Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

La République centrafricaine traverse depuis plusieurs décennies des crises socio­politiques et militaires. Celles-ci ont atteint leur apogée en 2013 autour des affrontements entre la Séléka, une rébellion du nord et les Anti­Balaka, un regroupement de milices locales. L’État n’a plus de contrôle sur l’ensemble de son territoire morcelé et tenu par des groupes armés. À partir du cas de l’Ouest centrafricain, cette thèse montre que les conflits armés ont des répercussions profondes sur les rapports des populations aux ressources et aux territoires. Ils ont un fort potentiel de destruction de certaines activités économiques telles que l’élevage bovin et la mine artisanale. Non seulement on assiste à une réorganisation des espaces de production des ressources pastorales et minières, mais le conflit induit également une trajectoire de décentralisation de l’accès aux ressources par les armes. Le contrôle par les armes a des incidences sur les acteurs, les réseaux et les flux de commercialisation. Nos travaux portent sur les dynamiques de l’Ouest centrafricain durant la période 2013-­2017. Ils s’appuient notamment sur une étude de cas à l’échelle de la commune d’élevage de Niem­-Yellewa, qui montre de quelle manière les ressentiments entre les groupes dominants, les luttes de pouvoirs entre les dirigeants locaux et les groupes armés en quête de ressources, s’agrègent pour générer, entretenir et faire perdurer un conflit local. / The Central African Republic has been experiencing socio­political and military crises for several decades. Those reached their peak in 2013 when clashes between the Séléka, a rebellion in the north and the Anti­Balaka, a group of local militias, arose. The state no longer has control over the entire territory which is fragmented and held by armed groups. Presenting the case­study of West Central African Republic, this thesis shows that armed conflicts have profound implications on people's relations to resources and territories. These conflicts also tend to destroy some economic activities such as cattle farming and artisanal mining. Not only it induces the reorganization of the production areas of pastoral and mining resources, but it also triggers a tendency for a decentralized access to resources via weapons. Such armed control impacts actors, networks and marketing flows. Our works focus on the dynamics of West Central Africa during the period 2013­2017. They are essentially based on a case study at the scale of the pastoral area of Niem­Yellewa, which shows how resentments between the dominant groups and power struggles between local leaders and the armed groups looking for resources, aggregate to generate, maintain and perpetuate a local conflict.

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Linha de pesquisa: Hist?ria, cultura e poder. / Submitted by Jos? Henrique Henrique (jose.neves@ufvjm.edu.br) on 2017-06-19T19:48:42Z No. of bitstreams: 2 amanda_monteiro_diniz_carneiro.pdf: 951338 bytes, checksum: b7f857ad86be9f9a2d29824c7b1cbd70 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rodrigo Martins Cruz (rodrigo.cruz@ufvjm.edu.br) on 2017-06-22T14:17:32Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 amanda_monteiro_diniz_carneiro.pdf: 951338 bytes, checksum: b7f857ad86be9f9a2d29824c7b1cbd70 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-22T14:17:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 amanda_monteiro_diniz_carneiro.pdf: 951338 bytes, checksum: b7f857ad86be9f9a2d29824c7b1cbd70 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017 / Esta disserta??o analisa a atua??o das mulheres no grupo de esquerda argentino denominado Montoneros no per?odo entre 1969 e 1980. O grupo surgiu, aproximadamente, em fins dos anos 1960, a partir da esquerda peronista. Nesse sentido, pretendemos entender e discutir com abrang?ncia as rela??es entre as referidas mulheres e o grupo. Para isso, exploramos os espa?os de atua??o pol?tica dessas mulheres; os pap?is desempenhados por elas; as rela??es com os demais participantes do grupo e da sociedade de modo geral; finalmente, discutimos as dificuldades e tentativas de se estabelecer o papel feminino dentro da organiza??o, sem a apropria??o do ?jeito? masculino para fundamentar suas atua??es no grupo e no meio social. Em s?ntese, este trabalho busca novas perspectivas para se pensar as mulheres como personagens hist?ricos como quaisquer outros, independentemente de compara??es e ju?zos de valor constru?dos historicamente e reproduzidos de forma hier?rquica como regras naturais. / Disserta??o (Mestrado Profissional) ? Programa de P?s-Gradua??o em Ci?ncias Humanas, Universidade Federal dos Vales do Jequitinhonha e Mucuri, 2017. / This dissertation analyzes the performance of women in the left-wing group called Montoneros in the period between 1969 and 1980. The group emerged approximately in the late 1960s from the Peronist left. In this sense, we intend to comprehensively discuss and discuss the