Research in the area of irregular naval warfare has been found to be deficient. Therefore, this essay aims to contribute to broaden the theorizing within this area. Arreguin- Toft´s Strategic interaction theory in force- asymmetric conflicts, involves the use of irregular warfare as a relatively weak actor in an asymmetric conflict. This theory, along with essential element of Sea Power theory, creates the theoretical framework. To examine its explanatory power in an naval context, the study was conducted as a theory testing case study. The to cases are the Tanker War 1984-1988 and the Battle at Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands, 1945. The results showed that the Strategic interaction theory, to some extent, possessed the ability to explain the outcome in both cases. One conclusion that can be made, is that a relatively weak naval actor can benefit from the use of irregular strategies to prevent a relatively strong navy’s attempt to secure command of the sea.

In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan with the intention to secure the Afghan communist regime from collapsing. Rebels, called the Mujahideen, began to resist the invasion and the Soviet Union soon found themselves fighting a tedious guerrilla war. The aim of this paper is to examine why the Soviet Union lost this asymmetrical war, even though they had a clear military superiority and stronger actors historically tend to win these types of conflicts. This paper has the ambition to explain in what ways soviet forces lacked proper understanding of not only asymmetrical warfare, but also counterinsurgency warfare, using theories that more closely look at the importance of strategic interactions between actors in asymmetrical wars, and principles of conducting successful counterinsurgencies. The empirical findings can succinctly be summarized by two factors: The Soviet Union was, despite tremendous effort, incapable of breaking Mujahideens will to fight. Insufficient attention was also paid towards cultivating trust with the Afghan populace, nor were strategies employed to rally support for the war against the Mujahideen.

Armed conflicts throughout history have always involved anticipating the opponent's strategies to increase your own chances of victory, which is even more vital if your opponent is stronger. On 24 February 2022, the strong state of Russia invaded the much weaker state of Ukraine after eight years of military tension. Despite the protracted military escalation, the outcomes of the battles fought vary, with both actors achieving success to different degrees.   Existing theories provide solid explanations for historical asymmetric conflict outcomes, but most of these theories lack explanatory value in contemporary armed conflicts, which this paper aims to examine. The purpose of the study is to test existing asymmetric conflict theory against a contemporary ongoing armed conflict, where the strategic interaction thesis by Ivan Arreguín-Toft is used in a theory-testing approach. The results show that both actors use a combination of attack and defence strategies, illustrating the complex nature of war. However, the results show a clear tendency towards opposite approach strategies on the part of the weak actor, which supports the theory of strategic interaction.

War is rarely fought on equal terms. On the contrary, before an upcoming war, stronger actors are often predicted to be the winner against the weaker one. History offers several examples that this isn’t always the case, if the weaker actor plays their cards well. Sweden’s military-strategic doctrine (MSD 16) describes the will, in case of being attacked, to win togheter with other actors - or to avoid defeat on it’s own. These descriptions are eerily similair to the German invasion of Norway 1940 and the Winter War 1939 – 1940. Supported by the Allies, Norway didn’t win, which led to a German occupation. Finland, on it’s own, avoided defeat, rendering in a draw against the Soviet Union. The study’s aim is to test Arreguín-Toft’s Strategic Interaction theory. Furthermore, the study aims to shed light on the strategic methods that resultet in success and adversity, in relation to the weak actor’s strategic goals. The results show that the Strategic interaction theory can explain the outcome of the conflicts to a certain degree. Success and adversity are both identified in the cases and serves as empirical basis that, to a certain degree, supports the will of the Swedish military-strategic doctrine.

Inom krigsvetenskapen används asymmetrisk konfliktteori för att förklara utkomsten av konflikter. Data under 1900-talets andra hälft visar att mer än varannan asymmetrisk konflikt slutar till den svagares fördel. Hur kan en relativt svagare aktör dra fördel av detta? Med en kritisk teoriutvecklande ansats syftar arbetet till att studera hur relativt svagare aktörer kan dra fördel av asymmetriska strategier i marin miljö. Detta sker genom att placera begreppet strategisk interaktion i relation till marina strategier vilket bildar arbetets teoretiska ramverk och på så sätt bidrar till en utveckling av teoribildningen. Genom en hypotesprövande fallstudie av sjöfartskriget i konflikten mellan Iran och Irak uppvisar det teoretiska ramverket samverkande förklaringsfaktorer. Detta innebär att strategisk interaktion inte entydigt eller enskilt kan förklara utkomsten av asymmetriska konflikter. Två kompletterande och i någon mån konkurrerande faktorer visar sig ha stort förklaringsvärde, intresseasymmetri och hur väl rustad den relativt svagare aktören är. Konkret betyder detta att en kombination av oväntad teknik och taktik tillsammans med en tydlig intensitet i uppträdandet kan påverka utkomsten av konflikten. Studiens viktigaste resultat visar att framtida studier fordras för att bekräfta interaktionseffekterna i det teoretiska ramverket och hur arbetets beroende variabel – framgång ska förstås av samtiden.