health care, and dispute settlement mechanisms. After the establishment of independent Eritrea in 1993, ELOF evolved into the People's Front for Democracy and Justice, which still remains a ruling Eritrean political party. The primary aim of the thesis is to answer the question of the role played by institutions created by non-state armed groups in building their relations with the civilian population. He is also marginally devoted to the development of Eritrea after independence.

Due to the high rates of criminal violence and the alternative authority of Criminal Armed Groups (CAGs) in Guatemala humanitarian access faces multiple barriers in regions under CAG control, often leaving vulnerable populations without necessary humanitarian services. With limited institutional and conceptual frameworks to support negotiating for humanitarian access in these criminally violent contexts the international humanitarian system favors avoiding these contexts altogether to minimize the risk of their operations, but with the trends of violence increasing in the region not addressing the issue of negotiating for humanitarian spaces in these contexts only will result in crises worsening. Currently there are few substantive discussions regarding establishing such negotiation frameworks in crime-rich environments, those which do discuss the topic directly suggest using frameworks meant for negotiations with Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) in armed conflict. However, due to the difference in motivations between CAGs and NSAGs and drastic contextual differences there is doubt for whether the strategies are transferable between the two contexts. Recently few scholars have shifted the conversation to creating the necessary frameworks to approach negotiating humanitarian access specifically in criminally violent situations, providing guidance based on the typology of the criminal organization and the level of violence. While these new discourses have expanded the resources necessary for humanitarian organizations to negotiate access in regions with high rates of criminal violence it is still necessary to broaden topic further. Therefore, examining strategies for negotiating humanitarian access in regions with high rates of criminal violence in Guatemala seeks to understand how to ensure that affected populations in regions under criminal control continue to receive humanitarian aid despite the threat of violence. To examine this phenomenon this study utilizes the mixed qualitative methods of an extensive literature review on the themes of humanitarian access, criminal governance, and humanitarian negotiations, along with a review of the case of El Salvador’s negotiated 2012 gang truce, and semi-structured interviews with experts in the field of negotiating access. Together with considerations of the unique context of Guatemala the points of intersection between themes and responses assisted in triangulating the analysis of the appropriate strategies to consider when negotiating humanitarian access in regions prevalent criminal violence. Ultimately in regions under criminal control in Guatemala strategies which respect the CAG authority, balance the perceived threat of violence with the real threat of violence, communicate humanitarian impartiality, and are specifically crafted for the type of CAG control are potential paths negotiating humanitarian access to affected populations otherwise forgotten.

Armed conflict and violence against civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has persisted for years starting in the 1990s. The Eastern, Western and North-Eastern parts of the country have seen the presence of a multiplicity of armed groups that have caused an escalation of the humanitarian crisis. The United Nations, in the interest of civilian protection, peacekeeping and security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo declared a mission under The United Nations Organisational Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). In spite of this mission, civilians continued in the Congo to suffer attacks and to endure human rights abuses by the armed militants that are fighting government and the government forces in shape of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC). This study examines the problematique of the mandate of MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in light of the challenges that have made its success debatable. The success of MONUC has become debatable in light of the fact that in spite of its presence and implementation in the DRC, between 2007 and 2010, conflict and the violence against civilians escalated to unprecedented levels. This study examines the causalities of the failure and observes its effect while making propositions towards amelioration of the challenges and the failure of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

Previous research has laid out different answers and explanations to why there is variation in female participation and sexual violence respectively. However, less attention has been attributed to investigate the relationship between female participation and sexual violence. In fact, the causal processes between these variables remains under-theorized and unclear. The aim of this study is to contribute theoretically by examining under what conditions NSAGs with female participation engage in sexual violence. Moreover, a novel classification of different types of female participation is introduced. This study argues that NSAGs with subordinate female participation are more likely to engage in sexual violence, compared to NSAGs with strategic female participation. Using a structured focused comparison method in a most-similar case study design, the suggested hypotheses are tested on two cases, UNITA and the EPLF. The results of the study find support for the theorized relationship. According to the findings of this study, I argue that the investigation of women’s roles and gender norms and hierarchies should be particularly considered when studying female participation in NSAGs and sexual violence in armed conflicts. Yet, data limitations and availability call for caution. Lastly, this study points to the need for greater attention and collection of data on female participation in armed organizations. Furthermore, the need for specified and disaggregated data as well as concepts beyond the non-combatant and combatant dichotomy is needed in order to further assess the relationship between female participation and sexual violence, as well as to tailor appropriate policies for its prevention.