relationships between these women and the group. For this, we explore the political activity spaces of these women; the roles played by them; the relations with the other participants of the group and society in general; finally, we discuss the difficulties and attempts to establish the feminine role within the organization, without appropriating the masculine "way" to base its actions in the group and in the social environment. In summary, this work seeks new perspectives to think of women as historical characters like any others, independently of comparisons and value judgments historically constructed and reproduced hierarchically as natural rules. / Esta disertaci?n analiza la actuaci?n de las mujeres en el grupo de izquierda argentino denominado Montoneros en el per?odo de 1969 a 1980. El grupo surgi?, aproximadamente, a fines de la d?cada de 1960, a partir de la izquierda peronista. En ese sentido, pretendemos entender y discutir las relaciones entre las referidas mujeres y el grupo de forma amplia. Para eso, exploramos los espacios de actuaci?n pol?tica de esas mujeres; los papeles desempe?ados por ellas; las relaciones con los dem?s participantes del grupo y con la sociedad de modo general; finalmente, discutimos las dificultades y los intentos de establecer el papel femenino dentro de la organizaci?n sin la apropiaci?n del modo masculino de fundamentar sus acciones en el grupo y el medio social. En s?ntesis, este trabajo busca nuevas perspectivas para pensar a las mujeres como personajes hist?ricos como cualquier otro, independientemente de comparaciones y juicos de valor construidos hist?ricamente y reproducidos de forma jer?rquica como reglas naturales.

Submitted by MARILIA CAROLINA BARBOSA DE SOUZA PIMENTA (mariliasouza84@yahoo.com) on 2016-04-27T20:54:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese Final _Marília Souza Pimenta.pdf: 9369849 bytes, checksum: 2c58e461a32524bc2721cdcaa191b873 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Felipe Augusto Arakaki (arakaki@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-04-29T17:45:09Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese Final _Marília Souza Pimenta.pdf: 9369849 bytes, checksum: 2c58e461a32524bc2721cdcaa191b873 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T17:45:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese Final _Marília Souza Pimenta.pdf: 9369849 bytes, checksum: 2c58e461a32524bc2721cdcaa191b873 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-22 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / A América do Sul observa há duas décadas a ausência de guerras interestatais entre seus Estados. Entretanto, tal fato não sugere ausência de violência, tensão e conflitos, sobretudo nas regiões de fronteira, em espaços onde o Estado não atua completamente. A violência estrutural, com a permanência de conflitos históricos, somados a questões ligadas ao cultivo, produção e tráfico de drogas, gera o desenvolvimento de economias paralelas, bem como gera deslocamentos internos e transnacionais, corroendo estruturas do Estado e de suas fronteiras. Acredita-se, portanto, que são as ameaças não tradicionais que oferecem obstáculos à consolidação da Zona de Paz na América do Sul. A presente pesquisa explora este fenômeno por meio da metodologia comparativa estrutural focada e tem a Colômbia, com suas questões ligadas ao conflito armado interno e às drogas, como estudo de caso. Nesse sentido, o espaço fronteiriço entre a Colômbia e a Venezuela se tornou, especialmente nos últimos 15 anos, um espaço profícuo para operações de grupos ligados ao tráfico de drogas e armas, bem como um lócus estratégico para o refúgio e retaguarda de grupos armados ilegais e paramilitares. Esta intensificação decorre, em grande parte, das operações militares colombianas de erradicação de cultivos, desmobilização de paramilitares, combate a grupos irregulares, por meio de operações de contra insurgência, ligadas ao Plano Colômbia, o que acabou por gerar um transbordamento de atividades transnacionais no espaço limítrofe, aqui denominado Zona Estratégica e Estrutural para os Trânsitos Ilícitos ZEETI. Tais regiões apresentam baixa governabilidade estatal, altos índices de corrupção, economia informal e exportam insegurança para o exterior. Por gerar constantes mobilizações das Forças Armadas na fronteira, bem como um ambiente de desconfiança e hostilidade entre os chefes de Estado, constata-se que as ZEETI, são para a América do Sul, o principal obstáculo atual para que se consolide uma efetiva Zona de Paz na região. / América del Sur ha observado durante dos décadas la ausencia de guerras entre Estados. Sin embargo, este hecho no sugiere ausencia de violencia, tensión y conflictos, sobre todo en las regiones fronterizas, en las zonas donde el Estado no actúa por completo. La violencia estructural, con la permanencia de conflictos históricos, además de las cuestiones relacionadas con el cultivo, la producción y el tráfico de drogas, genera el desarrollo de las economías paralelas y genera movimientos internos y transnacionales, erosionando las estructuras del estado y sus fronteras. Se cree, por lo tanto, son las amenazas no tradicionales que ofrecen obstáculos para la consolidación de la Zona de Paz en América del Sur. Esta investigación explora este fenómeno a través de la metodología comparativa estructural y Colombia, con sus temas de conflicto armado interno y las drogas, se presenta como caso de estudio. En este sentido, la zona fronteriza entre Colombia y Venezuela se ha convertido, sobre todo en los últimos 15 años, en un espacio fructífero para las operaciones de los grupos relacionados con el tráfico de drogas y armas, así como un lugar estratégico para el refugio de los grupos armados ilegales y paramilitares. Este incremento se debe, en gran parte, a las operaciones militares en Colombia para erradicar los cultivos, la desmovilización de los paramilitares que luchan grupos irregulares a través de operaciones de contrainsurgencia vinculados al Plan Colombia, que terminaron por generar un desbordamiento de las actividades transnacionales en el espacio limítrofe, aquí llamado zona estratégico y estructural de tránsito ilícito ZEETI. Estas regiones tienen una baja gobernabilidad del Estado, altos niveles de corrupción, economía informal y la inseguridad de exportación en el extranjero. En la recurrencia de generar la movilización constante de las fuerzas armadas en la frontera, así como un ambiente de desconfianza y hostilidad entre los jefes de estado, parece que el ZEETI representan, para América del Sur, el principal obstáculo actual para consolidar una Zona efectiva de Paz . / South America observed for two decades the absence of inter-State wars between the states. However, this fact does not suggest absence of violence, tension and conflicts, especially in border regions, in areas where the state does not act completely. Structural violence, with the permanence of historical conflicts, in addition to issues related to the cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs, generates the development of parallel economies and generates internal and transnational movements, eroding state and its borders structures. It is believed, therefore, are the non-traditional threats that provide obstacles to the consolidation of the Zone of Peace in South America. This research explores this phenomenon through the structural focused comparative methodology and has Colombia, with its issues of internal armed conflict and drugs, as a case study. In this sense, the border area between Colombia and Venezuela has become, especially in the last 15 years, a fruitful space for operations of groups linked to drug trafficking and weapons, as well as a strategic locus for refuge of illegal armed groups and paramilitaries. This increase is due, in large part, the Colombian military operations to eradicate crops, demobilization of paramilitaries fighting irregular groups through counter insurgency operations linked to Plan Colombia, which ended up generating an overflow of transnational activities in borderline space, here called Strategic and Structural Zone for Illicit Transit ZEETI. These regions have low state governance, high levels of corruption, informal economy and export insecurity abroad. In recurrence of generating constant mobilization of the armed forces at the border, as well as an environment of mistrust and hostility between the heads of state, it appears that the ZEETI represent to South America, the main current obstacle to consolidate an effective Zone of Peace.

The question of how armed group ideology influences its behaviour has been tentatively explored in the past decade. However, which role distinct ideological commitments play in civilian targeting has not been satisfactorily discussed thus far. This thesis turns to research on genocide and mass violence and incorporates the concepts of ‘exclusionary ideologies’ and ‘threat perceptions’ to fill this research gap. It addresses the following question: to what extent do exclusionary ideologies of armed groups influence their use of violence against civilians during civil conflicts? When revolutionary armed groups pursue their goals, threat perceptions determine which groups are considered legitimate targets for attack. Therefore, it is hypothesized that exclusionary groups will employ more violence against civilians than inclusionary groups because the former have a more expanded understanding of legitimate targeting than the latter. Through a structured focused comparison, discourse analysis and process tracing applied to the cases of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, moderate support for this hypothesis is found. It is shown that both armed groups to varying extents invoke threat perceptions regarding certain out-groups to legitimize and rationalise their patterns of violence. Nonetheless, a descent into indiscriminate violence by Boko Haram and data shortage of Al-Shabaab attacks warrant caution.