En proie à la guerre civile depuis son indépendance en 1948, l’Union de Myanmar (Union de Birmanie avant 1989) a connu de grandes difficultés dans le processus de construction d’un État-nation moderne. Envisagé sur des bases fédérales à l’indépendance, le pouvoir politique s’est caractérisé par une très forte centralisation, en particulier à la suite des coups d’État militaires de 1962 et 1988. Se faisant, la conception de l’identité nationale portée par le pouvoir central, largement liée aux éléments constitutifs de l’identité du groupe majoritaire (au delà d’une rhétorique et d’une imagerie classique d’« unité dans la diversité ») a continuellement fait l’objet de contestations, plus ou moins radicales. Accordant une place importante au contexte historique du sujet, ce travail examine le rôle de l’école dans le processus de construction nationale au Myanmar, en s’appuyant sur une grille de lecture simple : quantité,qualité, identité. L’accessibilité de l’école à travers le territoire national, les enjeux liés aux méthodes d’enseignement et à la langue d’instruction, les caractéristiques du « roman national » produit sous les gouvernements successifs ainsi que les compléments et alternatives à l’école publique proposés par la société civile et les groupes armés sont examinés en détails. L’ouvrage se conclut sur les perspectives de réformes de l’éducation dans le Myanmar post-SLORC/SPDC (la junte qui a dirigé le pays de 1988 à 2011), tentant de comprendre comment les enjeux identifiés au cours de ce travail se posent dans le nouveau contexte politique birman. / Born as a federal state in 1948, the Union of Myanmar (Union of Burma up to 1989) experienced great difficulties in the process of building a modern Nation-state. While political authority has been very centralizedin practice, especially after the army took over in 1962 and 1988, the official discourse on the nation and itshistory has been increasingly based on the components of the Burman majority identity (beyond the classical “unity in diversity” rhetoric), contributing to legitimize ethno-nationalist alternative conceptions of the Nationand armed struggle. This work focuses on the roles played by schooling in the perspective of nation-building. After examining the relation between schooling and nation-building over the different phases of Myanmar’s history, we move on todescribe schooling under the SLORC/SPDC (1988-2011), using a simple analytical lens : Quantity, Quality, Identity. Issues regarding the accessibility of schooling across the territory, teaching methods, language policiesand the conception of the nation conveyed by the national curriculum are examined in details. The last section of this work focuses on the complements and alternatives to education in public schools, set up by the civil society and the numerous armed-group that still exist in contemporary Myanmar. We conclude on education reform perspectives in post-SPDC Myanmar, trying to understand how the stakes and challenges identified in this work should be apprehended in the post-2011 political context.

United Nations Peacekeeping has proven to be remarkably effective at reducing violence against civilians - without using compellent force. A recent turn towards peace enforcement raises the questions: Does the use of force within a peace enforcement mandate affect the use of violence against civilians by an armed group? If this is the case, by what mechanism does this effect occur? This thesis provides two novel explanations on how the use of force by peacekeepers could affect violence against civilians by the targeted armed group. One predicts decreased- and the other one increased levels of violence. These explanations are tested on the Force Intervention Brigade, which was deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2013. A most similar comparison between the three most powerful armed groups in North Kivu at the time is drawn and examined with the method of structured focussed comparison. The most similar comparison does not reveal a clear correlation. Yet, temporal order as well as anecdotal evidence give tentative support for the main argument of the thesis. It suggests that compellent force against an armed group leads to strengthened deterrence and physical separation, which ultimately results in fewer civilian targeting.

Uninhabited Aircraft Systems (UAS), as a relatively novel technology, was always seen as a tool available and utilized only by rich and developed states. But thanks to globalizations and the fast proliferation of commercially available drones, this platform has already been used by smaller states and also non-state groups, giving them possibilities never seen before. Yet, there is little research on how and why these new actors use UAS to claim their cause. The research question to guide this thesis is how and why do non-state armed groups differ from states when using Uninhabited Aircraft Systems in their military operations? The thesis uses a demand- and supply-side theory, adapted for the proliferation of drones to help answer that question. This theory is tested in a multiple case study involving the United States as a state and the Houthis as a non-state group during the Yemeni crisis, from 2011 to 2022. Through a structured, focused comparison between the cases, indicators from the demand- and supply-side models were used to understand the differences in drone use between different actors. The main findings are that states and non-state armed groups differ in their use of UAS mainly because they have different boundaries (legal and technological), but also for the symbol and status that this platform carries. Finally, it was seen that the theory is not only able to clarify the trends on proliferation, but also the why actors use UAS, with few remarks, but with a need to test it further.