This thesis examines the internal dynamics of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone over the course of the civil war waged from 1991-2002. It does so in two parts, looking first at the RUF’s organizational capacity—its ability to emerge and survive as a group; and second, at its material viability—the logistics and procurement of food, weapons, and other resources required to sustain war. The RUF has become a paradigmatic case for the study of war and rebel groups in Africa. Although much has been written on the group and its violence, comparatively little is known about the inner-workings of the organization and how a largely forcibly recruited group of ill-equipped thousands managed to pose a viable threat to the state for over a decade. Through a fine-grained, case-based analysis, this study applies research on the microdynamics of violence in civil war to the structural and logistical mechanics that underpin it. Doing so contextualizes debates about resource wars, collective violence, and mobilization and onset within the RUF’s own strategies for controlling these aspects of war- making. New primary material, including rebel archive documents, describes the extensive military and civilian governance structures through which order and cohesion were established and enforced. Tracking the success and failure of these mechanisms helps explain the disconnect between rebel rhetoric and behaviour. A detailed examination of the RUF’s material capacity applies this organizational analysis to the group’s strategic priorities for survival. It reorients the resource war debate toward what actually fuels fighting on the ground. Food has long been overlooked as the primary requirement for group survival, and ammunition the basic element of military viability. These ‘low politics’ of survival explain the nature of the war and underscore the importance of shifting factors, such as territorial control, in shaping rebel behaviour. Finally, the ‘high politics’ of international arms trades and global diamond markets illumine changes in the RUF’s firepower and personalization of power, returning to the organizational failings that ultimately led to the group’s dissolution.

Lorsqu’il a fallu moderniser les instruments du droit international humanitaire le conflit armé non international n’était qu’un épiphénomène et son avènement a toujours été considéré comme un élément perturbateur d’une scène internationale profondément étatisé. Néanmoins l’importance croissante de ce type de conflit a permis de mettre en exergue le rôle sans cesse croissant d’un nouveau type d’acteurs à savoir les groupes armés non étatiques. Désormais, ils sont les acteurs majeurs de conflits largement majoritaires. Pour cette raison, nous pensons qu’il est temps de changer d’approche et de revoir les solutions proposées dans les instruments internationaux applicables. Pour toutes ces raisons et pour adapter le droit aux réalités des conflits actuels, une approche dépouillée de toute charge idéologique et péjorative doit primer par rapport à celle actuelle. De même, il est fondamentalement nécessaire de faire assumer à ces groupes les conséquences de leurs agissements en engageant leur responsabilité internationale. / When the instruments of international humanitarian law had to be modernized, the non-international armed conflict was an epiphenomenon and its advent has always been considered a disruptive element of a deeply internationalized international scene. Nevertheless, the growing importance of this type of conflict has highlighted the ever-increasing role of a new type of actors, namely non-State armed groups. From now on, they are the major actors of conflicts largely majority. For this reason, we believe that it is time to change the approach and review the solutions proposed in the applicable international instruments. For all these reasons and to adapt the law to the realities of current conflicts, an approach stripped of any ideological and pejorative burden must take precedence over the current one. Similarly, it is fundamentally necessary to make these groups bear the consequences of their actions by committing their international responsibility.

What does “success” mean for social reintegration of ex-combatants in urban settings? Although reintegration of former fighters has been at the center of academic and policy discourse for achieving peace, limited attention has been paid to unraveling how social reintegration processes occur and how they are impacted in urban contexts. This thesis studies the specific issue of successful social reintegration in urban contexts and asks why it evidences higher levels of success in some urban settings than others. Drawing on previous research on the impact of security conditions on reintegration processes, it argues that actual or suspected eroded security conditions, caused by the presence of organized armed groups as well as reintegrating ex-combatants whose former unit operated in the same host community, negatively impact levels of success of social reintegration in urban centers because they each increase levels of fear towards ex-combatants among community members. Through process tracing and structured focused comparison, this thesis assesses the explanatory power of the proposed hypotheses for the cases of Bogota and Medellin. Based on the yielded results, support for both hypotheses is identified. Nonetheless given the nuanced conceptualizations propose heiring, future research is called upon to further assess the explanatory power of the proposed models.

Les conflits armés non internationaux dominent de plus en plus la scène internationale, particulièrement en Afrique. Durant la période de violence, plusieurs crimes graves sont commis, ce qui n’a pas laissé la communauté internationale indifférente. De ce fait, des mécanismes ont été mis en place afin de, non seulement prévenir de tels actes, mais également de les réprimer. C’est dans cette logique que le principe de la Responsabilité pénale du Supérieur hiérarchique a été inventé afin, notamment, de mieux répondre au caractère collectif de la criminalité internationale. Autrefois applicable uniquement au sein des forces armées étatiques, cette doctrine est actuellement appliquée tant aux supérieurs hiérarchiques civils qu’à ceux des forces armées non étatiques. En ce qui concerne cette dernière catégorie, la question de l’effectivité de la doctrine se pose et plus particulièrement s’agissant de groupes armés qui mènent leurs opérations en RDC. En effet, selon la jurisprudence de la CPI, l’application de la RPSH est soumise à six conditions cumulatives qui doivent être remplies pour qu’on arrive à la condamnation d’un accusé. Or, pour ce qui est des groupes armés en RDC, il y a certaines questions d’ordre organisationnel telles que l’existence d’une hiérarchie claire et d’un système de discipline qui se posent. Cet état de fait soulève des difficultés quant à l’identification du suspect dans la hiérarchie et à la détermination des éléments pouvant permettre d’apprécier la capacité de ce dernier à exercer un contrôle effectif sur ses subordonnés. Il s’en suit que l’obligation de prévenir et de sanctionner, qui pèse sur le supérieur, n’est pas bien remplie durant la période de crise. En effet, la mauvaise organisation des institutions administratives et sécuritaires sur la partie du territoire contrôlée par les rebelles ne permet pas une bonne administration de la justice. De ce fait, certains droits fondamentaux de la personne tels que le droit à un procès équitable et la présomption d’innocence risquent de ne pas être respectés. Or, le non-respect de ces principes peut mener à commettre des violations qui relèvent du statut de Rome. De même, l’assimilation des supérieurs des groupes armés à ceux des supérieurs militaires des forces armées nationales telles que préconisée par la CPI, crée deux catégories de protagonistes qui sont soumis aux mêmes obligations alors qu’ils n’ont pas tous les mêmes capacités. Cette situation pourrait faire en sorte que l’on se retrouve avec une norme non applicable lorsque les groupes armés sont en cause et en conséquence encourager l’impunité. Dès lors, dans le but d’éviter ces effets pervers, cette étude suggère l’abandon, par le procureur de la CPI, de l’application de la RPSH aux groupes armés en RDC. Il est plutôt suggéré d’utiliser les autres modes de participation criminels qui s’adaptent mieux à ces organisations et qui feront en sorte que les auteurs des crimes graves ne continuent pas d’échapper à la justice. De ce fait, la complicité au sens de l’article 25-3-b et c du statut de Rome semble appropriée au contexte des groupes armés en RDC. / Non-international armed conflicts increasingly dominate the international scene especially in Africa. During this period of crisis, several serious crimes were committed and prompted the international community to act. As a result, mechanisms have been put in place to not only prevent such acts, but also to punish them. It is in this logic that the principle of the command responsibility was established. Formerly this doctrine was applicable only within state armed forces, but currently it is applied to both civilian superiors and those of non-state armed forces. Concerning superiors of non-state armed groups, the question of effectiveness arises, and more particularly to armed groups operating in the DRC. Indeed, according to the case law of the ICC, the application of the command responsibility is subject to six cumulative conditions. However, in case of armed groups in the DRC, there are organizational issues such as the existence of a clear hierarchy and a system of discipline that arise. This situation raises difficulties in identifying the hierarchical superior and in determining the elements that may allow an assessment of his ability to exercise effective control over his subordinates. The command's obligation to prevent and punish is not easy to carry out because during this period of crisis, the poor organization of institutions in the part of the territory controlled by the rebels does not allow for the proper administration of justice. As a result, some fundamental human rights such as the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence, may not be respected. Yet, failure to respect these principles can lead to other violations of international nature. Likewise, the assimilation of superiors of armed groups to those of military superiors of national armed forces as recommended by the ICC, creates two categories of protagonists who are subject to the same obligations although they do not all have the same capacities. This situation could result in an unenforceable standard when armed groups are involved and therefore encourage impunity. Hence, in order to avoid these perverse effects, this research suggests the application of other modes of criminal participation which adapt to armed groups in the DRC and which will ensure that those prosecuted do not escape justice. As a result, complicity within the meaning of article 25-3-b and c of the Rome Statute seems appropriate in the context of the armed groups operating in the DRC.